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PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNI

The Republic of National and Ethnic Minorities and Immigrants

Is today's Poland a **Republic of national, ethnic, and migrating minorities?**

The relevance of and interest in this issue grow increasingly. Authors of papers included in this volume of "Przegląd Zachodni", review and discuss old and new developments and problems, trying to answer the fundamental question whether Poland is a country of many nationalities, ethnic groups, and cultures? They discuss various interpretations of terms used to define nationality and ethnicity as well as determinants of identity; they discuss legal regulations concerning minority groups and try to determine the level of minorities' internal integration and assimilability.

Due to the breadth and specificity of the issue, the discussions presented in no way exhaust it. They, however, offer important historical, legal, political, and sociological perspectives on Poland and its regions as well as discussions on the situation of national minorities like Lithuanians, Germans, Vietnamese and ethnic minorities like Silesians, Kashubians and Karaites.

"Przegląd Zachodni" [Western Review] 2014, No. II is the English edition of the Polish academic quarterly "Przegląd Zachodni" 2013, No. 3. The quarterly has been published by the Institute for Western Affairs since 1945.

The topic of this volume was a research area of **Professor Andrzej Kwilecki**, a prominent member of Poznań sociological community who has been highly involved in the life of our Institute for Western Affairs.

Professor Kwilecki is an academic authority, a man of integrity whose manners and conduct toward others set a model to be followed, and, for us, he is also the epitome of what Professor Kwilecki called "our Institute patriotism".

Professor Kwilecki, we thank you for your interest and involvement, for supporting our efforts to make "Przegląd Zachodni" an essential and attractive reading, and for your help and advice which you never refuse.

Hanka Dmochowska

Dear Professor,

Please accept our congratulations on your Jubilee and this volume of "Przegląd Zachodni"/"Western Review". We wish you strength to complete the works you have started and especially those which you now judge to be most important, to enjoy your curiosity about life and people and to continue writing beautifully about them.

**With gratitude and fondness,
Institute for Western Affairs community**

MARCELI KOSMAN
Poznań

THE POLISH RES PUBLICA OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES FROM THE PIASTS TO THE 20ᵀᴴ CENTURY

Początki Polski [*The Beginnings of Poland*]*,* a fundamental work by Henryk Łowmiański, is subtitled *Z dziejów Słowian w I tysiącleciu n.e.* [*On the History of Slavs in the 1ˢᵗ Millennium A.D.*]. Its sixth and final volume, divided into two parts, is also titled *Poczatki Polski* but subtitled *Polityczne i społeczne procesy kształtowania się narodu do początku wieku XIV* [*Political and Social Processes of Nation Formation till the Beginning of the 14ᵗʰ Century*][1]. The subtitle was changed because the last volume concerns the formation of the Piast state and emergence of the Polish nation. Originally, there were to be three volumes. The first volume starts as follows:

> The notion of the beginnings of Poland covers two issues: the genesis of the state and the genesis of the nation. The two issues are closely connected since a state is usually a product of a specific ethnic group and it is the state which, subsequently, has an impact on the transformation of its people into a higher organisational form, i.e. a nation.[2]

The final stage of those processes in Poland is relatively easily identifiable. It was at the turn of the 10ᵗʰ and 11ᵗʰ century when the name *Poland* was used for the first time to denote a country under the superior authority of the duke of Gniezno, and the country inhabitants, as attested in early historical sources.[3] It is more difficult to determine the *terminus a quo* of the nation formation and the emergence of Poland's statehood. Łowmiański, an outstanding historian, devotes the first three parts of his work to those issues, i.e. first five volumes, and in the sixth one, he finally discusses the notion of *Początki Polski,* i.e. the beginnings of Poland or its emergence, in the context of *Political and Social Processes of Nation Formation*. The sixth vol-

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[1] H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski,* Vol. I, Warszawa 1963 – Vol. VI, Parts 1 and 2, Warszawa 1985 (the last volume was published posthumously, the author died in 1984).

[2] H. Łowmiański (1963), *Początki Polski,* Vol. I, p. 7.

[3] Occasionally, the scarcity of historical sources gives raise to mythic theories about the origin of the Piasts. Recently, Przemysław Urbańczyk, an archaeologist from Cracow, in his book entitled *Mieszko Pierwszy Tajemniczy*, sought the origins of the first historical ruler in ...Great Moravia. This is not the place discuss his hypothesis. It is mentioned here for the record as it is part of the discussion about foreigners in Poland. See A. Krzemińska response, *Zamieszanie z Mieszkiem,* "Polityka" No. 27(2914), 3-9.07.2013, pp. 59-61 Her text was headed by an intriguing question on the cover of "Polityka" weekly: *Czy Mieszko I był Polakiem?* [Was Mieszko I a Pole?]

ume covers the period of over four centuries, i.e. from Siemovit's coming to power, described by Gallus Anonymous as the symbolic beginning of a new victorious dynasty, to the coronation of Władysław Łokietek [Władysław I, the Elbow-high][4].

Łowmiański identifies four stages in the Polish nation formation process: 1) the tribe of Polanians establishes the "Gniezno" state under the aegis of the Piast dynasty in the person of Mieszko I; 2) during the rule of Bolesław I Chrobry [the Brave], other ethnic groups assimilate into the dominant Polanian people, giving rise to the Polish nation which later overcomes the crisis after the death of Bolesław I; the nation cohesiveness is proved by moving the capital to Cracow in Lesser Poland and "the initiation of full national integration of ethnic group living in the River Odra and River Vistula regions"; 3) the testament of Bolesław III Krzywousty [the Wrymouthed] of 1138[5] marks the beginning of the next stage, i.e. the times of feudal fragmentation characterised by a weakening of national bonds and, later, by a growing will to restore political unity and revive the Kingdom of Poland; 4) the success of the latter idea was initiated by Henry IV of Silesia in 1288 with his plan to create at least a particular kingdom of Cracow which two years later, before his death, was expanded by him by transferring the succession to Przemysł II of Greater Poland. That stage and at the same time the nation formation process were concluded with the coronation of Przemysł II in 1295 in Gniezno[6], which was a symbolic event, and – five years later – of Wacław II whose plan to incorporate Polish lands into the Kingdom of Bohemia did not succeed.

Starting from 1304, the idea of Poland's unification was effectively implemented by Władysław I who from a quarrelsome duke of Brzesko and Kuyavia (having such a reputation in the period from 1288 to 1300, for which he was exiled for a long time when he was not accepted in Greater Poland as the successor of Przemysł) turned into a true statesman and won support first in Lesser Poland[7] and later in the other Piast provinces. The first sixteen years following his return from exile were the time of gradual re-unification of Polish lands and strengthening of his power. In the final stage, that included his efforts aimed at winning the approval of Avignon (the papal capital at that time) for the renewal of the Kingdom which successfully led to Władysław's coronation. It was the first coronation of the King of Poland held in Cracow, i.e. in the Wawel cathedral.

The conclusion of Henryk Łowmiański's long research was as follows:

In 1320, the main part of objectives was implemented but the objectives were far from being completed. The implementation of the unification programme took centuries and was never fully suc-

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[4] H. Łowmiański (1963), *Początki Polski,* Vol. I.

[5] See G. Labuda (1959), *Testament Bolesława Krzywoustego,* in: *Opuscula Casimiro Tymieniecki septuagenario dedicata,* Poznań, pp. 171-190.

[6] One must not forget about the role played by representatives of the society, including in particular the role of Archbishop of Gniezno Jakub Świnka in the course of the three decades from 1284 to 1314. He, without exaggeration, can be called the architect of the Polish kingdom reconstruction. See. M. Kosman (2000), *Między ołtarzem a tronem. Poczet prymasów Polski,* Poznań, p. 33ff.

[7] S. Gawęda (1966), *Możnowładztwo małopolskie w XIV i w pierwszej połowie XV wieku,* Kraków.

cessful despite significant accomplishments such as the re-adjoining Pomerania and incorporation of Mazovia and Podlasie [Podlachia]. However, in 1320, a new period in the history of the Polish nation began, marked with deep changes in national awareness which gradually surfaced from the earlier single-track process i.e. limited to a single traditional ethnic area. After 1320, national awareness gradually gained another dimension. The first sign of the new direction was the policy adopted by Władysław I, the Elbow-high, after his coronation: taking the Galicia–Volhynia throne by Bolesław Jerzy Trojdenowicz, a Mazovian Piast (1323/4), and then the alliance of Władysław and Giedymin sealed by the marriage of Władysław's son, Kazimierz [Casimir], with Giedymin's daughter, Aldona Anna (1325) which was close to a vague prefiguration of the Union of Krewo.

The above not yet major steps were preceded by the involvement of the Piasts in Ruś [Ruthenia] and by closer relations with Lithuania initiated by Bolesław II of Mazovia. However, their significance changed in the light of broader historical processes in the 14th century which led to a radical transformation of the political order and the map of Central and Eastern Europe. And Poland played an active role in the formation of the emerging international constellation, entering the path of initially successful and later dramatic events. The Polish nation gained a large arena for action and assimilated and transformed new cultural and ethnic elements. However, the hearth of its life and its essential ethnic strength were continuously within the spatial and civilisational frames from the Piast era.[8]

The early Polish nation was that of knights and later of nobles who had political awareness of Poland which was united under the rule of the last Piasts at the critical moment, i.e. while facing the growing threat from the Teutonic Knights in the first quarter of the 14th century. The two last Piasts, in particular Władysław I, were contemptuously called "lesser kings of Cracow" by their enemies, but under the rule of his son Kazimierz Wielki [Casimir the Great] Poland won its place on the political map of the continent.

In the pre-partition era, a specific place at the top of the social hierarchy belonged royal couples. Polish rulers, with minor exceptions, married foreign women, mainly from the ruling houses in German countries, Ruthenia, Hungary, France, or Italy. The wives were accompanied by female and male personnel who would often settle in the new homeland and became part of its culture while introducing their own elements.[9]

In the second half of the 13th century, hostility or, to say the least, reluctance of German monasteries towards Polish culture became increasingly evident. Eight Franciscan monasteries in Silesia broke the links with its Polish-Bohemian province and successfully applied for membership in the Saxon branch of the Franciscan order. That issue became a matter of concern during the synod of Gniezno convened in 1285 in Łęczyca by Archbishop Jakub Świnka. Prelates attending the synod agreed upon sanctions in case of similar practices in the future and sharply criticised those

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[8] H. Łowmiański (1985), *Początki Polski,* Vol. VI, Part 2, p. 928ff.

[9] Cf. O. Balzer (2005), *Genealogia Piastów,* introduction to the second edition by J. Tęgowski, Kraków; Z. Wdowiszewski (2005), *Genealogia Jagiellonów i Domu Wazów w Polsce,* Kraków; idem (1999), *Pierwsze pokolenia Giedyminowiczów,* Poznań-Wrocław. An influence of the king's wife on the example of Bona Sforza d'Aragona and her Italian retinue on Polish society in the sphere of politics, economy, and culture in the first half of the 16th century is most thoroughly described in the unfinished analytical synthesis by W. Pociecha (1949-1958), *Królowa Bona. Czasy i ludzie Odrodzenia,* Vol. I-IV, Poznań.

monasteries which refused to accept Poles as their novices. Should that happen, they authorised bishops to take away benefices. That was a sign of the episcopate concern with the aggressive attitude of Germans who limited the rights of native inhabitants of the Piast land. To safeguard those rights, the synod decided to protect the Polish language threatened at school and church in Silesia and ordered that parishes could employ only persons fluent in the national tongue and able to explain Latin texts in it. Another decision was to award benefices only to priests born on Polish lands and fluent in the native language. In addition, the synod passed a memorandum of bishops, which was sent to the Holy See on 17 January 1285. The document emphasised the unity of Polish territories and their protection of the Holy See, a manifestation of which was the joint collection of Peter's Pence in Poland. Furthermore, attention was drawn to threat of the German component as well as the threat posed by decisions of local dukes to single out villages and change their ethnic composition by populating them with German colonists.[10]

The growing hostility between the two nations manifested itself in the attitude of residents of Germanised towns to the Polish state and the reaction of the state power. In the course of Polish rule consolidation, in 1311 that is in times of the country unification under King Władysław I, Cracow, German burghers revolted. The response of the state was strong. As recorded in *Rocznik Krasińskich,* knights of Lesser Poland were supposed to kill everyone who was not able to correctly pronounce Polish words like *soczewica*, *młyn*, *miele*, *koło* which were difficult for Germans.

The last stanza of a song about those events titled *O pewnym wójcie krakowskim Albercie* [*De quodam advocato Cracoviensi Alberto or About a Cracow's mayor named Albert*]*,* whose author was probably of Bohemian descent, is an expression of concern about Slavic nations threatened by their western neighbour:

"I Czech zginął tymi dzieły,   [And so the Czech man perished,
Jego własność pochłonęły   All he ever cherished
    Chytre Niemca paszcze;   Devoured by German folks;
Wnet - i wszystko mu zagarnie,   Soon - they'll seize it all,
Co zostało, pójdzie marnie   And what is left, will be traded
    Na ciżmy i płaszcze"   For boots and cloaks]

The author is concerned about the future, describing Germans as humble when weak but insolent when feeling strong:

"Niemiec zawżdy, gdzie się wnęci,   [Germans always find a way,
    Droga mu otwarta;   No matter where they choose to stay;
Chciałby pierwszym zostać zgoła,   To be ahead of all men
A nie dając innym czoła,   Bowing to no one else,
    K'sobie wszystko zgarta.   Claiming it all for themselves.

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[10] I. Subera (1981), *Synody prowincjonalne arcybiskupów gnieźnieńskich. Wybór tekstów ze zbioru Jana Ważyka z r. 1761,* Warszawa, p. 52ff.

Ten obyczaj wszyscy biorą;	This is their way;
Najprzód kłania się z pokorą	At first humble they stay
I do łask się wkrada,	To win favour with rich lords,
I wnet siebie, córki, braci	Trading their brothers and daughters,
Z możnym gniazdem koligaci	For power and gold
-	-
To już pewna zdrada.	But soon they will betray them all,
Bo gdy wzrośnie mu potęga,	'Cause when their power grows,
Dalej patrzy, dalej sięga,	They reach for more and more,
Bierze inną postać"[11].	And take another form].

Over forty years ago (25-27 November 1971), during a Warsaw conference on fighting foreign influence (xenophobia and open approach) in the Polish culture, Benedykt Zientara delivered a paper which contained a synthetic overview of "the others" in medieval Poland. It began with the following maxim from Hungary, a state neighbouring with Poland in the 12th century: "A kingdom of one language and one way of life is weak and fragile". The Hungarian author of a set of guidelines for a future ruler believed in a positive impact of foreigners on every state due to popularisation of various languages, customs, and cultural achievements. That maxim proved to be true in the case of the first Piasts who, according to historical sources, surrounded themselves with bishops and monks from different parts of Germany and Italy, starting from Bishop Jordan, as well as with a number of immigrants from Bohemia whom Zientara hesitantly identifies with strangers. Bolesław I, in turn, offered financial incentives to foreign knights to encourage them to come to Poland. Their names are mentioned in the chronicle of Thietmar, bishop of Merseburg. At some point, also foreigners from more distant countries arrived at the Polish court, including some from Spain in the 12th century.[12] Zientara argued that:

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[11] After J. Nowak-Dłużewski (1963), *Okolicznościowa poezja polityczna w Polsce. Średniowiecze*, Warszawa, p. 29ff. Cf. R. Gródecki (1935), *Albert (Albrecht)*, the vojt (mayor) of Cracow from 1290 to 1312, *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (hereinafter referred to as: *PSB*), Vol. I, Kraków, p. 43ff. Albert was a son and successor (along with his brothers) the post of Henryk, the vojt of Cracow under the rule of Bolesław V of Sandomierz and Leszek Czarny [Leszek, the Black]. In 1285, he earned Leszek's gratitude defending the Wawel (royal seat in Cracow) during a rebellion of knights and the gratitude of Władysław I in 1306, when he ceased to support the fading Bohemian rule and surrendered Crocow to Władysław I. However, in 1311, Albert and his brothers initiated of a plot against Władysław I. Albert was the leader of the plot, seeking to surrender Lesser Poland to the king of Bohemia, John of Luxembourg. After the rebellion was suppressed, Władysław I limited the prerogatives of the local government of Cracow while Albert, kidnapped by Bolesław, duke of Opole who represented the ruler of Bohemia, spent five years in prison. After his release, he went to Prague, where he soon died (after 1317). Perhaps – as the author of his short biography argues – although Albert's family came from Bohemia, "that was a German family both in terms of language and spirit".

[12] B. Zientara, *Cudzoziemcy w Polsce X-XV wieku: ich rola w zwierciadle polskiej opinii średniowiecznej,* in: Z. Stefanowska (ed.) (1973), *Swojskość i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej*, Warszawa, p. 9ff.

> Due to collaboration of such people, the Latin civilisation penetrated Poland deeply and inspired works which today amaze us with their quality. Representatives of the ruling class adopted European manners and, sometimes, gained substantial education, also while studying at universities abroad.[13]

Professionally and especially intellectually competent foreigners were useful for royal courts as an antidote to excessive aspirations of local aristocracy which grew in strength but was not always properly prepared to carry out requested tasks. The advantage of foreigners was well expressed by Duke Bretislaus II of Přemyslid dynasty who entrusted the Prague diocese not to a local priest but Herman, a German, commenting on that in the following way: "Because he is a foreigner, he will be of more use to the Church: he will not be impoverished by his family, he will not have to take care of children, he will not be robbed by a group of relatives, regardless of what he may gain". That comment of the duke was recorded by Cosmas of Prague in his chronicle.[14]

What was appreciated by some people, others, who treated foreigners as competitors, accepted reluctantly for understandable reasons. In the 13th century, the higher clergy had a strong position and blocked the path of local priests to senior positions. That was the background, though not the only one, against which the phenomenon of xenophobia started to emerge as early as during the early stage of the fragmentation period. More widely, xenophobia spread as dukes favoured foreigners who colonised villages and towns and awarded them exclusive privileges which the native population also wanted. An example is the town charter which Bolesław V granted to Cracow in 1257 which prohibited the settlement of Polish people there.[15]

In the 13th and 14th century, the demographic and economic dynamics of Germany (the growth of population by one third, i.e. to 15 million) led to migrations of peasants and craftsmen from the overpopulated areas to the east, first to regions between the River Elbe and the River Oder, and later across the latter. Gerard Labuda wrote about three huge migration routes: the southern one (along the Danube, to Bohemia, Slovenia, and Transylvania), the eastern one (Lusatia, Brandenburg, Silesia, central and southern Poland, and Ruthenia), and the northern one (along the Baltic coast, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Prussia, Latvia, and northern Ruthenia). The latter route was taken mainly by burgesses and members of Christian military orders while the two former ones were taken mainly by peasants, craftsmen, and knights. Labuda listed also 38 towns which were granted German town law charters in Greater Poland in the 13th century, and 55 towns granted the same in the 14th century. The very first German town law charters in Poland were granted to towns in Silesia.

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[13] *Ibidem,* p. 13.

[14] The quotation after B. Zientara (1973), *op. cit,* p. 14.

[15] It is presumed that the first town charter was granted to Cracow by Leszek Biały [Leszek, the White] in the early 13th century. The document which survived, however, was issued after Cracow was destroyed by Tatars. It is the town charter granted by Bolesław V in 1257 which was extremely favourable to burgesses of German descent. Cf. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa,* Vol. I, Kraków 1879, No. 1.

Those developments were possible because they met the interest of the Polish party seeking professionals who would settle in unpopulated areas.[16] That situation was well depicted by Henryk Sienkiewicz in his great novel about the beginnings of Poland under the Jagiellonian rule. One of its characters, Maćko of Bogdaniec, an experienced knight, together with his nephew Zbyszko, returns from a victorious war with the Teutonic Order in Lithuania. He must ensure that their family village, devastated during the home war and pawned before they went to war, is repopulated. On every occasion Maćko inquires about the possibility of getting new peasants, primarily captives. New inhabitants include Turks and squire Hlava, known also as Głowacz, from neighbouring Bohemia. Hlava is a very likeable character who, after his naturalisation, gets promoted to a minor knight.[17] For understandable reasons, Sienkiewicz does not underline the German colonisation when writing about struggles with the German element. He introduces representatives of that nation who settled by the River Vistula only incidentally. An example is the first scene in a Tyniec inn called "Pod Lutym Turem" where: "The innkeeper, a German, wearing a fawn cowl with dags, was pouring them beer from a bucket into earthen mugs and listening with great interest to their war adventures"[18].

Only at the beginning, the colonisation under the German law meant populating villages and towns with German people. Shortly, native people settled there as well and usually the only German was the *sołtys* (the village leader) or *wójt* (town hereditary alderman/mayor). That was typical of villages and small towns. In larger towns, in turn, German people were merchants, craftsmen, and clerks.

What was the impact of the demographic colonisation on ethnic relations?

People of German descent migrated in large numbers mainly to Lower Silesia, Lubusz Land, Western Pomerania, the New March, and Chełmno Land, and farther on to Prussia and Livonia. Some of them settled also in Greater Poland, Lesser Poland, Mazovia, Ruthenia, and – after the political situation of Teutonic Knights changed (in 1310) – also in Vistula Pomerania. The German patriciate became the dominant group in largest towns, including Cracow and Poznań. It is therefore no surprise that they opposed the attempts of Władysław I to unite the country: apart from rebellious Albert from Cracow, in Poznań, the main town in Greater Poland, mayor Przemko led a rebellion in the early 14th century. Jan Długosz, when writing about 1310, noted in his chronicle that:

> On the ninth of December [1309 – M.K.], Henryk, the duke of Greater Poland and Głogów, dies in Głogów and is buried in the monastery in Lubiąż. He was survived by four sons between whom his land was divided: Henry got Żagań, Konrad – Olesko, Jan – Ścinawa and Góra, and Przemysław – Głogów and its appurtenances. No part of Greater Poland was assigned to any of them. In fact, after the death of duke Henry, both prelates and lords of Greater Poland deserted his sons whom, and they saw it, Germans strongly encouraged and urged with their advice and directions to completely

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[16] G. Labuda (1971), *Polska granica zachodnia. Tysiąc lat dziejów politycznych,* Poznań, p. 61ff.

[17] Cf. H. Sienkiewicz (1988), *Krzyżacy,* Warszawa, *passim*.

[18] *Ibidem*, Vol. I, p. 5.

exterminate all Poles. In result, the prelates and lords at their congress, held in Gniezno, elected duke Władysław the Elbow-high to be their lord and king, depriving Henryk's sons of any power and authority in order **to put stop to the detrimental fragmentation** caused by their detaching their lands from the other lands of the Kingdom of Poland, and, subsequently, **to ease unification of the entire Polish Kingdom**.

Przemek [Przemko], a Poznań burgher, ignoring this decision and provisions agreed by the prelates and lords of Greater Poland, subjugated Poznań to motherland enemies – Głogów dukes. He fortified the Poznań cathedral and let in a garrison of enemies who ravished the homes of Poznań prelates and canons. All their dwellings were burned. The archdeacon of Poznań, Mikołaj known as Szamotuła, was killed and much other damage and devastation were done. When Polish soldiers chased the garrison away and peace was restored, it was agreed and decided that to penalise the crime committed by Poznań burgher Przemek, no son of any Poznań burgher would ever be allowed to take any senior office or cathedral prebend in the Kingdom of Poland".[19]

Most probably, Przemko (as that version of his name went down in history) was a son of Ludwik, a councillor of Poznań (1288-1302) and a great-grandson of mayor Tomasz who was mentioned in the town charter. From 1307 to 1310, he held the office of Poznań mayor, which was hereditary. During the conflict between Władysław I and dukes of Głogów, Przemko remained faithful to the dukes against majority of native inhabitants of Greater Poland who at that time were faithful to Władysław I. It is possible that he opposed Władysław I till November 1314 when the rebellion was finally suppressed by local knights. His later fate is unknown. He might have been killed during the rebellion or he escaped to Bohemia. The victorious ruler abolished the hereditary office of mayor in Poznań and confiscated related property.[20]

The involvement of the patriciate of largest towns in politics was linked to the patriciate growing economic importance. The latter led to intensification of antagonisms between affluent burghers having their allies in the Cistercian and Franciscan monasteries which were the mainstay of Germans, and local knights in native Polish lands. In Silesia, the German component was supported also by migrants from Lusatia and Brandenburg.[21]

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[19] *Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego dzieło czcigodnego Jana Długosza kanonika krakowskiego gorliwego badacza dziejów swego narodu zestawione z największą starannością i dbałością o prawdę historyczną*, Vol. No. 9, J. Garbacik (ed.) (1975), Warszawa, p. 78ff (my underlining – M.K.).

[20] J. Pakulski, *Przemko (XIV w.) wójt poznański,* PSB XXVIII, p. 723ff.; idem (1979), *Siły polityczno-społeczne w Wielkopolsce w pierwszej połowie XIV wieku,* Toruń,. In the first 100 years since Poznań got its town charter (1253), newcomers to Poznań (then on the Warta left bank) were originally mainly from the middle Oder region (Gubin, Gubinek, Kostrzyn, Krosno, Głogów, Ścinawa, Środa, Jawor). Some descendants of oldest immigrants involved in the rebellion led by Przemko, probably left the town after the revolt was suppressed by supporters of Władysław I. Cf. J. Topolski (ed.) (1988), *Dzieje Poznania*, Vol. I (to 1793), Part 1, Warszawa-Poznań, p. 247.

[21] In the Middle Ages, in Western Pomerania, Germans' inflow was mainly promoted by dukes and bishops of Kamień, while a similar role in the Terra Transoderana was played by the Brandenburg margraves, and in the Vistula Pomerania, Chełmno Land, Prussia and Livonia by the Teutonic Order. Cf. G. Labuda (1971), *Polska granica zachodnia...,* p. 63.

In the period of feudal fragmentation, national integration at the level of knights was an issue petrified enough to see that a too numerous influx of Germans was a threat. In contrast, the influx of small groups (Flemings, Walloons) who arrived in Silesia in the 12th century and quickly assimilated with the Polish community or with German immigrants was not a subject of concern. The same applied to individual migrants (clergymen, knights) from Italy, France, Bohemia, Hungary, and Ruthenia who often arrived in retinues of wives of Polish dukes or were expelled from their countries for political reasons. However, Germans who settled in compact groups, maintained their distinctness "and thanks to assuming a decisive role in trade and crafts and thanks to their considerable influences in courts and the Church, became a factor shaping the future of the Polish nation and state"[22].

In villages and small towns, it was the coexistence of immigrants with the locals which facilitated assimilation. Newcomers valued the new living conditions which were better than in their faraway homelands and the privileges which they were grated shortly. That was the bottom-up shaping of the situation. Among the upper class, however, anti-German xenophobia was increasingly evident. Germans, aware of their power, would get involved in fights between the Piast dukes and thus earned that negative attitude. The determinant of ethnicity was now the language which distinguished **us** from the **others**.

Teutonic Knights' aggression against the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, which was undergoing the unification process, contributed to the strengthening of national awareness in the time of last Piast monarchs. The response of the monarch, Władysław I, included both defensive warfare and diplomatic efforts and lawsuits against the invaders filed in courts (*judicium ecclesiasticum*), first in Inowrocław in 1320-1321, then in Warsaw in 1339. The lawsuits were also filed later in times of King Władysław Jagiełło, i.e. once the Polish-Lithuanian Union was created. Their detailed documentation *Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos Ordinemque Cruciferorum* first published in the 1850s has been an invaluable source of data for research on ethnic relations in Greater Poland and Pomerania.[23] Helena Chłopocka, an expert researcher, offered the following conclusion in one of her papers:

> The past was discussed all the time and everywhere. The never-ending political tension within provinces during the feudal fragmentation period, the atmosphere of the struggle to unite the fragmented heritage of the Piasts, and the constant internal threat, all contributed to the growth of national awareness. The latter contributed to deepening the interest in the past [...] The idea of great *Regnum Poloniae* gradually spread throughout the society to become the expression of *communis opinio*. Its actual reality was defended by witnesses from various provinces who testified at Polish-Teutonic trials in the 14th century and by their descendants in the 15th century.[24]

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[22] B. Zientara (1973), *op. cit.,* p. 18.

[23] H. Chłopocka (1959), *Kilka uwag o tradycji historycznej,* in: *Opuscula Casimiro Tymieniecki…,* p. 20ff.

[24] *Ibidem,* p. 24.

In the course of that process, Polish national awareness kept growing stronger and met with various reactions of the population of foreign descent: 1) indifference, 2) identification with the adopted homeland, or 3) hostility. The latter attitude was typical of those Germans who took a favourable view towards the Teutonic Order during the wars waged under the rule of Władysław Jagiełło and Kazimierz IV Jagiellończyk.

The renewed monarchy proved to be a successful project in the last years of Władysław I. After the death of Casimir III, the Great, and the turmoil accompanying the unfortunate personal union with Hungary, the collective political leadership of Lesser Poland lords took the historic decision, approved by Greater Poland lords, to form a union with formally pagan Lithuania. Those relations, strengthened with the Union of Lublin in 1569, were to last until the sovereign *Res Publica Polona* was eliminated by neighbouring partitioning powers in 1795. In the times of Polish-Lithuanian Union and Commonwealth, Lithuanians defended their distinctness and made sure that Poles did not hold any official positions in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or acquire lands. Poles, in contrast, did not impose such limitations when it came to marriage. This is a separate issue, however, and we shall only note that in the period from the 15th to the 18th century there was considerable "fraternisation" between the nobility of the two nations.[25] (That brotherhood kept deepened after the partitions of Poland until conflicts surfaced after the modern Lithuanian nation emerged in the second half of the 19th century.[26]) Let us only quote Henryk Łowmiański's view on the genesis of the Union of Krewo (1385).[27] His interpretation was based on his deep understanding of the realities of that time and may be surprising to current readers:

> If in the genesis of the Union defence motives dominated among Lithuanians, that does not exclude that the boyars were not interested in expansion. Actually, the support of Poland was to help them, *inter alia*, to continue the expansion to the east. What is more, **it was a Lithuanian who was to sit on the Polish throne, which was likely to inspire hopes that – with their king – Lithuanians would be promoted to influential positions in Poland. That is what boyars could expect on the basis of their own experience.** Indeed, the Lithuanians who accompanied their duke when he settled in the Ruthenian [Kreva] castle were later part of the group which

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[25] The formation process of a modern Lithuanian nation, was based mainly on the peasantry and there was a conflict between an ethnic Lithuanian and a historical Lithuanian who integrated with Polish people by sharing their culture. The latter was part of nobles' integration in both parts of the Res Publica before the partitions. The process did not stop when, following the 3rd partition, the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian state were cordoned off by the partitioners.

[26] Cf. P. Łossowski (1975), *Litewski ruch narodowy w polskiej myśli politycznej (1883-1914),* in: *Polska myśl polityczna XIX i XX wieku,* vol. I: *Polska jej sąsiedzi,* Wrocław, pp. 119-157. See also idem (1966), *Stosunki polsko-litewskie w latach 1918-1920,* Warszawa; idem (1982), *Litwa a sprawy polskie 1939-1940,* Warszawa; idem (1985), *Po tej i tamtej stronie Niemna. Stosunki polsko-litewskie 1883-1939,* Warszawa.

[27] More on the circumstances of the Union of Krewo in: M. Kosman (1992), *Orzeł i Pogoń. Z dziejów polsko-litewskich XIV-XX w.,* Warszawa, p. 94ff.

ruled that territory. That was common practice during feudal fragmentation that when a duke settled in a newly conquered province, his knights did too. In Poland [...], **Lithuanians were not prepared for that but they might have not realised it at the time when the union was created**.[28]

1385 to 1569 was the time of the multinational Jagiellonian monarchy.[29] When the last ruler from that dynasty, Sigismund II Augustus, died, the monarchy was transformed into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Actually, it was to be transformed to a monarchy consisting of not two but three parts. That turned out to be impossible due to the delayed and unfulfilled idea of the Treaty of Hadiach (1658) to create a Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian Commonwealth, i.e. Commonwealth of Three Nations.[30] In the 19th century, in times of partitioned Poland, the Polish nation, as it had been in the Jagiellonian era, was divided into Poles, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians.[31] That was the situation until modern Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian nations emerged on the map of Europe. The Polish nation was the only one, the formation of which was peaceful. It was based on the tradition of the state of the nobility with a number of features of a "political nation" from the pre-partition period.[32]

Marcin Kromer, who started his public carrier working at the Chancery of king Sigismund II Augustus and was a bishop of Warmia and a great historian of the Golden Age, in his work *Polonia sive de situ, populis, moribus, magistratibus, et republica regni Polonici libri duo* published in 1575, wrote:

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[28] H. Łowmiański (1999), *Polityka Jagiellonów,* Poznań, p. 38 (my underlining - M.K.). According to the publisher, the manuscript of this book dates to 1942-1948.

[29] Poles had the skills and played a leading role in political, economic, and cultural transformations and in the introduction of Catholicism to the hereditary Jagiellonian state. Some remained there for good, others returned to their homelands as old men. See M. Kosman (1981), *Polacy w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim. Z badań nad mobilnością społeczeństwa w dobie unii jagiellońskiej 1386-1569,* in: *Społeczeństwo Polski średniowiecznej. Zbiór studiów,* Vol. 1, Warszawa, 1981, pp. 347-378. In the time of the Res Publica of the Nobility, there were massive ethnic migrations which started after the Battle of Grunwald (the First Battle of Tannenberg) in 1410 to Teutonic Prussia (and later Ducal Prussia) from Mazovia and from the Great Duchy to territories called later Lithuania Minor. Cf. M. Kosman, *Udział ludności litewskiej w rozwoju kraju* and *Stosunki wyznaniowe w Prusach Książęcych,* in: G. Labuda (ed.) (1984), *Historia Pomorza,* Part 2, Poznań, pp. 449-368 and 521-537.

[30] The 350th anniversary of the Polish-Cossack Treaty of Hadiach was commemorated with several publications including Piotr Borek (ed.) (2009), *W kręgu Hadziacza A. D. 1658. Od historii do literatury,* Kraków.

[31] Cf. S. Kieniewicz's (1980) comments in his *Historia Polski 1795-1918,* 5th edition, Warszawa, passim, e.g. p. 277ff.

[32] More in: Zofia Stefanowska (ed.) (1976), *Tradycje szlacheckie w kulturze polskiej.* Materials from the seminar organised on 23-24 November 1973 in Warsaw by the Psychosociology of Literature Group at The Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warszawa.

[...] the Polish language is clearly different from all other language, of course apart from the fact that it adopted many names of tools, activities, and other matters related to craftsmanship and public life if I am not mistaken, from our German neighbours long settled [in Poland – M.K.].[33]

And today, not only there are many German merchants and craftsmen living in our towns but there are also towns and villages the entire population of which speaks the German language, both in Podgórze and neighbouring Ruthenia and Spiš, and in the borderlands of Greater Poland whereto, just like to Silesia and Prussia, German settlers were once brought and where, later, many common German people arrived on their own initiative in search for jobs. What is more, some Polish knighted families are descendants of German settlers as evidenced by their emblems, i.e. coats of arms and their names. But now, after having long made their home here and in result of marriages, both **a huge majority of them** as well as of burghers and peasants **turned into Poles.** Besides, Poles eagerly learn German due to its wide usage and their close contacts and relations with the Germans.

However, Poles learn Latin even more eagerly [...] In Ruthenia, and in particular in its southern parts, the Polish language happens to be used more often than the local one because since the native people accepted the supremacy of Poland[34], Poles have eagerly settled there to profit from fertile soil and to fight with Tatars.

In Ruthenia and Podolia there are also Armenians active in trade; whereas Jews in Ruthenia are many and their concentration in some towns and villages in other parts of Poland is even higher, except for Prussia. Both nations use their own languages but at the same time they speak Polish or Ruthenian; and Jews speak the German language everywhere."[35]

The above quotation is a bird's eye view of ethnic relations in the *Corona Regni Poloniae* called the Crown. A characteristic of those relations from a perspective of a foreigner was offered in *Reports*[36] by Nuncio Claudio Rangoni who spent several years in Poland at the turn of the 16th and 17th century.

Wacław Potocki, the author of an erudite study on the origin of the proverb *jak świat światem nie będzie Niemiec Polakowi bratem* [*since time immemorial, a German has never been a brother to a Pole*], which was popular in the mid 17th century, quotes also another saying from that time:

"Nie będzie jako świat światem Rusin Polakowi bratem.
Jak z zimy lata, tak z Rusina nie będzie brata".
[Since time immemorial, a Ruthenian has never been a brother to a Pole.
Like winter will not be summer, a Ruthenian will not be a Pole's brother][37].

Wacław Potocki frequently criticised Germans and expressed that criticism in a number of his poems for example in *Moralia:*

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[33] It is a regular cultural phenomenon. It suffices to mention numerous borrowings from the Czech language to Polish during the Christianisation process in times of first Piast monarchs and, especially, later borrowings from Polish in the Lithuanian language.

[34] Establishment of Poland's supremacy over Red Ruthenia started with the expedition of Casimir III, the Great, in 1340.

[35] M. Kromer (1984), *Polska czyli o położeniu, ludności, obyczajach i sprawach publicznych Królestwa Polskiego księgi dwie,* Olsztyn, pp. 54-56 (my underlining – M.K.)

[36] C. Rangoni (2013), *Relacja o Królestwie Polskim z 1604 roku.* [Polish translation], Opole.

[37] After G. Labuda (1996), *Geneza przysłowia: „jak świat światem nie będzie Niemiec Polakowi bratem*, w: idem, *Polsko-niemieckie rozmowy o przeszłości. Zbiór artykułów*, Poznań, p. 99 (first edition: 1966).

"Nigdy w szczerej **nie** żyli Polak	[A Pole and a German have **never** lived
z Niemcem zgodzie	in harmony,
Polaka pycha, Niemca wolność bodzie,	A Pole pricked by the pride and a German
Stąd przypowieści miejsce,	by the freedom of the other,
że póki świat światem,	Hence the saying: since time immemorial,
Nie będzie nigdy Niemiec Polakowi bratem"[38].	A German has never been a Pole's brother.]

Sayings like that should not be understood too literally, especially since in a concrete situation, "a German" could be easily replaced with another neighbour be it a Ruthenian or a Czech. However, though there were conflicts, there was also neighbourly cooperation. Labuda, the author of a great synthesis of the history of the Polish western border, wrote that the Polish-German border was the most "stable" border in Europe from the 16th to 18th century, even if in converted commas.[39] We know, however, how that ended for the Res Publica under the rule of Stanisław-August Poniatowski. In times of the Res Publica of the Nobles, the so-called second German colonisation took place. There were also migrations of Netherlandish peasants who left their homeland because of religious persecutions to settle in Vistula Pomerania as well as in Kuyavia and Greater Poland. Poland, after all (I mean the degeneration of the state of the nobility as a system and gross simplification of counter-reformation), was an oasis of freedoms while the western part of the European continent headed towards the Enlightenment. People from Mazuria, in turn, colonised southern parts of the Duchy of Prussia and Polish districts were created there. Labuda, wrote:

> While Europe's quietest frontier of the modern times was calm and restful for several centuries, everything around it kept changing: economy, social structure, military potential, and political systems. In result of those changes, the western border of the Republic started to move as well and so fast that in 25 years time, it disappeared. [40]

In the partition period, i.e. between the loss of independence and World War I, demographic relations changed considerably which was due to the political situation and economic and social transformations. In around 1880, Poles constituted approx. 45.9% of Galicia's population, followed by Ukrainians (42%) and Jews (11%) of whom some assimilated with Polish people. Ukrainians had the highest birth-rate.

From 1873, Galicia was *de facto* an autonomous province of Austria-Hungary and Germanisation was not much threat to the native people.[41] The situation was different in the Kingdom of Poland, especially in territories incorporated into the Russian Empire. There Russification was systematically intensified, especially in administration. At the same time, native inhabitants were forced to leave their home-

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[38] *Ibidem.*

[39] G. Labuda (1971), *Polska granica zachodnia…*, p. 94 (title of chapter XIV).

[40] *Ibidem,* p. 109.

[41] J. Buszko (2000), *Od niewoli do niepodległości 1864-1918 (Wielka historia Polski,* Vol. 8), Kraków, p.46.

land as part of repressions after a number of suppressed uprisings against the Russian partitioner. Many were sent to Siberia (from 1863 to 1865 alone, such was the fate of over 15 thousand people) and sentenced to death. Some migrated to the West, particularly after 1831 (Great Emigration). A common issue for all partitioners was labour emigration.

The rebirth of Poland's statehood had its impact on relations between the nations involved. For understandable reasons, both German and Russian administration as well as considerable numbers of new colonists who arrived in the 19th century left the territory of the (Second) Republic of Poland.

Having widely discussed German colonisation in the Middle Ages and later migrations from the west, we cannot forget about other less numerous minorities on the Polish lands before the partitions. The most significant minority of them was the Jewish nation. In the Middle Ages, Jews made Poland their home and were awarded a number of privileges by the rulers. During the partitions, their population amounted to approx. 800 thousand people, most of whom lived in towns. To the end of the 19th century, the number of Jews in the Kingdom of Poland alone was the same. According to the 1921 census, that is one conducted after Poland regained independence, the Jewish population amounted to 2.8 million, i.e. over 10% of the population total. All national minorities together constituted one third of the total population at that time. That was a challenge in the unification programme of the Republic.

Old Polish traditions of the state of the nobility were particularly strong in Eastern Borderlands where they clashed with objectives of new nations seeking to become fully independent (sovereignty). In most cases, that resulted in conflicts with Polish neighbours. Among the landed gentry, family conflicts emerged. To give an example of the Narutowicz family: Gabriel Narutowicz was elected the first President of the (Second) Polish Republic [42] while his brother Stanisław remained in their homeland (Samogitia) after Poland regained independence, declared to be a citizen of Lithuania and spelt his name as Stasis Narutovićius. He, unsuccessfully, tried to find a space for himself between historic and ethnic Lithuania. Stanisław was one of many who tried to combine the different traditions of Vilnius and Kaunas. Michał Römer was another example of difficult choices made. [43]

After 1918, a small number of emigrants returned to Poland. Most of them were already naturalised in their new countries and their children too as they were born

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[42] Gabriel Narutowicz had to leave his homeland in his youth due to his involvement in patriotic activities and sought refuge in Switzerland where he became a leading figure among Polish emigrants and an academic authority. He lived there until the end of World War I when he returned to Poland. Cf. J. Pajewski, W. Łazuga (1993), *Gabriel Narutowicz pierwszy prezydent Rzeczypospolitej,* Warszawa. Authors of that book dedicated it to the memory of Kazimierz Narutowicz (the son of Stanisław - Stasys) who expatriated to Poland after World War II and settled in Poznań.

[43] Michał Römer and his role in the *Krajowcy* group of mainly Polish-speaking intellectuals in Wilno and in the formation of an independent Lithuanian state is discussed in: Z. Solak (2004), *Między Litwą a Polską. Życie i działalność Michała Römera 1880-1920,* Kraków.

there. The oldest son of Polish bard Adam Mickiewicz, Władysław Mickiewicz[44] was born in France. When he arrived to Poland, he was treated like a living "monument" to his father.

According to censuses of 1921, 1931, and 1938, Poles constituted 69% of the population, Ukrainians respectively 14%, 8% and 8.4%, Germans 4% and 3.1%, and Belarusians 4%. The percentage of Russians, Czechs, Lithuanians, and "natives" of Polesie was smaller. In 1918-1939, small changes were induced by state authorities. Poles prevailed in central and western voivodships e.g. 93% in Kraków voivodship, and in major cities e.g. 93% in Poznań. In Volhynia, Poles constituted only 17% of the population.[45] In 1918-1939, historical conflicts from before the partitions were a difficult heritage and attempts to restore the situation which existed in times of the state of the nobility did not make things easier when modern Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian nations emerged and their respective statehood aspirations were ignored. In fact, conflicts dating back to Władysław Jagiełło and Vytautas turned out to be still relevant in diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania and to national propaganda.[46]

Arbitrary decisions were made after World War II.[47] The territorial losses in the east were compensated by lands in Silesia and Pomerania which were referred to as the Recovered Territories (for a few dozen years, however, it was forbidden to speak of the Lost Territories, just like the official *repatriation* (to) replaced *expatriation* (from)). The mass migration of people from across the Bug River to the Oder region began. As part of political migrations, whole groups of historical residents of Vilnius, Stanisławów (Ivano-Frankivsk), or Lviv moved to new territories (some villages

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[44] His extensive memoirs, which have been recently published anew, are a valuable source of information on the history of Polish emigrants and the life of emigrants of various nationalities who settled in the capital of France. Cf. W. Mickiewicz (2012), *Pamiętniki,* Warszawa.

[45] More on ethnic relations during the interwar period in: Cz. Brzoza (2001), *Polska w czasach niepodległości i drugiej wojny światowej 1918-1945 (Wielka historia Polski,* Vol. 9) Kraków, pp. 51-55. Apart from Ukrainians, Jews, Germans, and Belarusians, all other ethnic minorities constituted not more than 1% each. Largest minorities to a lesser or bigger extent objected to the state policy on national groups. The conflicts manifested themselves in various forms. That issue, however, goes beyond this sketchy paper.

[46] Cf. K. Buchowski (2006), *Litwomani i polonizatorzy. Mity, wzajemne postrzeganie i stereotypy w stosunkach polsko-litewskich w pierwszej połowie XX wieku*, Białystok; *Polacy w niepodległym państwie litewskim 1918-1940,* Białystok 1999; *Panowie i żmogusy. Stosunki polsko-litewskie w międzywojennych karykaturach,* Białystok 2004. See also M. Jackiewicz (1997), *Polskie życie kulturalne w Republice Litewskiej 1919-1940,* Olsztyn. More on the evolution of ethnic awareness in the territories annexed by the Russian partitioner in studies based on thorough source research conducted by French historian D. Beauvois (*Trójkąt ukraiński. Szlachta, carat i lud na Wołyniu, Podolu i Kijowszczyźnie 1793-1914,* Lublin 2005; *Wilno – polska stolica kulturalna zaboru rosyjskiego 1803-1832,* Wrocław 2010). D. Beauvois's approach has met with interest of Polish historiographers and inspired creative discussions.

[47] More on World War II and its consequences in: K. Jasiewicz (ed.) (2002), *Tygiel narodów. Stosunki społeczne i etniczne na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 1939-1953,* Warszawa--London.

arrived with their own parish priests and worshipped paintings). In the last decades, those migrations were documented in numerous publications and excellent essays whose authors came from those areas (I will mention but two authors Jerzy Janicki and Tadeusz Olszański) and young historians fascinated with the history of the Borderlands (to mention the impressive work done by Stanisław Sławomir Nicieja). And here we are in the historical reality shaped after World War II.[48]

ABSTRACT

The Polish state within the span of over a thousand years of history changed its borders several times but it is conventionally accepted that its ethnic territory stretches from the river Odra in the west, to the Bug in the east, and from the Baltic Sea in the north to the mountain ranges in the south. The article deals with the issue of the shaping of national identity of the knighthood in the Middle Ages and then its subsequent transformations during Poland's partition, the emergence of ethnic minorities (especially Germans and Jews) and the attitude of the local population to them in the pre-partition period. The discussed phenomena include xenophobia and xenophilia, the Polonisation of foreigners and their impact on Polish culture during the partition of Poland. In the interwar period a new concept of minorities was developed with regard to Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians inhabiting their ethnic territories which had been incorporated into the Polish state. Politics determined new borders after the end of World War II which resulted in yet another migration of the peoples, this time from the east to the west and the ensuing assimilation processes.

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[48] A synthetic overview of ethnic transformations in the post-Yalta reality was offered by P. Eberhardt (2010), *Migracje polityczne na ziemiach polskich (1939-1950),* Poznań. More on the history of Polish people who remained in the eastern parts of the former Polish Republic after 1945 in: A. Srebrakowski (2001), *Polacy w Litewskiej SRR 1944-1989,* Toruń; A. Bobryk (2006), *Odrodzenie narodowe Polaków w Republice Litewskiej 1987-1997,* Toruń; J. Sienkiewicz (1998), *Nasza racja stanu. Wybór publikacji 1988-1998,* Toruń. See also M. Kosman (2011), *O kresach w historii i legendzie. Studia i szkice z dziejów polskiej granicy wschodniej,* Part 1, Poznań.

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NATIONAL MINORITY AS A POLITICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL CATEGORY

In the course of democratisation processes in Poland, the issue of national and ethnic minorities was debated and decisions on legal / constitutional solutions were taken. In result, minorities have become politically "visible" after having being "dismissed" in times of communism. The recognition of minorities has gradually changed the general public awareness of their place in the society and has had an impact on politicians' agenda. Both, the minorities' political "visibility" and the increased awareness of their presence have attracted attention of various academics. This article aims to demonstrate the political character of the *national minority* category and its possible impact on sociological perspectives. Its objective, however, is not to once again review definitions used in law, political science and sociology and to indicate their common or related contents, or to offer a new definition of the phenomenon in question.[1] The objective is to identify potential and real difficulties and dilemmas sociologists have and will have in their research while facing a specific political practice of institutionalising[2] the status of national minorities. The impact

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[1] That does not mean that I consider the issue of defining the phenomenon in question irrelevant. It is relevant because it facilitates better understanding of the phenomenon. However, definitions and their critical reviews are available in academic literature while today, as Krzysztof Kwaśniewski rightly wrote, "The issue of national minorities, despite (or perhaps as a result of) researchers' growing interest, has recently (after decades of being ignored) been made more complex and approaches to it change. Lengthy and complex deliberations on the correct definition of the phenomenon have been abandoned. It has transpired that the classic definition formula cannot be filled in any other manner than by tautology and that intentional definitions, which specify properties required while, actually, the relevance of those properties depends on a given context (and which by no means are completely 'objective'), have identified the phenomenon but have not facilitated uniform, simple, and effective solutions". K. Kwaśniewski (2007), *O logice badań problemów narodowościowych,* "Przegląd Zachodni" No. 3, p. 7. The said inability to formulate an adequate definition is often the reason of sociologists' dilemmas in research methodology, which will be discussed later.

[2] Elinor Ostrom's definition of institutions will be very useful here. Institutions are a set of operating rules used to determine who is authorised to take decisions in a certain field, what activities are permitted or restricted, what aggregation principles will be applied, what procedures must be followed, what information must and must not be supplied, as well as what benefits will be assigned to individuals depending on their actions". After J. Mucha *Mniejszości kulturowe w procesie demokratyzacji*

of political practice on academic deliberations is noticeable in sociological works but seldom realised and explicated directly. The forecasted increase in migration to Poland may make the issue of the presence of "the others" even more political and lead to many new dilemmas of sociologists, not only of the theoretical but also methodological nature. This paper is not a comprehensive review of examples of the political status of minorities. It does not offer the identification of all problems which might be encountered by researchers. Its objective is to increase general awareness of the issue to make tacking it more informed.

The political nature, or shall we say *politicality*, as a key variable on which this paper on national minorities focuses is "a feature of relations between individuals and groups of individuals, which is part of distribution of all types of rare goods valued by a society"[3]. A justification for the adoption of such a perspective while analysing the situation of minorities and in academic deliberations can be found in works of Anthony Giddens who views deliberative democracy as a characteristic feature of contemporary Late Modern societies. Deliberative democracy differs from older democracy models because, *inter alia*, new actors have entered the area of policy making and thus the actors include not only political parties and state authorities. Other actors involved in the process of continuous transformation of the contents and essence of *politicality* include e.g. scholars and minorities. Another innovation in deliberative democracy is a change in the political agenda which now includes issues absent earlier such as ethnic minorities' rights.[4] Thus methodological solutions adopted in sociological research are relevant. What sociologists (understood here as active actors who impact a democratic system to an extent) write and conclude, shapes democracy and perception of the minority issue: they show, describe, and perhaps even legitimise or expose the "reality" imposed by other political actors (institutions traditionally involved in policy making). Hence the frame of my deliberations will be the legislative and institutional approach versus a scientific (sociological) approach to the issue of national minorities.

POLITCAL NATURE OF THE NATIONAL MINORITY CATEGORY

A brief introduction of the categories of national and ethnic minorities in Polish law is in place here. The differentiation between national and ethnic minorities[5] introduced in the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language

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w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, in: M. Szmeja (ed.) (2008), *Etniczność – o przemianach społeczeństw narodowych,* Kraków.

   [3] Ł. Błaszczykiewicz, *Polityczność w teoriach socjologicznych Parsonsa, Giddensa i Bourdieu*, in: A. Czajowski, L. Sobkowiak (eds) (2012), *Polityka i polityczność. Problemy teoretyczne i metodologiczne,* Wrocław, p. 162.

   [4] *Ibidem*, pp. 169-172

   [5] In a draft act of 2001 presented in the course of a parliamentary subcommittee work, reference was made to national minorities. They were listed in a uniform way and there was no division into national and ethnic minorities.

consists, virtually, in one *not*. National and ethnic minorities share common characteristics but the national minority "identifies itself" and the ethnic minority "does *not* identify itself with another nation organised in [having] its own state". Despite invoking an objective characteristic, i.e. having or not having a foreign motherland, the decision of the legislator raises some doubts. One may ask why or for what purpose that distinction was made as thus distinguished national minorities appear to be "stronger" and ethnic minorities "weaker" (Krzysztof Kwaśniewski argues that ethnic minorities are "most defenceless because they are stateless"[6]) if that differentiation has no impact on rights granted to both of them. In the case of the aforementioned Act, "The genesis of such a differentiation resulted, to a large extent, from the position of the Ukrainian minority strongly protesting against recognising Lemkos[7], who do not consider themselves part of the Ukrainian nation, as a national minority. This points to the political justification for the differentiation in question. Furthermore, the Act, itself, makes one doubt the differentiation justifiability. In that Act, the term "minorities" without attributes has been consistently used throughout except for the initial differentiation of the two kinds of minorities and a chapter on competences of relevant public administration.[8]

   Grzegorz Janusz, in his 2011 publication[9], reviewed differences in the legislation on national minorities in particular European countries. In his thorough analysis of specific solutions, the author identified four types of practice: the term "minorities" is used without defining it, a minority is indirectly identified in the context of minority language protection, minorities are listed without any definition, denotation of the term "minority" is defined by some criteria. He also discusses terminological solutions (application of categories such as: language minority, national minority,

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   [6] K. Kwaśniewski (2007), *op. cit.,* p. 8

   [7] G. Janusz (2011), *Ochrona praw mniejszości narodowych w Europie,* Lublin, p. 43.

   [8] For the record, prior to the Act, a fundamental provision was written into the Polish Constitution of 1997. Its Article 35.1 reads: "The Republic of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture.". More information on the lengthy legislative process of incorporating those issues into normative acts can be found in numerous publications of its participant S. Łodziński e.g. *Przekroczyć własny cień. Prawne, instytucjonalne oraz społeczne aspekty polityki państwa polskiego wobec mniejszości narodowych w latach 1989-1997,* in: B. Berdychowska (ed.) (1998), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce. Praktyka po 1989 r.,* Warszawa; *Być mniejszością w większości. Dyskusja o prawach mniejszości narodowych w Polsce w latach dziewięćdziesiątych,* in: P. Chmielewski, T. Krauze, W. Wesołowski (ed.) (2002), *Kultura. Osobowość. Polityka,* Warszawa; *Trauma i władza liczb. Wybrane problemy społecznego odbioru pytania o „Narodowość" w Narodowym Spisie Powszechnym z 2002 r.,* in: L. Adamczuk, S. Łodziński (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w świetle Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego z 2002 r.,* Warszawa; *Spory wokół ustawy o ochronie mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce okresu transformacji,* in: E. Michalik, H. Chałupczak (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w procesach transformacji oraz integracji,* Lublin; *Polityka wobec mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce w latach 1945-2008,* in: S. Dudra, B. Nitschke (2010), *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce po II wojnie światowej. Wybrane elementy polityki państwa,* Kraków.

   [9] G. Janusz (2011), *op. cit.*, pp. 59-76.

nationality group, national community) as well as the criteria for granting a protected status to specific communities, i.e. inclusion and exclusion.

In the Polish law, the issue of a protected minority status also points to the political nature of the national minority category. Protection of rights of minorities presupposes formal recognition of a given minority. The Polish Act on national minorities not only defines but also lists them as if doubting the *definiens* precision. In result, an ethnic group which is not mentioned in the Act, does not enjoy the minority status even if it meets the criteria. On the other hand, there is no solution in case a listed group would not like to be recognised as a minority. Its status cannot be changed at the group request. It might seem that the second possibility is an abstract construct only, but the opinion of no ethnic community should be ignored. "Deep identification of the fate of Polish Armenians with the fate of Poles may explain a clear aversion of the first to attempts at qualifying them as a national minority. In their opinion, "the achievements of their many generations have proved their loyalty to their adopted Motherland – Poland, and they are not torn by dilemmas typical of national minorities in contemporary Poland". Dariusz Szamel, the author of this observation underlines that considerable Polonisation did not erase the Armenians' awareness of their origin; that awareness "may be sometimes understated but is never concealed"[10]. Situations where minorities are not officially recognised despite their postulates are more frequent. When the Sejm [Parliament] worked on the Act on minorities, the Kashubian-Pomeranian Association filed a motion to be recognised as an ethnic minority and thus included under the Act.[11] The legislator has met their expectations in part recognising Kashubians as a "language minority" only. The minorities enumerated in the Act do not include also Greeks over a dozen thousands of whom came to Poland in the end of the 1950s as political refugees. While designing the Act, it was initially proposed that minorities should meet the condition of "traditionally inhabiting" the present territory of the country, which was further specified as "for at least three generations". Eventually, the 100-year criterion was adopted. Thus immigrants from Greece and their third or even fourth generation descendants have not obtained the status of a minority. What has aroused most controversy, however, is that Silesians are not mentioned in the Act. They wish their distinctness from Poles and Germans was recognised. It is mainly because of Silesians that the discourse on minorities in general has been present in the public space.

It is not only the Polish legislation the rationale and justification of which are difficult to understand. In Germany, four minorities have been recognised, i.e. Danes, Lusatian Sorbs, Sinti Roma, and Frisians. East Frisians[12] and people of Turkish descent are not recognised as national minorities. However, the example of Austria

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[10] D. Szamel (1998), *Małe społeczności narodowościowe, w: Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce. Praktyka po 1989 r.,* p. 272.

[11] S. Łodziński (2006), *Spory wokół ustawy...,* p. 296.

[12] G. Janusz (2011), *op. cit.,* p. 28.

shows that a change is possible and depends on political will. The Austrian Ethnic Group Act [Volksgruppengesetz] covers six minorities, including Roma people who were granted the ethnic group status only in 1993.[13]

The role of the state is visible also in the implementation of institutional solutions which apply to minorities. An example are procedures adopted in individual European countries for the census purpose. A census is a form of validating and determining the scale of various phenomena. The collected data on minorities, in a sense, objectivises and formally legitimises and verifies (hard data) not only their existence but also their population numbers. The diversity of solutions can be illustrated with the following examples. In Austria, the question asked in the national census is about the language used in a given family and not about nationality or ethnicity.[14] In the Czech Republic, it is possible to declare double nationality in the census. Censuses carried out in that country provide interesting data on the population of the Romani people who in the 2001 census declared a nationality other than Czech three times less than in 1991. Grzegorz Janusz explains it with the fact that "After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, there were about 200 thousand Romani people having Czechoslovakian citizenship in the Czech Republic and they were treated by the Czech authorities as stateless persons"[15]. In Estonia, both nationality and native language are recorded in the census. More people declare Estonian nationality than speak the Estonian language while less people declare Russian nationality than speak Russian. Changes in census criteria are clearly related to a political change visible e.g. in the south of Central Europe. "In Hungary, the catalogue of registered minorities was gradually enlarged from seven minorities in 1990 to fourteen in 2001. In Bulgaria, the Pomak minority was not distinguished in the census. In Croatia, the Yugoslavian nationality was not distinguished in the 2001 census but it was recognised in Montenegro in the 2003 census. In Serbia and in Montenegro, some people who previously declared to be Muslims now consider themselves to be Bosniaks, while in Macedonia the Bosnian minority was recognised only in the 2002 census".[16] The above examples only signal that the solutions used vary and have various consequences for specific national categories, political consequences included.

The experience of two last censuses carried out in Poland demonstrates the modification and manipulation potential of solutions which institutionalise the functioning of minorities within the state where those minorities happen to live. Polish national censuses of 2002 and 2011 differed in terms of methods used to collect the data on national minorities. In the first one, the question about nation-

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[13] *Ibidem,* p. 109.

[14] *Ibidem.*

[15] *Ibidem,* p. 116.

[16] K. Dolińska, J. Makaro (2012), *Wielokulturowość Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Kilka metodologicznych uwag o definiowaniu i badaniu zjawiska,* "Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria Nowa" No. 40, p. 98.

ality (understood as subjective identification) was asked for the first time after 1989, while in the second one, two questions were asked: one about nationality and another one about the sense of belonging to another nation/ethnic group different from the nationality indicated in response to the first question. Both censuses differed also by different sampling methods what appears to be of paramount importance if a census is to provide information on the ethnic structure of Poland. In 2011, non-Polish nationality could have been declared by persons who decided to self-register or were selected to be interviewed at home or by phone by special appointed agents. A complete census of the population was carried out in 86 municipalities only, where, according to the 2002 census, national and ethnic minorities constituted 10% of the population.

While studying social reality, sociologists are not obliged to define its components in accordance with the description and classification established by legal acts. A sociologist may but does not have to define an adult as an 18-year-old person, an unemployed person may but does not have to be registered with a job centre, and immigrants qualified in accordance with the terminology of the Border Guard as illegal, should be described by a sociologist in a non-evaluative way e.g. as persons crossing the border illegally. Thus, a minority group may be distinguished in a way different from official criteria used by administration authorities. It is social theory and not administrative categorisation which determines the subject and approach to social reality research. Hence the potential and actual discrepancies between sociological definitions and other ones. Hence also the usage of various terms (notions) to denote the same or overlapping objects.

Half a century ago, Stanisław Ossowski wrote:

> The opinion that sociology is scientifically underdeveloped results from a number of factors. Yet, not all complaints address the same works. There is a belief that in sociology there are a lack of verifiable general theses which would go beyond the wisdom of 'common sense' and complaints about the ambiguity of terms and limited applicability of theorems and definitions [...]. Some argue that there are no clear boundaries between sociology and journalism, between field study and reportage [...]. A stronger impact of ideologies on research results and their wording due to sociologists' awareness that social theory may shape the motivation behind actions and social trends, follows also from attitudes shaped by relic models and relations among scholars.[17]

It appears that issues raised in the above quotation are, to an extent, still valid. The lack of an autonomous conceptual apparatus (and thus needed borrowings from institutional or colloquial languages) as well as both, the research and the researcher of social reality being its parts and attempts at making the researcher an independent and external observer, are issues that still call for reflection on methodology but are sometimes forgotten or abandoned.

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[17] S. Ossowski (2001), *O osobliwościach nauk społecznych,* Warszawa, p. 132

SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLITICAL NATURE
OF THE NATIONAL MINORITY CATEGORY

As described above, in practice, the approach to national minorities is political and affects the sub-discipline of sociology focused on minority issues. Consequences of this situation can be grouped into: 1) problems in and consequences of applying various terms in reference to the same object or of one term in reference to various objects, 2) problems with and consequences of censuses as tools used to legitimise national minorities and sources of data on minorities.

Referring back to issues raised in the first part of this paper, firstly, the identification of national, ethnic, and language minorities should be discussed. As that has been extensively covered in sociological literature, I underline key issues only. There is a wide consensus that the basis for identifying (distinguishing) minority groups includes people's descent, culture, language, religion, and awareness of their distinct identity. It is common practice to treat national and ethnic minorities as synonymous notions. Nevertheless, if researchers decide to differentiate between them, they use the "state" criterion. Thus, in Polish law, an ethnic group has neither its own national state nor aspires to have one, which, sometimes, may suggest that its internal organisation is weaker. Some researchers highlight what we are dealing with is a process and, at present, political self-awareness of ethnic groups is high. A manifestation of that are efforts of those groups to be recognised as national groups as it guarantees their higher "visibility" in public discourse.[18]

Naturally, the independence of social theory allows for an autonomous identification of areas of interest. However, there are situations where a sociologist wants to/must use the findings/data collected in accordance with administrative criteria. In the late 1990s, Dariusz Szamel wrote about the Old Believers in Poland, noting that "it is probably the least known national group among national minorities living in Poland"[19]. If one would like to use national censuses data on that community, he or she would should look for information on the Russian minority in Poland. However, there is a problem which scholars should recognise and try to overcome. The Russian minority consists of two religious communities (Orthodox Christians and Old Believers) and in Polish censuses the question about religion was either absent or optional. In the latter case, none of those confessions were listed and the options were to choose "other" or write down one's confession. Thus the usefulness (completeness) of the census data has been substantially limited.

The lack of a wide agreement on using uniform terminology while describing analogous phenomena of sociologists' interest is probably an immanent distinctive feature of social sciences. It causes chaos and limits intersubjective communicability and verifiability of sociological conclusions. Such challenges are also faced by

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[18] E. Nowicka (2006), *Etniczność na sprzedaż i/lub etniczność domowa,* in: *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w świetle...,* pp. 292-294.

[19] D. Szamel (1998), *op. cit.,* p. 284.

researchers studying ethnic issues. To illustrate the above, let us start with Silesians, i.e. a category best described in sociological literature and the popularity of which largely results from its political character. A differentiation of Silesians based on sociological categories raises no doubts. What terms and classifications should be used, however, to describe them? The fact that Silesians are not mentioned in the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities leads to some confusion of (not only) linguistic nature. Has a scholar the right to use the term *national* or *ethnic minority* in that case and, if yes, why there are examples of "avoidance" of such a classification in the literature? Even a brief review of relevant publications reveals various semantic solutions e.g. "regional community", "Silesian nation", "postulated Silesian nation", or "Silesian national minority". Moreover, titles of many publications on Silesians are actually questions and end in a question mark. We encounter a similar problem when we try to compare results of censuses in different countries as sometimes official classifications of the same national group differ. For instance, Lemkos are recognised as an ethnic minority in Poland and as a national minority in the Czech Republic ("It [the list of minorities] was criticised by Ukrainian minority organisations for including 'Rusyn' Lemkos and thereby artificially dividing the entire Ukrainian community"[20]). In Poland, Jews are a national minority, while in the census carried out the Republic of Slovakia "they were not included in the ethnic structure [...] because they were identified as a religious and not ethnic community"[21]. If sociologists wanted to use the official terminology to refer to specific groups, it would not only limit comparative analyses but also invalidate or weaken the importance of social theory to the advantage of political solutions.

The case of Greeks, who arrived in Poland shortly after World War II, is different. They do not meet the statutory criterion of living in Poland long enough and that is the reason why they are not recognised as a national minority. Sociological characteristics of their community, however, allow for classifying it a minority. In practice, scholars refer to them plainly as Greeks in Poland (although the ones who have lived here for more than half a century should be distinguished somehow from those who arrived in Poland in recent years) or write about Greek refugees (which is inappropriate as it excludes their descendants).

Another example of problems resulting from a clash of political and sociological approaches is the concept of *Polonia*. *Polonia* appears to be different from national minority and the usual justification of that is the allochtonous *vs* autochtonous nature of a Polish community in another country (which, in essence, is a sociological criterion). At the same time, in the subject literature, Polish diaspora communities are considered national minorities if they have the status of a national minority in a given foreign country (the status assigned by the dominant group), and *Polonia* if they do not have that status (and that is a political or institutional criterion). The most telling

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[20] S. Łodziński (2006), *Trauma i władza...,* p. 200.
[21] M. Benża (1995), *Sytuacja prawna mniejszości narodowych w Republice Słowackiej,* "Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria Nowa" No. 2, p. 178.

example is the use of both terms in reference to Poles living in Germany who do not have the official status of national minority, a fact which is often contested.[22] On the other hand, researchers writing about Poles in Kazakhstan often refer to them as a national minority despite the fact that that community is also migratory.

This short review of issues resulting from terminology and definitions, is relevant also in the case of the growing number of new "others", that is numerous immigrants to Poland mainly from the East (which is an outcome of globalisation and regime changes). As in previous examples, their characteristics include non-Polish descent (which is key for the present considerations) and their sense of national and ethnic identity. In addition, majority of them do not have Polish citizenship (contrary to members of officially recognised national and ethnic minorities) but their children increasingly often are Polish citizens. That category has become an interesting subject of research but there is no agreement on the term which would best "embrace" their different groups distinguished by sociologists. The category of foreigners is too vague and broad, while the category of national and ethnic minorities is not appropriate in the light of its usage so far. The "new minorities" phrase is used increasingly often, sometimes in quotation marks, sometimes not.[23]

As it has been already pointed out, the institution of national census and its data can well lead to problems too. On the one hand, censuses are a very attractive source of data for sociologists, offering information which frequently exceeds sociologists' capabilities of measurement but, on the other hand, their interpretation is difficult (mainly because their objective is different from researchers'). Solutions and changes introduced in the methodology of national censuses carried out in Poland in 2002 and 2011 have had several consequences. First of all, it should be highlighted that the publishing of census results pertaining to national and ethnic minorities (to be precise their categories as determined by law) performs not only the informative function but also the creational one, i.e. it creates an impression that the results reflect the ethnic structure of the country. Secondly, the introduction of the option of declaring a double national identification widens sociological knowledge of minority identities but may well make the interpretation confusing (and in the political perspective, gives space for manipulation). How to interpret the fact that for instance the number of all nationality (single and double) declarations grew while the number of single nationality declarations decreased? What does it actually mean? Is it an increase or decrease of the population of a given national group? Thirdly, the full 2011 census was taken in administrative communes where national minorities constituted 10% of the population (according to the previous census) and complemented by a "representative sample" covering other parts of Poland. Such an approach ensures data collection in areas where the phenomenon in question is well visible but the resulting data on areas

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[22] Cf. J. Sandorski (2010), *Polska mniejszość narodowa w Niemczech w świetle prawa międzynarodowego,* "Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny" No. 2.

[23] A. Michalska (1997), *Pracownicy-migranci jako "nowa" mniejszość narodowa,* "Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria Nowa" No. 1.

where minorities are sporadic are incomplete[24] (less numerous categories are more difficult to capture by random sampling). In the case of "new minorities", a census such construed will hardy provide a reliable data as members of those minorities are unlikely to self-register and answer census questions online.

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The aforementioned difficulties (both potential and real) that can be encountered by sociologists interested in ethnic minorities suggest that sociologists should be aware that the discourse on minorities is dominated by the political perspective. That awareness should help them adhere to their social perspective. It does not mean that all implications of institutionalisation of national and ethnic minorities should be rejected but that much scrutiny is in place if such information is used to build a social theory.

Last but not least, the political *praxis* in respect to ethnic minorities is also shaped by sociologists. Sociologists participated in works on the Act on minorities and on the design of the census form used by the Central Statistical Office. The role of sociology keeps changing and sociology is increasingly an applied science in addition to its diagnostic and explicatory functions. In this context, it appears that sociology's impact stems from its achievements rather than individual sociologists' involvement. Hence, on the one hand, social studies on particular ethnic minorities become social facts building the reality and substantively justifying the distinctness, individual nature and specificity of minority communities. On the other hand, studies on political contexts in which minorities appear, fulfil another important role of sociology which is to unmask the actual social patterns or mechanisms. For that reason, the importance of all studies on the functioning of ethnic minorities under specific political conditions can hardly be underestimated e.g. studies on consequences/implications of Polish national censuses.[25] Most telling examples of the growing interest in those issues include the 2nd Polish Congress of Political Science in September 2012. Its programme included a five-part panel on "National and ethnic minorities in Poland and Europe. Political and social aspects" and some speakers were sociologists. Some speakers referred to the census data but none raised the issue of the impact of censuses on self-organisation and institutionalisation of minorities in Poland. In September 2013, the 15th Congress of the Polish Sociological Association was held. At the congress its working group on "National and ethnic minorities in the Third Polish Republic. Identity, theories, research" held three sessions, one of which was entirely devoted to the issue of minorities in national censuses.

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[24] For example, the data do not include information on the population of national and ethnic minorities in Wrocław and thus it is impossible say if and how their numbers changed in comparison to the previous census. Cf. K. Dolińska, J. Makaro (2013), *O wielokulturowości monokulturowego Wrocławia,* Wrocław, pp. 39-54. It is also impossible to say how many Greeks live in Zgorzelec and Wrocław as due to the sampling method chosen, the census data are aggregated at a higher level e.g. that of a voivodship.

[25] One of them is the already classic L. Adamczuk, S. Łodziński (eds) (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w świetle Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego z 2002 r.,* Warszawa.

ABSTRACT

The article aims to draw attention to the political character of the national minority category and its consequences for social studies. The political character of the national minority category consists, among others, in the method of officially distinguishing them, their institutionalisation and legitimisation. In the process of theory development and in field research, sociologists dealing with ethnic issues succumb, to a greater or lesser extent, to categories developed in the sphere of politics. Examples of that entanglement discussed in the article pertain to both the sociological distinguishing of the category of minorities and the usage of national census data with all its political implications.

Polsko-niemieckie stosunki społeczne i kulturalne

[Polish-German Societal and Cultural Relations]

Andrzej Sakson, Editor

In this next volume of *The Federal Republic of Germany 20 Years after Reunification. Politics – Economy – Society* series, contributors associated with the Institute for Western Affairs attempt at analysing various aspects of Polish-German societal and cultural relations. 65 years after WW2, Germany is now Poland's ally in NATO and the European Union. In Polish-German relations, societal and cultural relations play an important role and this includes direct, face-to-face contacts and meetings between Poles and Germans. They have created a dense network which has a significant impact on the climate of official bilateral relations.

The first part of this volume includes papers that refer to some aspects of the shared and difficult history which continue to influence present relations between the two countries. Andrzej Sakson discusses the stereotypes of the Pole and Poland in modern Germany pointing to the fact that despite a major change in Polish-German relations in the last 20 years, the old negative stereotypes persist. Piotr Kubiak presents the evolution of German politics of memory (Geschichtspolitik) and its impact on Germany relations with Poland. The recent symbol of historical misunderstandings between the two countries and nations has been the Centre against Expulsions (ZgV). Difficult issues related to WW2 and its consequences have had a detrimental impact on the bilateral relations in the first decade of the 21st century.

An important "case study" of Polish-German controversies involving the legacy of the past is the paper by Maria Rutowska on restitution of heritage artefacts. Rutowska points to formal legal issues of restitution of artefacts stolen and "re-located" during WW2. She writes about the number and value of Polish losses and the complicated controversies surrounding some collections and individual objects.

Today's culture, mass media and the cooperation of local (self) governments are discussed as well. Maria Wagińska-Marzec writes about Polish-German cultural cooperation. German investments in mass media are the topic of Marcin Tujdowski's paper in which he reconstructs the expansion of German media corporations onto the Polish market and their activities. Polish-German cooperation of local governments, twin cities/communes and Euro-regions at the Polish-German border is the topic of Witold Ostant's paper.

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Poznań

LEGAL REGULATIONS ON NATIONAL
AND ETHNIC MINORITIES IN POLAND

Democracy is increasingly often perceived through the prism of society's attitude towards minorities which function within it, and conditions enabling them to exercise their rights and freedoms. Protection of national and ethnic minorities has a long history but issues related to them are still disputed and disputes are often international. That is why protection guarantees are part of legal solutions at universal, regional, and national levels.

Also in Poland, national and ethnic minorities are protected and granted many rights related mainly to their language, education and culture. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 provides basic guarantees for Polish citizens who are members of national and ethnic minorities. Another important Act which in greater detail regulates their rights is the Act of 6 January 2005 on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language[1] (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Act and numerous regulations provide the basis for protection of national and ethnic minorities' rights. Poland is also a signatory of international agreements of which the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities which is a treaty of the Council of Europe,[2] and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages[3] are especially important. In addition, national minorities are protected under clauses in bilateral agreements which Poland concluded with all neighbouring countries and many other states.[4]

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[1] Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 17, item 141, as amended.

[2] In Poland, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities came into force on 1 April 2001, Journal of Laws of 2002, No. 22, item 209. An extremely useful mechanism is the obligation to submit reports which are later reviewed by the Advisory Committee. Recently, Poland submitted its third report to the Council of Europe, on which no opinion has been issued yet. All reports and opinions are available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/-3_FCNMdocs /Table_en.asp.

[3] In Poland, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages came into force on 1 June 2009, Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 137, item 1121.

[4] Such clauses are contained in agreements with Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Moldavia, Greece, and Georgia. The groups protected and rights granted under specific treaties differ. Cf. G. Janusz (2011), *Ochrona praw mniejszości narodowych w Europie,* Lublin, pp. 529-544.

Grażyna Baranowska

The aim of this paper is to review present legal regulations concerning the protection of national and ethnic minorities and to identify several problematic areas. The discussion will begin with presenting definitions of national and ethnic minorities. Then Polish legal regulations on minorities including the principle of equality before the law, the rights in the sphere of education, culture, and language, and privileges written into the election law will be discussed.

THE DEFINITION

So far, there is no accepted definition of minorities in international law, largely dues to the complexity of the issue and different approaches to it.[5] A consequence of such a state of affairs is the wording of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[6] of 1966 which is a most important convention on human rights and which gives considerable freedom to states to decide who is to be granted the status of national or ethnic minority. Art. 27 stipulates that:

> In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language".[7]

French authorities, for instance, while ratifying the Covenant stated that in France there are no national minorities. In consequence, the Covenant does not protect the preservation of the culture and distinctness of either the Bretons or the Alsatians living in France.

Similarly to the provisions of the Covenant, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland grants a number of rights to minorities (Article 35)[8] but does not define their conceptual or personal scope. What is more, Article 35 of the Constitution covers both national and ethnic minorities, while in Article 27 on the official language of Poland, only national minorities are mentioned. That is why indications provided by the case-law on the differentiation between the two terms is extremely important. In Poland there was a dispute concerning the concept of the Silesian nationality. Its peak was when a regional association filed a motion to be officially registered under the name the "Union of People of Silesian Nationality" (in Polish: Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej) and was registered as such. The Voivode [head of province] of the Katowice province, who opposed the registration of the association under such a name from the very beginning, filed an appeal. The appellate court revoked

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[5] Cf. *ibidem,* pp. 25-76.

[6] In Poland, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights came into force on 18 June 1977, Journal of Laws of 1977, No. 38, item 167/

[7] More on Article 27 of the Covenant in: R. Wieruszewski, *Artykuł 27. Ochrona mniejszości,* in: R. Wieruszewski (ed.) (2012), *Międzynarodowy Pakt Praw Obywatelskich (Osobistych) i Politycznych,* Warszawa, pp. 682-695.

[8] Rights under that article will be discussed later.

the decision of the court of the first instance and dismissed the motion of the associa-tion, arguing that: "In Poland, the tradition is that the concept of a national minority applies to groups the members of which constitute a majority in another State; in other words, a minority is an ethnic group which is supported by the majority living outside Poland."[9] The appellate court drew attention to the fact that a consequence of registering the Union would be granting it privileges guaranteed to national minori-ties. The matter was later referred to the Supreme Court which stated that national minority is a legal term undefined in the Polish law and refers to a "national group formed in the course of a historical process and socially accepted"[10]. Later, the asso-ciation lodged its complaint against Poland with the European Tribunal of Human Rights which found no violation of the Convention by the Polish authorities.[11]

The case-law facilitated determination of four basic conditions of the defini-tion of a national minority: the support of the people's majority abroad, non-Polish nationality, cultural distinctness, and social recognition as a national group.[12] On 6 January 2005, the Act entered into force which, like the Constitution, differentiates between ethnic and national minorities. Definitions contained in that Act are consis-tent with the case-law referred to above. A national minority is defined in Article 2 of the Act as a group of Polish citizens who jointly fulfil the following conditions: is numerically smaller than the rest of the population of the Republic of Poland; signifi-cantly differs from the remaining citizens in its language, culture or tradition; strives to preserve its language, culture or tradition; is aware of its own historical, national community, and is oriented towards its expression and protection; its ancestors have been living on the present territory of the Republic of Poland for at least 100 years; identifies itself with a nation organised in its own state.

An ethnic minority is defined as a group of Polish citizens who fulfil the same conditions but two are changed, i.e. an minority is aware of its own historical, eth-nic (not national) community and does not identify itself with a nation organised in its own state. Moreover, in the Act, the following national minorities are listed as recognised: Belarusian, Ukrainian, German, Lithuanian, Czech, Slovakian, Rus-sian, Armenian, and Jewish. Ethnic minorities listed are: the Karaim, the Lemko, the Tatar, and the Roma. It is important to note that the Act does not differentiate between the freedoms and rights of national and ethnic minorities, however there is a law on electoral privileges for election committees which applies to national minorities only.

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[9] *Postanowienie Sądu Apelacyjnego w Katowicach z dnia 24 września 1997 r.,* ref.: I Acz 493/97.

[10] *Postanowienie Sądu Najwyższego z 18 marca 1998 r. w sprawie rejestracji stowarzyszenia "Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej",* Ref. I PKN 4/98, "LexPolonica" No. 333477.

[11] *Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of 20 December 2001. Case of Gorzelik and others v. Poland, Application no. 44158/98*

[12] A. Kirpsza, *Status mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w prawie europejskim i polskim,* in: M. Galon, A. Gorgosz, J. Kihl, T. Pawłuszko, J. Piecha (eds) (2008), *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne – materiały konferencyjne, Kraków 12 maja 2008 r.*, Kraków, p. 15.

Hence, by defining the notions of national and ethnic minorities, the Act has filled a legal vacuum but at the same time it has given rise to new questions and issues.[13] For instance, the condition of identification with a nation organised in its own state may raise some doubts because not every member of a national minority in Poland identifies him or herself with another country and that concerns some Armenians and Jews in particular.[14] Actually during the legislative procedure, some minorities protested against the "division" into national and *ethnic* minorities. After the Lower Chamber approved of the Act in 2004 and referred it to the Upper House of the Polish Parliament, the Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Poland, the Association of Tatars of the Republic of Poland, and The Roma People Association in Poland sent a letter to senators protesting against such a division which they considered "deeply humiliating".[15]

The condition that minority "ancestors have been living on the present territory of the Republic of Poland for at least 100 years" has also been criticised as ancestors of members of a given minority might have lived in territories which now do not belong to Poland but did before WW2. That very condition does not take their migration into consideration. The issue of closed lists of minorities is also disputed. Particularly controversial is the fact that Silesians and Kashubians are not listed[16], i.e. groups which according to the 2011 census[17] are the largest. In the 2011 census as many as 847 thousand people declared their Silesian identity and 233 thousand Kashubians declared their Kashubian identity. For comparison, 148 thousand people declared German identity and 51 thousand people declared Ukrainian identity.[18] Kashubians, in a way, have been recognised as the Act introduced a new notion of "a community speaking a regional language" and Kashubians have

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[13] Cf. e.g.. A. Kirpsza (2008), *Status...,* pp. 19-22; J. Sobczak, *Języki regionalne i etniczne a problem tożsamości narodowej,* in: T. Gardocka, J. Sobczak (2010), *Prawa mniejszości narodowych,* Toruń, pp. 127-174.

[14] For a discussion on definitions of national and ethnic minorities see e.g. T. Gardocka (2010), *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne - zagadnienie definicji,* in: T. Gardocka, J. Sobczak, *Prawa...*, pp. 94-102

[15] S. Łodziński (2005), *Wyrównanie czy uprzywilejowanie? Spory dotyczące projektu ustawy o ochronie mniejszości narodowych (1989-2005),* Kancelaria Sejmu, Warszawa, http://biurose.sejm. gov.pl /teksty_pdf_05/r-232.pdf, p. 21.

[16] Cf. K. Dolińska (2009), *Potoczny i ideologiczny poziom doświadczania śląskości. Ślązacy w poszukiwaniu odrębności*?, Wrocław; C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Społeczność kaszubska,* in: S. Dudra, B. Nitschke (2010) (ed.), *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce po II wojnie światowej,* Kraków; Z. Kurcz, *Postulowany naród śląski i śląska ideologia narodowa,* in: E. Michalik, H. Chałupczak (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w procesach transformacji oraz integracji,* Lublin, pp. 355-375.

[17] The 2011 census was very important for national and ethnic minorities because it included a question about nationality and ethnicity and for the first time respondents could give more than one answer to that question.

[18] *Przynależność narodowo-etniczna ludności – wyniki spisu ludności i mieszkań 2011* [Nationality and ethnicity – results of the 2011 census of population and housing], http://www.stat.gov.pl/ cps/rde/ xbcr/gus/Przynaleznosc_narodowo-etniczna_w_2011JNSP.pdf

been recognised to be such a group/community. Hence some regulations on the use of a minority language apply also to the Kashubian language, in particular certain rights in the sphere of education, culture, and the use of that language in public and private life.[19]

EQUALITY PRINCIPLE

The non-discrimination clause is often considered a *sine qua non* condition for effective protection of national minorities[20] and thus the equality principle is greatly important to minorities. In two essential European documents, i.e. the European Convention on Human Rights[21] and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[22], national minorities are mentioned only in the non-discrimination clause[23] which underlines its importance.

In the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the equality principle is contained in Article 32 which reads that all persons shall be treated equally and no one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic life. The equality principle realisation in various spheres of social life is also guaranteed in other provisions of the Constitution: access to culture (Article 6.1), creation of political parties (Article 11.1), access to the public service (Article 60), protection of property/ownership (Article 64), access to health care services (Article 68.2), access to education (Article 70.4), electoral rights (Article 96,2, Article 127.1, Article 169.2). The repetitive underlining of citizens' equality in exercising their rights and freedoms is, in itself, a guarantee of those rights and freedoms for minorities.[24]

The Act additionally strengthens the Constitutional principle of non-discrimination against minorities by stipulating that public authorities are obliged to take appropriate measures in order to: 1) foster full and real equality in the economic, social, political, and cultural spheres of life between people belonging to minorities

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[19] Articles 7-15 of the Act, more comments below in the part on language rights.

[20] Cf. e.g.: K. Henrard, *Non-discrimination and full and effective equality,* in: M. Weller (ed.) (2007), *Universal Minority Rights. A Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies,* New York, pp. 75-147; G. Janusz (2011), *Ochrona...,* pp. 86-99.

[21] In Poland, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms came into force on 19 September 1993, Journal of Laws of 1993, No. 61, item 284.

[22] The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Journal of Laws EU 2010/C 83/02.

[23] Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this European Convention on Human Rights shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, **association with a national minority**, property, birth or other status". Article 21.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides: "Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, **membership of a national minority**, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.".

[24] M. Safjan, *Pozycja mniejszości w Polsce w świetle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego,* pp. 3-5, http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/wiadm/Komunikaty/20031003/20031003.pdf.

and people belonging to the majority; 2) protect people who are an object of discrimination, hostility or violence because of their belonging to a minority; 3) strengthen the inter-cultural dialogue.[25]

However, the enforcement of non-discrimination laws protecting people belonging to national and ethnic minorities does not seem to be sufficient and it is necessary to better prepare competent authorities to prevent violations and punish the violators. Legal solutions on provision of efficient anti-discrimination mechanisms to members of national and ethnic minorities are also criticised. That refers mainly to "multiple discrimination"[26] and "discrimination by association"[27] often experienced by members of national and ethnic groups.[28]

RIGHTS RELATED TO CULTURE

According to the Act, national and ethnic minorities are minorities essentially distinguished from the rest of the citizens by its own language, culture and tradition and guided by the will to maintain that language, culture and tradition. The legislator attributed special importance to rights related to education and culture. The basic source of rights of national and ethnic minorities is Article 35 of the Constitution which reads: "The Republic of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture". Subsequently, it is specified that: " National and ethnic minorities shall have the right to establish educational and cultural institutions, institutions designed to protect religious identity, as well as to participate in the resolution of matters connected with their cultural identity." The first part obliges the state to takes positive actions while the second one obliges it not to interfere and prohibits preventing minorities from exercising their rights.

Article 18 of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language specifies the measures supporting activities aimed at the protection, preservation and development of minorities' cultural identity. It imposes on public authorities the obligation to take appropriate measures including subsidies or rather grants from the state budget for: activities of cultural institutions; publication of books, magazines, periodicals, and leaflets; television programmes and radio broadcasts produced by

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[25] Article 6 of the Act of 6 January 2005 on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language.

[26] Multiple discrimination is one experienced by individuals because of their membership in different groups, i.e. on more than one ground.

[27] Discrimination by association takes place when a person associated with another person who belongs to a particular ethnic minority is treated less favourably because of that association.

[28] Conclusions of non-governmental organisations to the 3rd Report submitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the implementation of provisions of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by the Republic of Poland of 13.12.2012. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring /minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd_SR_Poland_pl.pdf.

minorities; protection of places connected with the minority cultures; activities of community centres and libraries; education of children and youths realised in various forms; and popularisation of knowledge about minorities. The disburser of the grants is the minister responsible for religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities who every year announces procedures for their award.[29] The Act provides that the grants may be awarded without open tender.

In order to cultivate a group culture, it is important to reach members of the group via publications or broadcasts, for which, as written above, the Polish legislator foresaw grants for minorities. Moreover, Article 21 of the Act on (Radio and Television) Broadcasting (29 December 1992)[30] reads that the tasks of public radio and television resulting from their public mission include production and broadcasting and "taking due attention to the needs of national and ethnic minorities and communities speaking a regional language, including broadcasting of news in languages of national and ethnic minorities and regional languages". That Act has also obliged directors of branches of public radio and television that while appointing programme boards of branch units which broadcast programmes in minority languages and regional languages, they must consider candidates proposed by social organisations of national and ethnic minorities and communities speaking a regional language. Thus the legislator ensured that minorities have access to mass media.[31]

RIGHTS RELATED TO EDUCATION

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland provides citizens belonging to national and ethnic minorities with rights related to education, stipulating that they have the freedom to preserve and develop their language, customs, tradition, and culture, and the right to establish their own educational institutions. The above has been expanded in the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, Article 17 of which provides that education in the language of a minority or teaching the language of a minority, its history and culture shall take place in accordance with the principles and procedure laid down in the Act on Education System of 1991.[32] Article 13 of the Act on Education System reads: "public schools shall enable pupils to retain their sense of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, and in particular, shall make it possible for them to learn their own language, history and culture."

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[29] On 24 December 2012, the Minister of Administration and Digitisation announced detailed procedures for granting subsidies/grants for protection, preservation, and development of cultural identity of national and ethnic minorities and regional languages in 2014, https://mac.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2012/ll/Informacja-2014-autograf.pdf.

[30] Journal of Laws of 1993, No. 7, item 34, as amended.

[31] More on the press of national and ethnic minorities in J. Mieczkowski (2010), *Perspektywy i zagrożenia w funkcjonowaniu prasy mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce,* in: T. Gardocka, J. Sobczak, *Prawa...*, pp. 303-313.

[32] Journal of Laws of 1991, No. 95, item 425, as amended.

The teaching of and in a minority language is conducted at the request of parents and may take place in kindergartens, special groups, schools, or inter-school groups. The act provides that necessary textbooks and auxiliary study books may receive additional financing from the state budget. The Act foresaw that detailed conditions and modes of teaching and education were to be laid down in a regulation of the minister competent for education. The regulation in force was issued in 2007[33] that is after the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language came into force. That is why the regulation, apart from languages of national and ethnic minorities, applies also the recognised regional language, i.e. Kashubian.

The regulation grants the right to study the language, history, culture, and geography of the country with the culture of which a given minority identifies, and foresees the option of art classes and other supplementary activities at schools and kindergartens. Such education is organised by the head of the said public institution at a written declaration of parents, and in upper secondary education of students, expressing the desire for that type of education if the requisite number of declarations is received. The minimum number of students depends on the type of school: in kindergartens, primary schools, and lower secondary schools the minimum is 7 students, while in upper secondary schools it is 14 per one class in a year group. If the number of students is below the required thresholds, the teaching is conducted in inter-class groups or groups created by students from different years. The number of students in an inter-class group cannot be less than 14 and in an inter-year group it cannot be not less than 3 and more than 14. The Act provides also that in justified cases and upon consent of the school supervising authority, the number of students in classes and groups may be lower. Furthermore, if the number of students (declarations) in one educational institution is not high enough or there is no teacher, it is possible form a group of students from several kindergartens or schools. The group must consist of 3 to 20 students.[34] In addition, Article 11 of the regulation referred to above provides also for additional support for the Roma minority.

> "1. Schools shall take, if required, additional measures aimed at sustaining and developing the sense of ethnic identity of Roma pupils and supporting the education of these students, particularly through compensatory [remedial] classes. 2. A school may employ a Romani education assistant to support the teacher. The Romani education assistant shall provide Roma students with support in contacts with the school community and cooperate with their parents and with the school".

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[33] Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 14 November 2007 on the conditions and execution of tasks, by kindergartens, schools and public educational institutions, that facilitate the preservation of the sense of national, ethnic and linguistic identity of students belonging to national and ethnic minorities and communities speaking a regional language, Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 214, item 1579, as amended. The regulation repealed the regulation of the Minister of National Education and Sport of 3 December 2002 on the conditions and execution of tasks, by schools and public institutions, that facilitate the preservation of the sense of national, ethnic and linguistic identity of students belonging to national minorities and ethnic groups (Journal of Laws No. 220, item 1853).

[34] Articles 5-8 of the Regulation.

The number of hours of minority and regional language classes is regulated in another regulation[35] and depends on the type of school too. At primary schools providing education in a minority language, a minority language is the language of instruction 14 hours per week in years 1 to 3 and 12 hours per week in years 4 to 6. The latter number of hours, i.e. 12, is offered also in lower and upper secondary schools. In vocational schools there are as many hours of minority language classes as Polish language classes. Students from minorities who learn a minority language and/or other subjects in a minority language may take school-leaving exams (primary school and lower secondary school and upper secondary school) in the minority language (except for exams on Polish language and literature and history and geography of Poland). They may also choose their minority language as an obligatory exam subject (both oral and written examination parts).[36]

As regards education, the issue raised most frequently is that of financing the schools. Teaching a minority language or in a minority language requires additional funds and it seems that state authorities are not always able to effectively encourage schools to provide such education. An additional problem for a number of minorities, especially ethnic ones, is the issue of publishing text books.

LANGUAGE RIGHTS

Article 27 of the Constitution stipulates that "Polish shall be the official language in the Republic of Poland. This provision shall not infringe upon national minority rights resulting from ratified international agreements.". The binding interpretation of "the official language" was provided by the Constitutional Tribunal already on 14 May 1997.[37] The Tribunal stated that the fact that Polish is the official language imposes on all central and local authorities the obligation to carry their administrative work in the Polish language. As the Tribunal wrote in the justification, the differentiation between the state language and the official language may be evoked by "a specific national structure of the society in a given country where ethnic minorities exist and there is a need to ensure their right to use their own national language.". In such situations special legal regulations apply which determine the possible official use of a native language by citizens who do not speak the state language or feel the need to manifest their ethnic distinctness. The obligation to respect Polish as the state language and the official language rests with central and local authorities. It applies to citizens in an indirect way in situations where they fulfil their obligations towards "authorities and administrative offices". In such situations, they must

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[35] Article 4.1 of the Regulation of the Minister of National Education and Sport of 12 February 2002 on the Framework Curricula in Public Schools, Journal of Laws of 2002, No. 15, item 142 as amended.

[36] Articles 36, 54, 55, 57, 58 of the Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 30 April 2007 on the terms and conditions of grading, classifying and promoting pupils and students as well as carrying out tests and examinations in public schools, Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 83, item 562 as amended.

[37] Resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 May 1997, W 7/96; Journal of Laws, No. 53.

take into account the fact that the working language of these entities is Polish. The Tribunal noted also that the limits on the applicability of the obligation to use the Polish language while addressing a citizen are "defined by Constitutional freedoms and civil rights". In this manner the Tribunal indicated that a citizen of Poland who does not speak the state language or feels the need to manifest his or her ethnic distinctness has the right to use his or her native language in every situation where the use the state language is not imposed.[38]

The significance of language rights[39] is demonstrated by the fact that in the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, the legislator included the chapter on the use of minority languages immediately after general provisions and devoted as many as ten Articles, which concern various matters, to that issue. All provisions under the Act apply to a regional language (Kashubian) under the same terms and conditions as those applicable in the case of teaching national and ethnic minorities' languages.

The first provision concerns the right to use and spell ones name and surname in accordance with the pronunciation and spelling principles of a minority language. Polish citizens belonging to national minorities may administratively change their name and surname to a version consistent with their spelling in their native language[40], which especially concerns those people whose surnames were obligatorily polonised in 1952 on the basis of an unpublished regulation issued by the then Prime Minister. As some names and surnames are originally written in an alphabet other than the Latin one, another regulation[41] was issued in 2005 which determines the manner of transliterating Belarusian, Lemko, Armenian, Russian, Ukrainian, Hebrew, and Yiddish names and surnames. Moreover, the transliteration of names and surnames in vital records consistent with their pronunciation and spelling in the native language is also provided for in provisions of bilateral treaties on good neighbourhood and friendly cooperation Poland signed with the Federal Republic of Germany, Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania.[42]

Article 8 of the Act provides citizens belonging to minorities with the right to use the minority language in private and public life and for the purpose of disseminating and exchanging information, posting information of private nature, and teaching/learning the minority language or in the minority language.

Article 9 introduces the option of using a minority language as an auxiliary language in contacts with authorities. This applies to communes where at least 20%

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[38] M. Safjan, *Pozycja...,* pp. 6-8

[39] More on language rights in: G. Janusz (2011), *Ochrona...,* pp. 641-667; J. Plewko (2009), *Mniejszości narodowe w wymiarze lokalnym,* Lublin, pp. 102-122.

[40] Currently, this is regulated by the Act of 17 October 2009 on the Name and Surname Change; Journal of Laws of 2008, No. 220, item 1414, as amended.

[41] Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 30 May 2005 on the manner of transliterating the names and surnames of persons belonging to national and ethnic minorities, written in an alphabet other than the Latin one, Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 102, item 855.

[42] G. Janusz (2010), *Prawa językowe mniejszości narodowych w Polsce,* in: T. Gardocka, J. Sobczak, *Prawa...,* pp. 178-180.

of the population belongs to a minority if the said communes have been entered in the Official Register of Communes in which an auxiliary language is used. It is the Minister competent for religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities who makes such an entry in the register upon an application of the Council of a given commune. The said application must contain both detailed statistical data on the commune and a resolution of the commune Council on the consent on the introduction an auxiliary language. First such bilingual communes were entered into the register in January 2006. Currently there are 31 bilingual communes registered including 22 where the auxiliary language is German, 5 with the Belarusian language, 3 with the Kashubian language, and in one with the Lithuanian language.[43]

Persons belonging to minorities and living in communes where an auxiliary language is used, may address local authorities in the recognised auxiliary language in writing and, at their explicit request, may receive replies in that language. Their motions and applications may also be written in the auxiliary language. The legislator, however, made it explicit that the appeal procedure shall be carried out in the official language only and that no one has the right to avoid the execution of a legal order or decision issued in the official language if circumstances require its immediate execution to meet the order or decision objective.

Another register[44] maintained by the Minister competent for religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities, into which communes may be entered, is the Register of communes in which place names in a minority language are used. On the basis of Article 12 of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, communes with at last 20% of the population being members of a minority, may, in addition to official place names, introduce traditional names of localities, physiographic objects and streets. If a number of residents belonging to a given minority is less than the statutory requirement, the commune must hold consultations on the introduction of a given name and half of its residents taking part in the consultations must support such a proposal. Moreover, the name must be accepted by the Commission on Names of Localities and Physiographic Objects (this requirement does not apply to names of streets). A motion must be presented on the initiative of the commune Council or residents and, later, it must be submitted by the commune

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[43] The list of communes entered in the Official Register of Communes in which an auxiliary language is used is available at https://mac.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Lista-gmin-wpisanych-do-rz%c4%99dowego-Rejestru-Gmin-w-kt%c3%b3rych-jest-u%c5%bcywany-j%c4%99zyk-pomoc-niczy.pdf. The entry principles are regulated by the Regulation of the Ministers of the Interior and Administration on the Official Register of Communes Where an Auxiliary Language Is Used (30 May 2005), Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 102, item 856.

[44] According to the Regulation, there are two separate registers, i.e. of communes where additional names of streets are used and of communes where additional names of localities and physiographic objects are used. Article 2.2 of the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on the Register of communes in which names in a minority language are used and sample forms of applications to enter in that Register and to determine an additional name of a locality or physiographic object in the language of a national or ethnic minority or in a regional language (30 May 2005), Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 102, item 857.

Council to the competent Minister. In the case of motions concerning the name of an inhabited locality, the commune Council is obliged to hold prior consultations with residents of that locality. The names cannot refer back to the names given by authorities of the Third Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1933-1945. So far, alternative names have been introduced in 44 communes.[45] Specific regulations on placing additional names on signs and plaques in minority languages, regarding among others the size and font, are provided in the Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure dated 10 August 2005.[46]

At this point, it is worth underlining that despite the fact that 7 years have passed since the Act was adopted, not many municipalities in which more than 20% of the population speaks a minority or regional language have taken advantage of the statutory opportunities. That has been noticed by central authorities[47] which try to encourage minority communities to exercise their rights provided by the Act.[48]

Translation/transliteration of names and texts on plaques of public offices or institutions, in other important places designed to spread information, in means of transport or intended for the public was possible prior to the adoption of the Act. Such options were provided by the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 2002.[49] It read that a foreign language into which place names and texts may be translated "should be in particular the language of national minorities or ethnic groups living in the territory of the Republic of Poland". Moreover, the Regulation stipulated that translations in a foreign language in regard to national minorities and ethnic groups may be made public in localities in which such communities are organised.

PRIVILEGES RELATED TO ELECTORAL RIGHT

In order to make the chances of entities participating in elections equal, national minorities have been granted certain privileges in respect to the election law. In accordance with the electoral code, committees of national minorities which stand

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[45] Lists of communes entered in the Official Register of Communes in which an auxiliary language is used and the Register of communes in which names in a minority language are used are available at http://mac. bip.gov.pl/rejestry/lista-gmin-wpisanych-na-podstawie-art-12-ustawy-z-dnia-6-stycznia-2005-r.html, data as of 10.05.2013.

[46] Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure on placing additional names in languages of national and ethnic minorities and in a regional language on signs and plaques (10 August 2005), Journal of Laws, No 157, item 1320.

[47] E.g. in the 3rd Report for the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the implementation of provisions of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by the Republic of Poland of 13.12.2012, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3-_FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd_SR_Poland_pl.pdf.

[48] J. Plewko (2009), *Mniejszości...,* pp. 111-113.

[49] Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on cases in which Polish names and texts may be accompanied by their translation into a foreign language (18 March 2002), Journal of Laws of 2002, No. 37, item 349, as amended.

in parliamentary elections do not have to meet the threshold of 5% of valid votes in the country. For this purpose, an electoral committee formed by voters who are members of registered minority organisations must provide relevant information to the State Electoral Committee 5 days before the date of elections at the latest. The information about the minority committee having been established should be supported by a document of a relevant statutory body of the national minority organisation confirming that the committee has been formed by voters who are members of that organisation. The State Electoral Committee will confirm the receipt of the above statement (information and the supporting document) and once the receipt is acknowledged, the statement is binding, i.e. the special electoral right (threshold) is granted.[50] This privilege, however, does not apply to coalition electoral committees.[51] So far, only the electoral committee of the German minority[52] has been successful, i.e. the minority has had its MP(s). In local elections minorities do not enjoy any preferences. Nevertheless, seats in local Councils have been won by candidates of German, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Lemko, and Slovak electoral committees[53].

In the dispute about the registration of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality as an association, one issue was that if it was registered under that name, it would obtain privileges granted to national minorities. Now, under the Act, any legal doubts which might have existed when attempts were made to register the Union of People of Silesian Nationality no longer exist as the Act contains a closed list of national and ethnic minorities. However, there are groups which have not been granted electoral privileges and are interested in obtaining them.

CONCLUSIONS

Summing up, legal protection of national and ethnic minorities in Poland is comprehensive and meets European standards.[54] The basic document which regulates the status of minorities and grants them rights is the Act on National and Ethnic

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[50] Art. 197 of the Act of 5 January 2011 – Electoral Code, Journal of Laws of 2011, No. 21, item 112, as amended. Electoral preferences for minorities were already included in the Ordinance on elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland issued on 28 May 1993, Journal of Laws, No. 45 item 205.

[51] In accordance with the interpretation provided by the Constitutional Tribunal, the Election Ordinance does not provide for any exception to the electoral threshold of 8% for a coalition and that applies also to electoral committees of national minorities. Resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal of 30 April 1997, W 1/97; Journal of Laws, No. 50, item 324.

[52] Official website of the Electoral Committee of German Minority: http://mniejszoscniemiecka.eu/.

[53] G. Janusz (2011), *Ochrona...,* pp. 678-688. Cf. also: J. Plewko (2009), *Mniejszości...,* pp. 175-183.

[54] See also A. Kirpsza, *Status prawny mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce w świetle standardów Rady Europy,* in: J. Jaskiernia (ed.) (2012), *Efektywność europejskiego systemu ochrony praw człowieka,* Toruń, pp. 743-762.

Minorities and Regional Language which strengthens the Constitutional principle of non-discrimination against minorities and grants minorities rights related to education, culture, and the use of their language. In addition, the legislator provided the minorities with certain privileges in respect to the election law.

The new law is not perfect however. For instance, some conditions which must be met by minorities to be considered national or ethnic minorities in Poland and the differentiation between national minorities and ethnic minorities, have raised doubts. Also the lists of minorities are criticised and in particular the fact that they do not include the Silesian and Kashubian minorities. It is also important to note that the Act does not provide for the possibility (or the procedure) of granting the minority status to groups which demand it.

Another issue is the execution of some rights guaranteed in the Act. For instance, so far the current model of funding the education of children and teenagers belonging to minorities is not the best one. The same applies to funding radio and television programmes for minorities broadcast by the public radio broadcaster (Polskie Radio S.A.) and by the public television broadcaster (TVP S.A.). Other examples include bilingual place naming as in many communes entitled to do so that option has not been used. Also many communes entitled to be registered as bilingual (national and auxiliary language) have not registered as such. At present, public authorities take actions to encourage minority communities to exercise their rights provided under the Act to a fuller extent. Another area which seems to require improvement are regulation on combating discrimination.[55]

ABSTRACT

In Poland national and ethnic minorities are protected by law and enjoy numerous rights especially in the sphere of language, education and culture. The basic document that regulates the status of minorities and grants them their respective rights is the Act of 6 January 2005 on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, which strengthens the Constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of belonging to a national or ethnic minority and grants the minorities rights related to education, culture and the use of their language. The aim of this paper is to review legal regulations pertaining to the protection of national and ethnic minorities in Poland, and to point out some problem areas. Issues discussed include definitions of national and ethnic minorities, the principle of equality before the law, rights related to education, culture and minority language as well as privileges in respect to the election law.

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[55] The 3rd Report for the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the implementation of provisions of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by the Republic of Poland. 13.12.2012, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl /monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd-_SR_ Poland_pl.pdf.

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POLAND'S MULTICULTURAL FUTURE VIS-À-VIS CRITICISM OF THE POLICY OF MULTICULTURALISM

POLAND AND ITS MULTICULTURAL POLICY

Multicultural policies of various scope pursued in many European countries, increasingly often meets with uncompromising criticism. Negative opinions about the policy of multiculturalism have been voiced by many European leaders (e.g. Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel). Possible derogations from the Schengen Convention are the subject of discussions aimed at preventing the undesired influx of foreigners, and Romania and Bulgaria have not yet been admitted to the Schengen area. European countries long known for their tolerance of explicit otherness, such as the Netherlands, are changing their policies. In a national referendum, Switzerland, known as the stronghold of ideological neutrality, has decided to forbid construction of minarets. Changes in Europe are huge but they may be difficult to see from the Polish perspective. As Poland still is not perceived as a country attractive to immigrants (especially in comparison to the "old" EU15), there has been no public debate on integration and social policy towards immigrants. In Poland, apart from few expert papers and occasional media interest in the fate of some individuals, most information on multicultural policy is presented through the prism of affluent western countries. However, the situation in Poland may change radically in the nearest future. The reasons may be Poland's economic growth as well as (or first of all) a policy change in other EU members states, and the unstable economic and political situation in Poland's close and distant neighbours. That is why it is important to be prepared in advance, starting from today.

The need of an immigration policy in Poland has been evidenced by experiences of western European countries which too late started to treat immigrants (and later also their children) as an important element of their societies, and by immigrants' experience in Poland, which does not instil optimism. The latter issue has recently been studied by a growing number of researchers. It is apparent that immigrants' integration encounters difficulties today. However, as the number of immigrants is relatively low in Poland, immigration issues are much less present in the public debate than in "old" Europe. So far, the approach to immigrants is based on the belief that their stay in Poland will be temporary. Indeed, in many cases that approach is

conducive to Poland being treated, by people who want to emigrate from their own country, as a migration transition country on the road to the final destination place and not as the place of new permanent residence. Unfortunately, such a policy approach tends to ignore persons who settle in Poland for good and this contributes to difficulties they have while integrating with Polish society and in their daily functioning. Today it is a micro-scale issue which concerns individuals and small groups but, in the future, it may become a critical issue for the general public as it is now in France and the UK. The lack of a carefully designed policy towards immigrants for whom Poland is the country of destination is likely to cause to a delayed and heated dispute in the future.

The current policy towards immigrants and their situation in Poland have been analysed in numerous studies including studies on the contacts of immigrants with Polish public offices. The said contacts are frequently the first ones after the arrival in Poland and concern most important issues such as employment, accommodation and health care. Recent research demonstrates that very few public administration institutions are well prepared to assists foreigners. It has been pointed out that many civil servants have a dismissive attitude to immigrants which follows from their belief that foreigners are not the most important group in need. Another issue raised in particular by immigrants from the East is the xenophobic behaviour of civil servants who, guided by stereotypes or biases, address the foreigners in a patronising way.[1] Also institutions which exclusively serve foreigners and specialised departments in voivodship administration employ staff without proper training on dealing with immigrants who are their usual clients. If appropriate courses on multicultural communication were obligatory, civil servants would be less surprised with foreigners' conduct resulting from foreign cultures, culture shock or stages of integration processes. Many civil servants do not speak English or do it unwillingly and they do not know Russian and Ukrainian which the majority of their clients use.[2] The unavailability of information about procedures in foreign languages, contradictory information and expectations that a foreigner will speak Polish or bring with him or her translations of necessary documents, all result in multiple visits of immigrants to public administration offices in order to resolve a single issue.[3]

Migrants do not always feel comfortable even while dealing with institutions designed to protect them. When they inform the police that they have been victims of racially motivated crimes, they are often ignored by police officers not willing to accept a racial motivation behind criminal acts.[4] Immigrants who were forced to leave

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[1] W. Klaus, *Cudzoziemiec w urzędzie. Czy polskie urzędy są przygotowane do obsługi obcokrajowców?,* in: J. Frelak (ed.) (2010), *Dyskusja o integracji. Wybór tekstów Polskiego Forum Integracyjnego*, Warszawa, pp. 141-145.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 147.

[3] E. Nowicka, A. Winiarska, *Polska w doświadczeniach długoletnich imigrantów,* in: W. Klaus (ed.) (2010), *Sąsiedzi czy intruzi? O dyskryminacji cudzoziemców w Polsce,* Warszawa, p. 154.

[4] W. Klaus, K. Wencel (2010), *Dyskryminacja cudzoziemców w Polsce 2008-2010,* in: W. Klaus (ed.), *Sąsiedzi czy intruzi?...,* pp. 114-118.

their country and stay in refugee centres speak of violence experienced from security guards and cleaners who apply "their own" rules in the absence of other staff.[5] Other negative practices, yet for another reason, take place in institutions providing social and family care which variously interpret regulations on integration assistance to refugees and persons granted subsidiary protection. Integration assistance includes Polish language courses, assistance in finding a job and accommodation, and, generally, assistance such people need to settle in Poland.[6] Access to health care services, in terms of legal regulations, is not an issue, i.e. immigrants whose status has been regulated[7] are guaranteed the same access as Polish citizens. To other groups of immigrants only the emergency medical service is provided free of charge. As the income of the latter is low, they are incapable of using other chargeable services. Thus, they are practically excluded from the health care system because of their legal and economic status/situation.[8]

Also the labour market, and that refers both to attitudes and procedures, is not very friendly to immigrant jobseekers[9] and entrepreneurs. In a pilot survey carried in 2010 by the Institute of Public Affairs, persons whose surnames suggested their non-Polish origin had smaller chances of being invited to a job interview than persons with Polish surnames and citizenship who had exactly the same qualifications and *curriculum vitae* formatted alike. According to authors of the survey report: "from among 167 employers to whom applications were sent on behalf of a Pole and a foreigner, 19 invited one or both to an interview or expressed their positive interest in an applicant in some other way. In the case of a candidate with Polish citizenship, 10 applications had to be sent to receive one interview invitation. In the case of a foreigner, almost 17 applications had to be sent to receive one invitation"[10]. It must be added that the unequal treatment of jobseekers because of their origin, discourages immigrants from taking legal jobs. That is not in the interest of the state

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[5] W. Klaus (2010), *Cudzoziemiec w urzędzie… .* See also: W. Klaus (ed.) (2011), *Słabe ogniwa. Wyzwania dla funkcjonowania systemu ochrony uchodźców w Polsce,* Warszawa.

[6] W. Klaus, K. Makaruk, K. Wencel, J. Frelak (co-authors) (2011), *Odmowa przyznania pomocy integracyjnej – prawo i praktyka,* Warszawa, pp. 27-28.

[7] It means having a health insurance contract with the National Health Fund and having paid obligatory contributions, or having other required documents e.g. a document confirming the amount of income or, in case of immigrants who were forced to leave their country, a referral issued by a physician working at a refugee centre.

[8] B. Jabłecka (2012), *Strukturalne i kulturowe przeszkody w dostępie imigrantów do ochrony zdrowia. Analiza źródeł zastanych,* Warszawa, p. 9. See also: A. Chrzanowska, W. Klaus (eds) (2011), *Poza systemem. Dostęp do ochrony zdrowia nieudokumentowanych migrantów i cudzoziemców ubiegających się o ochronę międzynarodową*, Warszawa; D. Cianciara, K. Dudzik, A. Lewczuk, J. Pinkas (2012), *Liczba, charakterystyka i zdrowie imigrantów w Polsce,* "Problemy Higieny i Epidemiologii" Vol. 93, pp. 143-150.

[9] M. Bieniecki, M. Pawlak (2010), *Strategie ukraińskich migrantów zarobkowych wobec polskiej rzeczywistości instytucjonalnej,* Warszawa, p. 63.

[10] K. Wysieńska (2010), *Nguyen, Serhij, czy Piotr? Pilotażowe badanie audytowe dyskryminacji cudzoziemców w rekrutacji*, Warszawa, pp. 21-22.

and, in a long run, may lead to exacerbated conflicts between immigrants and state authorities.[11]

A survey conducted among Vietnamese and Chinese minorities in Poland indicates that the state should also take steps supporting business activities of immigrant entrepreneurs. Issues that call for resolutions include procedures for obtaining a permit to conduct a business activity and unfriendly conduct of controlling inspection services and uniformed services.[12]

Difficulties faced by foreigners while adapting to and integrating with Polish society have their sources in procedures and law, and also in negative or ambivalent attitudes towards cultural and physical differences and in the need to compete with immigrants for economic goods.[13] This brings another challenge for immigration policy: raising inter-cultural competences of Polish citizens and supporting initiatives conducive to cooperation between immigrants and the Polish majority.[14]

A comprehensive conceptualization of difficulties immigrants from Arab countries have in Poland was the objective of the research part of the project titled "Otwieramy Poznań" [Opening Poznań]. Surveys and interviews conducted with immigrants allowed to identify five negative aspects of the functioning of the Muslim community in Poznań: language barriers, insufficient support from central and local authorities, a negative image among other residents of the city, a negative image in local and national media, and a feeling of not being safe.[15] The results show that the difficult situation of some immigrants has its roots not only in activities of various offices or services but also in common conduct patterns and stereotypes which the media discourse on immigrants endorses and revives.

Natural consequences of the aforementioned challenges are both, the postulates voiced by various communities to introduce a policy of multiculturalism, and an intensified criticism of the policy of multiculturalism and attempts at obstructing its application in Poland. Along the current immigrants' inflow and the tense situation in western European countries and the increasingly frequent use of immigration issues in electoral campaigns there, the issue of the policy of multiculturalism has become an increasingly important topic of discussions and disputes.

The debate on the policy of multiculturalism must take into consideration the situation in countries which long had or have had such a policy. Thus, it is to be expected that the western criticism of multiculturalism as the answer to integration

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[11] K. Iglicka (2013), *Raport: Imigranci pilnie potrzebni,* "Fundacja Energia dla Europy" No. 8, p. 2.

[12] I. Jóźwiak, Z. Karpiński, A. Piłat, J. Segeś-Frelak, K. Wysieńska, *Wnioski i rekomendacje,* in: K. Wysieńska (ed.) (2012), *Sprzedawać, gotować, budować. Plany i strategie Chińczyków i Wietnamczyków w Polsce*, Warszawa, pp. 165-166.

[13] E. Nowicka, A. Winiarska (2010), *Polska w doświadczeniach długoletnich imigrantów...,* p. 159.

[14] I. Jóźwiak, Z. Karpiński, A. Piłat, J. Segeś-Frelak, K. Wysieńska (2012), *Wnioski i rekomendacje...,* p. 168.

[15] G. Kruk, O. Samelak, Ł. Skoczylas, A. Smirnow, *Projekt Otwieramy Poznań,* unpublished report on the animation and research project. The project "Opening Poznań" was carried out by the Institute of Psychology at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań from October 2010 to February 2012.

issues, will be transplanted to Poland. My intention is to review possible sources of that criticism without deciding whether such criticism is justified or not (or whether its assessment beyond politics in its narrow sense is possible at all). Criticism of the policy of multiculturalism is a multifaceted phenomenon and its genesis is obviously complex. Therefore, I my review may not be covering all possible perspectives on its reasons. For the sake of simplicity, will focus only on those aspects of the multicultural policy which concern immigrants from Muslim countries.

In order to make my review more specific, I will follow the definition of multiculturalism given by Marian Golka:

> multiculturalism is an informed coexistence within the same area (or in the immediate neighbourhood without any clear divisions, or in a situation where aspirations to occupy the same area meet) of two or more social groups with relatively distinctive cultural features such as external appearance, language, religious denomination, system of values, etc., which contribute to mutual recognition of otherness with its various implications[16].

It is important to add, as Golka did, that a characteristic feature of thus understood multiculturalism is not only the objectivity of its manifestations but also mutual relations between the involved.

FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE END OF MULTICULTURAL POLICY

Let us start the review of possible sources of the critique of the multicultural policy with what to many appears the most obvious. The global financial crisis reached Europe with certain delay, but its consequences are difficult to overestimate. From the Polish perspective, among most threatened countries only Ireland was perceived as a popular migration destination but migrants headed also for Spain, Portugal, Italy, and even Greece. In this context the role of Spain is particularly important. Many people from Latin American countries still perceive it as the Promised Land because of the high living standards but primarily because of cultural similarity and the lack a major language barrier. Spain is also geographically close of Arab countries. Today, Spain has a high unemployment rate and Spanish people organise numerous protests against the economic policy of the government but more so against the whole political elite. The economic crisis has made the unemployment rate among the autochthonic population rise, which, in turn, translates into a growing aversion towards immigrants. This seemingly obvious process, is often ignored in analyses of the situation in western Europe. The main reason is that the criticism of immigrant communities focuses on cultural factors and integration issues, whereas speaking about "taking away the jobs" is perceived as populism and negatively assessed. That does not change the fact that radicalisation of the political scene in EU countries is

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[16] M. Golka (2010), *Imiona wielokulturowości,* Warszawa, pp. 64-65.

growing (one may suspect that this is a natural outcome of the crisis and cultural changes), and that the "job stealing" argument is increasingly often used openly. Technological revolution, which has reduced the number of workplaces, is also seen as a source of problems. That refers primarily to production industries which, in the past, grew rapidly and offered immigrants regular employment contracts.[17] Looking for reasons for criticism of the multicultural policy in the deteriorating economic situation is tempting, however, that connection is not obvious for everyone. Research on twelve European countries[18] demonstrated that aversion towards immigrants grows along growing affluence. Recognising the relevance of that research findings, it needs to be concluded that it is impossible to say whether the economic crisis has markedly influenced the perception of immigrants and/or whether the present situation is the culmination of a long process which might be independent from economic developments. However, the fact remains that the dismantling of support systems for immigrants and all other minorities facilitates savings needed in the time of crisis.

EUROPEAN PESSIMISM AND MULTICULTURALISM

It is possible, however, that the crisis has an impact on the criticism of the multicultural policy but in a different and not so obvious way. The idea of a united Europe has failed. Ten years ago, the idea of a united Europe as a new world superpower was commonly accepted if not in the military than at least in the economic sense. The transformation of the European Union in this sort of the world power was supported by the Lisbon strategy and political initiatives such as the enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, a reform of EU management and the EU Constitution project. The implementation of the Lisbon strategy failed, the Constitution was rejected by two European countries in national referendums, and enlargement of the Union (especially that in 2007) has been criticised. For the critics, the situation in Bulgaria and Romania has become the symbol of undue haste in letting new countries join the European community. All that has raised concerns of Euro-enthusiast and fuelled criticism from Euro-sceptics. Those events are described in pronouncements prophesying a crisis of traditional European values. Walter Laqueur[19] skilfully links the above to the growing number of immigrants and their descendants, predicting the ultimate collapse of the European civilisation. His thesis is that pessimism present in Europe of today results from the awareness of the political class of European countries that the entire continent faces a crisis. This pessimism appears to be

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[17] W. Hładkiewicz, *Obcy w wielokulturowej Europie – casus francuski,* in: D. Angutek (ed.) (2009), *"Obcy" w przestrzeni kulturowej współczesnej Europy*, Zielona Góra, p. 105 ff.

[18] Authors of this research are Semyonov, Rajiman, and Gorodzeisky. After: J. Hryniewicz, *Polityka wielokulturowości a imigranci islamscy w Europie Zachodniej,* in: S. Kapralski (ed.) (2010), *Pamięć, przestrzeń, tożsamość*, Warszawa, pp. 143-169.

[19] W. Laqueur (2007), *The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent*, New York [Polish translation: *Ostatnie dni Europy. Epitafium dla Starego Kontynentu,* Wrocław 2008].

even deeper in the light of the still recent thesis about the bright future of Europe as the new world power.[20]

Besides, a belief in Europe's bright future was not limited to Europe. It might have been that American liberals terrified of the success of euro and the road taken by their country under the rule of George W. Bush, were actually the strongest source of that belief. The effective introduction of the new currency into markets was a blow for America. The American dollar symbolised the economic power of the US which was thought to have been decisive in winning the Cold War and defeating the Soviet Union. Thomas Roy Reid, the author of *United States of Europe: The new superpower and the end of American supremacy*, titled a chapter of his book devoted to euro: *The Almighty Undollar*.[21] American intellectual elite was also strongly concerned about the growing debt of the United States, decades-long problems with the health care system, and political confusion of the state which by many was considered the only superpower in the world. The confusion was especially painful if compared with the great ideas and projects implemented on the "other" shores of two big oceans surrounding North America, that is in Europe and China. In the world where a collapse of national states and the clash of civilisations were predicted, the European Union was supposed to grow to be the example of a new organisation fitting the changing world and leading it. All of that (and probably many other factors) was the source of great expectations for Europe on both sides of the Atlantic. When it turned out that the Union was not able to meet them, pessimism arose. Nowadays, even those who adhered to the vision of the bright future of Europe write that the situation has changed not as expected (e.g. Charles Kupchan, author of the book entitled *The end of the American era*[22]).

Theses about the collapse of Europe coexist with theses about its growing Islamisation and inefficient multicultural policy which together transform old European democracies into Muslim countries. Therefore, the conservative model depicts Europe as a civilisation in its final stage, bored and sluggish, incapable of meeting requirements imposed by the outside world and, at the same time, not caring about its demographic and ideological cohesion. Europe has brought disappointment to its enthusiasts. At the same time Euro-sceptics have argued against the European life style and for urgent changes. These two phenomena shape the criticism of EU policy towards immigrants. The more apocalyptic the mood is, the fiercer is the criticism. It is not difficult to see that at the present stage of the crisis, in a situation where many European countries suffer financial problems, the collapse of Europe may seem more imminent and real than ever (surely since 1989).

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[20] *Ibidem.*

[21] T. R. Reid (2005), *The United States of Europe. The new superpower and the end of American supremacy,* New York.

[22] Cf. Ch. Kupchan (2011), *Niedemokratyczne kapitalizmy i nieliberalne demokracje,* "Europa" No. 7, pp. 10-13.

GLOBALISATION AND MUTLICULTURAL POLICY

Janusz Hryniewicz[23] underlines that the number of immigrants in a given area and their ethnicity have an impact on attitudes towards them. If that is so, then it may be not only the actually growing number of foreigners but also their perceived presence that matter. New generations of immigrants enter the political, cultural, and economic arena. They are not satisfied with the mere fact of residing in a given country and earning their living there. They are more visible than their parents, which, subsequently, may give rise to a feeling of not being safe. If we try to view contemporary multiculturalism in such categories, the criticism of multiculturalism is a manifestation of an ethnic conflict.

It is worth linking the above with the decreasing importance of the US in the global world. Sometimes, conflicts resulting from multiculturalism arise where there is no hegemon.[24] That is so because the leader's perception of multicultural issues can be top-down and the hegemon will act accordingly to maintain order. At the same time, the hegemon does not allow for any grass-root actions because they are perceived as a threat to the leader's authority. Obviously, this does not alter the fact that multiculturalism may function peacefully in democracy (or, in a politically multi-polar system). Referring back to Marian Golka's considerations[25], the conditions for such a state of affairs are awareness and acceptance of multiculturality treated as a value and recognition of positive characteristics of specific cultures and positive features resulting from their interaction. Peaceful multiculturality is also supported by efficient inter-group communication, training, and the tolerant approach (policy) of the majority towards the minority and of the minority towards the majority. Viewing globalisation optimistically, it can be argued that the growing awareness of the world's diversity limits outbursts of potential conflicts.[26] Such an optimistic perspective, however, is not the only one. Arjun Appadurai is of the opinion that, under globalisation conditions, "the cultural field is the main one in which fantasies of purity, authenticity, borders, and security can be enacted"[27]. Immigrants as representatives of minorities are in this sense the first victims of fear, the source of which is beyond their control. Appadurai comments further on minorities, saying that: "Their languages exacerbate worries about national cultural coherence. Their lifestyles are easy ways to displace widespread tensions in society […]"[28]. External political changes (emergence of a multi-polar world, globalisation) interact with in-

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[23] J. Hryniewicz (2010), *op. cit.*

[24] M. Golka, *Oblicza wielokulturowości,* in: M. Kempny, A. Kapciak, S. Łodziński (ed.) (1997), *U progu wielokulturowości*, Warszawa, p. 60; M. Golka (2010), *Imiona...,* p. 123.

[25] *Ibidem,* pp. 123-137.

[26] Cf. *ibidem,* pp. 115-116.

[27] A. Appadurai (2006), *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger,* Duke University Press*,* Durham, NC, p.23 [Polish translation: *Strach przed mniejszościami. Esej o geografii gniewu*, Warszawa, 2009, p. 30].

[28] *Ibidem,* p. 45 [Polish translation p. 50].

ternal factors (growing numbers of immigrants, coming of age of immigrants' new generations). Due to all that, the importance of issues connected with immigration grows in political debates and the policy of multiculturalism becomes the epitome of failed attempts to handle the present situation. Thus the policy of multiculturalism is more intensely criticised. On the other hand, multicultural policy is also perceived as a consequence of globalisation. Andrzej Szahaj[29] links that perspective to the growing desire to search for differences in the unifying reality. Most probably, globalisation has a two-sided impact, i.e. on both the supporters of multicultural policy and its critics.

MULTICULTURALISM VERSUS UNIFICATION: DESCENDANTS OF IMMIGRANTS

Both, the growing numbers of immigrants and their stronger visibility in streets of western European cities evoke a feeling of cultural otherness followed by criticism of multicultural policy. Actually, contrary to popular opinions, that feeling does not necessarily mean that "the multicultural society does not work". The problem with such a thesis is its hidden confusion of terms, namely, multiculturalism is taken as a synonym of unification. Noticing the otherness of immigrants does not prove the failure of multicultural policy because the objective of the latter is peaceful co-existence of people of various cultures within the same area. In its western European variant, multicultural policy has been implemented through "cultural neutrality of the state"[30]. That ideology leads to the acceptance of the equality of cultures and the diversity of sources from which people living in a given territory may draw to construe their identities. In terms of state activities, it includes alignment of various administration capacities to provide quality services to persons lacking cultural competencies traditional for a given community. Frequently, that includes making regularisation and obtaining a work permit or even citizenship easier. State activities include also anti-discrimination regulations and financial support for minority groups.[31] Criticism of such a policy may result from the fact that its introduction "strengthens the cultural distance between immigrants and natives"[32]. Paradoxically, the policy of cultural neutrality in a way entails an attempt of public authorities to impose on a given community their interpretation of its culture. Janusz Hryniewicz[33] gives an example of a German court which invoked its own interpretation of the Quran in a divorce case of a Muslim couple. Marek Krajewski[34], in turn, underlines

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[29] *A. Szahaj (2004), E pluribus unum? Dylematy wielokulturowości i politycznej poprawności,* Kraków, p. 133.

[30] J. Hryniewicz (2010), *op. cit.,* p. 146.

[31] Cf. J. Niessen, T. Huddleston, L. Citron (2007), *Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX),* Brussels.

[32] J. Hryniewicz (2010), *op. cit.,* p. 149.

[33] *Ibidem,* p. 151.

[34] M. Krajewski, *Paradoksy wielokulturowości,* in: R. Cichocki (ed.) (1997), *Teorie społeczne a możliwości praktyczne*, Poznań.

that the idea of multiculturalism is, in fact, inextricably linked to European human-
ism and as such is mono-cultural in its nature. Those arguments sound convincing
and today they are as valid as they were many years ago when multicultural policy
was implemented and its criticism was not so common. What has changed, then?
Assuming that the interpretation given above is correct, multiculturalism has been
confused with unification. It was thought that multicultural policy would eventually
result in immigrants becoming similar – in the cultural sense – to traditional natives.
Such a conviction might have resulted from ethnocentrism or a belief in the incredi-
ble plasticity of human habits. "Is the attractive power of the European way of life so
small that it will be overwhelmed by foreign customs and habits?", asked Laqueur[35]
That is now coupled with a political activity of immigrants and their descendants
which is not radical[36] but clearly demonstrates that the old model of functioning of
immigrants, which consists in "bribing" them with regular employment and rela-
tive tolerance in exchange for them not interfering with politics, works no longer.
Perhaps, this causes the dissatisfaction with multicultural policy. One may argue that
immigrants are tolerated only as a cheap and unqualified workforce, politically inac-
tive and not benefiting from economic growth on equal terms. Of course, sometimes,
moral aspects of that fact are underlined but that hardly influences the actual policy.[37]
On the other hand, one must not forget that migration (including labour migration)
is nothing new and descendant of old immigrants are now an important part of many
European societies.

MULTICULTURALISM VERSUS UNIFICATION: ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

The perception of multicultural policy as a policy of unification matters also in
situations where Islam is perceived as a threat. Christianity happens to be seen as
part of both the European identity and the identity of individual nations. Surveys
conducted in the UK, Ireland, Netherlands, and Denmark[38] have demonstrated that
persons who identify themselves with Christianity are actually more likely to per-
ceive immigration as a threat to their national identity. Majority of western Euro-
pean countries, however, have introduced the strict separation of religion and state,
and the number of religious believers has not grown recently (at least significantly).
Thus, religion is hardly the source of the recent intense criticism of multicultural pol-
icy. Another thesis, however, seems more probable, i.e. that Islam would be accepted
more widely and would not be treated as a threat if the Muslim minority underwent

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[35] W. Laqueur (2008), *op. cit.,* p. 6.

[36] I. Buruma (2011), *Dwie rewolucje,* "Europa" No. 7, p. 20.

[37] Cf. W. Żelazny, *Tubylcy i Barbarzyńcy wieloetnicznych aglomeracji,* in: B. Jałowiecki, E. A. Se-
kuła (eds) (2011), *Metropolie mniejszości w metropoliach*, Warszawa.

[38] I. Storm (2011), *"Christian nations"? Ethnic Christianity and anti-immigration attitudes in four
western European countries,* "Nordic Journal of Religion and Society" Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 75-96.

the laicisation process quickly. Islam could be commonly accepted as a minority religion within a given minority on the same principles as other religions are accepted. An indirect proof of that can be the enormous support provided by the right side of the political scene to those immigrants and their descendants who support a radical change of Islam, its "Europeanisation", or decide to abandon their faith (as greatly illustrated with the Dutch example described by Ian Buruma[39]). Also it is not clear to what extent immigrants and their descendants are religious because data available differ and suggest that the degree of religiousness depends on education and income more than on the length of stay in a given country.[40] Most probably, religiosity of immigrants and of the native population changes alike. Attitudes of immigrants' descendants have been grouped as follows: (i) full acceptance of the culture of the country of residence, (ii) an attempt at keeping a balance between requirements of both cultures, and (iii) total rejection of the culture of the country of residence.[41]

Of course, Islam arouses stronger emotions due to the fact that it is identified with terrorism and linked to internal and foreign policies of Arab countries. That happens despite European conflicts having, in fact, not much in common with the reality in Arab countries.[42] The assessment of Islam is conditioned by the assessment of the oppressive treatment of women which has been an argument for introducing changes in the law (e.g. ban on face veils) in a number of European countries. Finally, the image of Islam is strongly influenced by some religious organisations which, due to their radical character, draw attention of many people. It might have been that Islam was long tolerated because it was hoped that, with time, it would lose its influence on immigrant communities. Not only people who considered Christianity to be part of the cultural identity of a given country were fond of such an idea but also persons who perceived religion as the source of negative social phenomena. When their expectations were not met, the policy of tolerance towards Islamic cultures begun to be criticised.

Those two approaches are reflected in the two ways of understanding the functioning of democratic societies distinguished by Bert van den Brink.[43] In the first one, a resident of a given country cannot be a competent member of a democratic society unless he or she belongs to a political community which recognises the primacy of secular legal norms. The second understanding allows for norms based on

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[39] I. Buruma (2006), *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance*, New York [Polish translation: *Śmierć w Amsterdamie. Zabójstwo Theo van Gogha i granice tolerancji,* Kraków 2006].

[40] W. Laqueur (2008), *op. cit.,* p. 39.

[41] K. Szyniszewska, *W poszukiwaniu swojej tożsamości – drugie pokolenie imigrantów,* in: D. Lalak (ed.) (2007), *Migracja, uchodźstwo, wielokulturowość. Zderzenie kultur we współczesnym świecie*, Warszawa.

[42] Cf. I. Buruma (2011), *Dwie rewolucje...,* p. 23.

[43] B. van den Brink, *Imagining civic relations in moment of their break down: a crisis of civic integrity in the Netherlands,* in: A. Simon Laden, D. Owen (eds) (2007), *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*, New York, p. 356.

religious concepts of good but only when such norms contain similarly understood values e.g. individual independence. Thus, in essence, both concepts exclude from a democratic debate people who do not share democratic values understood in the European way. The concepts differ only in respect to the genesis of those values seeing their source either in religion or in its separation from the political life. The resulting different approaches are visible mainly in internal divisions within a political community characteristic of the Western culture and they do not have much to do with the immigration issue as such. Thus the immigration issue is interpreted within approaches alien to immigration, and this leads to two positions: (i) the acceptance of immigrants on the condition that, in the political life, they reject the values dictated by their religiosity, and (ii) immigrants shall interpret their religiosity in such a way that their religious values will coincide with the liberal interpretation of Christianity.

In deliberations on the issue of religions, the question is whether peaceful co-existence of two very different religious systems within one political community is possible. The issue of different religions within one multicultural society has been discussed many times. The ecumenical dialogue[44] and the setting of religiosity apart from the identity of a given community[45] were supposed to facilitate that coexistence. Despite various theoretical advantages of such solutions, they are extremely difficult to implement in practice.

Religious issues continue to be the basis for the critique of multicultural policy, especially once Christianity is considered be the characteristic of the national identity of a European country. Melanie Phillips criticises the above and her example is the UK where the heir to the throne said that he no longer believed that "Britain is or should be a Christian country" and her comment is that his "renunciation of the bedrock religious settlement of the British national amounts to a repudiation of national identity"[46].

Another issue is to what extent the phenomena, currently not approved of in western European countries, have their roots in the religion of immigrants and to what extent their roots are traditions of the lands the immigrants come from.[47] Explanations referring to certain traditional (local) behaviours are tempting as they explain the diversity of customs related to religion. Such explanations, however, are based on what is hardly visible to outsiders and thus they do not shape opinions about immigrants effectively. Popular opinions are (and, probably, will be) dominated by the stereotype of an Arab or, less frequently, a Turk. A stereotype ignores details of the origin of a given person or family. Stereotypes can be embedded in the public

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[44] Cf. L. Gęsiak (2007), *Wielokulturowość. Rola religii w dynamice zjawiska,* Kraków, p. 200.

[45] A. Maalouf (1998), *Les identités meurtrières*, Paris [Polish tranlsation: *Zabójcze tożsamości,* Warszawa 2002, p. 110].

[46] M. Phillips (2006), *Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within*, New York, p. 66 [Polish translation: *Londonistan. Jak Wielka Brytania stworzyła państwo terroru,* Warszawa, 2010, p. 129].

[47] I. Buruma (2006), *Murder in Amsterdam...* [Polish translation: p. 132].

discourse much more easily if attention is drawn to a negative impact of not the entire community of immigrants but of its part (of course, the most significant one). It would be difficult to reasonably argue that all or the majority of western European Muslims are extremists and thus it is argued that extremists are the immigrants' elite. That argument is put forward by for instance Melanie Phillips who writes that "the British Muslim establishment has itself been hijacked by extremist elements"[48]. Such an assessment facilitates the critique of multicultural policy avoiding the necessity to prove that all immigrants, be it Muslims or members of any other minority, are to be blamed for extremism.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONALITIES

The policy of multiculturalism would probably never be possible if a series of historical events did not happen. World War II bluntly revealed the sinister potential of racism and nationalism. The collapse of western European colonial empires was the direct reason for large number immigrants coming to old metropolises. Possibly, the fight for equal rights of Afro-Americans in the United States played a role as well.[49] From those historical events grew out the conviction that cultural diversity had to be accepted.[50] That idea, in turn, has become the foundation of the policy of multiculturalism. However, many years have passed since the said historical events and the influence of their direct witnesses on politics and the general public is increasingly weaker. Lessons of the past are being forgotten and the fears of the past give way to a rational assessment of the present. Maybe that is why there is the dissatisfaction with multicultural policy and the calls for an end of tolerance for phenomena which not so long time ago did not evoke negative emotions or were judged in the light of the past crimes of European nationalisms. Following Golka's deliberations[51], we can say that as far as multiculturalism is concerned, western societies increasingly crave order where there is chaos.

Another issue is the perception of immigrants as an internal political threat. As mentioned above, political activities of the majority of immigrant communities are probably far from being radical and concentrate on the fight for better living conditions. But that does not change the fact that the demands of radical communities are often shocking to the general public and influence the perception of the entire immigrant minority. In this way, the Muslim minority is commonly associated with terrorism and anti-Semitism. These two associations, for obvious reasons, evoke horror in a large part of European societies and their political elites.

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[48] After M. Phillips (2006), *op. cit.,* p. 5 [43].

[49] Ch. W. Mills, *Multiculturalism as/and/or anti-racism?*, in: A. Simon Laden, D. Owen (2007) (eds), *Multiculturalism...*

[50] Cf. J. Hryniewicz (2010), *op. cit.,* pp. 143-145.

[51] M. Golka, *Wielokulturowość: między ładem a chaosem,* in: R. Cichocki (ed.) (1997), *Teorie społeczne...*

Then there is also the political struggle for power in which minorities are not the agents but objects of political efforts to win more electoral votes for a given party. The left side of the political scene, traditionally fighting for good treatment of minorities, opposes the right wing which traditionally concentrates on national and religious issues. The thing is that those old political divisions become blurred in societies with a large number of immigrants. And so, the Left, supporting equal (and sometimes affirmative) treatment of immigrants, is criticised for the actual or alleged abandonment of Enlightenment ideas which guided it in the past. The criticism concerns mainly the attitude to religion which, in accordance with broadly understood postulates of the Enlightenment, should be separated as clearly as possible from politics. The point is that some immigrant communities are perceived as obvious adherents of Islam and the support for their postulates is treated as a support for that religion.[52] In disputes on that issue, it has been argued that Enlightenment liberalism actually promotes racism.[53] The leftists, traditionally considered the main power opposing nationalism, are also accused of supporting Arab anti-Semitism, which again results from their support for immigrant communities that are perceived as radically anti-Semitic.[54]

In this context, Lidia Nowakowska[55] has offered an interesting analysis of the growing importance of right-wing parties. In her interpretation, the right wing (especially its populist part) has profited from European integration which re-introduced the issue of sovereignty of national states into the political discourse and that has led to the growth of classical nationalism. The enemy of nationalism is "the other" and the immigrant is the other who can be most easily noticed, named, and singled out.

One must not forget that the policy of multiculturalism has introduced many changes opposed by people with traditionalist views. The changes were usually introduced at the local level and consisted in, *inter alia*, replacing traditional names or rituals with new ones which were not related to the Christian religion. An example is the replacement of "Christmas" with "winter festivals".[56] Melanie Phillips links such behaviours with the feeling of fear about the future fate of the dominant culture (in the cases described by her that refers to the British culture), which is treated worse than the other ones. That strand of criticism of multiculturalism assumes that the growth or just co-inhabitation of cultures different from the dominant one, will result in diminishing the importance of the latter, inhibiting its growth, and even making it fall. Such an argumentation echoes the critique prophesising the fall of Europe

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[52] Cf. I. Buruma, (2006), *Murder in Amsterdam...*

[53] E.g. Ch. W. Mills (2007), *op. cit.*

[54] Cf. M. Phillips (2010), *op. cit.,* p. 203; A. Finkielkraut (2003), *Au nom de l'autre**, réflexion sur l'antisémitisme qui vient*, Paris and the foreword by K. Gebert [the Polish translation: *W imię Innego. Antysemicka twarz lewicy*, Warszawa, 2005, pp. 5-44].

[55] L. Nowakowska, *Imigracja muzułmańska a fundamentalizm polityczny w Europie,* in: M. Szulakiewicz, Z. Karpus (ed.) (2005), *Fundamentalizm i kultury*, Toruń.

[56] After M. Phillips (2010), *op. cit.,* p. 123.

or of the European culture under the pressure of Muslim immigrants, which was mentioned above. Here comes the question about the extent to which multicultural policy is, in practice, the reflection of the idea of peaceful cooperation or coexistence of many cultures within one area, and to what extent it is a consent to transfer various non-European ethnocentrisms to Europe (this issue is discussed by Andrzej Szahaj who uses the American example[57]).

In this way, the policy of multiculturalism is hostage to internal disputes which are part of the traditional political struggle between the Left and the Right, and to external disputes the source of which is the situation in the Middle East. Thus, while specific historical and political events facilitated the emergence of the policy of multiculturalism, other events of the same nature contribute to its critique.

While analysing the criticism of multicultural policy, we cannot forget about high unemployment rates among immigrants and their descendants, and about riots by mainly Arab, North African, and black French second-generation immigrants which shook France in 2005. As far as unemployment is concerned, until recently it was explained with prejudices of employers mainly. Currently, however, attention is drawn to education deficiencies and the emergence of the learned helplessness phenomenon caused by excessive welfare services. As for the riots, we should probably agree with Hładkiewcz who argues that they were "the reaction to a radical change in the government strategy towards that social group"[58]. Changes in multicultural policy may thus bring not only positive results in the form of savings or better integration. They may also have negative consequences which go far beyond immigrants' private life. A recognition of the above is especially important in the current situation where there is no idea of how to positively resolve the problem of dissatisfaction of western European societies with the policy of multiculturalism. One may have an impression that all ideas currently articulated are solely negative, namely, that all of them propose nothing but abandoning the policy of multiculturalism and dismantling of system of financial support for immigrants (e.g. changes in the Dutch law[59]).

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We have mentioned seven possible sources of the criticism of the policy of multiculturalism. They include: the financial crisis and the resulting need to reduce social spending, pessimistic visions of the future of the European culture, globalisation and the emergence of the multi-polar world, the growing number of immigrants and the coming of age of their children and grandchildren, seeing multiculturalism as unification, the time distance from the events which contributed to the formulation of the policy of multiculturalism and, finally, the still high unemployment rate among

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[57] A. Szahaj (2004), *op. cit.,* pp. 65-79.
[58] W. Hładkiewicz (2009), *op. cit.,* p. 108.
[59] Ł. Wójcik, *Koniec projektu Holandia,* "Przekrój" 11.07.2011, pp. 16-17.

immigrant communities. While reflecting on the possible consequences of an increased immigration to Poland and response capabilities in terms of specific actions and measures in the area of social policy, we should be aware of multiple dissatisfaction with the policy of multiculturalism in western Europe. Being aware we can learn from mistakes of our neighbours and take advantage of ideas the implementation of which was successful.

ABSTRACT

In the article seven sources of the criticism of the policy of multiculturalism are analysed in the context of opinions recently voiced by western European political leaders. The described sources of criticism are: the financial crisis and the need to reduce social spending, the pessimistic visions of the future of the European culture, globalisation, the growing number of the immigrants and their descendants, understanding multiculturalism as a unification rather than coexistence of different cultures, the decreasing impact of historical and political events that were an inspiration for the politics of multiculturalism, and, finally, the still high unemployment rate among the immigrants and their descendants.

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NATIONAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES IN POLAND IN THE OPINIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

The aim of this article is to analyse the Polish legal order, taking into consideration changes introduced since Poland ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. A review of both positive and negative aspects of the present situation will facilitate the assessment of regulations in force. It will also give us a better insight into problems which are still faced by national and ethnic minorities living in Poland. Due to the scope of the article, it is hardly possible to present the subject matter in a comprehensive way and, therefore, the focus is on issues judged by me to be critical, namely on areas where the most rapid progress can be observed and on those which evoke most controversy and appear to be most difficult in practice.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Poland is a state almost uniform in terms of ethnicity. National and ethnic minorities constitute about 3.5% of the population and that percentage is one of the lowest in Europe. According to the 2011 national census, the number of people of homogeneous Polish identity[1] was 36,157 thousand, i.e. 93.9% of the entire population. About 842 thousand people (2.19%) declared both Polish identity and other national or ethnic identities, while 562 thousand (1.46%) declared only non-Polish national or ethnic affiliation. In the latter group, 38 thousand people declared two non-Polish affiliations.[2]

If we sum up the above figures, in Poland, 96.1% of its population has the Polish identity and the identity of 3.65% is non-Polish. The remaining percentage includes persons whose identity could not be established because of, for instance, their stay abroad for at least 12 months.

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[1] In the 2011 national census, for the first time in history, Polish residents could declare complex national and ethnic identities as two questions about their national and ethnic affiliations were asked.

[2] Narodowy spis powszechny ludności i mieszkań 2011. Raport z wyników [National census of population and housing 2011. Report of results], Central Statistical Office, Warszawa 2012, p. 105.

The biggest minorities are German, Ukrainian and Belarusian. The smallest are Slovak, Czech, Armenian, Tatar, and Karaim minorities.

In accordance with the Polish law, a given group must meet the following conditions to be recognised as a national or ethnic minority: its members have Polish citizenship, its membership is smaller than of the rest of the population of the Republic of Poland; its members significantly differ from other citizens in terms of language, culture and tradition; its members strive to maintain their language, culture and tradition; its members are aware of their own historical national community and wish to express and protect it; the members' ancestors inhabited the present territory of the Republic of Poland for at least 100 years.[3]

The only difference between national and ethnic minorities is the fact that the first identify themselves with a nation organised in their own state and ethnic minorities do not. At present, 9 groups have the status of national minorities[4] and 4 groups are recognised ethnic minorities[5]. In addition, the Polish legislator recognised the Kashubian community as having their own regional language. The issue that still evokes strong emotions is that of Silesians. Their status has been disputed for years. Polish authorities consistently defend their position that the status of that group should be considered in a regional and not national context.[6]

At present, Poland is a country actively involved in the protection of national minorities. It is a party to a number of international conventions, the most important of which include the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The Charter is a European treaty adopted on 25 June 1992 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. A few months later, on 5 November, it was opened for signature. The Charter entered into force on 1 March 1998.[7]

The preparation of the Framework Convention lasted until 1991, when, on 8 February, the European Commission for Democracy through Law[8] submitted its

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[3] Such a definition is consistent with Article 2 of the Act of 6 January 2005 on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 17, item 141 (as amended).

[4] They include the following minorities: Belarusian, Czech, Lithuanian, German, Armenian, Russian, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Jewish.

[5] Those are Karaim, Lemko, Tatar, and Roma groups.

[6] It is important to note that, according to results of the 2011 census, the Silesian community is the most numerous. 847 thousand people declared such an identity (in response to both questions), including 362 thousand people for whom it was their only identity.

[7] The work on that document started to the end of the 1980s. In 1988, a draft Charter was first adopted as Resolution No. 192. The adoption took place during the 23rd session of the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. Then the text was adopted at the 14th session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in the same year. See: G. Janusz, P. Bajda (2000), *Prawa mniejszości narodowych. Standardy europejskie,* Warszawa, pp. 44, 47.

[8] The Commission was appointed to prepare the text of a document which would regulate issues related to national minorities. On 29 May 1990, it adopted a set of rules concerning national minorities. Another step was the presentation of the draft of the Convention which took place nearly a year later. During the work of the Commission, an idea was born to establish the European Committee for the

own draft. Another important moment was the draft approval by the Committee of Ministers of the Council, which took place at its 95th meeting on 10 November 1994. A few months later, on 1 February 1995, the Framework Convention was opened for signature. The Convention entered into force on 1 February 1998.[9]

Poland is a signatory of both documents. Poland signed the Charter on 12 May 2003 and ratified it on 12 February 2009. A few months later, on 1 June, the Charter came into force.[10] The Framework Convention was signed by Poland on 1 February 1995 and ratified on 20 December 2002. It entered into force on 1 April 2001.[11]

THE ROLE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION

The control system of the Framework Convention consists in reports prepared by States and submitted one year after the ratification and then every fifth year.[12] Reports are subject to review by the Advisory Committee.

The Committee is, in fact, a group of eighteen independent experts appointed for four years. Their role is to evaluate the implementation of the Framework Convention in State parties on the basis of their reports and to advise the Committee of Ministers. This includes examination of the reports and meetings with interested entities (including minority representatives).

Rules of Procedure of the Advisory Committee[13] were adopted on 29 October 1998 and approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on

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Protection of Minorities. It was supposed to be a body additional to binding legal solutions which would exercise control by e.g. obliging the States to submit periodic reports on the implementation of the Convention or by reviewing voluntary petitions. Cf. J. Barcz (1992), *Ochrona mniejszości narodowych w systemie KBWE na tle standardów europejskich,* "Sprawy Międzynarodowe" No. 7-12, p. 160 and S. Kux (1992), *Międzynarodowe podejście do problemu mniejszości narodowych, "*Sprawy Międzyna-rodowe" No. 7-12, pp. 10-11.

[9] G. Janusz, P. Bajda (2000), *op. cit,* p. 47. More on the preparatory work in: S. Pawlak (2001), *Ochrona mniejszości narodowych w Europie,* Warszawa 2001, pp. 39-41.

[10] http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp7NT=148&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG (accessed: 30.12.2012).

[11] http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/Table_en.asp#Poland (accessed: 30.12.2012).

[12] It should be underlined, however, that Article 25 of the Convention mentions only a report submitted one year after the ratification and submission of subsequent reports at the request of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. On 15 January 2003, the Committee adopted the rule of submitting subsequent reports every 5th year as part of the Outline for State Reports to be Submitted under the Second Monitoring Cycle, in Conformity with Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 January 2003 at the 824th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies) http://www.coe.int/T/e/human_rights/Minorities/2._FRAMEWORK_CONVENTION_(MONITORING)/2._Monitoring_mechanism/2._Outlines_for_state_reports/ACFC-iNF(2003) 001%20E%20Outline.asp (accessed: 12.04.2011).

[13] Rules of Procedure of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/2_Monitoring/PDF_ACFC_RulesProcedure_en.pdf

16 December 1998. The internal structure and activities of the Advisory Committee are laid down there. The Committee is headed by the Presidium composed of the President and two Vice-Presidents. They are elected for a two-year term and may be re-elected. The official and working languages are English and French. Meetings of the Committee are held *in camera*, unless the Committee decides otherwise. The general rule (with few exceptions) is that decisions are taken by the ordinary majority of members present. A representative of the country the report of which is being assessed cannot vote in meetings devoted to its assessment.

In accordance with the adopted rules, the Committee may set up working parties or other subsidiary bodies. It may also request assistance of external experts and consultants. In addition, it can cooperate with other bodies of the Council of Europe.

Since the ratification, Poland prepared three reports in 2002, 2007 and 2012. The Advisory Committee presented its Opinions on the first two reports. The latest one, submitted under the third monitoring cycle, is under examination.

POSITIVE ASPECTS OF POLISH LEGAL SOLUTIONS

Having analysed the two Opinions issued by the Advisory Committee, Poland appears to be a country where the level of the protection of national minorities is high. Since the ratification of the Framework Convention, a number of changes have been introduced to national law expanding that protection substantially. The course of the changes should be assessed positively. The turning point was in 2005 when the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language was adopted and entered into force. That development was appreciated by the Advisory Committee. It has widened language rights, namely minority languages can be use in communication with public administration offices (as supporting auxiliary languages) and topographic signs can be bilingual. At present, such rights can be exercised by communes [the smallest administrative unit] where at least 20% of the population are members a minority.[14]

As far as auxiliary languages are concerned, substantial changes can be noticed. In its first Opinion of 27 November 2003, the Advisory Committee urged Poland to make its law compatible with Article 10.2 of the Framework Convention. The reason was that the Polish legal order did not provide for the use of minority languages in dealings with administrative authorities. That situation changed when the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities entered into force. The possibility of using

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[14] The legislator specifies additional requirements e.g. the requirement that such a commune is entered in the Official Register of Municipalities where an Auxiliary Language is Used and in the Official Register of Municipalities on whose Territory Names in a Minority Language are Used provided that such a motion has been approved by the Committee for Names of Localities and Physiographical Objects. The legislator banned using names given in 1933-1945 by authorities of the Third Reich and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

auxiliary languages was positively assessed in the second Opinion of the Advisory Committee which was announced on 20 March 2009.[15] Regulations on bilingual topographic sings were also welcomed.

With the adoption of the Act on minorities, Poland joined the group European States which earlier similarly regulated the status of minorities inhabiting their respective territories.

The Act on minorities also established the Joint Commission of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities. The Commission has a wide range of consultative prerogatives and is an important link between authorities and representatives of minorities. Before the Joint Commission was introduced there was a Team for National Minorities[16] which, in the opinion of the Advisory Committee, had very limited competences. Its role was primarily symbolic and did not include social dialogue as the Team members were representatives of the government only. The establishment of the Joint Commission was thus a significant qualitative change promising good prospects of lasting cooperation between representatives of both authorities and minorities.[17]

The two Opinions issued by the Advisory Committee pointed out other positive changes too. The most important of them include the strengthening of intercultural dialogue, the setting up of the Government structure for combating discrimination, improvements in education, and stronger efforts addressing difficulties experienced by the Roma minority.

The Advisory Committee noted the multifaceted nature of activities undertaken by Polish authorities to counteract racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes. It gave positive examples of commemoration events in Jedwabne in 2001 and in Pawłokoma where, in 2006, Presidents of Poland and Ukraine commemorated the Ukrainian villagers killed by Poles during World War II. In 2004, a Team for Monitoring Racism and Xenophobia[18] was established within the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. In the same year, Plenipotentiaries for Human Rights Protection were appointed at all Police Headquarters at the central and voviodship levels and in all police schools. Another important initiative was the National Programme for

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[15] Cf. Opinion on Poland, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg 27 November 2003, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)005, and the Second Opinion on Poland, the Advisory Committee to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasburg, 20 March 2009, ACFC/PO/II(2009)002.

[16] The Team worked from 2002 to 2008 continuing the work of the former Inter-Departmental Team for National Minorities. The latter functioned from 1997 to 2001.

[17] The Advisory Committee noted that the Commission, after a period of inactivity in the second half of 2007, resumed regular meetings in 2008 and that in the opinion of national minorities has been working well.

[18] Starting from 23 December 2011, that unit is called the Team for Human Rights Protection. The name was changed along the widening of its competences and the division of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration into the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Administration and Digitisation.

Counteracting Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance implemented in 2004-2009. It was aimed mainly at public administration, local authorities and law enforcement bodies. When indicating that the National Programme set a good example, the Advisory Committee recommended its continuation. On 29 October 2009 (that is after the Second Opinion of the Committee was issued), the Prime Minister agreed to continue the programme in 2010-2013.[19]

A most significant achievement was also the establishment of the Bureau of the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment in 2008. The Ordinance establishing the Plenipotentiary obliges it to combat discrimination on the grounds of gender, race, ethnic origin, nationality, religion or belief, political opinion, age, sexual orientation, civil and family status.

At this point, initiatives aimed at combating anti-Semitism in Poland are also worth noting. The Advisory Committee welcomed the support of the Polish authorities to the Museum of Jewish Culture in Tykocin, the Centre for Jewish Culture in Cracow and the initiative to support the construction of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews[20] in Warsaw, in a prestigious location in the immediate vicinity of the Monument of the Ghetto Uprising of 1943.

In its Second Opinion, the Advisory Committee underlined the positive role played by the Parliamentary National and Ethnic Minorities Committee "in stimulating public awareness of national minorities' history, culture, tradition, as well as of their role played in Polish history and in current affairs"[21].

During the second monitoring cycle, there were also positive changes in education. The Advisory Committee highlighted that the educational subsidy for each pupil/student belonging to a national minority was substantially increased and reached 150% of the applicable amount per student at a public school of the same type and in the same commune. Efforts to improve the situation of Roma children at Polish schools were intensified as well. One form of such activities was the introduction of Roma educational assistants and special scholarships. In addition, efforts were made to integrate Roma children and youth into ordinary schools and separate Roma classes were abolished.

There was also progress in the implementation of aid programmes for the Roma community. Examples include the Pilot Programme for the Roma Community in the Małopolskie Region in 2001-2003, and the ten-year Programme for the Roma Community in 2003-2013. The latter one is comprehensive and covers economic, social, political and cultural life. It aims particularly at improving the living conditions and education opportunities of the Roma community.

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[19] Report on the implementation of the National Programme for Counteracting Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in 2004-2009, Warszawa 2010.

[20] The opening of the Museum (the date of which was changed several times) is expected in November 2014.

[21] Second Opinion on Poland, p. 5.

The Advisory Committee commented also on the financial support for minorities, underlining that in Poland it kept growing steadily.[22] In 2006, it amounted to PLN 114,961,749.60, in 2009 to PLN 195,877,902.16 and in 2011 to PLN 253,051,907.89.[23]

NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF POLISH LEGAL SOLUTIONS

The two issued Opinions of the Advisory Committee included many negative comments. Some of them concerned the xenophobic or even racist attitudes still present in society. Despite increased efforts of Polish authorities to combat their manifestations, the results are frequently insufficient. The Committee noted cases of anti-Semitic graffiti and vandalised tomb-stones in Jewish cemeteries, incitement to racial hatred on the Internet and shouting anti-Semitic slogans and insults at public gatherings. Another dangerous phenomena is racism in sports facilities (mainly football stadiums), which rarely evoke any reaction on the part of referees or the law enforcement bodies.

As the Polish law strictly forbids all forms of discrimination and racism[24], the main complaint of the Advisory Committee addresses the gap between law and practice as well as the failure to provide victims of such crimes with appropriate assistance.

In the opinion of the Advisory Committee, there are still many negative stereotypes in Poland which are present in the media for example. They stigmatise mainly the Roma but also Ukrainians and Germans. In the case of the two latter groups, the Advisory Committee recommended to promote objective treatment of painful historical events.

Another problem are instances of provocative statements insulting members of minorities and statements conditioning respect for minority rights on reciprocity in neighbouring countries.

One of the latest examples confirming the above was a comment made by Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of Law and Justice right-wing party [Polish: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS], during his visit to Opole on 8 December 2012. He said that

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[22] It is not always the case. For instance, in its Third Opinion on Austria, the Advisory Committee expressed its concern with the fact that the amount of State subsidies for minorities did not changed since 2001. At that time, it amounted to EUR 3,768 million. In 2007, it was EUR 3,843,578.18, and two years later it was EUR 3,803,895.95. Cf. Third Report of the Republic of Austria pursuant to Article 25 (2) of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg 2011.

[23] The data comes from the three Reports on Poland submitted so far. The data refers to funds allocated for the support of minority cultures on the basis of the Act of 2005 and do not take include funds granted on general terms.

[24] At this point it is worth mentioning Article 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 6 of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, Article 11 of the Labour Code, and Articles 256 and 257 of the Criminal Code.

the German minority in Poland should be guaranteed the same rights as Poles in Germany. At a public meeting, he said: "If Law and Justice comes to power, the following principle will be applied: as many rights for Germans in Poland as for Poles in Germany. The asymmetry will be abolished."[25] Kaczyński criticised "extensive privileges" granted to the German minority in Poland while Poles in Germany have been refused to be officially recognised as a minority and that Germany does not implement provisions of the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations. Kaczyński added: "We cannot consent to Germanisation of Poles in Germany and to building a sense of superiority and arrogance by the German minority. The situation where Polish children are offered attractive educational programmes under the condition they adopt German as the main language of instruction is unbearable".[26] He expressed his support for the idea that the 5% election threshold should apply to the German minority but rejected a suggestion to increase the percentage of local minority population from 20% to 51% in the smallest administrative unit to have the right to display bilingual signs.

His statement led to a heated discussion in Poland. Representatives of the German minority in Poland strongly criticised the use of minority issues by PiS in the political game. Also members of the Parliamentary Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities expressed their concern with what Kaczyński said. According to the Committee, such attitudes jeopardise the consensus reached in Polish-German relations.

The Advisory Committee pointed out that the right to use the *auxiliary* language is limited. Although the introduction of auxiliary or supporting languages was a substantial achievement, the regulation applies to local self-government authorities only. The law does not provide for the right to use the minority language in contacts with the police, health care services, the post office or the State administration at the local level. In the opinion of the Advisory Committee, it is important that Polish authorities are more flexible in this respect. From analyses of opinions on other member states of the Council of Europe it follows that in many cases, the potential use of auxiliary languages is substantially greater. In Poland, there is still one more basic obstacle to exercising the right to use auxiliary languages. The Advisory Committee noted that, in accordance with the statutory requirements, a given municipality is entered in the Official Register of Municipalities where an Auxiliary Language is Used upon a resolution of the local Council. Thus the number of persons who declared their affiliation with a minority is 20% of all residents is not enough for a commune to be automatically entered in the Register. The required percentage is but a preliminary condition. In many other countries, municipalities or communes may exercise the right to officially use a minority language without meeting additional conditions.

The situation of the Roma minority is a separate issue. As it was already mentioned, it has substantially improved. However, despite increased efforts, the Roma

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[25] After http://www.nto.pl/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20121208/POWIAT01/121209592 (accessed: 23.12.2012).

[26] *Ibidem.*

people are still the minority particularly threatened with exclusion and social margin-alisation. In the opinion of the Advisory Committee, of serious concern are health, employment and housing. Much progress has been achieved in education and a man-ifestation of which is, for instance, the almost complete abolition of separate Roma classes. Nevertheless, incidents of discrimination against that minority take place. In its Second Opinion, the Advisory Committee gave the example of the primary school in Maszkowice, where Roma children attending one of the few remaining segregated Roma classes were required to use a separate entrance to the building. In another case, a Roma educational assistant was not allowed to enter the teachers' room.[27] Another concern of the Advisory Committee has been that the Roma minority is not represented in elected bodies at all at any level within the State.

The status of Silesians is another issue repeatedly raised by the Advisory Commit-tee. The dispute between State authorities and representatives of that group who want Silesians to be recognised as a minority was even brought to the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg.[28] The Advisory Committee does not have the authority to resolve the issue of Silesians but many a times it has called for a broader dialogue and a more open attitude on the part of the Polish government. In its Second Opinion, the Committee expressed its positive opinion about the 2008 initiative of the Parliamen-tary Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities to organise a public hearing on the identity, language aspirations and national identification of Silesians.[29] However, not much has changed since then. The Silesian issue is not a priority for the Parliamentary Committee. The problem has not met with a wide interest of the Parliament as a whole either. Recently, it was proposed to recognise the language of Silesians as a regional language like the Kashubian language but many experts point to formal difficulties. The Silesian language is treated as a dialect and *dialect* is a concept different from *regional language*.[30] In addition, the Silesian issue evokes much emotion and one may get an impression that there is an irrational worry about negotiating it.

CONCLUSIONS

In the light of the Advisory Committee's Opinions issued so far, Poland appears to be a country where national minorities are well established and their rights are respected in most cases. Minorities participate in social dialogue and are an increas-

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[27] Cf. Second Opinion..., p. 16.

[28] See: The case of Gorzelik and others v. Poland, European Court of Human Rights, Complaint No. 44158/98.

[29] More in: Sprawozdanie z 30. posiedzenia Sejmowej Komisji Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicz-nych z dnia 3 grudnia 2008.

[30] Pursuant to Article 1 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, "regional or minority languages" quote: "means languages that are: (i) traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's popu-lation; and (ii) different from the official language(s) of that State; it does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants […]".

ingly important partner for Polish authorities. Their status improved significantly in 2005 when the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language came into force. The introduction of language rights related to the use of auxiliary languages in public administration and bilingual topographic signs was a positive development. The Joint Commission of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities was established and several major projects were implemented to combat discrimination, et cetera. Access to education and the media as well as the right to spell surnames and names consistently with their pronunciation in the native language do not provoke much controversy. There is some concern with little participation of minorities in public life, in particular at the central level. The situation at the local level is much better but it refers to some minorities only. Representatives of German, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lemko and Lithuanian minorities were elected to local councils at all levels, i.e. commune/municipality, poviat (county) and voivodship (province/region) levels.

In Poland, historical experience has a huge impact on the situation of many minorities. That experience to a large extent determines local relations and perception of minorities. It is also the source of issues which have not been resolved yet. One of them is the lack of regulations on the return of property to Polish citizens belonging to Ukrainian and Lemko minorities who, in 1947, were forcibly resettled to northern and western parts of Poland by the communist regime.

Intolerance, discrimination, stereotypical perception of minorities and their marginalisation are still important issues. Some solutions applied in Poland differ from European standards. In case of the latter ones, there is a tendency to liberalise the law. One of its manifestations is the lowering of percentage requirements related to language rights.[31] However, the Polish Act on national minorities is one of the youngest and normalisation of mutual relations takes time. The States which are currently liberalising their laws on national minorities can draw on their longer experience in that area. Generally, the approach and policy of Polish authorities should be assessed positively. In the light of the two Opinions of the Advisory Committee, it is not the Polish legislation which is a problem but a gap between law and practice. Thus it is not a change of law which is necessary but increased efforts to ensure that the existing rights can be exercised more fully and freely.

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[31] Austrian and Czech solutions are examples. In Austria, in 2001, the Federal Constitutional Tribunal (case ref. No.: G 213/01-18 and V 62, 63/01-18) decided that the 25% clause be replaced with a 10% threshold. The Czech law was liberalised in the same year. In the Act on the Rights of Members of National Minorities and on Amendment of Certain Other Acts (O právech přislušníků národnostních menšin a o změně některých zákonů, Sbírka Zakonů České Republiky No. 273/2001), the 20% requirement was reduced by half.

ABSTRACT

Poland now belongs to a group of countries which actively engage in the protection of national minorities. Poland is a party to numerous international conventions including the most important Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. Since its ratification Poland submitted three reports in 2002, 2007 and 2012, in accordance with the monitoring procedure. The Advisory Committee issued its opinions on the first two. The latest report is under examination. In the light of the opinions issued, Poland appears to be a country where national minorities are well established and their rights are respected in a majority of cases. In 2005, the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language entered into force and since then their legal status improved significantly. The introduction of the right to use "auxiliary" minority languages in dealings with public administration and bilingual topographic signs were positive changes. The Joint Commission of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities was established and several crucial projects with a view to counteract discrimination were implemented.

Migracje polityczne na ziemiach polskich (1939-1950)

[Political migrations on Polish territories (1939-1950)]

Piotr Eberhardt

During World War II and immediately after it, Polish lands were the site of massive forced relocations of civilian population. In total, nearly 30 million Poles, Germans, Jews and Ukrainians were resettled. Ruthlessness winners of consecutive stages of the war forced inhabitants who did not meet some criteria, be it of ethnicity, religion or social class, to leave their homeland, sometimes forever. Despite the passage of many decades, the issue is not only of a cognitive significance. It is a tool recurrently used in both domestic and international politics.

In a critical and eloquent way, Piotr Eberhardt analyses major forced political migrations which took the form of displacement, deportation, expulsion, escapes, or repatriation. He carefully tries to determine their scale, geographical directions, as well as their demographic and geopolitical consequences. Complex historical and demographic issues are communicated in a clear and concise way. Using abundant data, the author identifies the initiators and principal executors of resettlement policies. Numerous excellent number tables, maps and charts help the reader understand the scale and course of the processes described.

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LITHUANIANS IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC OF POLAND

The process of political transformation initiated in Poland in 1989 was of great significance for national minorities. In the new post-1989 reality, old problems in relations between the majority and minorities did not disappear automatically. In fact, new problems emerged. In addition, both parties did not forget about old disputes and quarrels. National minorities, however, were finally able to make their voice be heard. In the new situation, minorities became more active. Some set up new organisations and started to publish their magazines. They have also been granted regular access to public radio and television.

None of the general censuses conducted in the communist People's Republic of Poland included a question about national affiliation or native language. The lack of reliable statistical data on national groups made it difficult to determine the precise number of Lithuanians (and other national minorities) and thus changes in their population in Poland. Estimates should be treated with caution if only because of huge discrepancies between them. The estimates were not based on self-determination of an individual, which should be decisive, but on such criteria as language, origin, religion and surname. Those criteria produced unreliable data and thus the estimated population size of national minorities was imprecise.

In the 1990s, according to activists of the Lithuanian minority, approximately 20 to 25 thousand people of national Lithuanian affiliation lived in Poland, including 10 to 12 thousand living in the former Suwalskie voivodship (till 1998). The Lithuanian population has long been concentrated in a small area in the north-eastern part of the historical Suwałki Region, mainly in the commune[1] of Puńsk (where, according to old estimates, Lithuanians were supposed to constitute 80% of the population), in rural communes of Sejny (estimated 40% of the population) and Szypliszki, as well as in two towns: Sejny and Suwałki.[2] Basing on those estimates, the Office for Culture of National Minorities at the Ministry of Culture and Art assumed that the

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[1] Commune [*gmina*] is the smallest administrative unit in Poland.

[2] E. Pietruszkiewicz, *Liczebność i rozmieszczenie społeczności litewskiej w Polsce. Status prawny. Stan organizacyjny (organizacje, ich cele i warunki działania) i dostęp do środków masowego przekazu,* in: *Litwini w Polsce. Materiały informacyjne o sytuacji mniejszości litewskiej w Polsce,* Puńsk 1995, p. 8.

population of the Lithuanian minority in Poland was around 20 thousand people strong[3]. The above estimates, however, seem to have been strongly overstated.

The estimates of Cezary Żołędowski were much more realistic. He used statistical data on the population number in administrative subdivision units of *gmina* [commune] called *sołectwo* [roughly "parish"] in 1983, which he obtained from commune administration.

According to Żołędowski, in the early 1980s, the Lithuanian population was under 9 thousand people of whom nearly 7 thousand lived in the Suwałki Region.[4] The source of such discrepancies were mainly different estimates of the number of Lithuanians living outside the area of their compact population. According Żołędowski, their number was 2 thousand while minority activists estimated their number to be over 10 thousand. Estimates of the Lithuanian population the Suwałki Region also differed but less.

Lithuanians were a clear majority in the commune of Puńsk. The following villages were entirely or mostly Lithuanian: Buraki. Dziedziule, Giełujsze, Kalinowo, Kompocie, Krejwiany, Nowiniki, Ogórki, Oszkinie, Pełele, Przystawańce, Puńsk, Rejsztokiemie, Sankury, Szlinokiemie, Tauroszyszki, Trakiszki, Trompole, Widugiery, Wiłkopedzie, Wojciuliszki, Wojtokiemie, and Zwikiele. Mixed Polish-Lithuanian villages included Buda Zawidugierska, Poluńce, Sejwy, Skarkiszki, and Szołtany. In the commune of Sejny, Lithuanians constituted a clear majority in the following villages: Burbiszki, Dusznica, Jenorajście, Jodeliszki, Klejwy, Rachelany, Radziucie, Rynkojeziory, and Żegary. Mixed villages included Hołny Mejera, Krasnogruda, Krasnowo, Łumbie, Nowosady, and Ogrodniki. In the commune of Szypliszki, two villages, Jegliniec and Wojponie, were mostly Lithuanian. Mixed Polish-Lithuanian villages were Budzisko, Podwojponie and Sadzawki. Some Lithuanians lived also in the following villages: Dębniak, Romaniuki, Szymanowizna, Wesołowo, and Zaboryszki.

Żołędowski calculated that commune of Puńsk was inhabited by almost 3,700 people of Lithuanian origin, the commune of Sejny by 1600 Lithuanians, and the commune of Szypliszki by 300. According to his estimates, the town of Sejny was inhabited by around 1 thousand Lithuanians. Thus, in total, the number of people of national Lithuanian affiliation was 6,600. The above numbers were estimates only. In the opinion of Żołędowski, the above total number of Lithuanians was more likely to be overestimated than underestimated due to the calculation method used.[5]

Estimates of local Church authorities were slightly lower. According to the bishop of Ełk, only 5.5-6 thousand members of the congregation in the Suwałki region wanted pastoral services in the Lithuanian language.[6]

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[3] *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce. Informator 1994,* Warszawa 1995, p. 11.

[4] C. Żołędowski (1992), *Rozmieszczenie i liczebność mniejszości litewskiej w Polsce,* "Zeszyty Naukowe Instytutu Nauk Politycznych" Uniwersytet Warszawski, No. 17, p. 186

[5] *Ibidem*, pp. 183-185.

[6] W. Ziemba (1995), *Narodowa różnorodność bogactwem Kościoła Ełckiego,* "Lithuania" No. 2(15), p. 89.

To the end of 1994, the Team for Religions and Nationalities at the Central Statistical Office carried a survey which was also a source of estimates. The survey covered 23 localities situated in the area densely populated by Lithuanians. Due to the lack of national statistics, it was not possible to preselect a representative sample of Poles and Lithuanians at the level of individual localities and the survey population. It was only possible to determine who was a Pole and who was a Lithuanian during interviews. All respondents were 15 years of age or older. A total of 2,533 questionnaires was filled in. The number of persons who declared their Lithuanian affiliation was 1,054 (42%) and 1,462 (58%) declared their Polish affiliation (17 persons declared other national affiliation than Polish or Lithuanian). The survey confirmed the estimated size of the Lithuanian population. The commune where the percentage of Lithuanians was the highest was the commune of Puńsk where 80% of respondents declared their Lithuanian affiliation. The percentage of Lithuanians in the commune of Sejny was 33% and only 9% in the town of Sejny.[7]

In the 2002 census, a question about national affiliation and language spoken at home was included for the first time after World War II. According to its results, 5,639 Polish citizens declared that their national identity was Lithuanian. The vast majority of them (5,097 people) lived in the Podlaskie voivodship (created in 1990) on the Polish-Lithuanian border. Every fifth resident of the *powiat* [poviat: administrative unit between the commune and the voivodship, a group of neighbouring communes] of Sejny (4,595 people, i.e. 21% of the poviat population) was a Lithuanian. The highest percentage of Lithuanians lived in the commune of Puńsk. According to the census, they constituted over 74% of its population (3,312 people). In the rural commune of Sejny, the percentage of Lithuanians was 18.5% (775 people) and in the urban commune of Sejny it was almost 8% (469 people). In the rural commune of Krasnopol, their percentage was only 0.85% (34 Lithuanians). In the poviat of Suwałki, 123 people belonged to the Lithuanian minority, including the commune of Szypliszki where 109 Lithuanians lived (almost 3% of its population). In addition, 316 Lithuanians lived in the town of Suwałki, and 41 in Białystok.[8]

Small, scattered groups of Lithuanians live all over Poland. Contrary to Lithuanians who live in areas where their percentage is high, they undergo the natural process of assimilation (Polonisation) to a larger extent. According to the results of the 2002 census, the number of Lithuanians in all other voivodships was 542, including 99 persons in the Mazowieckie voivodship (73 in Warsaw), 83 in the Warmińsko-mazurskie voivodship (18 in Olsztyn), 75 in the Pomorskie voivodship (24 in Gdańsk, 21 in Gdynia), 67 in the Zachodniopomorskie voivodship (21 in Szczecin), 53 in the Dolnośląskie voivodshop (21 in Wrocław), 48 in the Śląskie voivodshp (11 in Katowice, 10 in Gliwice), 32 in the Wielkopolskie voivodshop

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[7] *Litwini w Polsce – Polacy na Litwie – 1994,* Warszawa-Wilno 1995, pp. 12-14.

[8] Results of the 2002 National Census of Population and Housing concerning the declared nationality and language spoke at home, table 3/m, Minorities by voivodships, poviats, and municipalities in 2002 (data of the Central Statistical Office).

(19 in Poznań), 18 in the Kujawsko-pomorskie voivodshop (10 in Bydgoszcz), 17 in the Łódzkie voivodship (11 in Łódź), 15 in the Lubuskie voivodshop, 13 in the Małopolskie voivodshop, 10 in the Lubelskie voivodship, 7 in the Opolskie voivod-shop, 3 in the Świętokrzyskie voivodship, and 2 in the Podkarpackie voivodshop.[9]

In the national census of 2011, residents of Poland were for the first time able to express their multiple national and ethnic identities declaring membership in one or two ethnic categories. According to the census results, 7,863 persons declared their Lithuanian identity. For 5,559 people it was their first declared identification and for 2,264 people it was their second identification (for 4,830 people the Lithuanian identity was the only one, and for 2,961 people it was declared together with the Polish identity).[10]

Estimates according to which 6.5-7 thousand Lithuanians live in the Suwałki Region seem most realistic. The size of the Lithuanian population living outside that area can be estimated to be 1 thousand. Thus, the size of the Lithuanian minority in Poland is approximately 7.5 to 8 thousand people.

Assimilation processes and migration movements contribute to the steady shrinking of the Lithuanian community. A few dozen years ago, Lithuanian was spoken on a much larger territory. It was used in such localities as Smolany, Berżniki, Dworczysko and Wiżajny which today are populated almost exclusively by the Polish population. Lithuanian traces are found only in surnames of persons who now declare their Polish identity, and in the names of localities, rivers, lakes, forests, swamps and hills.[11] In the 1990s, that process was halted but what had been lost cannot be restored. The gradual assimilation of the Lithuanian population was primarily the result of natural processes within the minority itself.

The early 1990s brought changes in the organised life of Lithuanians. In May 1990, some activists of the then Lithuanian Social and Cultural Association [*Litewskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, LTS-K*] established a new organisation, i.e. the Lithuanian Society of St. Casimir in Sejny [*Litewskie Towarzystwo św. Kazimierza*], the name of which refers back to a society active before WW2. It was founded by Lithuanians from Sejny who felt ignored and stranded by leaders of the Lithuanian Social and Cultural Association who lived mostly in Puńsk. Some were uneasy about former activities of the Association, its name and communist past, and thought that a new organisation should be established after the political system changed in Poland. The chairman of the Society has been Vytautas Grigutis. The organisation is active mainly in Sejny and the surrounding area. The Lithuanian Society of St. Casimir underlines its Christian (Catholic) character. Its members founded the first

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[9] *Ibidem.* See also: L. Adamczuk and S. Łodziński (eds) (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w świetle Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego z 2002 roku,* Warszawa.

[10] *Ludność. Stan i struktura demograficzno-społeczna. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011,* Warszawa 2013, p. 91.

[11] E. Pietruszkiewicz (1995), *op. cit,* p. 8; C. Żołędowski (1992), *op. cit,* pp. 178-183.

Lithuanian parish choir and persistently argued for a separate school in Sejny where the language of instruction would be Lithuanian. In addition, they started to organise a festival of amateur artistic groups from the Sejny region. The organisation supported also the construction of the Lithuanian House in Sejny.[12]

At the time, the Lithuanian Social and Cultural Association, founded in 1957, experienced a serious crisis. The convention of the Association scheduled for June 1990 was not held due to the lack of quorum. Half a year later, members of the Association introduced substantial changes to its Statutes. The former editor in chief of the *Aušra* journal, Eugeniusz Pietruszkiewicz from Suwałki, was elected its new chairman (from among three candidates). During the subsequent 12th convention of the Lithuanian Social and Cultural Association, the organisation changed its name to the Association of Lithuanians in Poland. The name change was to symbolise a new beginning. The statutory objectives have remained the same. Except for the new chairman, the composition of the Board did not change. Under the communist rule, for nearly 35 years of its existence, the Lithuanian Social and Cultural Association was the only organisation of the Lithuanian minority in Poland. It played a significant role in the history of that community sustaining its national identity. Despite its functioning in the said environment, the Association tried to halt the assimilation of the Lithuanian population. Entangled in official structures of the political life in communist Poland, it did not act against their compatriots. The main objective was to protect the Lithuanian enclave against denationalisation even though that was never mentioned in the statutes of the Association. The society has had significant achievements in the sphere of culture and education. It was long the only organiser of associational life of Lithuanians in Poland. The Board of the Association of Lithuanians in Poland has its seat in Sejny. The Association is the most important organisation of the Lithuanian minority in Poland. In 2013, its chairman was Olgierd Wojciechowski.[13]

In April 1993, another organisation was founded, i.e. the Polish Lithuanian Community. It has established contacts with the large (about 0.5 million) Lithuanian minority in the US and Canada and is part of The Lithuanian World Community which includes the Lithuanian diaspora scattered around the world. In addition to representing Polish Lithuanians in the country and abroad, the Community tries to coordinate activities of various Lithuanian organisations and institutions. Its statutory objective is to preserve the national identity of Lithuanians living in Poland, to promote their national culture, and to participate in social and political life. The activities of the Community have been managed by Józef Sygit Forencewicz, Bronisław Makowski, and Irena Gasperowicz[14].

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[12] K. Tarka (1998), *Litwini w Polsce 1944-1997,* Opole, pp. 198-199.

[13] *Ibidem,* pp. 199-201. See also: P. Łossowski (2000), *Mniejszość litewska w Polsce 1944-1999,* "Przegląd Humanistyczny" No. 5, p. 37.

[14] K. Tarka (1998), *op. cit.,* pp. 201-202.

Lituanians run in election to local Councils and have been very successful in Puńsk. Representatives of the Lithuanian minority have kept winning an overwhelming majority of seats in the commune Council and their candidate has been elected the *wójt* [vojt, the commune leader]. Lithuanians succeeded also in winning some seats in the commune Council of Sejny. In contrast, their attempts to win seats in the Parliament failed. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, Lithuanian activists together with members of Czech, Slovak, and Ukrainian minorities registered the Electoral Bloc of National Minorities. The coalition, however, did not win any seats in the Parliament. In the Białostocki constituency, the Lithuanian candidate won only 1,285 votes. Also attempts of Lithuanians to win seats by introducing their candidates to lists of Polish political parties were unsuccessful. The main reason was the small size of the Lithuanian community in terms of the country population.[15]

In the early 1990s, there were organisational changes and the Lithuanian community undertook new publishing initiatives. In 1990, the *Aušra* quarterly was transformed into a monthly and, starting from 1992, the magazine has been published as a biweekly. *Aušra* is financed by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage. Its editor-in-chief was Alicja Sitarska and, since 1997, that function has been performed by Irena Gasperowicz. The biweekly focuses on social, cultural, and political issues. Articles are devoted to Lithuanian culture and education, the history of the region, and the chronicle of events. There is also a religious section. In addition to the informative, educational, and cultural role, the main function of *Aušra* is to sustain the sense of the national identity among Lithuanians living in Poland. The written word is also of key importance to maintaining the Lithuanian tongue.

In addition to *Aušra*, the Lithuanian minority publishes some other magazines in its native language. Their role, however, is significantly smaller. *Aušrelė* monthly for children has been published since 1997. In addition, since 1992, the Suwałki branch of the Association of Lithuanians in Poland publishes its *Suvalkietis* bulletin (now a quarterly). Another quarterly has been published by the Society of St. Casimir since 2005.

In 1993, for the first time after World War II, the Aušra publishing house began to print books in Lithuanian (in total, around 100 different books and textbooks have been printed so far).[16]

In March 1990, the Lithuanian minority gained regular access to public radio. Initially, the Radio Białystok broadcast a half-hour programme in Lithuanian once a week (on Sunday). At present, radio programmes in Lithuanian are broadcast three times a week (on Tuesdays and Thursday evenings and on Sunday mornings (60 minutes in total per week). They include news on the life of Lithuanians in Poland, commentaries, essays, reports, discussions on important current and past events

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[15] L. Nijakowski, S. Łodziński (ed.) (2003), *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce. Informator 2003,* Warszawa, pp. 171-172.

[16] K. Tarka (1998), *op. cit,* pp. 228-232. See also: S. Birgiel (1995), *Działalność wydawnicza (historia i stan obecny),* in: *Litwini w Polsce...,* pp. 14-19.

and recordings of Lithuanian folk assembles. In the mid-1990s, Lithuanians gained access to public television. The regional branch of Polish Television in Białystok broadcasts a programme in Lithuanian titled *Lietuvių panorama* once a week (on Sundays, broadcast time: 7 minutes and 30 seconds).[17]

The Lithuanian minority living in the north-east of Poland is especially active in the area of culture. The cultural movement is an important factor integrating the community. Despite inevitable changes in the lifestyle, Lithuanians are still attached to their traditions and customs. Their massive (active and passive) participation in cultural events integrates them. It has contributed to the development of authentic personal bonds, created positive values, and strengthened the sense of distinctness and national awareness. Contacts with the native culture have positively affected their identification with the community and shaped the national awareness of new generations.

Starting from the 1980s, Lithuanians wanted to build a new community centre in Puńsk (as the old one was situated in a small, wooden, pre-war building). Their intent was to create the Centre for Lithuanian Culture. At the time, however, the voivodship authorities in Suwałki supported the idea of a Commune Culture Centre or, alternatively, a Polish-Lithuanian or a Polish-Soviet Culture Centre. It was underlined that the very name of the new institution should integrate the two local communities: Poles and Lithuanians. Lithuanians, however, strongly opposed such ideas. In result of the dispute, the project was withheld for several years. The construction works started in 1988 but, due to the lack of funds, the investment was not completed on time and lasted (with interruptions) until 2001. The largest part of the new Centre for Lithuanian Culture is the auditorium with over 300 seats. In the mid-1990s, Lithuanians launched the construction of another culture centre in nearby Sejny. The construction of the Lithuanian House took four years and was financed by the Lithuanian government. Most important art events include meetings of amateur folk groups held in Burbiszki at the Gaładuś Lake and the Barn Theatre Festival in Puńsk.[18]

National awareness of Lithuanians is high and they are able to organise themselves to safeguard their interests. In their postulates addressed to Polish authorities after 1989, the issue of education was raised particularly frequently. A construction of an educational facility in Sejny, consisting of a nursery and kindergarten, a primary school and a secondary school with Lithuanian as the language of instruction was considered an urgent and critical issue. Lithuanian teachers strongly criticised the solution implemented for economical reasons which consisted in creating inter-class groups of pupils studying Lithuanian in the commune of Sejny (in Klejwy, Łumbie, Ogrodniki) and in the primary school in Szymanowizna, the only one in the commune of Szypliszki (where, however only two children were interested in

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[17] K. Tarka (998), *op. cit.,* pp. 232-233.
[18] *Ibidem,* pp. 223-228. See also: J. Kordowska (1995), *Działalność kulturalna,* in: *Litwini w Polsce...,* pp. 20-22.

Lithuanian classes). They also pointed out that school buildings required refurbishment (in particular in Widugiery). Insufficient facilities, however, were not only the problem of Lithuanian schools or, speaking more broadly, of ethnic minority education. Similar difficulties were faced by a number of Polish schools in rural areas. There were no major problems with the teaching staff in the commune of Puńsk (in the town of Puńsk, actually, there was a teacher surplus) although not all schools employed qualified teachers of Lithuanian. In the commune of Sejny, there was no teacher of the Lithuanian language with higher education qualifications. The number of teachers who could teach other subjects in Lithuanian, was not sufficient either. Lithuanian organisations (the Association of Lithuanians in Poland, the Society of St. Casimir, the Polish Lithuanian Community) requested the Ministry of National Education to design and publish a new Lithuanian language textbook for primary schools (in connection with curriculum changes), a history textbook and an anthology of Lithuanian literature. They also asked the Ministry to systematically import textbooks (e.g. for Lithuanian language classes in upper secondary schools) and teaching aids from Lithuania, to issue bilingual certificates, to introduce History of Lithuania as a separate subject, to enable teachers in Lithuanian schools to participate in various forms of professional development trainings in Lithuania, to build new schools (in particular in Widugiery and Sejny), and to formally give schools bilingual names and to produce bilingual plaques and seals. They demanded that the voivodship school inspectorate employs a plenipotentiary for Lithuanian education. It was also postulated that groups of Lithuanians all over the country would have the opportunity to master the Lithuanian language.[19]

The Ministry's response was positive. In 1992, the Suwałki school inspector inaugurated the "11 March" Secondary School with Lithuanian as the Language of Instruction in Puńsk. Next to the Polish plaque, another one in Lithuanian was mounted. In June 1993, the first bilingual certificates were issued for all types of Lithuanian schools. In 1994, a new building of the primary school in Widugiery was opened. Two years later, a branch of the Suwałki primary music school was opened in Puńsk. In December 2005, the "Žiburys" School Complex with Lithuanian as the Language of Instruction was opened in Sejny. The centre consists of a kindergarten, a primary school, and a lower secondary school. Its construction was financed by the government of Lithuania. In 2006, the construction of a Lithuanian upper secondary school in Puńsk begun. Four years later, the building was officially opened.[20]

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[19] *Pro memoria* with appendix of 19 March 1991. Cf. "Lituanica" No. 1, 1991, pp. 27-28; *Raport o stanie szkolnictwa z litewskim językiem nauczania i jego najpilniejszych potrzebach z 25 IX 1991 r.*, and *Litwini w Polsce...* (1995)*, p. 55.

[20] Materials of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration (Problemy mniejszości litewskiej z 9 V 2011 r., mps., pp. 4-5) and the Ministry of Education (Informacja na temat sytuacji i problemów mniejszości litewskiej w Polsce oraz mniejszości polskiej na Litwie w zakresie edukacji z maja 2011, mps., p. 9-11). See also: K. Tarka (1998), *op. cit.,* pp. 238-239.

Education for national minorities is regulated by Article 12 of the Act of 7 September 1991 on the Education System.[21] Details are contained in the Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 14 November 2007 "on the conditions and manner of performing tasks by kindergartens, schools and public institutions allowing maintenance of a sense of national, ethnic and linguistic identity of pupils belonging to national and ethnic minorities and communities using a regional language". In accordance with the regulation of the Minister of National Education, kindergartens and public schools enable pupils belonging to national minorities "to maintain and develop the sense of national, ethnic, and linguistic identity" by teaching their native language as well as their history and culture. The classes are organised by headmasters at a written request of parents. The native language of a given minority can be taught at kindergartens and schools with the minority language as the language of instruction, in bilingual establishments, in establishments with additional classes in the minority language, or in inter-schools groups studying the minority language. A class (division) with the minority language as the language of instruction at primary schools and lower secondary schools must consist of at least 7 students, and at upper secondary schools of at least 14 students. If the number of students is lower, the teaching in the minority language is organised in inter-division or inter-class groups or, optionally, in inter-school groups.[22]

At the end of 1990, teachers of the Lithuanian language prepared, in cooperation with the Lithuanian Social and Cultural Association, a curriculum for teaching Lithuanian in primary schools. In March 1991, the curriculum was approved by the Ministry of National Education. In 1993, on the initiative of Lithuanians, a curriculum for teaching history of Lithuania was developed. In addition, Lithuanian teachers developed curricula for teaching geography of Lithuania and the Lithuanian language in secondary schools.[23]

In 1993, Eugeniusz Pietruszkiewicz, the then chairman of the Association of Lithuanians in Poland, the largest Lithuanian organisation, assessed that the Lithuanian educational network was sufficient to meet the needs of that minority. The best situation was in the commune of Puńsk.[24]

In result of regime changes in Poland and Lithuania, the opportunities for Lithuanians living in Poland to continue their education in Lithuania improved significantly. Graduates of the upper secondary school in Puńsk have been able to pursue further education at higher education institutions in Lithuania. While until the end of the 1980s, no more than 2-3 persons per year were able to take up studies (almost exclusively the Lithuanian philology) in Lithuania, in the 1989-1990 academic year as many as 31 young Polish Lithuanians studied in Lithuania. What is more, they could

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[21] Journal of Laws of 1991, No. 95, item 425.
[22] Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 214, item 1579.
[23] K. Tarka (1998), *op. cit.*, pp. 237-238.
[24] *Litwini w Polsce. Rozmowa z E. Pietruszkiewiczem, prezesem Stowarzyszenia Litwinów w Polsce*, "Kultura" No. 3, 1993, p. 97.

choose any fields of study. Later, there have been practically no restrictions on continuing one's education at higher education institutions in independent Lithuania.[25]

In the 1990s, the number of pupils/students who learned the Lithuanian language grew. At primary schools, over 600 Lithuanian children were taught their native language. The highest number of children (685) learning Lithuanian was in the 1991-1992 school year, and the lowest (583) in 1990-1991. At that time, around 130 young Lithuanians attended the upper secondary school in Puńsk. There the highest number of students (141) was in 1996-1997 and 1998-1999, and the lowest (119) in 1992-1993.

In the following decade, the number of pupils/students in every type of school decreased. In the 1999-2000 school year, there were 528 Lithuanian children in primary schools. In 2005-2006, their number fell to 378, and in 2010-2011 to 269. In the first year following the introduction of lower secondary schools in 1999, 73 students studied Lithuanian there, in the mid-1990s, there were 177 students (in the 2003-2004 school year as many as 204), and in 2010-2011 the number of students was 164. The number of students in upper secondary schools ranged from 135 in 2001-2002 and 2004-2005 to 94 in 2010-2011. The decrease in the number of pupils/students was mainly due to a demographic decline.[26]

In Puńsk, in the 2007-2008 school year, in the Darius and Girenas School Complex with Lithuanian as the Language of Instruction, 182 out of 243 pupils learned Lithuanian at the primary school and 116 out of 162 students at the lower secondary school. In addition, in the commune of Puńsk, primary schools with Lithuanian as the language of instruction were in Nowinki (35 pupils), Widugiery (20 pupils) and Przystawańce (7 pupils). Due to the small number of pupils, the closing of schools in Przystawańce and Widugery is being considered.

In the neighbouring poviat, Lithuanian education is concentrated in Sejny. The "Žiburys" School Complex with Lithuanian as the Language of Instruction, established in 2005, consists of a primary school and a lower secondary school. The establishment is a non-public school with public school competencies. It is managed by the Bishop Antanas Baranasuskas Foundation "Lithuanian House". The "Žiburys" schools are attended by pupils from closed schools in Łumbie, Ogrodniki, and Krasnogruda. In the 2007-2008 school year, the "Žiburys" primary school in Sejny was attended by 27 Lithuanian pupils and the lower secondary school by 30 students. The Lithuanian language was also the language of instruction for 8 students in the Lower Secondary School No. 2 in Sejny. Starting from 2009-2010, it has been taught as an additional (optional) subject at that school. In the same year, the status of Lithuanian at the primary school in Krasnowo changed as well. In its last year of operation, only 3 children were taught in Lithuanian (language of instruction). In the 2007-2008 school year, 32 out of 74 pupils at that school learned Lithuanian as an additional subject. In the primary school in Klejwy, 4 pupils learned Lithuanian, and 10 pupils

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[25] K. Tarka (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 241.
[26] Materials of the Ministry of National Education: Informacja na temat sytuacji..., p. 10.

in the primary school in Poćkunki (in 2010-2011, due to the lack of applications there were no classes in Lithuanian). In the Mjr H. Dobrzański Primary School in Sejny, 15 out of 500 pupils learned Lithuanian, and at the Lower Secondary School in Sejny, only 5 out of 299 pupils. In Suwałki, 34 pupils/students learned Lithuanian in three inter-school groups consisting of pupils and students of primary and lower secondary schools.[27]

In 2011-2012 school year, 5 primary schools with Lithuanian as the language of instruction (in Puńsk, Nowiniki, Przystawańce, Widugiery, and Sejny) and 2 schools with Lithuanian taught as an additional subject (Krasnowo, Sejny) were attended by 269 pupils in total. In Lithuanian lower secondary schools in Puńsk and in Sejny and in the lower secondary school in Sejny with Lithuanian taught as an additional subject, there were 164 students learning Lithuanian or in Lithuanian. Moreover, there were 107 students at the Lithuanian upper secondary school in Puńsk and the upper secondary school in Sejny where the Lithuanian curriculum is an option. In total, in the 2011-2012 school year, there were 530 pupils/students studying Lithuanian in all types of schools.[28]

In the early 1990s, the *Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne* publishing house specialising in textbooks prepared the fourth set of textbooks for teaching Lithuanian in primary schools. It complied with the new curriculum. The new books were supposed to be published gradually, i.e. one title per year. However, no textbook was published until the end of 1996 when a textbook for teaching Lithuanian to pupils in their 8th school year was published. In the following year textbooks for the 7th and 6th school years were published. Authors of those textbooks were Lithuanian teachers. Historian Bronisław Makowski (Bronius Makauskas), a Lithuanian activist working at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, wrote a textbook for the history of Lithuania for upper secondary school students which was published to the end of 1997.[29]

Changes in the national system of education (e.g. introduction of lower secondary schools) and in the curricula content required new textbooks. All costs connected with the writing, print and distribution of textbooks for national minorities in Poland are covered from the state budget. Textbooks for the Lithuanian minority are printed by the *Aušra*, the Lithuanian publisher in Puńsk, as commissioned by the Ministry of National Education. Due to a low number of copies, the cost of publishing textbooks for national minorities is very high. For instance, the total cost of a textbook on grammar, spelling and history of a minority language for the 3rd school year in upper secondary schools printed in 2009 in 100 copies was as high as PLN 930 per copy. After 2000, a set of textbooks of the Lithuanian language for primary, lower secondary and upper secondary schools was published, as well as workbooks for

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[27] Materials of the Ministry of National Education: Szkoły z litewskim językiem nauczania oraz szkoły prowadzące dodatkowe nauczanie języka litewskiego w roku szkolnym 2007/2008.

[28] Materials of the Ministry of National Education: Informacja na temat sytuacji..., p. 10.

[29] K. Tarka (1998), *op. cit.,* p. 241.

learning mathematics and a textbook of the history of Lithuania for primary schools, textbooks of natural environment and geography of Lithuania for primary schools and lower secondary schools, and Polish-Lithuanian glossaries of mathematics, geography, art, physics, chemistry, biology, and IT terminology.[30]

Students graduating from Lithuanian upper secondary schools must take the school-leaving exam [*matura*] in the Lithuanian language. They may also take exams in other subjects (excluding Polish language and literature) in their native language. Also primary school pupils and lower secondary school students may take their respective school-leaving exams in Lithuanian.[31]

Polish legislation provides that pupils/students belonging to national minorities may learn in their native language and ensures that schools where minority language is taught are financed from the state budget. Schools for national minorities receive subsidies which are 20% and 150% higher than other schools. An additional subsidy, increased at first by 50% (in 2002) and then by 100% (in 2005) and 150% (in 2006) is dedicated to small schools in which the number of students does not exceed 84 (primary schools) or 42 (lower and upper secondary schools). The increased subsidies for small schools were a demand of the Lithuanian minority.[32]

Ethnic education is an important element supporting national and cultural distinctness. Compared to education provided for other national minorities, the situation of the Lithuanian community is outstanding. It is stable and the access to education in the Lithuanian language is universal. Lithuanian schools have not experienced a rapid decrease in the number of students, and almost 70% of Lithuanian children in school age receive education in their mother tongue. This demonstrates that both parents and students are interested in education in their native language and have a strong sense of their national identity and distinctness. That sense is definitely stronger among young Lithuanians than among their Belarusian peers for instance. In result, Lithuanians are relatively little affected by assimilation processes. The concentration of the Lithuanian minority in a small area and the involvement of Lithuanian teachers and organisations are conducive to the provision of teaching and having own facilities . In a survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office in 1994, over 67% of Polish Lithuanians were of the opinion that their children should received education in their native language and only 14% favoured education in the Polish Language.[33]

The role of schools in supporting the linguistic and cultural distinctness is extremely important. Education orientated towards protection of minorities and preservation of their national identities may prevent their assimilation. It performs its function through the teaching of the native language, cultivating traditions and protecting values and culture of the minority. Its objective is to maintain national awareness e.g.

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[30] Materials of the Ministry of National Education: Informacja na temat sytuacji..., pp. 12-14.

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 11.

[32] *Ibidem*, pp. 5-8.

[33] *Litwini w Polsce – Polacy na Litwie...* (1995), pp. 38-39.

by improving mother tongue skills to facilitate quality communication. Education in the native language strongly supports its preservation, contributing to its use at home and in everyday life.

Another issue important to Lithuanian Catholics was the language of liturgy and pastoral care. Nearly forty years of efforts to restore the celebration of the mass in the Lithuanian language in the Minor Basilica in Sejny antagonised Lithuanians and Church authorities (the then local priest and the bishop of the Łomża diocese) as well as Polish parishioners. The mass in Lithuanian started to be celebrated in Sejny only in October 1983. The memory of past conflicts affected everybody involved and current events. In result, the seriousness of apparently lesser issues grew.[34]

On 25 March 1992, Pope John Paul II approved a new administrative division of the Catholic Church in Poland. As a result of the reorganisation, the Suwałki Region belonged now to the newly created diocese of Ełk headed by bishop Wojciech Ziemba. One of his firsts decisions was to introduce the celebration of the mass in Lithuanian in Suwałki, at the Church of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus initially, once a month, and later on every second Sunday. In addition, to the end of May 1992, he appointed prelate Ignacy Dziermejka, a long-time parish priest in Puńsk, the Episcopal vicar for the Lithuanian congregation.[35]

Shortly, the relations between the Curia and Lithuanians deteriorated rapidly. In order to bring the Church closer to the congregation and to ennoble the local community, the bishop decided to establish a new parish in Widugiery. It was supposed to consist of Lithuanian villages of the Sejny parish and part of the Puńsk parish. It was also planned that the new parish would be joined by Zegary and Ogrodniki, i.e. localities which, if connected by a straight line on a map, were not far from Widugiery but were separated by the Gaładuś Lake. Their residents would need to travel 25 km and pass through Sejny in order to get to Widugiery.

The construction of the chapel in Widugiery started in the mid-1980s. The initiator of that project was the bishop of Puńsk, who was about to retire. Financial means came from Lithuanians from Chicago and the local congregation. Initially, it was supposed to be only a chapel or a filial church for those congregation members who lived a dozen or so kilometres from the parish church. The Sunday mass was to be celebrated by priests from Puńsk. In June 1992, when the construction works were almost finished, parish priests from Puńsk and Sejny announced from the pulpit the intent to establish a new parish in Widugiery. The decision met with protest from the surprised Lithuanian community. The Puńsk parish council was of the opinion that the manner in which the new decision was taken had all the characteristics of "conspiracy led by his Excellency [bishop Ziemba – K.T.] against the Lithuanian congregation".

The bishop of Ełk did not act in bad faith. It seems that being new, he was not familiar enough with the complicated situation. Lithuanians interpreted the actions

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[34] More in: K. Tarka (1998), *op. cit.*, pp. 50-55, 69, 171-186.

[35] *Ibidem*, p. 243.

of the Curia as attempts at their Polonisation. They believed that the detachment of Lithuanian villages from the parish in Sejny was to reduce the number of Lithuanians in that parish, which would result in cancelling the only mass in Lithuanian celebrated in the basilica for which they struggled for almost 40 years. In their opinion, that was the real, hidden agenda behind the changes.

When the talks between the parish council and the bishop, held in August 1992, did not produce any results, Lithuanians closed the church in Widugiery and did not let in priest Zenon Parakiewicz, a former vicar of Lithuanian descent in Sejny who was supposed to be the new parish priest. The front door was secured with chains fastened with padlocks. When they were removed after few days, representatives of the parish council mounted metal bars on the door and welded them.

Establishing a parish against the will of the congregation was doomed to failure. The bishop, instead of abandoning the unfortunate idea as quickly as possible, kept postponing his decision. That worsened the situation and led to the conflict escalation.

Lithuanians expected bishop Ziemba to confirm in writing that he would not establish a parish in Widugery. Such a confirmation letter was not delivered. For the unrest they also blamed priest Dziermejka and dean Stanisław Rogowski from Sejny who were the authors of the new territorial division of the parish. The unrest among Lithuanians grew and in mid December, the parish council from Puńsk decided to refuse traditional Christmas home visits of their parish priest.

On 29 December 1992, representatives of all Lithuanian organisations, namely Eugeniusz Pietruszkiewicz (Association of Lithuanians in Poland), Witold Grygutis (Lithuanian Society of St. Casimir) and Józef Sygit Forencewicz (Polish Lithuanian Community), appealed to the diocesan Curia. Once again they asked the bishop to determine the status of the new church as soon as possible. "The lack of decision or postponing the decision, they warned, carries the risk that the conflict between the congregation and their local priests and between Polish and Lithuanian congregations will escalate". They underlined that the establishment of a new parish should be an initiative of its inhabitants and could not be done against their will. They argued that the establishment of a parish in Widugiery "violates the existing territorial unity of Lithuanians and reduces their representation in two neighbouring parishes of Puńsk and Sejny, thus posing an additional threat". The concerns and sensitivities of Lithuanians might have been unjustified in that case but they had their roots in past experience.

The dispute about the status of the church in Widugiery deepened the conflict between the parish priest in Puńsk and its congregation. In response to the community's boycott of traditional Christmas visits, priest Dziermejko refused to perform pastoral services (baptisms, funerals). That was a dead end. In addition to the issue of Widugiery, another postulate was voiced. Lithuanians accused the parish priest of "almost pathological malice towards the congregation" and, underlining his disabilities due to his advanced age (poor memory, sight problems, and the like), they requested the Curia to replace the parish priest and appoint a new Episcopal vicar.

After over 2 months, on 9 March 1993, bishop Ziemba personally assured the Lithuanian delegation which arrived at the Curia that the legal status of the church in Widugiery had not been changed, which meant that it was still a filial church of the parish of Puńsk. He sent a letter confirming the above to parish priests in Puńsk and Sejny.

After 9 months of confusion, the strange tug war on Widugiery was finally over. The conflict was the reason for the retirement of father Dziermejko who, as it turned out, was a real victim of the dispute. The parish priest lost the trust of his parishioners and, after 26 years of pastoral service in Puńsk, was forced to leave the parish in June 1993. The bishop appointed Jan Jerzy Macek new parish priest. Macek happened to be a Pole fluent in Lithuanian. Father Dziermejko was dismissed from the function of the Episcopal vicar in the diocese of Ełk for Lithuanian congregation.[36] Starting from 2000, the function of the parish priest in Puńsk has been performed by father Czesław Bagan.

Shortly after, another conflict surfaced. In the summer of 1994, priest Parakiewicz was appointed the parish priest of the neighbouring Giby parish. Every week, he would go to Sejny but the mass in the Żegary chapel was celebrated by a new vicar (a Pole) in Polish while the people attending the mass would respond in Lithuanian. The situation in other "Lithuanian" parishes deteriorated as well. In mid-1995, father Virginijus Veprauskas, who provided pastoral services to Lithuanians in Poland, was requested by his archbishop to return to Lithuania. Fortunately, another priest from Lithuania arrived three month later. In addition, at the same time the Missionary Oblates of Saint Mary left Smolany and the authorities of that order called off father Antoni Deguits who worked with and for Lithuanians. In result of a series of different events, the mass in Lithuanian was suspended in Żegary, Suwałki and Smolany. That situation worried the Lithuanian community. They blamed the parish priest in Sejny and the bishop of the Ełk diocese for neglecting the problem and for taking actions detrimental to maintaining the sense of national identity. In July 1995, leaders of Lithuanian organisations and parish councils in Puńsk, Sejny and Suwałki appealed to the Curia. They underlined that their natural right to pastoral services in their native language was "once again severely" violated "in the entire area inhabited by the Lithuanian-speaking population". They demanded from bishop Ziemba to "repair the damage" and restore the complete pastoral service. They threatened that some actions of the desperate Lithuanian community may be beyond their and the bishop's control. They argued that the cumulation of negative developments was the result of not appointing Lithuanian priests to parish priests which made them move to central and western Poland. Therefore, they strongly suggested that the bishop of the diocese of Ełk should appoint Alfons Jurkiewicz new parish priest in Sejny. Jurkiewicz is a priest of Lithuanian descent who worked in the archdiocese of Wrocław for years. In addition, they informed the Primate of Poland, the Vatican

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[36] More on the conflict in Widugiery in: *ibidem*, pp. 243-248.

Secretariat of State and the Episcopate of Lithuania of their demands. The build-up of tensions became real again.

This time bishop Ziemba reacted quickly. He explained that the issue of "human resources" should be resolved as soon as a Lithuanian priest from the Ełk diocese completes his studies in Rome and returns to Poland. Another Lithuanian student was about to complete his last year of studies at a local seminary. The bishop insisted also on the arrival of new priests from Lithuania. His calm, balanced tone and concrete answer helped to mitigate the emerging conflict.[37]

Currently, the mass in Lithuanian is celebrated every day in churches in Puńsk, Sejny and Smolany, every Sunday in Widugiery and Żegary, every second week in Suwałki, and once a month in Warsaw.

Lithuanians are one of the smallest national groups in Poland. The main objective of social and cultural activists of that minority have been to protect the Lithuanian community against discrimination and assimilation. The high level of the community internal integration has mitigated the process of assimilation and safeguarded Lithuanians from being absorbed by the Polish majority. It helped Lithuanians to retain their distinctive identity, their own language, culture and education. Factors which have contributed to the above include Lithuanians' concentration within a small area, peripheral location, and relative isolation from the Polish society. The strong identification of the Lithuanian minority with their "little motherland" (the region of Puńsk) has been another factor strengthening their sense of national identity.

ABSTRACT

The article presents the situation of the Lithuanian minority in the Third Republic of Poland. Lithuanians who densely inhabit a small area of the north-east Suwałki Region, in and around Puńsk and Sejny, form a close-knit community. This is the autochthonous and almost exclusively rural population. Lesser and dispersed groups of Lithuanians live in the entire territory of Poland. The overall number of the Lithuanian minority of Poland is approximately 7.5-8 thousand people. In the new reality after 1989, there have been changes in the organised activity of Lithuanians. The Lithuanian Social and Cultural Association, which had existed for over thirty years, changed its name to the Association of Lithuanians in Poland. New organisations were also founded, including the Lithuanian Society of St. Casimir and the Polish Lithuanian Community. For Lithuanian activists a most important issue was education in their native tongue. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Aušra Publishing House began the printing of first books in Lithuanian after the Second World War. The Aušra quarterly was transformed into a monthly and then into a biweekly. Besides, regional stations of the public radio and television began broadcasting regular programmes in Lithuanian. Lithuanians are characterised by high national self-awareness and the ability to organise themselves in defence of their interests. A high degree of internal integration minimised the process of assimilation and allowed them to retain their distinctive identity, their own language, culture and system of education. The factors that have facilitates the above are: a compact population inhabiting a small area, peripheral location, and isolation from the Polish society.

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[37] *Ibidem*, pp. 248-251.

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KARAIMS: THE IDENTITY QUESTION*

The name Karaims[1] derives from *karaim*, a Hebrew word meaning "the reading one", "the calling one" and hence Karaims are also called "the people of Scripture".[2] But *karaim* also means "the detached", "the disconnected". The same word in Turkish means "black"[3], "north", or "poor", which suggests Turkic origin of Karaims, namely from Khazars. Karaim dignitaries from the early 20th century popularised that version of the origin of Karaim people, however, that origin is not sufficiently documented.[4] Thus the question whether Karaims were the followers of Judaism in Khazaria is frequently asked. In publications on history, such a religious faction is mentioned but it is not exactly clear whether it was of Karaims.[5] This is hardly

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[1] As many authors argue: "In Polish scientific (and popular) publications, followers of Karaism are referred to as *karaimi* [Karaims] and not as *karaici* [Karaites]". Cf. M. Pawelec (2010), *Niepojęty świat Karaimów?,* "Awazymyz", No. 3(28), http://www.awazymyz.karaimi.org/zeszyty/item/357-niepojety--swiat-karaimow [accessed: 08.06.13]. This does not seem, however, to be a consistent terminological convention. Cf. B. Janusz (1927), *Karaici w Polsce,* Kraków.

[2] R. Otsason (2004), *Karaimi,* in: *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii,* Vol. 5, Lublin, pp. 487-489.

[3] "At the end of the fourth millennium BC, the Iranian plateau was inhabited by tribes speaking a Turkish-Kipchak dialect of the Oghuz group. So far, the reasons for the migration of those tribes to eastern lands and, finally, to middle Mesopotamia have not been fully explained. In Mesopotamia, the migrating tribes split. Some went to the South and gave rise to Sumer. Others, led by the Black Chieftain (*Kara imam* or *Kara im*), went to the North and, later, formed the nucleus or better the core of the Karaim nation." Cf. http://bakkal.kulichki.com/karap/istork.htlm [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[4] K. Kohler, A. de Harkavy (ca. 1906), *Karaites and Karaism,* in: *Jewish Encyclopedia*, pp. 438-447, http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=108&letter=K [accessed: 08.06.2013]; P. Fijałkowski, *Karaimi,* in: Z. Borzymińska, R. Żebrowski, (eds) (2003), *Polski słownik judaistyczny. Dzieje – kultura – religia – ludzie,* Vol. 1, Warszawa, pp. 758-759.

[5] There is also another version. "More or less at the same time (end of the 8th century), an interesting event took place in the region neighbouring with the Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire in the North. There was a strong Khazar Empire. Khazars were people of Turkic descent who dominated other Turkic and non-Turkic tribes in the area stretching roughly to the Caucasus Mountains, the Black Sea, the Don River, the Volga, and the Caspian Sea. Bulan, a king of Khazars, facing the competition for influence between Christianity and Islam, two great religions of that time, decided to convert to ... Judaism. There are records saying that Khazars did not accept the Talmud, which has been the starting point of the dispute in literature." Cf. J. Krzystek, *Najmniejsza mniejszość Rzeczpospolitej?,* "Spojrzenia" 29.05.1992, http://

the only mystery surrounding the history of Karaims and their culture. In this article, we want to trace a common denominator of all those inconsistencies, i.e. the dual identity of Karaims.[6] The duality issue is deeply rooted in postmodern discussions on nationality (national affiliation) and ethnicity. Postmodernity will constitute a broader context for our deliberations[7] in particular on ethno-sociological research conducted by Lucjan Adamczuk[8]. We will reconstruct the essence of that duality exploring transformations of the classical concepts of identity in the social teaching of Zygmunt Bauman.[9]

IDENTITY, MINORITY AND IDENTIFICATION

Identity, *minority* and *identification* are terms used repeatedly throughout this text. When speaking about *identity*, we mean the self-determination of a social actor who, in this case, is the Karaim community. Self-definition is construed from the actor's own beliefs, ideas and self-evaluation which are realised and confirmed in the social and cultural life of a given community (in the form of symbols, rituals, organisation of social life, social status hierarchy, etc.) and by historically attested authenticity of the bonds among community members (e.g. traditions, myths and legends, tales, history of the community).[10] That is why a large part of this paper

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magnet.fsu.edu/~krzystek/Spojrz/SPO.27 [accessed: 08.06.2013]. Much information about the origin of Karaims and their possible connections with Khazars, along with references to written sources and findings of scholars representing various fields, can be found in comprehensive monograph by Stefan Gąsiorowski (2008), *Karaimi w Koronie i na Litwie w XV-XVIII wieku*, Kraków-Budapest, pp. 100-120.

[6] We refer to Karaims in the double sense, i.e. as an ethnic group and as a religious group. However, although we are interested in Karaims who are not followers of Karaism, we are not interested in followers of Karaism who are not ethnic Karaims. This reservation is particularly important if we take into consideration the fact that, starting from 2007, we may observe a growing wave of group conversions to Karaism (e.g. in Egypt, the US and Turkey). Cf. S. Cohen (2011), *The Jews who take off their shoes for shul*, http://www.thejc.com/judaism/judaism-features/50660/the-jews-who-take-the-ir-shoes-shul [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[7] Other terms used to refer to our times include *post-modernity* and *post-modernism*. Cf. Z. Bauman (1994), *Dwa szkice o moralności ponowoczesnej,* Warszawa, p. 16.

[8] It is worth noting that the research conducted by Adamczuk mainly focused on families in which at least one spouse declared to be a Karaim. In the orthodox doctrine of Karaism, a Karaim family is a family in which both husband and wife are Karaims. Adamczuk writes that in a research perspective "what seems to be the decisive factor determining the Karaim identity is the sense of a strong emotional connection with the broadly understood Karaim culture". Cf. L. Adamczuk (2004), *Socjologiczny obraz współczesnego życia Karaimów na Litwie i w Polsce,* "Awazymyz", No. 2(9), http://www.awazymyz.karaimi.org/zeszyty/item/125-socjologiczny-obraz [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[9] In the opinion of Z. Bokszański, Bauman's considerations are also characterised by a specific ambivalence located between *modernity* and *postmodernity*, both as topics of his deliberations and the discourse pursued. Cf. Z. Bokszański (2007), *Indywidualizm a zmiana społeczna. Polacy wobec nowoczesności – raport z badań,* Warszawa, pp. 39-41.

[10] Cf. Z. Bokszański, *Tożsamość,* in: Z. Bokszański et al., (ed.) (2002), *Encyklopedia socjologii,* Vol. 4, Warszawa, pp. 252-255. Referring to Bauman, Bokszański notes also that identity issues become

is devoted to the history, culture, and origin of Karaims which are the foundations of that minority identity structure.[11] While speaking of *minority*, we refer to a few determinants: population size (the number of its members is always lower than the number of members of the dominant group in a given territory), a sense of belonging (bonds), cultural distinctness, asymmetrical participation in the life of dominant groups, limited autonomy, ascribed membership, and historical and symbolic validity.[12] Karaims are, therefore, a minority meaning that they have such distinctive features differentiating them from other groups inhabiting the same territories. Those features are also the basis for the *identification* of individual members of the Karaim community and thus for finding one's own *identity* in what makes one "different" which is decisive for a community emergence. Karaims are also a community whose *identity* and *minority* status undergo far-reaching transformations today. Those *postmodern re-transformations* are the cause of the aforementioned dualism. Who, then, are Karaims?

HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF KARAIMS: AN OUTLINE OF CONTROVERSIES

If we want to describe Karaims as briefly as possible, we may quote Feliks Koneczny according to whom "Karaims are Jews who dismiss the *Talmud* and for whom all comments are based only on the *Pentateuch*. They emancipated their women, participated in secular education (under the Arab rule), frequently adopted Arabs' monotheistic universality, and used Arabic, thanks to which they were more well-read and grew stronger while Talmudists wrote only in Aramaic."[13] It is worth adding that the history of those people intertwined with histories of many European countries (many centuries of migrations, resettlements and vicissitudes of life). At

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an interesting subject of reflections when boundaries of the identity "begin to blur in the darkness" and "when that does not become a problem". Cf. Z. Bokszański (2007), *Tożsamości zbiorowe,* Warszawa, p. 16. More arguments in favour of the abandonment of identity systematising concepts (both normative and descriptive) are provided within processual approaches to the category in question e.g. in "dramaturgical, phenomenological and actionalistic sociology". Cf. Z. Bokszański (1989), *Tożsamość, interakcja, grupa. Tożsamość jednostki w perspektywie teorii socjologicznej,* Łódź, pp. 148-152, 155-161, 213-214 and 224-229. Processual approaches provide a wider context for the consolidation of Bauman's theses on identity (e.g. multiplicity of identities, "selective moments of biographies", situational correlates of identity, the illusory nature of stable identity).

[11] We must not forget that, for example, relations between Poles and Karaims (which began in the 13th century) constituted an important element in the formation of the Karaim identity by shaping its "reflected self" which is the source of social actors' ideas about and evaluations of themselves. Cf. Z. Bokszański (1989), *Tożsamość*...

[12] Cf. T. Paleczny, *Mniejszości,* in: Z. Bokszański et al., (ed.) (1999), *Encyklopedia socjologii,* Vol. 2, Warszawa, pp. 259-264.

[13] F. Koneczny (1999), *Synopsis "Cywilizacji żydowskiej" Feliksa Konecznego,* Poznań. According to Linde's dictionary from the 19th century [free translation]: "Karaims, who today still live also in Poland, contributed much to old observations and they do not differ much from Jews in terms of many superstitions and they are somehow close to Mohammedanism". Cf. *Słownik języka polskiego przez M. Samuela Bogumiła Linde. Wydanie drugie*, Vol. II: G - L, Lwów 1855, p. 315.

present their number is estimated to be around 30 thousand people (25 thousand in Israel alone). The above, however, is so simplified that it obscures the essence of Karaism.

The ethnogenesis of the Karaims is not homogeneous because of their several separate lines. "In the ethnogenesis of the Crimean and Polish-Lithuanian Karaims, both the Turkic people of the Khazar Empire played their part and, after the fall of that empire in the second half of the 10th century (in result of a battle lost in 969 against prince Sviatoslav of Kiev), the Kipchak-Polovtsian tribes of Turkic descent which arrived there later."[14]. Those peoples, if the above is correct, came from the territory of modern Iraq where they were called Ananites after Anan Ben David of Basra[15]. Such an explanation, although frequently given, does not have to be entirely correct. Its grounds are lost in the mists of time and possible sources seem to be silent or disagree about its legitimacy. Szymon Szyszman, a well-known scholar studying Karaims, "considers it to be a fact that Karaism is in a straight line an extension of the beliefs of the Essenes, remains of whose monastery were discovered in Qumran near the Dead Sea in 1949"[16]. Another "fact" is that Karaims are descendants of the Sadducees. "The tribe which today is called the Karaim are Israelite people who long before the birth of Christ got separated from their native tribe under the rule of Israelite king Uzziah (or: Azariah [in historiography he was king of Judah – P.L. and K.R.]) in the number of ten generations."[17] After the destruction of the Temple in

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[14] S. Pilecki (2003), *Pochodzenie etniczne*, http://www.karaimi.org/index.php7p=1 [accessed: 08.06.2013]. According to historiography, Sviatoslav defeated Khazars in a battle in 965 while the capital of Kazaria, Atil, fell in result of the invasion of Ruthenians in 969. S. Gąsiorowski (2008), *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

[15] His teachings determined the dual (Judeo-Islamic) nature of the Karaim religion: "Anan ben David of Basra concluded that the prophetic vocation did not end with Biblical prophets but was still possible. He considered Jesus from Nazareth to be a prophet sent to convert pagans and a great teacher of Jews. He rejected, however, the divinity of Jesus. He also considered Muhammad to be a prophet whose task was to save Arabs from committing idolatry by revealing to them the true God. The creator of Karaism incorporated some ideas of less strict schools of the Muslim law, i.e. of the Hanafi school. He also adapted a number of elements from the Muslim liturgy and religious terminology." Cf. M. A. Koprowski (2008), *Fenomen Karaimów*, http://www.kresy.pl/zycieduchowe?zobacz/fenomen-karaimow [accessed: 08.06.2013]. Anan ben David has been often considered the "founder" of the Karaim religion and even of Karaism as such, but he was, in fact, its reformer only. Basic dogmas of Karaism and related religious writings preceded his activities. Cf. Sz. Szyszman (2005), *Karaimizm. Historia i doktryna,* Wrocław, p. 15. Not all authors, however, agree on that interpretation, cf. R. Otsason (2004), *Karaimi...,* p. 487; X.G.R., *Karaici,* in: *Encyklopedja kościelna podług teologicznej encyklopedji Wetzera i Weltego, z licznemi jej dopełnieniami,* vol. 10: *Karaici-Kongregacje dekanalne,* Warszawa 1877, pp. 1-5.

[16] J. Krzystek (1992), *op. cit.*

[17] W. Syrokomla (1857), *Wycieczki po Litwie: w promieniach od Wilna (Troki, Stokliszki, Jezno, Funie, Niemież, Miedniki etc.),* Vilnius, p. 61. The theory that Karaims are descendants of Sadducees has been questioned by some authors because "the Sadducees, as it is known, rejected the belief in the immortality of souls, while on the oldest Karaim tombstones which P. Firkowicz saw in Crimea and Asia there were prayers for the dead and inscriptions that their souls would be remembered by the living". *Ibidem*, pp. 65-66. See also M. Pawelec (2010), *op. cit.*

Jerusalem, the Sadducees lost their leading role and, in line with rabbinic tradition, were declared heretics. Their place was taken by a Jewish religious and political formation of Pharisees.[18] It is thought that in the 8th century, Karaims separated as a religious group in the region of modern Iraq, and became known for its orthodox interpretation of the Torah and promotion of Hellenism. That was also the starting point of Karaims' life as wanderers which later found its reflection in the doctrine of Karaism.

> From the 8th to the 10th century, as a result of missionary activities, Karaism spread in Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and North Africa and reached Spain, Byzantium, Persia, and the Khazar Empire (*Khaganate*) where it was adopted by its ruler (*khagan*) Bulan, his court and dignitaries as well as by a part of the population[19], especially people who settled in the Crimean Peninsula and the southern steppe of Ruthenia. During those dozen or so centuries, the Karaim religion was practised in many different territories and by people of different descent but nowhere their number was very high.[20]

Their presence in Crimea is confirmed in a sources from the 12th century. It is highly probable, however, that they settled there much earlier.[21] The later established communes of Halych, Lutsk, and Lviv were the new home for Karaims. Starting from that time, the history of Karaims and their heritage is better documented but questions about their Turkic or Israelite descent and about them coming from Khazars or Sadducees, keep recurring. Those questions have not been fully answered yet, and thus Karaims' thinking about their past has a dual character.[22]

KARAIM-POLISH CONTACTS FROM THE 13TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY: CULTURE AND SCIENCE

The history of contacts between Karaims and Poles dates back to the Middle Ages. Already at that time Karaim settlers from Crimea inhabited Ruthenian and Lithuanian lands. According to some sources, their settlements in the territory of the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia can be dated back to the mid 13th century when Karaims supposedly settled in such towns as: Halych, Darażno, Olyka, Kotowice,

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[18] R. Żebrowski, *Saduceusze,* in: Z. Borzymińska, R. Żebrowski, (eds) (2003), *Polski słownik judaistyczny. Dzieje – kultura – religia – ludzie,* Vol. 2, Warszawa, pp. 464-465.

[19] Such was the Khazar tradition but it is not clear what movement within the Israelite religion it was exactly. Cf. S. Gąsiorowski (2008), *op. cit.,* pp. 107-110.

[20] S. Pilecki, (2003) *Religia,* http://www.karaimi.org/index.php7p=103 [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[21] S. Gąsiorowski (2008), *op. cit.,* p. 127.

[22] The bi-polar nature of the genesis of Karaism is based on dialectics of history as well as on tales, legends and beliefs. Their mutual dependencies are perfectly reconstructed by M. Bałaban, *Karaici w Polsce, studjum historyczne,* in: idem, *Studja historyczne,* Warszawa 1927, pp. 1-92. That is clear especially of compared to its criticism by A. Zajączkowski (1928), *Na marginesie studjum Bałabana "Karaici w Polsce",* Vilnius.

Lviv, and Lutsk. Those were the towns where religious communes were estab-lished[23]. Grzegorz Pełczyński mentions another interpretation according to which the arrival of Karaims in Ruthenian lands was related to the settlement campaign of duke Vytautas in the early 15th century.[24] According to Pełczyński, that appears to be disputable. The territories of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, the capital of which was Lviv in the 14th century, were divided between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland and to the latter belonged Halych Ruthenia with Lviv and Halych. That is why it is seems strange that duke Vytautas would let Karaims settle in the Kingdom of Poland. Most probably, however, the involvement of Vytautas referred to Karaims who settled in the Lithuanian town of Trakai, divided into Christian and Karaim parts, and neighbouring villages. According to the Karaim tradition, in 1397 Vytautas brought Tatars from the territories of the Golden Horde, and 383 Karaim families from Solkhat in Crimea. A widespread view that it was connected with Karaims militarily guarding Lithuanian borders against the Teutonic Order forces lacks any solid basis in available sources.[25] Pełczyński believes that is very probable that Vytautas awarded privileges first to Karaims living in Trakai. The successive rulers from the Jagiellonian dynasty and later elective monarchs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth followed in his footsteps. The privileges, how-ever, were never granted to the entire Karaim community in the country but only to specific communes. On 27 March 1441, Grand Duke of Lithuania Casimir IV Jagiellon granted Karaims in Trakai privileges similar to Magdeburg rights. It was an extraordinary event because it allowed Karaims to form their own local government while the non-Christian population could not.[26] Karaites themselves were subordi-nate to the power of an elected vojt who reported directly to the monarch.

Both in the Middle Ages and in the early modern era, the majority of Karaims living in towns in Poland and Lithuania were tradesmen and craftsmen. Many were lease-holders.[27] Most probably, they worked also in agriculture and horticulture and supposedly were especially known as cucumber growers. Their mercantile activ-ity, however, was most important, especially since they were involved in the Black Sea trade, transporting grain and wood via rivers to ports.[28] Owing to their trade contacts with brothers in Crimea, they were hired as translators for the military and diplomacy. They also mediated in the exchange of prisoners between Poland and the

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[23] S. Pilecki (2003), *Pochodzenie...*

[24] G. Pełczyński (2004), *Karaimi polscy,* Poznań, p. 14.

[25] S. Gąsiorowski (2008), *op. cit.,* p. 336. Information on the alleged military traditions of Karaims which dated back to the Middle Ages is provided by M. Morelowski (1946), *Zamek najeziorny w Tro-kach z źródła formy zachodnie i czarnomorskie: studium z dziejów architektury, urbanistyki i karaim-sko-tatarsko-ormiańskich migracyj,* "Myśl Karaimska" Vol. 23, No. 1, Wrocław, pp. 75-76 and 88-89, and by many other authors e.g. S. Pilecki, A. Tokarczyk, Sz. Szyszman.

[26] Cf. S. Pilecki (2003), *Pochodzenie...;* A. Tokarczyk (2006), *Karaimizm. Saga polskich Karai-mów,* Warszawa.

[27] S. Gąsiorowski (2008), *op. cit.,* pp. 343-362.

[28] G. Pełczyński (2004), *Karaimi...,* p. 16.

Crimean Khanate. Those were Crimean Karaims whose fortress was Chufut-Kale, and whom the khans from nearby Bakhchysarai obliged to take care of most distinguished prisoners.[29]

Another domain in which Karaims were active was science. In the 16th century, one of popular figures was exegete and philosopher Isaac ben Abraham of Trakai. Many students of Anan ben David, in turn, were interested in medicine and a Karaim, Abraham ben Josiah, was appointed the court physician of king Jan III Sobieski.[30]

The early modern period was also the time when Karaims attracted interest of European scholars. The development of biblical studies in protestant countries stimulated interest in the Karaim version of the Old Testament, and Lithuanian and Ruthenian communes regularly exchanged letters with scholars in the West. In 1691, king Charles IX of Sweden sent a scholar, Gustaf Peringer, to Lithuania. Peringer wrote a letter titled *Epistola de Karaitis Lithuaniae* which was an important source of information on Karaims for the West until the 19th century.[31]

In the modern era, Karaims' involvement in science has continued. Important Polish scholars of the 20th century who were of Karaim descent include Ananiasz Zajączkowski (professor of the University of Warsaw and author of over 335 studies devoted *inter alia* to Turkic people from the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea steppe, oriental influences in the Polish culture, and Karaim issues; member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Polish Academy of Sciences[32]), the last Polish *hazzan* Rafał Abkowicz of Trakai (the founder of the Wrocław *kenesa*), and geophysicist Ananiasz Rojecki (co-founder of the Polish Hydrological and Meteorological Society renamed Polish Geophysical Society in 1966; awarded the Silver Cross of Merit and the Knight's Cross and Officer's Cross of Order of Polonia Restituta). They all were buried in the Karaim cemetery founded in 1890 in Warsaw, the only Karaim cemetery still in use in Europe.[33] Other outstanding Karaims include Szymon Firkowicz (a poet who translated several works by Adam Mickiewicz into the Karaim language), Szymon Pilecki (called the "Warsaw professor", chairman of the *Karaj Diń Birligiari LR* [Karaim Religious Association in the Republic of Poland], aircraft engineer[34]), Aleksander Dubiński (Oriental Studies), and Mariola Abkowicz (since 1997, the chairperson of the Karaim Association in Poland, editor-in-chief of

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[29] J. Orłowska-Stanisławska (2006), *Uwięzieni w skalnym gnieździe,* "Poznaj Świat" No. 8 (595), http://www.poznaj-swiat.pl/artykul,uwiezieni_w_skalnym_gniezdzie,441 [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[30] G. Pełczyński (2004), *Karaimi...,* p. 16.

[31] *Ibidem,* pp. 16-17.

[32] Cf. A. Zajączkowski (2006), *Zarys religii karaimskiej,* Wrocław.

[33] Cf. M. Abkowicz (2006), *Karaimi tu i teraz*, http://www.lewica.pl/index.php7id=11246 [accessed: 08.06.2013]; A. Dubiński (2006), *Cmentarz Karaimski w Warszawie,* "Awazymyz" No. 3 (13), pp. 3-6, http://www.awazymyz.karaimi.org/zeszyty/item/187-cmentarz-karaimski-w-warszawie [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[34] E. Bezekowicz (2007), *Szymon Pilecki,* "Awazymyz" No. 1(15), pp. 17-18, http://www.awazymyz.karaimi.org/zeszyty/item/202-szymon-pilecki [accessed: 08.06.2013].

the *Awazymyz* magazine, and researcher at the Department of Hebrew, Aramaic and Karaim Studies at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań).[35]

In the modern era, Karaims have enjoyed popular esteem. In addition, there is evidence that their culture grew closer to the dominant Polish culture. Such evidence includes their surnames which were increasingly Slavonic and very frequently Polish. The Semitic surnames, in turn, a characteristic feature of which was the word *ben* which means "son", went out of use. It allows us to conclude that partial acculturation and adoption of the dominant cultural models took place at that time. Grzegorz Pełczyński mentions the following popular surnames: "Abkowicz, Charczenko, Dubiński, Jutkiewicz, Kapłonowski, Kobecki, Leonowicz, Lokszyński, Łobanas, Malecki, Mickiewicz, Pilecki, Robaczewski, Sułkowski, Zajączkowski, Żarnowski, and others".[36]

In the late 18th century, Catherine the Great massively enlarged her empire. Karaims living in Crimea and in the territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which were annexed by Russia during the partitions of Poland, lived in one State. In result, there were about 30 Karaim religious communes (*dżymats*) in Russia. From 1795 to 1828, individual branches of Karaims of Volhynia, Lithuania and Crimea were exempted from mandatory military service (the aim of which was to strengthen antagonisms towards Jews). In the 19th century, there were also two Karaim communes in Galicia, in Halych and Kukeziv. In Russia, Karaims still enjoyed religious freedoms and their internal organisation was intact. In 1837, the Tauride-Odessa *Hachan* (or *Hakam*) and the Karaim Spritual Board in Evpatoria were established. In 1850, Karaim *dżymats* in western regions were subjugated to the Hachan. In 1863, a Hachan for western communes was appointed and his seat was in Trakai. However, before the legal situation of Karaims improved, they were treated like the Jewish people whose freedoms were limited.

It was Abraham Firkovich (1786-1874), the *hazzan* of Lutsk and a scholar, who successfully demonstrated to Russian authorities that the blame for murdering Jesus could not be laid on Karaims. He argued that Karaims were not deicides because they were not present in Jerusalem at the time when Jews crucified Christ.[37] His scholarly archaeological work is still valuable today. During his travels to places where Karaims lived in the past, to the Middle East and Crimea and in particular to Chufut-Kale, he collected relics and documents connected with the history of Karaims. In addition, he contributed, though probably forging or misinterpreting some of the sources, to enrooting Karaims' belief that they should not be associated with

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[35] Thus it is no surprise that according to the data of the Polish 2002 National Census of Population and Housing, almost 59% members of the Karaim minority in Poland have higher education, which is the highest percentage among all minorities. Cf. *III Raport dla Sekretarza Generalnego Rady Europy z realizacji przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską postanowień "Konwencji ramowej o ochronie mniejszości narodowych",* Warszawa 2012, p. 12, https://mac.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Tekst-III-Raportu. pdf [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[36] G. Pełczyński (2004), *Karaimi...,* p. 17.

[37] *Ibidem,* p. 19.

Jews. In the light of the present knowledge about Karaims, his interpretation appears to be misguided but, in the 19th century, it had a positive impact on the situation of the Karaim people which improved in comparison to the situation of the Jewish people. It also contributed to the fact that Karaims were not treated as Jews in the time of the Holocaust.

Today, thanks to materials collected by Abraham Firkovich, we can continue discovering the history of Karaims. His research contributed also to the enrooting and consolidation of the sense of Karaims' identity. That was particularly important in the context of Karaims' partial departure from their own cultural models. In the 19th century, many Karaims took advantage of their rights and made their careers in the administration and serving the military in Russia. Others engaged in trade and other economic activities. In the opinion of Grzegorz Pełczyński, Karaims europeanised to a large extent at that time. They became more modern and lost their oriental aura.[38] They were also very eager to learn and study. At the same time, in the community intellectual circles, an informal national revival movement began, the aim of which was to reconcile traditions with new transformations of the Karaim diaspora. The movement gained on importance among the Crimean Karaites. Changes in Lithuanian and Lutsk circles were of a similar character. It must be highlighted that part of the Karaim intelligentsia assimilated to Russians or Poles. Many Karaims were dedicated to Polish issues, including, for instance, hachan Romuald Kobecki.

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KARAIMS AT THE FINAL STAGE OF MODERNITY
AND THE ONSET OF POSTMODERNITY (1918-2000)

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The end of World War I brought further major changes for the Karaim community. The communes in historical Lithuania and Ruthenia were once again separated by borders from those in Crimea. In addition, the community inhabiting the regions of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania was divided. Communes in Panevėžys, Pasvalys, and Tałaczkany were now part of the Lithuanian state. Trakais, Vilnius, Lutsk (before WW1 in Russia) and Halych, (previously belonged to Austria-Hungary), after WW1 were in Poland. Gradually, many members of the Karaim community settled also in Warsaw.

Karaims were loyal to their new-old Polish homeland. They were very much liked by fellow citizens and Polish authorities were sympathetic. In 1930, the Karaim commune in Trakai was visited by President of Poland Ignacy Mościcki. Visits of other Polish dignitaries were frequent.[39] Relations between the Polish State and Karaims were regulated by a special Act of 1936[40], and it was the Karaim Religious

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[38] *Ibidem,* p. 21.

[39] *Ibidem,* p. 23.

[40] *Act of 21 April 1936 on the relations between the State and the Karaim Religious Association in the Republic of Poland* (Journal of Laws of 1936, No. 30, item 241), http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id= WDU19360300241 [accessed: 08.06.2013].

Association which represented Karaims in official dealings with Polish authorities. In the interwar period, the culture of the almost one-thousand community flourished. Several magazines were published including *Myśl Karaimska* [Karaim thought], which was co-financed by the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment and published from 1924 to 1939, and *Karaj Awazy* [Karaim Voice]. The community organised themselves in various associations. There were associations of women and the youth (*Bir-Baw*). In Trakai, the youth from *Bir-Baw* organised meetings with young Karaims from other localities and actively participated in the establishment of various organisation, including sports organisations. Polish Karaims had lively contacts with communities now living in Lithuania. At that time, Karaims once again became of interest to scholars both in Poland and abroad, and numerous tourists visited Trakai [Polish: *Troki*].[41]

During World War II, the situation of Karaims was relatively good, in particular because Germans considered them "racially different" from the Jewish population.[42] Karaims in Lutsk and Halych, however, suffered direct attacks by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The war was a great tragedy for that small community which suffered human and material losses. The year 1944 was particularly difficult for Crimean Tatars and Karaims as Stalin decided to displace them thereby destroying that old local culture and numerous social ties. Negative consequences of Stalin's policy are still visible today. After the Second World War, the borders were changed again and followed by resettlements. A group of about one hundred fifty members of the Karaim community, the majority of whom were young people, arrived in Poland from territories Poland lost. "After World War II, Karaims who inhabited Lithuania migrated to Poland: to Gdańsk, Słupsk, and Wrocław. Today, over one hundred of them live in Poland. In Lithuania, their number is less than three hundred".[43]

After 1956, when another wave of repatriates arrived, the Karaim community in Poland consisted of about three hundred people living mainly in Warsaw, Tricity

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[41] G. Pełczyński (2004), *Karaimi...,* pp. 24-25.

[42] It is estimated that about 500 to 600 Karaims fought in the ranks of *Wehrmacht, Waffen SS,* and the Tatar Legion (the "endogenous dejudaisation" policy of Freund). Cf. J. Krzystek (1992), *op. cit.* More on the ideological justification of "racial distinctness" of Karaims from Jews (e.g. arguments "borrowed" by the 3rd Reich administration from directives issued by Pyotr Stolypin in the Tsarist Russia period) in K. Feferman (2011), *Nazi Germany and the Karaites in 1938-1944: between racial theory and Realpolitik,* "Nationalities Papers. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity" No. 2(39), pp. 280-281. It should be taken into consideration, however, that there are numerous contradictory studies on that period. One author states that "the Tatar Mountain Infantry Brigade was formed not in Crimea but in Hungary during the period from June to December 1944. Its formation was never fully completed. It maintained garrisons but never fought in any battles on the side of Germany. The brigade was 3.5 thousand soldiers strong, 1/4 of whom were Germans. There are no verified sources which would confirm that members of the brigade were also Crimean Karaites, especially in the number of few hundred! There is also no evidence that any Lithuanian Karaim fought under German banners." M. Pawelec (2010), *op. cit..*

[43] T. Kurs, *Karaimowie, ochroniarze księcia Witolda,* "Gazeta Wyborcza - Olsztyn" 29.06.2008, http://miasta.gazeta.p1/olsztyn/l,35186,5407607,Karaimowie_ochroniarze_ksiecia_Witolda.html [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia], Wrocław, Opole, and Cracow.[44] The situation of Karaims was very difficult, in particular due to their little number and dispersion across the country. Assimilation seemed inevitable and some Karaim traditions vanished. An important factor which, however, saved Karaims from complete assimilation, was and is their religion. In the 1970s, there was the renaissance of Karaimism in Poland.[45] In 1975, the Karaim Religious Association organised its first convention in Warsaw which was attended by about one hundred people. The idea of conventions has been continued, which undoubtedly keeps contributing to maintaining traditions and bonds. Topics discussed during conventions included religious, cultural, and historical issues, but the conventions have also been an occasion for informal meetings. In the late 1980s, Polish Karaims established contacts with fellow Karaims living in Lithuania, which have been very lively. They also stay in touch with Karaims who inhabit regions of the former USSR. The turning point was the year 1989, when

> On 19-20.08.1989, in Trakai, a convention was held which was attended by Polish citizens and also by Karaims from many localities in the USSR including Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Crimean towns, Almaty, and many others. Over 400 people gathered in Trakai and, for most of them, that enclave of Karaism was the spark of their own history in the darkness of communism. Most participants, after returning home, took advantage of the thaw and perestroika and started associate in Karaim organisations.[46]
>
> [...] the latest census of population in the Soviet Union carried in 1989 revealed that 2,800 Karaims lived there at that time. At present, the number of Karaims in those regions is lower.[47]

In 1997, a group of 60 Polish Karaims joined celebrations of the 600th anniversary of Karaims' settlement in Trakai and Lithuania (facilitated by duke Vytautas), which was a perfect opportunity to integrate with communities from all over the world. In 1998, the 750th anniversary of Karaims' settlement in Halych was celebrated. One year later, another occasion for an international meeting was the re-opening of the renovated *kenesa* in Evpatoria.[48] Next meetings (in 1999 in France and in 2003 in Warsaw) were devoted to the history of Karaims and their contribution to the European heritage. The number of people attending subsequent conventions has, however, been decreasing.

In addition to numerous meetings in Poland and abroad, an important role in bringing the Karaim community together is played by the *Awazymyz* magazine which has been published in Poland since 1989 and, since 1999, by the Polish Karaim Association. The magazine is addressed to Karaim communities living in Poland and Lithuania.[49] *Awazymyz* as well as other titles devoted to Karaims are published by

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[44] G. Pełczyński (2004), *Karaimi...,* p. 29.

[45] Cf. M. Abkowicz (2003), *Współczesność,* http://www.karaimi.org/o-nas/wspołczesnosc [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[46] *Ibidem.*

[47] G. Górny (2007), *Sambation, Chazarowie i Karaimowie,* "W drodze" No 9(409), http://www.miesiecznik.wdrodze.pl/?mod=archiwumtekst&id=12150 [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[48] M. Abkowicz (2003), *Współczesność...*

[49] Homepage: www.awazymyz.karaimi.org.

the Bitik publishing house under the patronage of the Polish Karaim Association (established in 1997).

In Poland, there are not many material traits related to Karaims. The most important is the Warsaw cemetery at Redutowa 34 Street.[50] Many more historic sites have survived in Lithuania. The most important is Trakai with its renovated *kenesa*, old wooden houses with a 3 window side-gable facing the street, and traditional Karaim cuisine served in local restaurants. The cuisine is particularly significant for that community as dishes have symbolic meanings and are deeply rooted in traditions and culture. That is why it still plays an important role in up-keeping the Karaim identity.[51] In Crimea, numerous material traits of Karaims have survived e.g. the *kenesa* in Evpatoria with the altar brought from Halych, and the picturesque remains of Chufut-Kale town-fortress.

KARAISM AS ETHNICITY AND RELIGION: POLISH NATIONAL CENSUSES OF 2002 AND 2011

Today, Karaims are formally classified as one of the four ethnic minorities living in Poland (along with Lemkos, Roma people and Tatars).[52] They are the smallest ethnic minority in Poland. In 1975, their estimated number was about

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[50] It is still a very important place for the Polish Karaim community and taking care of graves of ancestors brings together all generations. In 2012, thanks to funds allocated by the Cultural Heritage Programme of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage and the support of Fundacja Banku Zachodniego WBK, the necessary conservation and maintenance works at the cemetery were completed and the Karaim heritage presented at educational institutions in Warsaw and Wrocław. A. Dubiński (2012), *Usuwanie zagrożeń, czyli co robiliśmy przez ostatni rok,* "Awazymyz" No. 4(37), http://www. awazymyz.karaimi.org/zeszyty/item/419-usuwanie-zagrozen-czyli-co-robilismy-przez-ostatni-rok [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[51] For Karaims, their traditional cuisine is the "carrier of culture". Cf. Z. Abkowicz, *Kuchnia w tradycji dnia powszedniego i świąt karaimskich,* in: M. Abkowicz, A. Sulimowicz, (ed.) (2007), *Almanach Karaimski 2007,* Wrocław, p. 15.

[52] Report of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce. Charakterystyka mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce*, http://www.mswia.gov.pl/index. php7dzial= 6l&id=37 [accessed: 29.06.2009]. Excerpts are available at http://www.stowarzyszenielem-kow.pl/new/modu-les/publisher/item.php?itemid=81 [accessed: 08.06.13]. That classification of Karaims is, however, imprecise. "Karaims are not a typical minority because they combine the characteristics of religious and ethnic minorities. It should be underlined that only the so-called Crimean-Polish Karaims constitute a religious and ethnic group. Outside Poland, there are two groups of followers of the Karaim religion who are not ethnic Karaims. They include the Oriental Karaims of Semitic descent who live mainly in Palestine and Muslim countries (probably also in the US), and Slavic Karaims who live in Russia. The Crimean-Polish Karaims are Turkic people. The Karaim minority is an exotic minority of oriental origin in Poland, like Tatar and Armenian minorities." A. Rumpel (2005), *Karaimi polscy jako mniejszość etniczna i religijna,* http://www.kosciol.pl/article.php/20050608191535408/print [accessed: 08.06.2013]. Since 2011, data on national and ethnic minorities are collected by the Ministry of Administration and Digitisation (which replaced the Ministry of the Interior and Administration and the Ministry of Infrastructure) and not by the Ministry of the Interior which was anew established in 2011.

200[53] and it dramatically decreased in next 30 years. "In the 2002 National Census of Population and Housing, Karaim nationality was declared by 43 Polish citizens".[54] According to the data of the Central Statistical Office, their number was 45.[55] However, in the next Census of Population and Housing carried in 2011, the number of Karaims increased to 346.[56] Earlier, their number was estimated to be 120. Most Karaims live in Warsaw (41 people), Wrocław (55 people), Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia Tricity (26 people)[57] and in Szczecin, Opole, and Cracow[58]. The majority of them associate in the Karaim Religious Association in Poland and the Karaim Association in Poland. Activities of the latter include cultural events focused on maintaining traditions, organisation of scientific conferences and exhibitions to popularise the Karaim heritage[59], national and international meetings

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[53] M. Abkowicz (2003), *Współczesność...*

[54] Report of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, *Mniejszości narodowe...*

[55] *Ludność według narodowości, płci oraz miejsca zamieszkania w 2002 r.,* in: "Wyniki Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2002 w zakresie deklarowanej narodowości oraz języka używanego w domu" http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_4520_PLK_HTML.htm [accessed: 08.06.2013]. The reason for the discrepancy is that the group of 45 people was divided according to their place of residence into residents of towns (43 people) and villages (2 people). More on many other discrepancies in numbers and identity profiles in: M. Abkowicz, *Karaimi we Wrocławiu,* in: M. Abkowicz, A. Sulimowicz, (ed.) (2007), *Almanach Karaimski 2007,* Wrocław, p. 107.

[56] The number of Karaims who declared complex national and ethnic identity was 113, i.e. almost 33% of Polish Karaims. Nevertheless, the percentage of people declaring homogeneous identification (233 people) increased over 500% compared to the 45 people estimate (cf. *Ludność. Stan i struktura demograficzno-społeczna. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011,* Warszawa 2013, p. 264, http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/LUD_ludnosc_stan_str_dem_spo_NSP2011. pdf [accessed: 08.06.2013]. Therefore, the only reason for such a situation cannot be the manner in which the census questions were formulated but rather the already mentioned identity dualism as a result of which before 2011 (and due to the design of statistical research tools) more people identified themselves with Polish culture than Karaism. While the lack of option of a dual choice in 2002 was closing and limiting, the provision of an opportunity to declare double identification in the 2011 census was but an opportunity and not an obligation. So far, it remains unknown whether the Karaim identification was chosen as the first one or the second one, which is important in the context of deliberations on identity, and what percentage lives in diasporas and what percentage lives solitarily. Cf. http://www.karaimi.org/wydarzenia/2012/item/32-gus [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[57] http://www.karaim.eu/index.php7id=10&lang= en [accessed: 08.06.2013). According to the data of the 2002 National Census, 10 members of the Karaim minority lived in Wrocław and 16 in Warsaw. Cf. *Mniejszości według województw, powiatów i gmin w 2002 r,* 2008, http://www. stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/nsp2002_tabl3_mn.xls [accessed: 08.06.2013]. Equally detailed data based on the results on the 2011 National Census will be published in October - December 2013.

[58] B. Machul-Telus, *Wprowadzenie,* in: idem (ed.) (2012), *Karaimi,* Warszawa, p. 8.

[59] For instance, the exhibition titled "Karaj jołłary – karaimskie drogi" (Karaim paths), presenting photographs from 1864 to 1960 from family archives of Polish Karaims. The exhibition was opened in October 2010 at the Ethnographic Museum in Wrocław and later it visited a number of large Polish towns as well as Trakai and Prague. Cf. M. Abkowicz, A. Sulimowicz (2010), *Karaj jołłary – karaimskie drogi. Karaimi w dawnej fotografii,* Wrocław, pp. 7-9; P. Suchecka (2010), *Karaj jołłary – karaimskie drogi,* in: "Awazymyz" No. 3(28), http://awazymyz.karaimi.org/zeszyty/2010/28/item/358-ka-raj--jo%C5%82%C5%82ary-%E2%80%93-karaimskie-drogi [accessed: 08.06.2013].

for people of Karaim descent both, language courses for the youth in Trakai, as well as charity and self-help activities.[60] It is significant that only 23.26% of that minority is under 18 years of age.[61] Hence, there are many voices predicting the gradual extinction of that minority. Recently, however, members of the Karaim community in Poland have been more optimistic about that difficult issue.[62]

As far as the Karaim religion is concerned, its basis is the Old Testament and in particular the Decalogue. Karaism requires its followers to interpret it individually and adopt it in the spirit of their faith.[63] The so-called Karaim Bible consists of the Five Books of Moses and 19 Books of Prophets which are subordinate to the Decalogue as the leading thought.

> The final organisational and legal forms crystallised in the 8th century in Mesopotamia (Iraq) under the rule of Abbasid caliph Abu Ja'far al-Mansur. The main codifier was Anan, son of David of Basra (d. 775), who argued that the Old Testament was so perfect that it could not be altered and supplemented in any way.[64]

The four basic fundamentals of the Karaim faith include: 1) the written Torah and rejection of the Oral Law (Talmud and rabbinic literature)[65]; 2) rejection of the vision of future award for perseverance in faith in the form of a "paradise garden" or Eden; 3) rejection of the dogma of the resurrection (different authors present that issue in various ways[66]); 4) absence of angelology and demonology. Due to some

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[60] Homepage of the Association: http://www.karaimi.org/ [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[61] Report of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, *Raport dotyczący sytuacji mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych oraz języka regionalnego w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej,* 2007, http://prohumanum.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/raportmniejszosci.pdf [accessed: 08.06.2013]. Unfortunately, reports of 2009 and 2011 do not contain such detailed data, cf. http://mniejszosci.edudemo.org.pl/pliki/cat_view/75-raporty [access: 08.06.2013].

[62] Probably that was why Szymon Pilecki in a documentary by Włodzimierz Szpak titled *Karaimi. Ginący naród* (Karaims. Vanishing people) on Polish Karaims said that the time left to that community was one or two generations at most and later their existence would end naturally. Cf. G. Pełczyński (2004), *Karaimi...,* p. 85, and G. Górny (2007), *Sambation...* In the European context, the above has been confirmed also by other researchers both with respect to Karaims of Turkic-Khazar identity and of Jewish identity. Cf. M. Kizilov (2003), *Karaites and Karaism: Recent Developments,* http:// www. cesnur.org/2003/vil2003_kizilov.htm [accessed: 08.06.2013]; T. Schegoleva (2011), *Karaites of Crimea: History and Present-Day Situation in Community*, http://eajc.org/page34/news24063.html [accessed: 08.06.2013]. On the other hand, publications in "Awazymyz" quarterly demonstrate that the involvement of the youngest generation of Karaims in the life of the minority is not little.

[63] S. Pilecki (2003), *Religia...*

[64] *Ibidem.*

[65] More on the impact on rabbinic literature, medieval Jewish philosophy, and Arabic culture on the religious doctrine of Karaism in: R. Otsason (2004), *Karaimi...* In 1903, Samuel Poznański wrote that Karaims say that "they only observe the Bible and do not recognise the tradition which followed it, i.e. Talmud, but [...] that principle is theory only and could not have been fully complied with in practice". S. Poznański (1903), *Karaici,* in: *Wielka Encyklopedya Powszechna Ilustrowana, Vol. XXXIII-XXXIV: Joerg Jan Krystyan Gotfryd – Karyszew Mikołaj,* Warszawa, p. 776.

[66] Cf. A. Tokarczyk (2006), *op. cit,* pp. 66-78.

of analogies to Christian reformation movements, Karaims are sometimes called the "protestants of Judaism".[67] In Karaism, the chief religious dignitary is a *hachan* who exercises authority over a district. Individual communes, in turn, are headed by *hazzans* (in the 19th century, there were two of them in each kenesa – the senior one called *ullu* and the junior one[68]), who act as priests and registrars, and have *shamashes* as their helpers (whose duties include managing the temple property and teaching children). Both hazzans and shamashes are elected by the entire congregation. The traditional place of religious meetings of Karaims is *kenesa* (temple) and if it is not there, religious meetings are held at private houses. The latter is common among Polish Karaims as the last kenesa in Poland (established in 1946 by hazzan Rafał Abkowicz in Wrocław) was closed in 1989. The congregation membership decreased from 200 people in 1991 to about 40 in 2005 which is due to both the decreasing number of Karaims and their distancing from Karaism as a religious doctrine.[69] So what are the reasons for that situation?

> After the question [about the religious life of Karaims – P.L. and K.R.] was asked, it was found that out of 401 people who responded to it, 87.2% considered themselves to be believers; in Lithuania that percentage was 84.4% and in Poland it was 93.7%. That global attitude towards faith is the result of being a follower of Karaism (63.8%) and Catholicism (23.4%). At this point it is important to note that there are significant differences in terms of religious identity between the two communities. In the Lithuanian community, 69.5% of people declared to be followers of Karaism while in the Polish community only 51.6%. That considerable difference can be explained with the fact that 42.1% people in Poland and 14.9% people in Lithuanian declared to be followers of Catholicism.[70]

Thus, we can speak of two identity constructs, i.e. Karaim-Karaim and Karaim-Catholic. The identity dualism in respect to religion is not limited only to religion as it also closely connected with the language of religious life.

The Karaim belief that the truths of the faith must be acquired in their original version makes it necessary to study Hebrew as each verse of the Holy Script in the Karaim language is an interpretation of the original and the canon obliges the followers to interpret the Bible on their own, for their own use, and not using someone else's interpretations. Thus the commitment to maintain the Karaim language is limited by its absence in the Karaim religion (not entirely though as some prayers are written and read in Karaim) which, in turn, is inextricably connected with the need to know the Hebrew tongue despite the fact that the first translation of the Hebrew Bible into Karaim dates back to the 11th century. A characteristic feature of Karaims

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[67] Cf. G. Pełczyński (2006), *Protestanci judaizmu?, "*Awazymyz" No. 1(12), http://www.awazymyz.karaimi.org/zeszyty/item/166-protestanci-judaizmu [accessed: 08.06.2013].
[68] S. Pilecki (2003), *Religia...*
[69] Cf. footnotes 6 and 8 above.
[70] L. Adamczuk (2004), *op. cit.;* cf. S. Pilecki (2003), *Religia...*

is, therefore, their bilingualism which is part of the *sacrum-profanum* dualism.[71] Interestingly, the mentioned 2007 Report of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration reads: "Karaims lost the knowledge of their native language. What distinguishes them, however, is the Karaim religion which has its roots in Judaism."[72] That statement clearly demonstrates a lack of knowledge about the Karaim religion and faith and it was regularly repeated in all publications of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration on ethnic and national minorities in 2005-2008. The statistical data e.g. the results of the 2002 National Census seem to confirm, however, that the Karaim language is dying as not one person who declared to be a member of the Karaim ethnic minority, would speak Karaim at home.[73] One may ask whether Karaims, as citizens of the post-modern world, speak the language of the country where they reside and only that language.

> Differences between communities are, however, relatively huge. In Poland, the language of the country [the national language of the country of residence – P.L. and K.R.] is spoken at home by 96.8% of Karaims and in Lithuania by 59.3%. In Lithuania, the second most popular language used at home is Russian (22.9%) and the third one is Polish (8.7%). The Karaim language is used at home by 24 people in Lithuania and 2 people in Poland.[74]

However, in order to remain faithful to the dictates of their religion, Karaims should use Hebrew when reading the Holy Script, and Karaim when praying. In everyday life, Karaims use the official language of the country where they live. In this way, the bilingual religious practice seems to permeate the bilingual reality of Karaims' daily life.

POSTMODERNITY AND KARAIM IDENTITY DUALISM: AN INTERPRETATION

The post-modern identity is an identity which is treated as a "task to be fulfilled". That task is an ongoing process which is completed not in the final phase of development. Instead, it is being completed in the course of a continuous dynamic reconstruction which is uninterrupted and not subject to evolutionary fatalism. In

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[71] An additional differentiation is the division of the Karaim language into Trakai-Vilnius and Lutsk-Halych dialects. Cf. S. Pilecki (2003), *Religia...*

[72] Report of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, *Mniejszości narodowe...*

[73] Report of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, *Raport dotyczący sytuacji...* Similar conclusions can be found in sociological research. "Results of the research demonstrate that 28 people in the Lithuanian community (10.2%) and 11 people in the Polish community (8.7%) are able to both speak and write in that language [the Karaim language – P.L. and K.R.]. A lower level of fluency in that language, i.e. speaking only, has been declared by 69 people in Lithuania (25.1%) and 17 people in Poland (13.5%). It means that less than one third of the Karaim population in both countries can speak Karaim and two thirds of them do not know that language." Cf. Adamczuk (2004), *op. cit.* So far, the lack of detailed reports on the 2011 National Census makes it impossible to update those data.

[74] L. Adamczuk (2004), *op. cit.*

that sense, identity is *practised*. We do not *have* it, so we can never *lose* it, which is frequently forgotten by risk society theorists, or make it unconditionally subordinate to our will and actions. Identity is being created in the course of a (*role-*)*play* between us and the external world. The identity game has a double purpose. It is a game played to gain identity (a game played by the world / environments and individuals and between individuals) and a game of identity (in which we try to restore our agency in creating our identity against the impact of the environment and other people). What is at stake in both variants of the identity game, which occur simultaneously, is the *reconciliation of identity* on the basis of short-term, motivated and dynamically changing social factors and influences. Essential issues are the art of maintaining an *equilibrium* between the social impact and one's own *self*, and the ability to discover the modernity dialectics which balances our own contribution against the contribution of others in creating individual identities. In that sense, we are never fully ourselves but *products of others* just like other people are never completely "alien" because in everyone we find a trait of ourselves as we also influence others. We all participate in the same game.

   In the light of their history, Karaims are a perfect illustration of metaphorical postmodernist claims about modern identity issues, identity instability, fragmentation and elective identity construction. Giddens argues that today individuals are forced to construct and reconstruct their identity on their own due to the changing experience of everyday life and modern institutions' tendency to fragment individual identities.[75] The fragmentation, in turn, leads to identity being elective and facultative. Identity becomes a syncretic structure which "happens" to us rather than "lasts". In other words, the configuration of identity elements is as unstable as the stability of the continuously accelerating present. In addition, identity is based on numerous paradoxes and mutual exclusions. Karaims, despite their small number, are also subject to various contradictions. That small groups combines in its culture Turkic and Semitic languages, various interpretations of dogmas of faith (e.g. some branches of Karaims consider both Jesus and Muhammad to be prophets), and strong discrepancies in the impact of Jewish religion and culture on specific subgroups (lesser in case of Lithuanian and Polish Karaims[76] who are considered the continuators of the Khazar line[77]).

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[75] A. Giddens (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Stanford, p. 181 [Polish translation: *Nowoczesność i tożsamość.* "*Ja" i społeczeństwo w epoce późnej nowoczesności,* Warszawa 2002, p. 254].

[76] More at https://foram.jewish.org.pl/ (bookmark: Judaism) [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[77] "The main evidence is their language which is the almost unchanged Turkic-Kipchak dialect. It is also known that that language was the language of Khazars and their successors Polovtsy (Kipchaks)." Cf. J. Krzystek (1992), *op. cit.* Other researchers are of a different opinion, for instance Freund argued that "the language itself is no evidence of the Khazar descent of Karaimes. He argues that they are ethnic Jews who came to Crimea directly from Byzantium and adopted the language from Khazars in the same way as Spanish Jews adopted Ladino and German Jews adopted Yiddish. As key evidence he cites the fact that Crimea was inhabited, in addition to Karaims, by the so-called Krymchaks who spoke exactly the same language but were followers of Judaism in its Rabbinic version." *Ibidem.*

Today, the decisive feature of identity is not a coherent unity developed and maintained by tradition but the act of creation. The unity protection is particularity difficult[78] in the case of Karaims.[79] Some time ago, Karaims were *pilgrims* in Bauman's sense.[80] Today, they are a postmodern transformation of that archetype that is a sum of an introvert *stroller*, a nomadic *vagabond,* an ex-territorial *tourist*, and a *player* entangled in identity games.[81] Each of those ideal types or models of postmodern individuals contains an element that has strongly affected the shape of identity of contemporary Karaims. Those models, as Bauman writes, have always existed. When reviewing the history of Karaims, it is impossible to ignore the impression that Karaims were (in result of a number of historical and socio-political factors) one of the first to depart from the model of a *pilgrim* towards models which before the advent of postmodernity appeared marginal and disjunctive.[82] Of course, Karaims are not exceptional. It suffices to mention Roma people, Sahara nomads and Mongolian tribes. Usually, the above was experienced by peoples and nations that for a long time lacked (or still lack) an autonomous state organisation or were subject to "cultural eradication" by mighty powers starting from ancient Egypt and the Roman Empire, through the Golden Horde, up to totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. In that sense, Karaims are a *historical prototype* of postmodern individuals and groups, i.e. deterritorialised, with eclectic identities, enslaved by the sense of unlimited freedom in "creating oneself" (What tradition to draw from? From where does my "self" draw more?).

When speaking of the identity dualism of Karaims, it is worthwhile to illustrate it recalling Włodzimierz Szpak's documentary film titled *Karaimi. Ginący naród* [*Karaims. The vanishing people*] which focuses on the fate of Karaims-Poles. One of its interesting characters is Anna Sulimowicz of a Karaim father and a Polish

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[78] M. Abkowicz (2003), *Współczesność...* and idem (2006), *Karaimi...*

[79] Z. Bauman comments on that in the following way: "Efforts of an individual to stabilise the self do not compensate for consequences of the original 'disembedding'; they will not be sufficient to keep the identity tossed by the waves and drifting in one place. Some authors (including Giddens) elaborate on the now popular attempts at 're-embedding' of the disembedded self which has broken away. However, since havens are but postulates and their vision is drawn with capricious emotions, the places where the self tries to anchor are plagued with the same unsustainability and unreliability which had prompted the 'disembedded' individuals to seek havens so avidly". Z. Bauman (2000), *Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień,* Warszawa, p. 43.

[80] Z. Bauman (1994), *Dwa szkice...,* pp. 10-14. The decision to adhere to Bauman's thought on "postmodern" identity transformations and not to other competing concepts e.g. "postmodern society" of A. Etzioni, periodisation of modernity of S. Lash, or determinants of modernity of K. Kumara (cf. Z. Bokszański (2007), *Indywidualizm...,* pp. 36-39) results from the construction of Bauman's "postmodern" identity which is different from other frequently excessively sociological and anti-voluntarist concepts which reject the emergent nature of individual transformations of identity. Cf. *ibidem,* pp. 39-49 and 132-134. See also M. Castells' construction of identity in the "network of flows". Cf. M. Castells (1997), *Power of Identity* [Polish translation: *Siła tożsamości*, Warszawa 2008].

[81] Z. Bauman (1994), *Dwa szkice...,* pp. 21-36.

[82] *Ibidem*, p. 7.

mother. The apparently harmonious story of Anna breaks down when she speaks about passing Karaim traditions to her child. Wishing to save the heritage of her father from being forgotten, she cannot free herself from a subconscious feeling of guilt about putting her Karaim identity above the Polish one. That tension between being a Karaim and a Pole was not noticeable at all in a social campaign titled "I am Polish man/Polish woman". Its aim was to draw attention to the multicultural character of Poland and acquaint a wide range of the public with the issue of double identity.[83]

The dual self-identification is also evidenced in the research by Adamczuk demonstrating that Karaims are more strongly attached to their religious declaration than to the ethnic/national one. However, it might have been a result of a confusion caused by interviewers equating national affiliation with nationality-com-citizenship.[84] It needs to be remembered, however, that prior to the adoption of Judaism and reforming its foundations, Karaism was a sum of various beliefs, histories, and secular traditions. Only later, "the Bible became not only the moral and religious code of Karaims but also a history book in which they tried to trace the history of their people, identifying their own past with the changing fate of the Israeli people. Disconnected from their native land, Karaims started to wander along histories of other peoples".[85] Does it means that religious declarations do not go hand in hand with ethnic/national declarations orthodox Karaims? Or perhaps did the "religious" vision of the history of Karaims precede the "secular" one? And which of them may be considered the "true" history? Questions like those seem to never end.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Karaim community is scattered. Karaims meet at their ethnic/national conventions every few years when they cross state borders and consolidate around the historically nomadised Karaim identity. For instance:

> In the Lithuanian Karaim community, there is no person who was born in post-war Poland but there are people who were born in Ukraine and Crimea (23) as well as in Russia (5). From among the Polish community, 68.3% people were born in Poland, 19% in Lithuania, and 12% to the east of Poland. Unfortunately, there are no data on Russia and Ukraine and, therefore, we cannot "balance" those migrations. Were it possible, it might turn out that Poland and Lithuania have been the countries of destination for Karaim migrants.[86]

Karaims live also at the crossroads between their land of origin and their present homelands. "It is no surprise, therefore, that within the Karaim soul two elements

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[83] A. Dubiński, M. Abkowicz (2008), *Kampania medialna "Jestem Polką/Jestem Polakiem"*, "Awazymyz", No. 1(18), http://www.awazymyz.karaimi.org/zeszyty/item/231-kampania-medialna--jestem-polka-jestem-polakiem [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[84] L. Adamczuk, *op. cit.*

[85] A. Mardkowicz (1936), *Szkice Karaimskie:* Cz. I. *Pogrzebane źródła.* Cz. II. *Samotna wysepka,* "Karaj Awazy" No. 10, p. 12, http://www.jazyszlar.karaimi.Org/czasopisma/l/989_2.jpg [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[86] L. Adamczuk (2004), *op. cit.*

struggle with one another. On the one hand, it is the self-preservation instinct of the species that desperately defends its place on Earth and, on the other hand, it is fatalism which derives its strength from grim facts" [the long distance from the native land – P.L. and K.R.].[87] In this dramatic tension, there is the experience of the episodic nature of freedom, i.e. after a moment of satisfaction with finding peace, security, shelter and fulfilment of emotional needs, the imagination realises the temporary and ephemeral nature of that situation and a spectrum of possible threats and mechanisms of the stability internal erosion which do not allow the identity to get attached to new conditions and become *embedded*.

What prevails is the specific self-doubt[88] manifested in questions "who am I", "where do I come from", and "where am I heading". "Doubt, a pervasive feature of modern critical reason, permeates into everyday life as well as philosophical consciousness, and forms a general existential dimension of the contemporary social world."[89] What is particularly interesting for a sociologist is the presence of that uncertainty in mental foundations of community systems, in the history which legitimises cohabitation and continuity of particular groups, and in the social awareness of people inhabiting a given area which they consider "their own". It is a category which undermines the stability and certainty of "familiarity". Something what "from time to time", "with varying luck", or "at times" happens to be *ours*, may quickly become *foreign* if the time for which it belongs to another group or is *no man's* property gets longer. That is exactly what has affected various elements of the Karaim identity and led to its slow deconstruction and entropy. This is how legends about Karaims' links with the emergence of the State of Sumer, the traditional tracing of Karaims' lineage to the Sadducees and the Karaim language disappear. Instead, new elements of identity have gained on importance e.g. Karaims' role in the history of Poland and Lithuania and connections with such towns as Evpatoria and Trakai after Karaims eventually settled in Europe. In result of the above, the tradition is from time to time and in a fragmentary manner updated and internally transformed, creating itself anew to an extent. It happens through transformations of its components and playing with the baggage or burden of the past and the needs of the present.[90] We strive to eliminate ambivalence, ambiguity, uncertainty, historical vagueness and dualistic structure in our mental representations of the world around us because we have a need to reduce cognitive dissonance. And this is a feature of all peoples and all nations as well as of each individual identity.

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[87] A. Mardkowicz (1936), *op. cit.,* p. 14, [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[88] "Radical doubt filters into most aspects of day-to-day life, at least as a background phenomenon." (A. Giddens (2002), *op. cit.,* p. 248). Cf. Z. Bauman (2000), *Ponowoczesność...,* pp. 44-59.

[89] A. Giddens (2002), *op. cit.,* p. 5.

[90] E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger (1983), *The Invention of Tradition* [Polish translation: *Tradycja wynaleziona,* Kraków 2008].

SEARCHING FOR THE SELF: NEW DIRECTIONS OF EXPLORATION

It is worth noting that Karaims fit perfectly the contemporary discourse of post-materialist transformations[91] which can be observed on the example of contrasting hierarchies of values of Polish and Lithuanian Karaims.[92] In addition, they are an interesting example of the narrativisation of identity.[93] "I do not know" and "it is difficult to say" are categories which are frequently used by the Karaim youth in reconstructing their hierarchies of values[94], thereby confirming Giddens' thesis about *doubt* discussed above. The inability to find a firm basis of one's own identity is a characteristic feature of the liquid times of modernity in which one's individual and social self is not owned but created in a modular manner by combining inconsistent and internally contradictory elements. In the case of Karaims that includes breaking traditional divisions between the language of the sacred and the language of the profane and concomitant explaining the structure of the Karaim culture with various presumed lines of ethnogenesis. That is how the Karaim game of and for identity is played. Karaims, however, are not exactly Bauman's *players*. They are a group which cannot or does not want to *slightly adhere* to requirements of modernity or, which is more probable, it neither not wants to do that (as there is a large group of Karaims who want to maintain and restore their cultural heritage) nor is able to do so (which can be deduced from the mentioned research carried by Adamczuk).[95] That dual exclusion loop (unwillingness and inability) makes them modern "*sans papiers,*

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[91] R. Inglehart (1997), *Modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies,* Princeton; R. Inglehart, *Culture and Democracy*, in: L. E. Harrison, S. P. Huntington (eds) (2000), *Culture Matters* [Polish translation: *Kultura ma znaczenie,* Poznań, 2003]; R. Inglehart, *Pojawienie się wartości postmaterialistycznych*, in: P. Sztompka, M. Kucia, (ed.) (2005), *Socjologia. Lektury,* Kraków; J. Żakowski, *Różni nas seks. Rozmowa z Ronaldem Inglehartem,* in: J. Żakowski (ed.) (2005), *Anty-Tina. Rozmowy o lepszym świecie, myśleniu i życiu,* Warszawa.

[92] Responses to "The adopted list of values revealed two significant differences between Lithuanian and Polish communities. Those differences consist, *inter alia,* in that "career" and "professional work" were considered "very important" and "important" much more frequently in Lithuania than in Poland. In turn, "culture" and "free time" were indicated more often in Poland than in Lithuania. What we have here is the classic model of two opposing values which is characteristic of a certain stage in the development of modern industrial societies." L. Adamczuk (2004), *op. cit.*

[93] W. J. Burszta, W. Kuligowski (2005), *Sequel. Dalsze przygody kultury w globalnym świecie,* Warszawa, p. 226.

[94] W. J. Burszta and W. Kuligowski explain it as follows: "a man of today immersed primarily in the meta culture of novelty, is to an increasingly greater extent deprived of permanent conceptual frameworks which were at his disposal (and which were imposed for instance by religion) in traditional cultures and, therefore, often quite intuitively, is a *seeker of meaning*". *Ibidem.* Cf. L. Adamczuk (2004), *op. cit.*

[95] At this point, the question about the extent of potential opportunities arises once again as "the postmodern world is considering the possibility of living with uncertainty forever, in an environment uncertain till the end of time and with the uncertainty which cannot be reduced in any way" Z. Bauman (2002), *Ponowoczesność...,* p. 44.

stateless, refugees, exiles"[96], who were welcome in most places in which they arrived (in Lithuania and Russia) but never were there at home, i.e. in a place which they could call their (Karaim) land, hence Bauman's analogy to the fate of ancient exiles.[97] However, Karaims are not a "despised" people of the world, condemned and chased away from any place where they appeared, but a "welcomed guest". Being a *guest* and not a *host* is the root of the problem, i.e. being a guest who is not chased away but treated as a good *Other* but still the Other. "Perfect intruders who are always and everywhere strangers and never have their own place with the exception of places which do not have a place themselves and cannot be found on maps used by ordinary people."[98] That can well be observed on the example of Karaims who are more often described as inhabitants of a *vision* of history or a *moment* in history rather than of a specific place, town, or country.[99]

The discourse on the Karaim identity in the newest scarce sources from the early 21st century differs significantly from the sources from the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Today, when speaking about Karaims, questions about their identity are asked through the prism of the "people of Israel" or "citizens of the world". And the latter interpretation seems to prevail or strongly tends to prevail. Writing about that latter category, Bauman argues that "having a deeply rooted identity which is resistant to change, 'an identity for life', will quickly prove to be not an asset but a burden in the life of a person who does not fully control the circumstances of their life journey – an albatross or a ballast which must be thrown overboard in order to regain the freedom of movement"[100]. One cannot help noticing, however, that, paradoxically, in the face of all postmodern transformations of the world, the strength of the identity of the least numerous minority is its size. Perhaps, it is a positive effect of not exceeding the critical mass of identification or of not getting close to its limits. Thus, the generalised Other for the Karaim community, in particular for the diaspora members who know each other, is a construct representing not a much larger community that the group of individual, dispersed communities of people who know each other directly. It means that statistically a Karaim is more often a close or distant friend of another Karaim than an "unfamiliar" member of the Karaim community. Shared by few ethnic minorities in few countries, that unique

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[96] Z. Bauman (2005), *Liquid Life* [Polish translation: *Płynne życie,* Kraków, 2007, p. 13].

[97] *Ibidem,* p. 14.

[98] Z. Bauman (2004), *Wasted Lives* [Polish translation: *Życie na przemiał,* Kraków, 2004, p. 126].

[99] In the case of Karaims who take advantage of technological advances in communication (e.g. Karaim language e-learning courses), the virtual participation (new media, globalisation processes, and the expansion of network forms of building ethnic and national bonds) is but an action of an individual and not a manifestation of a group activity just like in the case of all other real communities whose members use the Internet. Cf. L. Graczyk, *Karaimi – społeczność realna w wirtualnej sieci,* in: B. Machul-Telus (ed.) (2012), *Karaimi,* Warszawa, p. 223. In addition, the Karaim community, which is larger in the Internet than in reality, is still strongly entangled in processes of hybridisation and fluctuation of identity which are side effects of the new media (*ibidem*).

[100] Z. Bauman (2000), *Ponowoczesność...,* p. 52.

characteristic of Karaims as a community which is permanently at the crossroads of history, identification and religion, and which keeps trying to firmly anchor and embed its identity raises further questions. Are Karaims now facing a new challenge of setting off on the most important journey into their self identity and across further borders? Do they need to find their place or just .... to find themselves? Perhaps the words of the Karaim anthem *Hanuz karajłar eksiłmied*[101] will prove to be prophetic:

> Karaims have not yet perished
> So long as we live,
> We still believe
> That we will rise.

ABSTRACT

The article aims to reconstruct the history of Karaims in the perspective of identity dualisms (polygenesis, bilingualism, etc.) in this ethnic and religious group which according to us is an illustration of "postmodern identity re-transformations". Emphasising social and religious aspects of Karaism, we portray that minor minority in the Republic of Poland as an exemplification of postmodern statements about "troubles with cultivating identity" in which the cardinal construction rule remains "doubting" in Anthony Giddens' terms. Scrutinizing first references to and records of Karaims as well as their wandering history across whole Europe up to modern times, we propose a thesis on the immanent features of deterritorialisation and identity eclecticism ascribed to Karaism from the dawn of its history. Thus the title Karaim "identity question" remains a dual one. It is addresses the past ("who were we? and "where do we come from?") and the future ("who are we going to be?", "where are we heading?").

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[101] The is sung to the tune of Dąbrowski's Mazurka, i.e. the national anthem of Poland. Cf. http://wwwjazysz-lar.karaimi.org/index.php?m= 7&p=467 [accessed: 08.06.2013].

Polityka zagraniczna zjednoczonych Niemiec

[Foreign Policy of Reunited Germany]

Jadwiga Kiwerska, Bogdan Koszel, Maria Tomczak, Stanisław Żerko

Twenty years ago, on 12 September 1990, at the consent of the Four Powers that until then bore responsibility for the two German states, Germany was reunited. The new Federal Republic of Germany was a completely sovereign state that could define its foreign policy without any limitations. In the new situation, Germany had to define its international objectives anew. At the same time, Germans had to remember about their past, responsibility for WW2, violence and calamities their neighbours and other states had suffered. In the 1990s, Germany's geographical and geopolitical location in the heart of Europe, its human and economic potential and the resulting ambitions and aspirations made Europe and the world take an interest in reunited Germany which, in turn, had to face higher expectations as well as fears and concerns expressed by international public opinion.

This book is the first volume of the series titled *The Federal Republic of Germany. Twenty Years after the Reunification*. It is a discussion on international activities of the reunited FRG and an evaluation of its major objectives and decisions in the area of foreign policy. In an analytical perspective, four main areas of Germany's external activity are assessed, i.e. its approach to the European Union, the transatlantic agreement, its policy toward Russia, and reactions to most important challenges and threats of modern times. The authors have succeeded in describing the continuation and changeability of Germany's external strategies, indicating factors that influenced the shape, direction and character of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and their consequences for Germany and its international environment. In the complex European and global environment, Germany keeps trying to develop and implement a strategy corresponding to its new potential.

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BETWEEN ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY
A SOCIOLOGICAL CASE STUDY OF THE UPPER SILESIANS' GROUP [1]

CULTURAL HOMOGENISATION VS. CULTURAL HETEROGENISATION

The world in the early 21st century is both the world of national and ethnic cultures and global homogenisation of the cultural system. The process of cultural uniformisation is accompanied by the return to ethnic and national roots, i.e. *ethnos*. That phenomenon has been metaphorically described by Benjamin Barber writing about McWorld and Jihad which are not against each other but feed one other.[2] People who accept global elements of the system want to preserve the diversity which determines their individual and group identities. While taking advantage of the world civilisation achievements, they are faithful to their own language, tradition, and religion. They manifest their culture in order to gain a significant place within the societal structure in which they live. Such a situation is typical mainly of ethnic and national minorities which, while living in a dominant culture, want to keep their own one which is substantially different. At the same time, they strive to have a prominent place in the social structure not only in the cultural sense but also economically and politically. In this article we will raise the issue of Silesians, who inhabit the region of Upper Silesia, i.e. the Śląskie [Silesian] and Opolskie voivodships. Formally, the existence of that group was confirmed with the 2002 National Census data. Until today, however, Silesians have not been recognised as an ethnic or national minority in the meaning of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language[3]. Silesians do seek to be recognised as a national group but so far gave been unsuccessful. Who are Silesians? What is their place in the Polish society?

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[1] The article focuses on the region of Upper Silesia within its historical borders (part of the present Śląskie and Opolskie voivodships) but for stylistic reasons we will use also the terms Silesia and Silesians.

[2] B.R. Barber (1995), *Jihad vs. McWorld*, New York [Polish translation: *Dżihad kontra McŚwiat,* Warszawa, 1997].

[3] Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language of 6 January 2005.

ETHNICITY VS. NATIONALITY

Referring to Silesians, sociologists use the word a *group*, however, Silesians want to be recognised as a nationality. Manifestations of Silesians' desire are the Union of People of Silesian Nationality (Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej) in Katowice which has not been registered so far, and the Association of People of Silesian Nationality (Stowarzyszenie Osób Narodowości Śląskiej) registered in Opole. Leaving terminological disputes aside, it is important to provide an insight into the ethnicity and nationality concepts in sociology. The term *ethnicity* corresponds directly to the sociological definition of an *ethnic group*, a more comprehensive understanding of which was already provided by Max Weber.

> We shall call 'ethnic groups' those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descendent because of similarities of physical type and customs or both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of the group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists [...][4].

Weber's understanding of an ethnic group is broad and embraces nations, national minorities, autochthonic groups, and groups of immigrant descent. Silesians are native people of Upper Silesia and so they are an ethnic group in Weber's sense. In the 1970s, an ethnic group was equated with ethnicity and that situation lasted practically until 1974. Then, in 1975, *Ethnicity,* a collection of essays by American sociologists, was published.[5] In this book inter-ethnic relations in the pluralistic American society were described and the research on the ethnic specificity of groups. Their cultural distinctness was highlighted.[6] In the theory of ethnicity formulated by American sociologists, cultural factors were recognised to be primary manifestations of ethnicity. Their significance results from cultural heritage, group cultivation of culture and shared history of the group formed in the course of migration and adaptation to a new environment.[7] That understanding of ethnicity seems more relevant in the context of Silesians' fight for their nationality. Silesians' presence in Upper Silesia, however, is not a result of migration as they are its indigenous population. It is also a fact that Silesians are defined by a number of features which are associated with ethnicity. Referring back to the classical dispute between primordialism[8] and situationalism[9], Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan considered ethnicity to be

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[4] J. Mucha (1996), *Codzienność i odświętność,* Warszawa, p. 20.

[5] N. Glazer, D. Moynihan (eds) (1975), *Ethnicity. Theory and Experience,* New York.

[6] A. Posern-Zieliński (1982), *Tradycja a etniczność. Przemiany kultury Polonii amerykańskiej,* Wrocław, pp. 12-13.

[7] *Ibidem.* pp. 12-13.

[8] Primordialism is a kind of ties constituting a group through their shared culture, religion and origin. This sort of ties persists in a group, which guarantees its continuity: E. Shils (1957), *Primordial, Personal Sacred, and Civil Ties, "*British Journal of Sociology" Vol. 8, pp. 130-145.

[9] Situationalism refers to ethnic minorities which update their distinctive features in specific situations. Cf. G. Babiński (1998), *Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie: etniczność, zróżnicowanie religijne, tożsamość,* Kraków, p. 28-30.

a conscious group identification in terms of culture and tradition. That specific category of the sense of ethnicity manifests itself primarily in sentiments, preferences and sensitivity and thus in ethnic awareness and identity. Nathan Glazer considered ethnicity to be a kind of awareness composed of "nostalgia" and ethnic "ideology". At the core of a brief definition of ethnicity are beliefs, sentiments and traditional values of the group. That is the condition of Upper Silesians who are faithful to a tradition different from the Polish one. Their distinctness is for them the ground for their struggle not for their ethnicity (i.e. they are ethnically distinct) but for being granted the status of nationality, i.e. for being recognised as members of the Silesian nation. Thus it is important to underline that in sociological literature, ethnic groups are considered to be seeds of nations and that blurs boundaries between the two.

> The emergence of national communities on ethnic foundations is a historical process which can take various forms. Many authors strongly agree with ethnic sources of nations [...]. An ethnic group is treated as a proto-nation stage.[10]

In the above context it is important to note that the recognition of a group as a nation has serious political implications. Only a national group can claim their rights to independence (though it is not a necessary precondition).[11] As Max Weber wrote, the sense of community *ergo* nation has many sources including shared political memories, religion, common language, and finally, "racial" *habitus*.[12] Bronisław Malinowski believed that a national group is characterised by a mature culture which, despite its internal diversity, is coherent[13] and members of the group are aware of their belonging to that community and feel the ties that bind them all. Members of an ethnic group, on the other hand, are not always aware that they belong to a specific group and of ethnic ties that connect all its members. If we view Silesians in that way, it is clear why they want to be recognised as a nation and not an ethnicity. Who, then, are the Silesians of today?

HISTORY OF SILESIA AND ITS POPULATION: CONTEXTS

In ancient times, regions of the present Silesia were inhabited by Celtic and Germanic tribes. Starting from the 7th century, however, that area was unquestionably under the influence of the Slavic culture. The recorded history of Upper Silesia as the most culturally diverse region of modern Poland dates to the times of Silesian Piasts. During their rule, colonisation processes increased the number of Germans

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[10] A. Kłoskowska (1996), *Kultury narodowe u korzeni,* Warszawa, p. 46.

[11] J. Kurczewska (1999), *Naród,* in: *Encyklopedia socjologii,* vol. 2, Warszawa, p. 290.

[12] M. Weber (1978), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, University of California Press, p. 389 [Polish translation: *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo. Zarys socjologii rozumiejącej,* Warszawa, 2002, p. 317].

[13] B. Malinowski (1958), *Szkice z teorii kultury,* Warszawa, p. 47.

in towns and villages and in monasteries and convents. The German language was used increasingly often, and German knights and clergy were increasingly present at Polish courts. That led to dissatisfaction among Poles who, until the 17th century, were the majority in Silesia, and whose settlements gradually became but an oasis in the midst of "German lands on the left bank of the Oder"[14]. As a result of subordinating Upper Silesian duchies to the Bohemian Crown, those lands became part of the Bohemian-German culture. Until the 18th century, the Czech language was official there and starting from the 16th century, it was accompanied by German. After the Silesian wars in the 18th century, most of Upper Silesia lands became part of Prussia which did not change the character those lands inhabited by Poles, Germans, Moravians (Czechs), and Jews. Along with industrialisation of Upper Silesia, the region experienced a growing inflow of Germans who were employed as technical staff, teachers, and merchants.[15] The life of Poles, Germans, Czechs and Jews in Upper Silesia, just like the entire Upper Silesian world, kept changing in the following centuries. Between WW1 and WW2, as Wojciech Korfanty wrote, national awareness of 1/3 of the population inhabiting the then Polish part of Upper Silesia was not crystallised as Polish or German and locals described themselves as Silesians. That was the first clear self-identification of the autochthonous people. In the three Silesian uprisings, they fought either on the German side or on the Polish one, depending on their views.[16] That situation was an example of how vague the identity of the native Silesian population was. The most tragic period in the relations between Polish, German, Czech, and Jewish people and the native population was the time of the World War II and the years which followed. After WW2, German people inhibiting the lands of Upper Silesia were resettled to Germany while people from central and eastern Poland increasingly settled in Silesia. Upper Silesia remained, therefore, a melting pot of cultures,

> in which mixing cultural and historical experiences of the local people, who were thoroughly investigated by the People's Government because of their inclusion in various national lists from the war period (the so-called Volksliste), mixed with experiences of immigrant population from central and eastern Poland, people displaced from the territories of the Second Polish Republic annexed, in 1945, to the Soviet Republic, and repatriates from France and Belgium [...] in addition to the Polish population, to Upper Silesia came Ukrainians who identified themselves as Poles due to the fact that they were citizens of the Second Polish Republic and Jews from the East of Poland.[17]

Later, the mosaic of national and ethnic minorities and the native population of Silesia was enriched by a growing number of Poles who migrated there looking for jobs. When the process of industrialisation accelerated, they migrated from culturally different regions of Poland in search for work and better living conditions. In the

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[14] L. Szaraniec (2007), *Wielokulturowość Górnego Śląska,* Katowice, p. 7.

[15] *Ibidem*, pp. 7-8.

[16] M. Czapliński, E. Kaszuba, G. Wąs, R. Zerelik (2002), *Historia Śląska,* Wrocław, p. 395.

[17] L. Szaraniec (2007), *op. cit.,* p. 10.

1970s, a large of part of the autochthonic population left Upper Silesia to join their families in Germany and settled in the industrial centres of Westphalia and Northern Rhineland. In addition, the Jewish minority departed, moving to western European countries, the United States and Israel.

In the real socialism period, numerous efforts were made to integrate the culturally and nationally diversified Upper Silesia. Activities of authorities included, *inter alia,* an introduction a special system of education, a cultural programme and a special agenda for mass media. Traditions of national, ethnic minorities and Silesians were cultivated in the private sphere only and were sometimes supported by the Church. When Poland embarked on its path of freedom, the atmosphere of cultural pluralism was restored. Its empirical exemplifications are the results of recent National Censuses (2002 and 2011) which demonstrated the degree of cultural diversity of Poland and its regions including Upper Silesia.

SILESIAN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

The most visible minorities living in Upper Silesia include the German minority and Silesians. Members of Czech, Roma and Jewish minorities live there too but they do not constitute substantial communities. We focus on the group of Silesians who live in Upper Silesia only. In the National Census conducted in Poland in 2002, the Silesian nationality was declared by 173,153 people, including 145,500 living in the Śląskie voivodship and 24,200 living in the Pomorskie voivodship. In 2002, in the Polish part of Cieszyn Silesia (Bielsko-Biała town and poviats of Cieszyn and Bielsko-Biała), Silesian nationality was declared by 1,045 people.[18] Results of the 2011 National Census were very different. The Silesian nationality was declared by 817 thousand people, 362 thousand of whom declared that it was their only nationality and 418 thousand declared that it was their "first" nationality.[19] It is difficult to compare the data collected in both censuses. In 2002, respondents were asked to identify one nationality (national affiliation) only whereas in 2011 it was possible to declare both a (first) nationality and other (second) national and ethnic identifications.[20] The number of identifications with Silesian nationality aroused a desire among members of that group to fight for being recognised as a nation(ality). Results of the census have become an important argument for supporters of such a solution, who are mostly members of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality in Katowice and the Association of People of Silesian Nationality in Opole. The latter one was

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[18] Results of the 2002 National Census of Population and Housing. Central Statistical Office (online) [accessed: December 2010].

[19] National census of population and housing 2011. Report: www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/lud_raportj_wynikowJNSP201 l.pdf [accessed: 09.06.2013].

[20] www.ceo.org.pl/pl/online/6/mniejszosci-narodowe-w-liczbach [accessed: 05.06.2013].

registered by the appropriate court in Opole in December 2011[21] and in September 2012, the court dismissed the appeal of the Prosecutor's Office against that decision.[22] The Union of People of Silesian Nationality despite its efforts had not been registered yet. Supporters of the thesis on the existence of the Silesian nation(ality) see it as separate from Polish, German, Czech, or Slovak in terms of having its own culture, history and language. The Silesian nationality, however, has not been recognised by any country. In addition, in 1998 and 2007, the Polish Supreme Court decided that Silesians are not recognised as a separate national group by the general public (social awareness) and sustained the decision of the District Court in Katowice of March 2006.[23] At that time, the latter court had refused to enter the Union of People of Silesian Nationality into the appropriate register.

> The District Court decided that the concept of 'nationality' derives 'nation', and 'nation' as a conceptual category requires the existence of an organised community. Such an existence of an organised community which can be treated a separate nation requires, *inter alia*, that it is perceived in that way by the legislator or other people. Neither an internal belief of a group of people about the existence of a separate Silesian nation and Silesian nationality, nor declaring such a nationality in censuses will suffice to recognise the existence of a separate Silesian nation and Silesian nationality. A Silesian nation (Silesian nationality) exists neither in the public awareness nor in legal acts. The perceived distinctness of Silesians (in terms of language, culture...) is associated more with historical regions (Upper Silesia, Lower Silesia, Cieszyn Silesia) of the country than with the existence of the Silesian nation.[24]

Earlier, in 2004, the European Court of Human Rights dismissed the appeal against the decision not to register the Union of People of Silesian Nationality taken by the District Court in Katowice in 1998. At the same time, the European Court did not take any position on the existence or non-existence of the Silesian nation(ality).[25] From the above facts it follows that the registration of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality would be equal to recognising Silesians as a nation(ality). Such a dependence does not seem to exist in case of the Association of People of Silesian Nationality. It was formally institutionalised but that fact was not seen as related to the recognising Silesians as a nation(ality). Silesians still think about their nation(ality) but today they focus more on cultural and political activities than on the registration of their own nation(ality).

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[21]   www.slonzoki.org [accessed: 08.06.2013].

[22]   *Jest decyzja sądu w sprawie Stowarzyszenia Osób Narodowości Śląskiej,* "Nowa Trybuna Opolska" 7.09.2012.

[23]   Decision of 14.02.2007, III SK 20/06; www.prawo.money.pl/orzecznictwo/sad_najwyzszy/ postanowienie [accessed: 09.06.2013].

[24]   *Ibidem.*

[25]   Decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights of 17 February 2004 in case of Gorzelik and others v. Poland (Application 44158/98), Gorzelik et autres c. Pologne/and Others v. Poland [GC], no/no. 44158/98, CEDH/ECHR 2004.

CULTURE OF SILESIANS: INSTITUTIONS AND IMPONDERABLES

A constitutive element of a national group is both an objective and subjective sense of cultural distinctness. That distinctness is determined by such factors as shared historical memory, attachment to a given territory, tradition (customs and habits), religion, and language. Max Weber, in his analysis of the understanding of nationality, wrote:

> Until a short time ago most Poles in Upper Silesia had no strongly developed sense of Polish nationality that was antagonistic to the Prussian state which is based essentially on the German language. They were loyal if passive 'Prussians', but they were not 'Germans' interested in the existence of the *Reich*; the majority did not feel a conscious or a strong need to segregate themselves from German-speaking fellow citizens. Hence, in this case there was no sense of nationality based on common language, and there was no *Kulturgemeinschaft* in view of the lack of cultural development.[26]

The above speaks for a diversified identification of the indigenous people of Silesia who, until today, do not have a clear definition of their own nationality or even ethnicity.

Upper Silesia is a cultural border region, a peripheral borderland far from political and administrative centres. At the same time, its population is clearly aware of its social distinctness. Despite its borderland location, the region was the second most important industrial area after the Ruhr, at first of Prussia, and later of Germany. It was there where one of the first steam engines in Europe was installed, the formula of Nivea cream, marketed since 1911, was developed, the shower was invented, and trams were early introduced. Illiteracy was common but twelve inhabitants of historical Silesia were awarded Noble prizes in physics, chemistry, and economy. In the real socialism period, Silesia was characterised by further intensive industrialisation and today it is one of the fastest developing regions of the Republic of Poland.

The regional Upper Silesian cultural system is a outcome of many years of intertwining of different cultures and traditions of various provenance.[27] A characteristic feature of Upper Silesia is the fact that, over the centuries, it was influenced by various cultural, political, administrative, and economic systems. In result, its population is characterised by ambiguous and diversified national identity combinations and national indifference is a not a marginal phenomenon. Like many borderlands, Silesia had been part of different countries and that had to very important and significant consequences. In brief, Upper Silesia in last ten centuries was under the political influence of Moravians, Czechs, Poles, again Czechs, Austrians, Prussians, and later,

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[26] M. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 396 [Polish translation: p. 316].

[27] Z. Staszczak (1978), *Pogranicze polsko-niemieckie jako pogranicze etnograficzne,* Poznań; K. Kwaśniewski (1982), *Zderzenie kultur. Tożsamość a aspekty konfliktów i tolerancji,* Warszawa; Z. Rykiel (1990), *Region przygraniczny jako przedmiot badań geograficznych*, "Przegląd Geograficzny" V. 62.

after the Silesian referendum, of Poles, Germans, and Czechs. It is also important to note that Silesia has been always part of Europe, not only in the geographical but also cultural and civilisational sense. It shared Europe's history and kept consolidating its own specificity. An element of that specificity is "Silesianness", a regional system of culture which manifests itself mainly through popular culture, i.e. in all kinds of festivals, festivities and Silesian cuisine, customs and local celebrations as well as in popular Silesian songs and stage events. It is also manifested in strong family bonds and neighbourly contacts which are core ties in the Silesian community.[28] Examples of Silesian traditions include church fairs and celebrations of one's fiftieth birthday (Abraham). Another element of Silesian traditions is the regional cuisine. Silesian dumplings with roulade and red cabbage are an almost obligatory Sunday dinner in each Silesian house. Hence, family ties are an important element of the Silesian world. But Silesian culture has also its public dimension. For example, the Radio Katowice broadcaster organises dialect contests titled "Po naszemu, czyli po Śląsku" (In our tongue that is in Silesian). The Radio Piekary's advertising slogan is "Na Śląsku, o Śląsku, po Śląsku" (In Silesia, about Silesia, in Silesian).[29]

The issue of the Silesian dialect or tongue is highly relevant. For a couple of years already, the Polish Sejm [Parliament] has been debating whether to recognise the Silesian tongue as a regional language. In the Polish Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, neither Silesians are recognised as an ethnic minority, nor the Silesian tongue is recognised as a regional language as Kashubian is.[30] The Sejm is working on amending the provision on the regional language with the aim to include the Silesian tongue. The Silesian tongue, in fact, meets the criteria mentioned in the definition of a regional language set forth in the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages drawn up in Strasbourg on 5 November 1992. According to the Charter, a regional language is traditionally spoken by citizens of a given country who constitute a minority and is neither a dialect of the official language, i.e. Polish in that case, nor a language of immigrants. Core activities of people who identify themselves as Silesians include taking care of the culture and traditions of the Upper Silesian region. An official recognition of Silesian as a regional language is their primary objective.[31] Disputes on recognising Silesians as a national minority and their tongue as a regional language have been carried at the Sejm for a couple of years. They have involved not only politicians but also linguists, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. To the end of August 2012, those issues were again disputed at meetings of the Sejm Committee for national and regional minorities. And once again the Silesian *dialect* was not given the status of a *language* but, undoubtedly, such efforts will be continued. The concern about

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[28] J. Kijonka-Niezabitowska (2009), *Z problemów narodowości i tożsamości śląskiej – dylematy i wybory,* "Studia Socjologiczne" No. 4, p. 101.

[29] *Ibidem,* p. 101.

[30] Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language of 6 January 2005.

[31] *Ibidem.*

the Silesian *godka* [Silesian word for a tongue/speech] is common not only among individuals, such as Kazimierz Kutz, but also organisations, such as the Movement for Silesian Autonomy, the main objective of which is the fight for the autonomy of Upper Silesia which that region once had in the Second Republic of Poland, i.e. between WW1 and WW2.

AUTONOMY OF UPPER SILESIA? ACTORS AND IDEAS[32]

The fact that Silesia used to be part of different States played a special role in the disintegration and social deconstruction of the community living in that region. As one may presume, the Silesian referendum (20 March 1921) and three Silesian uprisings (August 1919, August 1920, May-July 1921) accelerated the disintegration process dramatically. As a result of political decisions, the territorially and socially cohesive area was divided. The Upper Silesian community was permanently and irrevocably compromised.

In the political history of Upper Silesia, a most important fact was the establishment of the Silesian (Śląskie) voivodship after World War I. The voivodship was created by the Legislative Sejm of the Republic of Poland by means of the Constitutional Act of 15 July 1920. The new administrative and political unit was perceived to be the fulfilment of autonomy and separatist aspirations which, in the past, manifested themselves in activities of Hans Georg von Praschma, Karl Ulitzka, Hans Lukaschka and Ewald Latacz as well as of Wojciech Korfanty (elected to the *Reichstag* in 1907), Adam Napieralski and Jan Kapica. All of them, though for very different reasons, strived for separating Upper Silesia from the Silesian province and granting it an autonomous status, first within the borders of Prussia and later of Poland.

The Silesian voivodship started to function as an autonomous administrative unit only after Polish army entered the territory granted to Poland as a result of the 1921 referendum, i.e. between 17 June and 4 July 1922. The Legislative Sejm granted the newly established voivodship its autonomy and symbolic institutions including the regional Silesian Sejm and the Silesian Treasury, i.e. a regional Ministry of Treasury. The Silesian Sejm had broad competence in matters related to internal policy and everyday life of the voivodship but none in foreign affairs and military issues. It needs to be underlined that the Silesian Sejm, the statutory competence of which were wide, at least formally, was, after the May Coup d'État, limited in its activities by an influential voivod, Michał Grażyński, supported by the central government and Marshal Józef Piłsudski.[33]

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[32] In this part of the article, we use some fragments of: M. S. Szczepański, A. Śliz, *Die Bewegung für die Autonomie Schlesiens (RAŚ),* "Polen-Analysen" Deutsches Polen Institut Darmstadt und Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen, 112/03.07.2012.

[33] A. Klich (2007), *Bez mitów. Portrety ze Śląska,* Gdynia.

The Silesian Treasury was a separate institution, to which a *tangent* principle applied, i.e. about 50% of Silesian income stayed in the voivodship and the remaining part was passed to the Treasury of the Republic of Poland. The Constitutional Act of the State National Council of 6 May 1945 put an end to the regional autonomy of Silesia. However, many Silesian scholars question the validity of that political decision taken by post-war communist authorities. The Polish transformation of the 1990s once again revived the dream about the autonomous Silesian region.

That dream was institutionalised by the creation of the Movement for Silesia Autonomy (Ruch Autonomii Śląska, RAŚ). This association was founded in January 1990. Today, according to its activists, it has about 7 thousand members, the majority of whom live in the Silesian voivodship. The basic statutory objective of the Movement is to establish an autonomous region within the historical borders of Upper Silesia. In the Movement's Statutes, the objectives are described in more detail:

> 1. obtaining autonomy by Silesia within the framework of the mature decentralisation of the Republic of Poland, 2. deepening the regional identity among the population of Silesia and of other regions of the Republic of Poland, 3. shaping and developing an active civil attitude among Silesian people, 4. participation in the integration of all people living in Silesia, irrespective of their ethnicity, 5. taking active measures aimed at the protection of natural environment and the material and mental heritage, 6. promotion of human rights and civil freedoms, 7. promotion of European integration and development of contacts and cooperation between societies, 8. keeping cultural and economic contacts with the Silesian diasporas as well as sustaining their emotional ties with their homeland, 9. promoting and shaping a positive image of Silesia, 10. promoting linguistic diversity and the Silesian tongue.[34]

The Movement seeks to achieve its clearly defined objectives through, *inter alia*, a considerable activity of its members in public life: acting for the local community, supporting cultural and educational activities, working with the youth and promoting the idea of autonomy and regionalism. In this context it is important to mention the Upper Silesian Heritage Days organised by the Movement, initiatives aimed at saving post-industrial monuments as well as numerous educational activities in the real and virtual world.

The idea of the Movement for Silesia Autonomy invokes the autonomy enjoyed by the Silesian voivodship during the Second Republic of Poland. At the same time, it clearly refers to the present situation in Spain, especially in Catalonia. It must be highlighted that the Movement deprecates separatist tendencies but is of the opinion that broad autonomy within the Republic of Poland is the best solution for Silesia. Therefore, from the beginning, the Movement has emphasised the need for a constitutional reform which would take into consideration Poland's regional diversity and respect the sense of identity of regional, ethnic, and national groups and their aspirations to manifest political autonomy. That is why the nature of the Movement

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[34] Statutes of the Movement for Silesia Autonomy, Chapter II – Objectives, measures, and methods of action, Article12: www.autonomia.pl (accessed: 13.06.2012).

is regional only. Its fundamental objective is administrative modernisation of Poland oriented towards the Republic of autonomous regions which has found its expression in the Movement proposal of draft amendments to the Polish Constitution, i.e.

> The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Republic of Poland, the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, and it recognises and guarantees the right to territorial autonomy of its regions and solidarity among all. The Act establishes local government units which exercise public authority.[35]

It is assumed that the level of autonomy of the regions would differ, similarly to the Spanish model, as an expression of the strength of cultural identity (language, religion, tradition) and the level of economic development.

Members of the Movement for Silesia Autonomy are people associated with cultural and civilisational values of the region which, however, are not necessarily native. According to its *Biuletyn Informacyjny* (Information Bulletin), the Movement's goal is that

> Silesia obtains its full rights which it deserves, first of all, due to its strong economic potential, natural resources of this Land, its minerals and coal. The foundation of the path we have taken is the right of people inhabiting this Land to decide about their own fate.

The Movement, starting from its formation, has a clear and definite view of the shape of autonomous Silesia and principles of its functioning. The basis for the future regionalisation decisions in this part of Poland should, according to the Movement, be the restitution of the Silesian Autonomy on the basis of the Constitutional Act of 15 July 1920.

UPPER SILESIA CLAIMS

The group of Upper Silesians provokes strong emotions not only among inhabitants of Upper Silesia but also among Poles in other regions of the Republic of Poland. Those emotions are connected with Silesians' efforts to be recognised as a nation(ality) and political activities aimed at obtaining autonomy for Upper Silesia within Polish borders. We are aware that the two dimensions are not equivocal but it is difficult not to notice a connection between them. On the one hand, the efforts to promote the Silesian nation(ality) consist in raising arguments related to results of National Censuses (2002 and 2011) which revealed a high level of self-identification of inhabitants of Silesia with the Silesian nation(ality). On the other hand, they include measures taken to maintain the Silesian system of culture, the aim of which is to demonstrate the mature culture of the region which is different from the Pol-

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[35] Draft amendments of 13 June 2012 to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997. Chapter I: The Republic, Article 3, items 1 and 2, www.autonomia.pl/n/konstytucja.

ish culture. The struggle for the autonomy of Upper Silesia is, however, primarily a political activity though it also oriented towards the manifestation of the Silesian culture. What brings the two worlds together is the struggle for the recognition of Silesian as a regional language which, to a varying degree, may become a distinctive competence of both the Silesian people and autonomous Upper Silesia.

ABSTRACT

The difficult and complicated history of Upper Silesia, especially changes in state affiliation, created in the native population the need of a stable identity that would resist political transformations. This led to the formation of the Silesian community, which according to the latest national census (2011) is 817 thousand people strong. That number is a substantial argument in the strife of Silesians for the recognition of their Silesian nationality, all the more so, since according to the law on national and ethnic minorities and regional language, Upper Silesians are neither an ethnic nor national minority. Hitherto endeavours to register the Silesian nation(ality) proved unsuccessful. But Silesians persist in their efforts. They preserve their cultural system and strive for the recognition of the Silesian tongue as a regional language. Culture and language are important elements defining national identification and Upper Silesians are aware of that fact. In their activity, they are supported among others by the Movement for Silesia Autonomy (Ruch Autonomii Śląska), which in its aspiration to the autonomy of Upper Silesia does not forget about the Silesian tradition and above all about the tongue.

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A SILESIAN REVOLT?
IDENTITY RESTITUTION PROCESSES IN UPPER SILESIA
AND THE IDEA OF A UNITARY STATE

When describing decentralisation/devolution issues in European countries, it was noted that little was written about a unitary state in relevant literature. To start with, there is no definition of that concept. If sociologists or political scientists refer to *unitary state*, it is usually in opposition to the widely described model of a federal State. The term *unitary state* is used to describe a political organisation of a centralised national state.[1] A unitary state is a political organisation in which all power, or most of it, is in the hands of the central administration. Characteristically, in such a state, the central authority delegates some powers to local self-government units to execute specific tasks.[2] Typical features of a unitary state include: integrity of public authorities, uniform law applicable in the entire state, and territorial integrity, i.e. the lack of a territorial division (which is feasible in case of very small states) or a strictly administrative division. The above is possible because all power is in the hands of the central administration which delegates some of its executive powers to units at a lower level, operations of which are dependent on the central administration.[3]

In Poland, discussions about a new model of public administration began in 1989. The need for regionalisation appeared obvious, considering the country management system which was a combination of the previous and the new political system, the excessive number of small voivodships ("provinces"), the lack of demo-

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[1] R. A. Rhodes, P. Carmichael, J. McMillan, A. Massey (2003), *Decentralizing the civil service. From unitary state to differentiated polity in the United Kingdom,* Philadelphia, p. 3.

[2] Actually, there many models of a unitary state. When reviewing political territorial solutions in modern states, Michael Keating notes that, undoubtedly, the archetype of a unitary state is the Napoleonic system established in France (though its beginnings go back to the French revolution during which, in the name of national unity, local privileges were liquidated, and new huge departments were established) with its uniform system of law and administration adopted later in many countries of Europe and, in particular, in its southern part. Its key feature is the uniformity of policy guaranteed by entrusting some administrative tasks of the central administration to officials "in the field". M. Keating, *The Territorial State,* in: R. Axtmann (2003), *Understanding Democratic Politics. An Introduction,* London.

[3] Cf. P. Sarnecki, *Uwagi do art. 164 Konstytucji RP,* in: *Komentarz do Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,* Vol. IV, Warszawa 2007, p. 1.

cratically elected representative bodies in voivodships, and the necessity to create structures which would facilitate integration with the European Union, the policy of which underlined interregional contacts and cooperation.[4] The debate on the reform of state administration resulted in numerous projects of a new territorial division of the country.[5] On their basis, two basic approaches to future regions can be identified. In one approach, the then existing voivodships were to be covered by a network of greater units, i.e. regions. In the second approach, completely new voivodships were to be created. The first idea, for unclear reasons, did not have many supporters. Its opponents, in turn, claimed that the existing division of the country into 49 voivodships had too short tradition for people to identify with them strongly enough to make old voivodships a necessary level of the new territorial administration.[6] Finally, the decision was taken to design voivodships anew and their concept was that of "regions". More significant, however, was the concurrent discussion on their powers. Out of three basic models, the model of self-governing voivodships-comregions was chosen. It fitted perfectly the concept of a unitary state where central authorities delegate some of their power to units at a lower level while remaining the only entity responsible for regional legislature and, consequently, regional policies. Thus, regionalisation was limited to de-concentration of power without substantially increasing the competencies of regions. The reluctance to strengthen the authority of regional self-governments resulted, to a large extent, from worries about the new democracy being fragile and, primarily, from typically Polish concerns about the inviolability of Poland's borders.[7] Autonomy of regions was and still is perceived by a large part of Polish society as a form of separatism and hence as a threat to the unity of the Polish State.

Another difficulty for regional communities is the fact that the concept of the Polish unitary state is closely related to the binding concept of Polish national identity. Jacek Wódz qualifies that identity as a Romantic one. It is "a symbolic amalgam, in which the Polish identity was supposed, first of all, to be symbolically uniform and based on common historical roots, and secondly, that identity – while glorifying

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[4] Cf. e.g. B. Jałowiecki (1996), *Nowa regionalizacja,* "Przegląd Polityczny" No. 32.

[5] From 1990 to 1992, as many as 26 various projects were presented with proposals to establish 6 to 14 regions.

[6] As it turned out, during the introduction of the territorial reform in 1999, the identification was stronger than expected and the liquidation of old voivodships led to many protests and conflicts, some of which persist till today. A good example is the Bielskie voivodship and recurring ideas to separate it from the Silesian voivodship, i.e. the idea of the Podbeskidzie Autonomy Movement promoted by a group associated with Grażyna Staniszewska or their vision to establish a southern sub-region with its capital in Bielsko-Biała.

[7] A good example may be the results of surveys about national security conducted since the 1990s by the CBOS [Public Opinion Research Centre]. Among potential threats, respondents have indicated our closest neighbours, i.e. Germany and Russia. They have justified their opinions with attempts of the two stronger neighbours to make Poland economically and politically dependent. Such historically conditioned fears were and are fuelled by rightwing politics.

the community of symbols – worryingly tolerated symbolic differences between particular regions perceiving them as a threat to the essence of the state"[8]. Such a model of national identity and of the state has been particularly unfavourable for regions distinct culturally and ethnically whose inhabitants were strongly attached to their regional identity and where efforts to increase the region autonomy were made. Such a region is Upper Silesia. Its history has been bound to the history of Poland since 1339 when Casimir the Great renounced all Polish claims to Silesia in the context legal battles in the papal court in the case Poland vs. Teutonic Knights. (In that trial one of arbiters was the king of Bohemia and Hungary.) Over the following centuries, Silesia was in Czech, Prussian and German hands.[9] In result, a specific culture developed in that region, which is typical of borderlands where regular interactions with culturally different neighbours take place.[10] Its culture combined elements of Polish, German, and Bohemian cultures with unique local culture elements. That culture has become one of core elements of the Silesian identity about which Emil Szramek wrote in 1934 as follows:

> in result of the long infiltration, i.e. a national mixture, there are individuals who are not only bilingual but also have double national identity, similarly to boundary stones which have the Polish mark on one side and the German mark on the other, or boundary pear trees dropping off fruit on both sides. These are not people lacking character but having a borderland character.[11]

After World War II, the Silesian culture was considered secondary to other regional cultures, and in particular to national culture. Its status was the result of its clearly borderland character:

> The Silesian axionormative system and social behaviours which manifested it were thus socially defined as deficient but also essentially foreign culturally. In terms of categories of P. Bourdieu [...], it can be said that, owing to post-war processes and developments, the Silesian culture was socially defined as illegal.[12]

Silesians were subject to national verification.

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[8] J. Wódz, *Polskie regiony – dynamika tożsamości,* in: A. Michalak, A. Sakson, Ż. Stasieniuk, (eds) (2011), *Polskie Ziemie Zachodnie,* Poznań, p. 38.

[9] Cf. e.g. J. Bahlcke, D. Gawrecki, R. Kaczmarek (2011), *Historia Górnego Śląska. Polityka, gospodarka i kultura europejskiego regionu,* Gliwice; A. Herzig, K. Ruchniewicz, M. Ruchniewicz (2012), *Śląsk i jego dzieje,* Wrocław; M. Czapliński, E. Kaszuba, G. Wąs, R. Żerelik (2002), *Historia Śląska,* Wrocław; J. Bahlcke (2001), *Śląsk i Ślązacy,* Warszawa; K. Popiołek (1972), *Historia Śląska od pradziejów do 1945 r.,* Katowice.

[10] Cf. e.g. M. Szmeja (2000), *Niemcy? Polacy? Ślązacy!,* Kraków, pp. 194-195; J. Wódz, *Region pogranicza – wyzwanie europejskie,* in: J. Wódz, (ed.) (1993), *Niektóre problemy społeczne w województwie katowickim,* Katowice; A. Kłoskowska (1996), *Kultury narodowe u korzeni,* Warszawa.

[11] E. Szramek (1934), *Śląsk jako problem socjologiczny,* "Roczniki Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk na Górnym Śląsku" Vol. IV, Katowice, p. 35.

[12] W. Błasiak, *Śląska zbiorowość regionalna i jej kultura w latach 1945-1956,* in: M. Błaszczak-Wacławik, W. Błasiak, T. Nawrocki, (eds) (1990), *Górny Śląsk. Szczególny przypadek kulturowy,* Kielce, p. 128.

The economic and political transformation of the 1990s promised a chance to change the approach of central authorities to Upper Silesia and Silesians. Inhabitants of the region started to hope for a better future. That hope

> followed from the permanent feeling that their group was ousted to socially peripheral positions, from regular 'exploitation' of the region and, finally, from the increasing negation of the People's Republic of Poland. [...] Expectations towards 'the new democracy' were remarkably high, especially in that region. Silesians felt disadvantaged. Rapid changes for the better were much awaited.[13]

The lack of any chances that expectations of the region's inhabitants would be met, the growing sense of economic alienation of the region deepened by restructuring of its heavy industry as well as the persisting feeling of being disadvantaged and the belief in the region's impairment became the basis for the revival of regional movements in the early 1990s. Their emergence, the growth of pro-autonomy tendencies, and the highlighting of cultural separateness caused many controversies.

In this article, processes of creating and restoring the Silesian identity after 1989 and issues resulting from a unitary concept of the state binding in Poland are presented. Contradictions between the adopted model of national identity and the identity of Upper Silesia inhabitants are discussed. The Silesian identity is based on a different canon of cultural values not matching the aforesaid model and, hence, it challenges the model. One of main objectives is to demonstrate that the present structure of the state is a basic cause of conflicts in Upper Silesia, of the support for regional movements and, most importantly, that it strengthens the process of Silesian identity restitution. The paper is based on qualitative and quantitative research conducted since 1997 and on analyses of secondary sources. I will limit the analysis to the part of Upper Silesia which in the past constituted the Katowickie voivodship. That choice largely results from the fact that most conflicts over the creation and restitution of the Silesian identity have taken place in that area and that there, three groups of prime importance for the emerging discourse about Silesia have been most active.

REGIONALISM AFTER 1989

The political and economic transformation which began in 1989, contributed to the revival of regional movements in Upper Silesia.[14] Most important organisations on the regional political scene include: Upper Silesian Union (Związek Górnośląski),

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[13] M. Gerlich (2010), *"My prawdziwi Górnoślązacy..." Studium etnologiczne,* Warszawa, p. 75.

[14] Cf. e.g. M. Szczepański, *Regionalizm górnośląski w społecznej świadomości,* in: W. Świątkiewicz (ed.) (1993), *Społeczne problemy Górnego Śląska we współczesnych badaniach socjologicznych,* Katowice; idem (1998)*, Regionalizm górnośląski: miedzy plemiennością a systemem globalnym,* "Kultura i Społeczeństwo" No.1; idem, *Regionalizm górnośląski w świadomości społecznej,* in: B. Jałowiecki, G. Gorzelak (eds) (1993), *Czy Polska będzie państwem regionalnym?,* Warszawa; J. Wódz,

Movement for Silesian Autonomy (Ruch Autonomii Śląska), Union of People of Silesian Nationality (Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej), German Working Group *Reconciliation and Future* (Niemiecka Wspólnota Robocza „Pojednanie i Przyszłość"), *Polish Silesia* Civic Movement (Ruch Obywatelski Polski Śląsk), Polish Western Union (Polski Związek Zachodni, PZZ), and Silesian Sovereignty Defence League (Liga Obrony Suwerenności Śląska). I will focus on activities of the first three groups because their activities and programmes have defined the shape of Silesian regionalism and of the discussion about the region and its future. What is more, problems with registration experienced by the Union of People of Silesian Nationality became the basis for restarting the discussion about the identity of Silesians and, above all, about the manner of defining regional and ethnic groups and national minorities in Poland.

In the beginning, the most influential organisation was the Upper Silesian Union, established on 30 November 1989. Its dominance on the regional political scene resulted primarily from the fact that, in contrast to the Movement for Silesian Autonomy and other regional organisations founded at the time, it enjoyed wide political support. Its core membership included members of regional political, cultural and social elites. In addition, the shared oppositional past of its leading activists and their activity in the Catholic Intelligentsia Club in Katowice were not without importance. The Union started to grow and develop its structures rapidly. In two years, it had field branches in the majority of large towns of the then Katowickie voivodship and in some towns in the Opolskie voivodship. Its political significance was becoming more apparent, too. The voivod and vice-voivod of the Katowickie voivodship, the head of the Office for State Security, the chairman of the voivodship regional parliament, several mayors and chairpersons of town and commune councils and MPs were members of that Union.

Having had such a political power, the Union became the main actor on the regional political scene and played the decisive role in preparing the development strategy for the Katowickie voivodship and the voivodship restructuring project. Its leaders were supporters of regionalisation and State decentralisation, and advocated the creation of the so-called Great Silesia. Great Silesia was supposed to be a region embracing all Silesian lands, including Opava Silesia (part of the Czech Republic) and parts of the historical Dąbrowa Basin (Zagłębie Dąbrowskie) in the Katowickie voivodship. The planned region had a clear cross-border character and the first step

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Tożsamość śląska jako zjawisko polityczne, in: W. Świątkiewicz (ed.) (1998), *Regiony i regionalizmy w Polsce współczesnej,* Katowice; idem, K. Wódz, *Regionalizm, dzielnicowość, tożsamość narodowa,* in: M. Wanatowicz (ed.) (1995), *Regionalizm a separatyzm – historia i współczesność. Śląsk na tle innych obszarów,* Katowice; T. Nawrocki, *Spór o regionalizm i regionalizację na Górnym Śląsku,* in: B. Jałowiecki, G. Gorzelak (eds) (1993), *Czy Polska będzie państwem regionalnym?,* Warszawa; R. Geisler, *Oblicza śląskich regionalizmów. Od konfliktów do demokracji deliberatywnej,* in: K. Bondyra, M. Szczepański, P. Śliwa (eds) (2005), *Państwo, samorząd i społeczności lokalne. Piotr Buczkowski in memoriam,* Poznań.

towards its creation was the establishment of the Union of Upper Silesia and North-ern Moravia Communes (Związek Gmin Górnego Śląska i Północnych Moraw) in 1992. Activities of voivod Czech and the Upper Silesian Union caused several pro-tests of the Confederation of Independent Poland party and of the Polish Western Union[15] which demanded the dismissal of the voivod. They argued that the establish-ment of such a Euro-region was contrary to Polish national interest.[16]

Allegations of the Confederation and the Polish Western Union seem absurd if we take into consideration the fact that from the very beginning of its existence, the Upper Silesian Union was an organisation of the native population, emphasising bonds of Upper Silesia with Poland and the unitary character of the Polish State. In no document of the Upper Silesian Union, there were suggestions to create an autonomous region. Instead, the Union underlined the need for regionalisation of the State and widening self-governance competencies of the region. In the opinion of the Union representatives, self-governance was supposed to be based on the concept of financial independence, meaning that some income generated in the region should remain there instead of being passed to the state budget. The concept was never properly developed by the Union activists and it was never determined what part of the income should remain in the voivodship and on what basis.[17]

In the late 1990s, the significance of the Upper Silesian Union started to fade. It was no longer the leading actor on the Silesian political scene. Now it is a formation with few members which, from time to time, organises cultural events which do not attract crowds. More importantly, the Union has not succeeded in reaching the youth in the region as it has nothing to offer to them. The best summary of its recent activ-ity was given by Michał Smolorz.

> In the past 20 years, the Upper Silesian Union, a former power, screwed up everything what could have been screwed up, but at the historical palace in Stalmacha street [...] in Katowice, one can still hear the classic verse: what can we screw up next, gentlemen, what? It is the only recipe for life of

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[15] The Polish Western Union appeared on the Polish political scene for the first time in 1934. It was a mutation of the Western Borderlands Defence Union. The group which appeared after 1989 was strongly linked to the Confederation of Independent Poland and, in 1991, introduced four MPs to the Sejm thanks to them being candidates "of" the Confederation. In Upper Silesia, from the very begin-ning, the Union activists were critical of activities of voivod Czech and the Upper Silesia Union which was associated with him. Opinions of Polish Western Union activists often contained comparisons to the "V column" and another partition of Poland. Voivod Czech was accused of unequal treatment of the region's inhabitants and excessive promotion of the native population. It was said that the voivod was obsessed with Upper Silesia, which was manifested in changing names of institutions in the voivodship by adding the adjective "Upper Silesian". There were jokes that under the rule of the voivod, Silesian dumplings would have their name changed to Upper Silesian dumplings.

[16] Cf. e.g. T. Majcherkiewicz, *Górny Śląsk – opinie regionalnych elit administracyjnych w latach dziewięćdziesiątych,* in: Z. Leszkowicz-Baczyńska, (ed.) (2005), *Transgraniczność w perspektywie so-cjologicznej. Nowe pogranicza?,* Zielona Góra, pp. 275-278.

[17] Cf. A. Skudrzykowa, J. Tambor, K. Urban, O. Wolińska (2001), *Gwara śląska – świadectwo kul-tury, narzędzie komunikacji,* Katowice, p. 25.

the coterie of losers consuming leftovers of past prosperity. None of them is ready to accept the fact that 23 years have passed since 1989 and that a new generation of Silesians has entered their adulthood, for whom wearing yellow pants and a wreath with beads, all those dialect contests and pseudo-folk songs are but a ridiculous theatre which has nothing in common with modern regionalism. That generation is not satisfied with licensed Silesian culture limited to celebrating Saint Barbara's Day, laying wreaths at the monument to insurgents, and singing 'Poof, poof from the pipe' [...]. I have the impression that chairman Andrzej Stania and people around him live in some imaginary world completely detached from reality, and that a dream of power still runs through their heads.[18]

At present, the Union struggles to survive and that struggle comes down to opposing the Movement for Silesian Autonomy.

The Movement for Silesian Autonomy appeared on the Silesian political scene a little later than the Upper Silesian Union, i.e. on 13 January 1990, in Rybnik. One year later, it was registered by the Voivodship Court in Katowice. From its very beginning, the Movement was perceived as an organisation more radical than the Upper Silesian Union. Its primary objective was the restoration of Upper Silesia autonomy. Its plan was that the first stage of that process would be the reconstruction of the autonomy on the basis of the Act of 15 July 1920. The Act granted substantial powers to the Silesian Sejm, both passive and active. The only matters beyond its powers were, in fact, matters related to foreign policy, customs, and the military.[19] Such a design of autonomy evoked much controversy among inhabitants of the region but mostly outside it, i.e. it was controversial to Polish political parties and central authorities. The controversy resulted mainly from the lack of the tradition of autonomous regions in Poland and equating autonomy with separatism. The concerns grew in 1996 when some activists of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy founded the Union of People of Silesian Nationality.

The Movement for Silesian Autonomy built its position somewhat more slowly than its competitor, i.e. the Upper Silesian Union. The Movement was a local initiative and, at the beginning, it was perceived in that way by observers of political life in Silesia. That situation started to change with a new generation of regionalists who took control over the Movement. They steadily built a new image of the Movement as an association fighting for the case of Silesia and Silesians and taking care of the Silesian culture and tradition (hence, organisation of the Upper Silesian Heritage Days, digitalisation of Upper Silesian press, cataloguing the lost and stolen cultural heritage of Upper Silesia, and numerous conferences and debates devoted to the issue of culture and history of Upper Silesia). Initially, their activities resembled happenings which, on the one hand, resulted from the lack of financial resources and, on the other, allowed them to reach the youngest inhabitants of the region. The hard

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[18] M. Smolorz, *Związek Górnośląski spieprzył wszystko,* "Dziennik Zachodni" 28.04.2012.

[19] Cf. e.g. M. W. Wanatowicz, *Województwo śląskie na tle Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej,* in: F. Serafin (ed.) (1996), *Województwo śląskie (1922-1939). Zarys monograficzny,* Katowice, p. 23. S. Janicki (1928), *Samorząd województwa śląskiego,* in: *Dziesięciolecie Polski odrodzonej. Księga pamiątkowa 1918-1928,* Kraków-Warszawa, pp. 201-203.

work paid off and since 2000, the popularity and importance of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy in the region have grown. From a small organisation in conflict with almost everyone, the Movement for Silesian Autonomy transformed into the strongest player on the Silesian political scene. It has been efficiently managed and avoided mistakes made by other Silesian organisations like focusing on their own community only, lacking a vision for the development of the region and the future of their own organisation, entering into inconvenient alliances with nation-wide parties[20], personal conflicts within their own organisation and, last but not least, promotion of the Silesian culture as folk art only.

<center>SILESIANS VS THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND: CONFLICT AREAS</center>

The conflict caused by the identity resurgence in Upper Silesia includes three areas closely connected to the concept of the state and national identity adopted in Poland. The first one is the issue of granting the autonomy status to the region. The second one, evoking most controversy, is the issue of the existence of the Silesian nation. Finally, the third and seemingly least controversial area is the status of the Silesian dialect and attempts of regional organisations to grant it the status of a regional language. Those three issues are the main ones but, obviously, the list of problematic issues which are the cause of the conflict between Silesians and authorities of the Polish state is longer. At the margin of the above issues, there will always be the financial one as, undoubtedly, it is one of most important and fully articulated issues in relations between Upper Silesia represented by regional organisations and local inhabitants, and the state authorities.

Upper Silesia Autonomy

As I have already mentioned, the issue of Upper Silesia autonomy appeared in declarations of regional organisations already in the early 1990s. Autonomy demands resulted from the traditions of the region dating back to the inter-war period and addressed the popular idea of a Europe of regions.[21] Restitution of the autonomy,

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[20] The Movement for Silesian Autonomy (RAŚ) has cooperated with political parties, various organisations and associations on various projects but never abandoned its goals. When those objectives are at risk or a partner's vision of the future of the region is substantially different from the one of RAŚ, their paths diverge and RAŚ withdraws from the inconvenient arrangement. This can be illustrated with what happened to its coalition with Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) in the Silesian Sejmik (voivodship parliament) after the 2010 local elections. The appointment of Mirosław Sekuła as the voivodship marshal [i.e. the local parliament Speaker], the removal of Leszek Jodliński from the post of director of the Silesian Museum, issues related to a substantial conversion of the Silesian Stadium and a difficult situation of Silesian Railways, were reasons why the chairman of RAŚ resigned from being a member of the executive body of voivodship self-government and broke the coalition with PO.

[21] In his pronouncements, the chairman of RAŚ has frequently referred to one of key authors of the

which the Śląskie voivodship enjoyed in the inter-war period, has been the primary objective of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy. Two most significant manifestations of that autonomy were the Silesian Sejm and the Silesian Treasury. Pursuant to the Act of 1920, the Silesian Sejm had full statutory powers in the following areas: the use of Polish and German languages in the Śląskie voivodship; legislation concerning Silesian administrative authorities as well as poviat, municipal and commune self-governments; administrative division of Silesia; sanitary legislation with the exception for regulations on fighting infectious diseases and contagious animal plagues; organisation of police forces and gendarmerie; construction, fire safety, and road inspection; all types and levels of education; church matters with the exclusion of the Concordat between Poland and the Holy See; support for the poor and fighting vagrancy and begging; legislation on professional agricultural organisations such as agricultural chambers, agricultural credit unions, accumulation of lands, agricultural and forest production, and amelioration; water law with the exclusion of artificial waterways and regulation of navigable and border rivers; legislation on public and private electrification; legislation on secondary and tertiary railways as well as electrical and motor transport; law on usury; matters related to public service facilities and public works financed by the Silesian Treasury; the right to decide annual Silesian budget and contract voivodship loans, and rights related to sale, exchange, and charge. Despite the creation of the autonomous voivodship, central authorities were not particularly

> interested in expanding competences of the Silesian Sejm, as they supported the unification and integration processes in the State. Hence, Article. 81 of the April [1935] Constitution abolished the provision of the Organic Statutes which read that the Silesian autonomy cannot be liquidated without consent of the Silesian Sejm. The separate status of the Silesian voivodship remained unchanged however, until the outbreak of World War II and was formally abolished only in 1945.[22]

In their declarations, representatives of the Movement have clearly underlined that the restitution of the autonomy from the inter-war period will be the first stage in their struggle to reach a stage (not fully defined) at which Upper Silesia obtains "full autonomy".[23] With time and growth of the Movement, the concept of autonomy has become increasingly concrete. In the year 2000, Jerzy Gorzelik, chairman of the

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idea of Europe of regions Denis de Rougemont but, generally, references have been mainly made to the concept of "Europe of 100 flags" of Breton national activist Yann Fouere. Following Fouere, RAŚ supports the idea of united Europe in which the role of a national state is significantly reduced and most of its powers is transferred to historical regions.

[22] M. Wanatowicz, *Województwo śląskie (1922-1939),* in: J. Bahlcke, D. Gawrecki, R. Kaczmarek (eds) (2011), *Historia Górnego Śląska. Polityka, gospodarka i kultura europejskiego regionu,* Gliwice, p. 242.

[23] During the initial period of the Movement's existence, that "full autonomy" was a rather enigmatic slogan. It was nowhere specified what it was supposed to mean, what powers would be in the hands of the region, and on what legal basis that autonomy was to be introduced.

Movement, stated that members of the Movement were supporters of Euro-regionalism, in other words, they supported a Europe which

> is a federation of regions, old historical regions, thus - as I have already said - [RAŚ] advocates the return to some natural geography of the continent. It is not about detaching some part of Poland and creating a state essentially similar but within other borders, that is a smaller state, a miniature of a national state. Instead, it is about creating such a political structure which, on the one hand, will meet the present needs, so the trend towards globalisation which is so much talked about and which surely is not just a slogan because it is a fact. Some national states are already not able to solve their problems, so there is a need for some greater structure. On the other hand, the basic structures will be those regions which are natural homelands and which, in a way, are adjusted to the human scale. A national state (Poland, France, Sweden) is already obsolete for two reasons: on the one hand, it stifles regions and individuals; it is too large for individuals and imposes on them certain solutions; regions and smaller communities are not able to opposes such a state. On the other hand, that state does not solve fundamental economic, security problems.[24]

That vision still lacked a clear division of competencies between regions and the central authority. Some of few assigned powers were those connected with defence which, according to the chairman of the Movement, were to remain the domain of the central authority. What drew the attention, however, was the fact that the autonomy was a project which not so much concerned changes to the Polish model of territorial administration but one inscribed in processes taking place within the framework of the European Union like the emergence of common social and political space and common economy.

Recently, RAŚ prepared two draft documents essential to changing the status of regions in Poland: draft amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (the last version of that document is from 8 July 2011) and a draft of "Organic Statutes" defining the autonomy framework for the Silesian voivodship (the last version of which is from 15 January 2012).[25] The "Organic Statutes of the Silesian Voivodship" proposed by the Movement for Silesian Autonomy reads that the voivodship "has a legal personality and its separate rights are respected in accordance with the Constitution, the legal system of the Republic of Poland and international structures of which it is a member"[26]. There is no information in any of the Movement documents which would indicate that the autonomy would be an introduction to a creation of a separate state or an attempt to create another German federal land. According to its leader, the Movement's draft documents assume a change of the Constitution but, what is also important,

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[24] An interview conducted in July 2000 as part of the research on Upper Silesian regionalism [co-author R. Geisler].

[25] Both documents are published on the Movement's website: http://autonomia.pl. They are supplemented by a list of answers in the FAQ section.

[26] *Statut Organiczny Śląskiego Województwa Autonomicznego*, http://autonomia.pl/n/statut-organiczny [accessed: 20.04.2013].

the autonomy should be approved by the people concerned. That means that the autonomic or organic statutes, at a certain stage, should be approved in a referendum. In our concept of that entire procedure facilitating the development of such an autonomy, we are dealing with an initiative of regional elites, that is the existing voivodship parliaments, followed by negotiations at the central level and, later, the final product of those negotiations is assessed by society in a referendum. Of course, the existing voivodships can be combined and a draft of a joint autonomic statutes can be presented by self-governments of two neighbouring voivodships. And, of course, it is also possible to hold local referendums on administrative affiliation in disputed areas.[27]

The autonomy is to ensure that inhabitants of Silesia can decide, to a larger extent, about the directions of the region development and on what the generated income is to be spent. Of course, that is also to allow to take care of the culture and history of the region.

In Poland, the idea of autonomy is surely not a most popular one. This is largely due to historical reasons. Poles, who fought for independence for many years, perceive attempts to restitute the autonomy of Upper Silesia as manifestations of separatism and attempts at changing the borders of the Polish State. That was clear in a report on the state security disclosed in 2000. The report, produced by the then State Security Bureau (Urząd Ochrony Państwa, UOP), mentioned the Movement for Silesian Autonomy as a potential threat. To quote:

The Katowice branch of the State Security Bureau monitors activities of some communities, groups, movements and associations as to whether the aims declared in their statutes are consistent with their actual implementation. We do it by monitoring generally accessible sources such as radio, TV, press, and the Internet. […] Undoubtedly, separatist movements attract interest of intelligence agencies in all countries where such movements appear. They pose a potential threat to the state, its structures and stability which, of course, does not mean that they are combated. If their activities are consistent with their statutes approved by courts, there is no reason for concern both for such movements and the state which, as the very name of the Bureau indicates, we should protect. […] **A potential threat to interests of the Republic of Poland, in particular in the context of Polish efforts to join the European Union, may be posed by activities of structures (sic!) affiliated to German *Landsmanshaft* organisations (Federation of Expellees). In this context, the massive propaganda for Silesian autonomy can be mentioned (implemented with involvement of some German minority communities and activists of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy).[28]**

The idea of the autonomy caused concerns also among politicians, in particular those representing the right side of the Polish political scene. In 2008, Zbigniew Girzyński MP of PiS (Law and Order) party commented on an article by Kazimierz Kutz in which Kutz recalled that Prime Minister Tusk promised him to promote the idea of Upper Silesia autonomy in exchange for Kutz being a PO (Civic Platform) candidate in parliamentary elections. Girzyński argued that such promises were a worrying sign for Poland because they might lead to violation of the state integ-

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[27] An interview conducted on 11 October 2012 as part of the research on new regionalism and post-colonialism in Upper Silesia [co-author R. Geisler].

[28] J. Dziadul, *Jaskółka kala gniazdo, "*Polityka" 29.04.2000, No. 18.

rity.[29] In 2009, Rajmund Pollak, a former member of the Silesian Sejmik [voivodship parliament], wrote a letter to Prime Minister Tusk, in which he demanded to delegalise the Movement for Silesian Autonomy, arguing that it was an anti-Polish organisation which was a threat to the integrity of the Polish State. RAŚ was, in his opinion, "a new 5th column", cooperating with *Landsmanschaft* movements and the Federation of Expellees of Erika Steinbach.[30]

The lack of understanding of the autonomy issue has been also evident in pronouncements of Poland's highest authorities. President of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Komorowski associated autonomy with a breakdown of the state and thus a threat to its integrity. In his opinion, one should think about Poland and its future a whole. Referring to the PO and RAŚ coalition formed in 2010 after local elections, he argued that it was dangerous to allow a formation advocating autonomy of regions to co-govern. He warned that it could result in a growing number of organisations with similar demands and advance regional autonomy which no one would be able to control and which would contribute to the weakening of the state. He underlined that the local government reform of 1999 was a major achievement of Polish democracy. Moreover, as a result of the reform, substantial powers were transferred to communes, poviats, and voivodships which helped resolving local problems more effectively. In his view, the autonomy demanded by RAŚ was not about decentralisation but about satisfying aspirations of some regional politicians.

The reluctance of Polish politicians to debate the concept of autonomy of regions largely results from the concept of a unitary state, characteristic features of which include a uniform legal system in the country and subordination of territorial administrative units to central authorities. Autonomy demands in Silesia are perceived as a threat to the Polish State. They are perceived as contrary to the existing model of the state and, therefore, wrong. Autonomous regions are not associated with solutions which for years have functioned in western Europe. They are associated with separatism and bloodshed, the best example of which are frequent comparisons of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy to ETA and the Basque Country. There have been no attempts to debate whether the introduction of autonomic regions in Poland could be beneficial for the development of the state and specific regions, and whether regions are necessary. No one makes the effort to review and evaluate the current regionalisation model in that context. No one tries to dispute the Movement's proposals, that is to present rational arguments that the idea of autonomy is not feasible

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[29] Cf. A. Szulc, *Górny Śląsk znów chce autonomii,* "Przekrój" 31.01.2008.

[30] An interview given by Pollak to "Nasz Dziennik" was an interesting supplement to his letter to Prime Minister. Repeating the argument about the threat posed by the Movement for Silesian Autonomy to the Polish State, he claimed that during a para-referendum on restitution of Upper Silesia autonomy organised by the Movement in Pszczyna, he saw cars with German licence plates at the outskirts of the city. He compared that event with the 1921 referendum on the future of Upper Silesia. He highlighted that some Silesians had both Polish and German citizenship. Thus RAŚ could easily organise a referendum similar to the one in 1921 and make 100 thousand Germans come and vote because they "are disciplined like an army".

or is unnecessary because the existing solutions provide regions with sufficient powers to achieve their objectives and to develop further. The proposal of autonomy is rejected because it is seen as a threat to the state integrity and the existence of the state within its present borders.

The Silesian nation

The issue of the Silesian nation and nationality has appeared in discussions on Upper Silesia in connection with the founding and attempted registration of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality. The Union applied for registration to the Voivodship Court in Katowice on 11 December 1996. Its application was widely discussed not only in the region but also in the entire country. Local organisations and regional authorities reacted strongly. Both the name of the Union and provisions of its statutes appeared problematic. The statutory objectives included the awakening and embedding of national awareness of Silesians, activities aimed at reviving the Silesian culture, and protection of ethnic rights of people of Silesian nationality (§7). Any person having the Polish citizenship, who confirms in writing his or her Silesian nationality, may become a full member of the Union (§10). Most controversies, however, were evoked by §30, according to which the Union was an organisation of the Silesian national minority. On the one hand, the controversies resulted from the fact of "setting up" the Silesian national minority and, consequently, of the Silesian nation. On the other hand, they were related to legal consequences of the above. A recognition of the existence of the Silesian nation and Silesian national minority would entitle the Union to privileges granted in the Electoral Law to national minorities. According to that Law, election committees formed by national minority organisations do not have to reach the 5% electoral threshold. Moreover, Article 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 reads that national minorities have "the right to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions and to develop their own culture" and " the right to establish educational or cultural institutions, institutions designed to protect religious identity, as well as to participate in the resolution of matters connected with their cultural identity"[31]. Thus those rights would be granted to the recognised Silesian national minority as well.

The case of the registration of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality was settled by courts of all instances in Poland and, finally, reached the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In Poland, a court of first instance registered the Union, taking its decision on the basis of the Law on Associations of 7 April 1989. The court decided that the Union's Statutes did not violate legal regulations in force, and that the decision whether the Silesian nation and Silesian nationality existed was not in the competence of the court examining the application and was not the subject matter

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[31] *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland.* Text adopted on 2 April 1997, http://www.sejm. gov. pl/prawo/konst/polski/konl.htm [access 20.04.2013].

of the dispute being settled. The court decision which was favourable to the Union was widely commented by politicians. The then President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, commenting on that decision said:

> Although it is not my habit to comment on court decisions, it seems to me that the appeal procedure should be launched to explain that issue. In my opinion, a Silesian nationality, understood as a separate nation, is a misuse. Of course, there are Silesians. Similarly are people of Wielkopolska region and others. Thus there are groups of Polish society which have their own traditions, linguistics features, and perhaps even separate interests. But issues of Silesia cannot be considered in terms of nationality and obscure what really the essence of nations is according to global standards. I will request the substantiation of the court decision to be sent to me. Because, honestly, I do not understand the intention of people who want something like a Silesian nationality to be legally approved. If that is a harbinger of separatism, or of Italy's experience with Padania, it would be, of course, terrible.[32]

The decision of the court caused consternation among regional authorities and they decided to appeal. On 24 September 1997, when examining the application filed by Katowicki voivod Eugeniusz Ciszak[33], the appellate court in Katowice decided to change the decision of the court of first instance and dismissed the application for the registration of the Union. The appellate Court decided that "the Statutes presented by the Union are invalid in accordance with Article 58 of the Civil Code because the Statutes violate social norms. In compliance to Article 288 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, facts widely know do not require justification and such a fact, in the opinion of the Court, is the non-existence of the Silesian nation. [...] Silesians are a separate group in a regional and not national sense."[34] It is worth underlining that, in its decision, the court for the first time referred to issues which were not directly the subject of the dispute. The basis for rejecting the application for registration of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality was not the Law on Associations, but the Court's conviction about the non-existence of the Silesian nation.

As one may easily guess, the position taken by the appellate court on the existence of the Silesian nation resulted in the Union lodging a pleading with the Supreme Court which, similarly to the appellate court, dismissed the registration application. Again, the compliance with the Law on Associations was not part of the court

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[32] A comment for *Sygnały dnia* of 27.04.1997

[33] In an interview in July 2000, a key officer in the Katowice Voivodship Office said that one should also consider the fact that voivod Ciszak "was quite strongly associated with PSL [agrarian Polish People's Party] [...] It is a fact that, let's say, a sense [...] of national identity or a patriotic feeling is very strong among farmers and PSL has always supported patriotic trends [...] voivod Ciszak was also under great pressure, [...] he became a voivod owing to personal support of prime minister Pawlak. At that time, SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] was already in power, but voivod Ciszak [...] as if remembered about his roots and how he made it to the Voivodship Office. There was a great pressure to do so [to appeal], in particular on the part of PSL coalition activists, but I think that SLD, which was in power at that time, pressed the Katowickie voivod as well". The interview was conducted as part of the research on Upper Silesian regionalism in July 2000 [co-author R. Geisler].

[34] *Naród odwołany, "*Dziennik Zachodni" 25.09.1997 No. 224.

reasoning, and the court referred mainly to the definition of a nation and objective determinants of its existence. The Court argued that: "the choice of nation [national affiliation] by an individual is always inseparably connected with objective criteria relevant to national identity. [...] An individual has, therefore, the right to make his or her subjective choice about nationality [...] but that does not result directly in the emergence of a new separate nation or national identity."[35] The Court also noted that a Silesian nationality does not exist because Silesian people have never been treated by other national and ethnic groups as a separate nation. Hence, the belief of a few people that they belong to such a nation cannot change that objective fact in any way. Moreover, the Court did not see any obstacles to the realisation of objectives specified in the Union's Statutes by other already existing organisations.

After the decision taken by the Supreme Court, there was no more possibility to lodge a pleading again in Poland. Therefore, the Union's activists submitted their complaint against Poland to the European Court of Human Rights. The judgement of the Court was anxiously awaited in Poland and many other European countries. It was assumed that a judgement favourable to the Union of People of Silesian Nationality could set a case law to be respected by courts in Europe and thus open the path to demand compliance with claims of various separatist organisations for years active in EU members states. In December 2001, the Court upheld the decision of Polish courts. It acknowledged that the Poland had the right to dismiss the Union's application for registration. In the context of the unitary state concept, the following part of the Court judgement is interesting:

> The Court would also point out that pluralism and democracy are, by the nature of things, based on a compromise that requires various concessions by individuals and groups of individuals. The latter must sometimes be prepared to limit some of their freedoms so as to ensure the greater stability of the country as a whole. This is particularly true as regards the electoral system, which is of paramount importance for any democratic state. The Court accordingly considers that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, it was reasonable on the part of the authorities to act as they did in order to protect the electoral system of the state, a system which is an indispensable element of the proper functioning of a "democratic society" [...].[36]

The court admitted that there is no legally approved definition of a national minority, which results in legal uncertainty for individuals, especially since persons claiming to belong to a minority, in order to be recognised as such, had to make use of a procedure which was not designed for that purpose. That gives authorities much freedom in making decisions about which of the groups should be considered a minority. In the case of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality, however, the issue

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[35] A copy of the document in my archive.

[36] The European Court of Human Rights, the Fourth Section, *Case of Gorzelik and Others v. Poland. Application No. 44158/98.* Judgement, 20 December 2001; http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"appno":["44158/98"]} and see 44158/98 44158/98 | Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) | Court (Fourth Section) | 20/12/2001 [accessed: 20.04.2013].

of the possible existence of Silesian nationality proved to be less important than a possible disturbance of the existing social order caused by the Union's registration.

The decision of the European Court for Human Rights did not mean the end of the battle for Silesian nationality. Prior to the 2002 National Census, activists of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy and of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality launched a campaign among inhabitants of Upper and Lower Silesia, during which they encouraged inhabitants of those regions to declare their Silesian nationality in the census. The results of the campaign surprised many observers in Poland, made some politicians of major parties anxious, and caused heated debates in the media. According to results of the Census published by the Central Statistical Office, Silesian nationality was declared by 173,153 people.[37] Thus, Silesians became the largest minority in Poland. To compare, the German minority, long considered the largest one in Poland, had 152,897 members according to the same census. For Kazimierz Kutz, a film director and a Silesian, what happened during the Census was "a great triumph of democracy. Finally people stopped to be afraid to admit who they are. And they have the right to say who they are. Silesia was under various governments and part of various States and people there were but a workforce. Now they have demonstrated that they do exist and it would be good if authorities understood that."[38] Jacek Wódz commented on the results, saying: "First of all, Silesians are not a nationality, but a group. Secondly, the fact that they called themselves 'a nationality' in the census is not enough. To be a nation(ality), it is necessary that other people recognise such a group as a nation [...]. And, thirdly... Only 173 thousand, and what kind of a nation is it?"[39] In his analysis of the issue of the Silesian nation, Lech Nijakowski referred to a catalogue of conditions which are necessary and sufficient for a nation to exist[40], arguing that in the case of Silesians they are not met because they are

> an ethnic group, whose members make very different declarations in response to the question about who they are. Some of those responses can be treated as a declaration of national identification (mainly Polish or German, and Czech in Cieszyn Silesia), some as a declaration of regional or ethnographic identification, and other as a declaration of ethnic identity. Such an answer, however, is not complete because it does not take into consideration dynamic transformations of the Silesian community.[41]

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[37] Numerous irregularities were reported during and after the Census, mainly refusals to enter Silesian nationality and cases of Polish nationality being arbitrarily entered by census collectors. Such irregularities were confirmed by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.

[38] *Kto Ty jesteś? Ślązak!,* "Gazeta Wyborcza. Katowice" 20.06.2003.

[39] Ibidem.

[40] That catalogue, according to Nijakowski, included: having an ethnic territory; considering that territory to be the native land and inhabiting it; active and creative maintenance of the community's own distinct cultural heritage by its members; existence of a common language or languages; self-categorisation as a nation and belief in shared ethnic origin; existence of numerous strong social ties among people belonging to various social categories; existence of common self-stereotypes and biases; having a State at present, in the past or manifesting the will to create one or to gain a considerable autonomy; belief of "the social environment" in cultural and/or ethnic distinctiness of a given community.

[41] L. Nijakowski, *O procesach narodowotwórczych na Śląsku,* in: L. Nijakowski (ed.) (2004), *Nadciągają Ślązacy. Czy istnieje narodowość śląska?,* Warszawa, p. 155.

Preparations for the next Census (2011) involved a wide information campaign addressed to inhabitants of three voivodships: Śląskie [Silesian], Opolskie, and Dolnośląskie [Lower Silesian]. That time more regional organisations got involved. Active were also people previously not associated with activities of regional movements. One of them was Marek Plura, MP of PO, who appealed to Silesian organisations to launch a joint information campaign encouraging people to declare their Silesian nationality in the Census. Plura succeeded in winning the cooperation of e.g. activists of the Upper Silesian Union strongly dissociating themselves from activities of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality and the Movement for Silesian Autonomy. The campaign was also strengthened by the *Raport o stanie Rzeczpospolitej* [*Report on the condition of the Republic of Poland*] published by PiS, in which it was argued that "the **Silesian identity** which rejects Polish **national** affiliation is simply a kind of cutting off from the Polish identity and, presumably, it is a camouflaged adoption of the German option"[42]. When asked to comment on the above, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the party, stated that he and his political party treat all people who claim that the Silesian nation exists, as a camouflaged German "option". His comment outraged a large part of the population living in that region and those who previously did not intend to declare their Silesian nationality did so during the Census.[43] Kaczyński's comment was considered a manifestation of the typical of the Polish State treatment of Silesians not as citizens of Poland but as representatives of the German minority struggling to separate Silesia from Poland. In the opinion of the region's inhabitants, it was a typical manifestation of the long colonial policy of the State towards Silesia and the lack of understanding for Silesian cultural distinctness. The 2011 Census turned out to be another success of regional organisations. According to the latest data published by the Central Statistical Office, the Silesian nationality was declared by 847 thousand people, 376 thousand of whom declared it as their only national identity.[44] Thus, once again Silesians turned out to be the largest minority in Poland. It is worth noting that the second largest minority proved to be the Kashubian one with 233 thousand people. Marek Szczepański commented on the results of the Census in the following way: "RAŚ has recently had great election results. That census is also their success. The question is what next? Will the region benefit from those data? I would like to learn how RAŚ is going to utilise those dec-

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[42] *Raport o stanie Rzeczypospolitej,* Law and Justice Office, Warszawa 2011, pp. 34-35.

[43] What is more, the Silesian nationality was declared by people who did not live in Silesia and were loosely or not at all connected with that region, just to annoy Kaczyński. One of them was Marcin Meller who posted the following note on his Facebook profile on 3 April 2011: "watching nationalistic instigations by Jarosław Kaczyński and his journalists, I publicly declare that I am going to declare the Silesian nationality in the general census despite of the fact that my only link with Silesia is my Silesian wife. I witnessed such abomination as this threatening people with Germans and questioning their Polish identity in the time of the martial law and I read about such abomination while reading about March 1968 [in Poland]."

[44] Data published in 2012, http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/Przynaleznosc_narodowo-etniczna_w_2011_ NSP.pdf.

larations and whether local population will get mobilised to take pro-social attitudes towards their 'little homelands'".[45]

The trouble with the Silesian nation is, to a large extent, the result of the lack of one binding definition of a *nation* and, more precisely, the lack of its objective determinants. When describing problems connected with defining a national identity and a nation, A. D. Smith draws attention to two basic models which have developed over centuries. The first one has its roots in the Western tradition where nations were seen as culture communities whose members were united by common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. What is relevant in the context of the Silesian nation trouble, components of the Western model of the nation include historic territory, legal-political community and legal-political equality of members. In the Eastern tradition, which in Smith's opinion is typical of Eastern Europe and Asia, an "ethnic" concept of the nation is common. That model emphasizes a community of birth and native culture.[46] Therefore, in the Western model, the nation is associated with the state, while in the Eastern model it is associated with culture.

> The first school has its roots in a political concept of the nation which gains the shape in an already existing state. In the second one, the starting point is the ethnicity concept, the core of which are people usually deprived of their state. If the state existed and national identity could gain shape there, a voluntary understanding of the nation evolved in which the will to form a political community came first. If there was no common state, intellectuals referred to the so-called natural categories, i.e. categories related to the reality existing prior to the formation of the state such as language, origin and culture, and construed – in their presentations – a community based on culture and origin. What is typical of that school is the belief that nations exist first outside state structures.[47]

The dispute about what the nation is, constitutes the primary axis of the conflict between representatives of RAŚ and authorities of Poland. Opponents can be divided into supporters of the definition that highlights objective determinants of the existence of a nation such as language, territory and institutions, and supporters of the definition referring to the subjective determinants of a nation which include self-identification, behaviours and feelings.[48] The second definition is definitely closer to the Movement for Silesian Autonomy and the Union of People of Silesian Nationality. In their definitions of what a nation is, the most important role is played by the self-identification of Silesians as members of the Silesian nation. In the case of Upper Silesia, this is surely a most important determinant of group affiliation. Other de-

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[45] *Spis Powszechny: Ślązaków jest ponad 800 tys.*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" 22.03.2012.

[46] A. D. Smith (1991), *National Identity,* Reno, p. 11.

[47] U. Altermatt (1996), *Das Fanal von Sarajevo. Ethnonationalismus in Europa*, Wien [Polish translation: *Sarajewo przestrzega. Etnonacjonalizm w Europie,* Kraków 1998, pp. 36-37].

[48] Cf. A. D. Smith (1997), *Theories of Nationalism*, London [Polish translation: *Nacjonalizm,* Warszawa 2007]; S. Fenton (1999), *Ethnicity: Racism, Class and Culture*, London [Polish translation: *Etniczność,* Warszawa 2007]; A. D. Smith (1986) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford [Polish translation: *Etniczne źródła narodów,* Kraków 2009]; J. Hutchinson, A. D. Smith (1996), *Ethnicity,* New York.

terminants, due to the complicated history of the region, are not always "workable", i.e. sufficient to ascertain whether a given individual is a Silesian or not.[49] At this point, it is worth recalling Gordon Mathews' ideas. In his analysis of changes taking place in today's societies, Mathews argues that at present we live in global cultural supermarkets which provide us with seemingly unlimited possibilities to choose who we are, what values we identify with, and what the basis of our identity is. Longing for the sense of connection with a wider whole, individuals construct their sense of home from the cultural supermarket's shelves, and endeavour to forget that their cultural home is a recently erected construction.[50] Taking into consideration the complexity of national and regional identifications typical of inhabitants of Silesia, RAŚ and its concept of the Silesian identity is an offer[51] and it is a quite interesting one. On the one hand, it is an offer departing from the traditionally defined Silesian identity based on natal and behavioural determinants. That identity was problematic for a large part of inhabitants who arrived in Silesia after World War II attracted by prospects of higher earnings, jobs and accommodation. On the other hand, it is a modern offer which one does not need to be ashamed of or hide. It allows to construct a self-image which does not make one "lesser" in relations with others. Such a definition of oneself as a Silesian is based on various characteristics and, inevitably, they are related to the specific culture of Upper Silesia. In the opinion of the leader of RAŚ, what is characteristic of that region is a sort of over-interpretation of features or attitudes resulting from a different history of Upper Silesia. They are often called the pillars of the traditionally understood Silesian identity:

> the ethos of work, commitment to family and to the Church. Statistically, religion is probably more practiced, even much more than in the neighbouring non-Silesian diocese that is the diocese of Sosnowiec. Those differences, however, become less and less noticeable. I think that some level of technical culture, which is a result of industrial conditionalities, is still higher. There is a different perception of history, some other kind of historical sensitivity – perhaps we have talked about it last time – which I could compare to the contrast between the worm's-eye view and the bird's-eye view. So, traditionally, the Upper-Silesian perspective is the worm's eye view, owing to which we see history and historical processes through the prism of individuals and their experiences. The Polish perspective, in turn, is the perspective conditioned by a metanarrative, which allows to synthesise but which fails to recognise the experience of an individual. I believe that it is rather important, because contrary to what one may often hear, the way we look at history determines also our relations with the environment and our thinking about the future.[52]

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[49] A good example is, for instance, the language used by autochthonic and immigrant inhabitants of the region. However, the youngest generation of Silesians speak the local dialect much less. Interestingly, recently some Silesian tongue courses have been offered in the region and they enjoy considerable popularity among the youngest inhabitants.

[50] G. Mathews (2000), *Global Culture/individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket*, Abingdon UK, New York NY [Polish translation: *Supermarket kultury. Kultura globalna a tożsamość jednostki,* Warszawa 2005, p. 35].

[51] Cf. A. Kłoskowska (1996), *op. cit.,* pp. 252-277.

[52] An interview conducted on 11 October 2012 [co-author R. Geisler].

One more issue is relevant here, i.e. the concept of the state and national identity adopted in Poland. For centuries, the Polish State has been built on a canon of national identity having unitary characteristics. In result, the Polish identity of each citizen is taken for granted, similarly like the uniformity of national culture. In that context, "the other" is perceived as "the foreign", and not sharing the same canon of values is treated with great suspicion. That canon of identity was consolidated in the communist People's Republic of Poland. After the regime change, the history of the Polish nation was hardly debated. The justification for Poland's borders invoking the vision of Poland during the Piast dynasty, which was typical of the former regime, was adopted as well. The result of such a perspective was, *inter alia*, a discussion which accompanied the 90th anniversary of the 3rd Silesian uprising (1921) and Silesia becoming part of Poland again. Some referred to the historical event as "the annexation of Silesia to Poland" and others as Silesia's "return to the motherland".

> Poles have never had a tradition of a political debate which would facilitate consolidation of certain rational views on our past. Certain visions were imposed on us. I was taught history right after World War II and my teachers, who were great authorities such as Professor Labuda, taught me that the Western Lands were always Polish and they simply returned to the Motherland. That issue, however, has never been seriously discussed in Poland. If views were exchanged, those who were of a different opinion were considered revisionists and were not to supposed to be talked to. Today, instead of feeling offended, we should create a platform for discussion.[53]

To sum up, it appears that the refusal to register the Union of Population of Silesian Nationality has contributed to the escalation of the conflict in the region. What is more, that refusal results solely from an irrational fear of the state authorities afraid of escalation of demands of regional organisations (mainly of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy and of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality), and not from legal provisions.[54]

The Silesian language

One of basic determinants of Silesians as a regional group is their language. Its role in Upper Silesia has been particularly important. It was one of basic determinants of one's membership in the group; it separated "us" from "the others". It made

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[53] J. Wódz (2012), *Polskość na Śląsku – śląskość w Polsce,* "Śląsk" No. 9.

[54] In July 1997, the Legal Office of the Chancellery of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski commissioned an expert opinion on national minorities in the light of national and international law, with special focus on the issue of registration of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality. In that expert opinion, Anna Michalska and Renata Hliwa write that: "the statutory objectives of the Union are not inconsistent with the binding legal order irrespective of the fact whether 'the Silesian nation' does objectively exist in the light of the aforementioned criteria. What is more, one cannot deprive a group of citizens of their right of association even if objectives of their association are objectively impossible to implement (awakening and strengthening of national awareness of a nation which does not exist), especially in the light of citizens' freedom to express different views and pursue their individual interests, which freedom of association is to serve." (Typescript in the author's archive.).

the group unique and distinguished it from other groups, but at the same time it also protected the group against the others. The knowledge of the dialect was common among inhabitants of the region[55] who, frequently, did not know standard Polish well. It is worth underlining that the Silesian dialect was an everyday language, spoken with family, friends and neighbours. Polish, just like German in the past, was the official and literary language. It was spoken at schools, offices and at work, although not always and not everywhere. After World War II, the authorities initiated the process of the country cultural unification which in the case of Western and Northern Lands frequently meant re-Polonisation or Polonisation of those territories. The culture typical of Upper Silesia, due to its distinctness and characteristics typical of borderland culture, was considered not fully Polish. Central authorities took many measures to harmonise it with the national culture, mainly to eliminate elements resulting from the intertwining of Polish, German and Czech cultures in those areas. They fiercely fought all traits of German culture or what was associated with it. That was a complex problem due to fact that it was

> also a matter of language and thus street names, signboards, advertisements and other letterings. That included also first names, surnames and documents. There was also a symbolic level referring to the past, to the dominant culture, its traditions and artefacts. Those were cemeteries, churches, monuments and their complex symbolism. Thus the scope of liquidation of what was German and of de-Germanisation in Upper Silesia was considerable.[56]

One of the victims of those activities was the Silesian dialect which was considered not Polish enough and contaminated with too many German features.[57] Efforts were made to eliminate the dialect from public life and replace it with the Polish language.

In 1989, groups of specialists associated with regional organisations started to work on codification of the Silesian language. That objective, however, seemed unrealistic. Many linguists argued that in case of Silesia, one could, at best, talk about many Silesian dialects of the Polish language. There was no single model of the Silesian dialect[58] and – what was highlighted – there were no literary works in that dialect. In 2000, the leader of RAŚ commented on that issue as follows:

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[55] The ability to speak the dialect is still common in Upper Silesia. My research conducted in upper secondary school in six towns in the Katowice part of the Silesian voivodship, revealed that only 11.1% of students did not understand the dialect and were not able to speak it. As many as 88.9% knew the dialect, of whom 14.4% spoke it every day and 13.2% very often. Most frequently, as one may expect, the dialect was spoken in private with family and friends. There were also frequent responses proving that the respondents spoke the dialect not being aware that they did so. The importance of the dialect is also evidenced by the fact that as many as 54.8% of upper secondary school students considered it to be the most characteristic feature of Silesian culture.

[56] M. Gerlich (2010), *op. cit.,* p. 169.

[57] It is important to highlight that the same dialect was not German enough for Germans who called it *Bastardsprache* or *Wasserpolnisch.*

[58] The Silesian dialect in various regions differs in terms of vocabulary, pronunciation, inflection, and kinds of borrowings (in some areas there are more Bohemisms, in other more Germanisms).

one should make the effort to codify the Silesian dialect and to grant it the status of a full literary language because, at present, it is a sort of an incomplete language, and with that I agree [...]. If we want the Silesian language to survive, we must make a step forward, we must make the effort to codify it. Of course, the State will not do that. Linguists working for the state will not do it because that is against their interest and the national state does not pay them to support a development of Silesian culture promoted as an element of European culture and not of a Polish national culture. Thus there are no illusions. We need to look for support somewhere else, among our people, among people with appropriate education and among people in Europe who have similar experience.[59]

At the beginning, the work on codification progressed very slowly, owing to the fact that there was no single established group which would do that work officially with some help of experts. The work was carried in various centres and by various groups; frequently some work was done by individuals in their own study rooms and it was not shared with others. The work was also frequently interrupted and stopped. When the codification issue was raised again, the work started anew from scratch. In spite of the lack of substantial progress in the codification of the Silesian language, in the 2002 General Census as many as 56.6 thousand respondents declared that it was the language they used at home.

The issue of the legal status of regional languages in Poland was supposed to be finally resolved by the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language of 31 January 2005. The Act specified that a *regional language* is every language traditionally used within the territory of a given state by its citizens whose group is considerably smaller than the rest of the population of that state and which – what is important – differs from the official language of that state. In the light of the Act, a dialect or immigrants' language cannot be considered a regional language. In the opinion of legislators, the only regional language in Poland was Kashubian. The publication of the long-awaited Act with such a content was perceived by activists of some regional organisations and inhabitants of Silesia as evidence of the unequal treatment of Silesians and a revenge of central authorities for the demands of the region to restore its autonomy and for declarations of the Silesian nationality in the 2002 General Census.

In September 2007, a group of 23 MPs representing Śląskie (Silesian) and Opolskie voivodships submitted to the Sejm their joint project amending the Act and granting the status of a regional language to the Silesian dialect. In the project justification, they argued that after the Act came into force, much work was done to codify their language and that granting it the status of a regional language "will make it supported by the Polish State. This will not change the actual existence of the Silesian language which is used within the territory of Upper Silesia as a language used not only at home but also in interpersonal contacts, in the media and books."[60] It was

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[59] An interview conducted in July 2000 as part of research on Upper Silesian regionalism [co-author R. Geisler].

[60] *23 posłów chce nadania gwarze śląskiej statusu jeżyka regionalnego,* "Gazeta Wyborcza" 7.09.2007.

also underlined that in 2006, the Silesian language was registered by the International Organisation for Standardization. In 2007, the *Pro Loquela Silesiana* Society for Cultivation and Promotion of the Silesian Speech (Towarzystwo Kultywowania i Promowania Mowy Śląskiej) was founded and has played an important role in advancing the works on the codification of Silesian and its recognition as a regional language. According to the statutes of the Society, its main objectives include:

> ensuring appropriate recognition of the Silesian speech in the community of Upper Silesia and its presence in the public space; promoting knowledge of the Silesian speech; initiating and supporting works aimed at unification of Silesian spelling, grammar, and lexis; promoting the Silesian speech via the media and publications, and supporting authors using the Silesian speech.[61]

Thanks to the Society's efforts, a group of six academics was formed[62] and prepared expert opinions on the Silesian language which were later attached to the amendment project submitted by the MPs.

Despite actions taken, the project of amendments to the Act was dismissed in May 2010. The Ministry of the Interior justified its decision emphasising that a language is a product of history and, therefore, requires many centuries to develop. The Silesian dialect, although to some extent distinct from other dialects of the Polish language such as Masovian, Lesser Polish (of Małopolska), or Greater Polish (of Wielkopolska), is still just a dialect of Polish and not a separate language. Its distinctiveness is a result of the complicated history of the region and its long-lasting separation from Poland, as a consequence of which the Silesian dialect kept developing outside the main stream of the Polish literary language. The justification mentioned also the presumed analogy between the Silesian tongue and the Kashubian language, underlined by the authors of draft amendments. In the opinion of the Ministry, such an analogy does not exist due to the fact that in the case of the Silesian dialect, no recognised authorities on linguistics or ethnology confirmed the thesis about the existence of a separate Silesian language. It was also underlined that efforts aimed at granting it the status of a regional language were politically motivated and were a clear manifestation of ambitions of activists of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy. The dismissal of the amendment project did not discourage members of regional organisations. Actually, it contributed to the intensification of efforts to codify the Silesian tongue and build a strong lobby for amending the Act. At the same time, the dismissal was interpreted as another instance of the lack of understanding for Silesia and Silesians on the part of central authorities, and as a manifestation of oppression

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[61] Statutes of the *Pro Loquela Silesiana* Society for Cultivation and Promotion of Silesian Speech, Chapter II, http://silesiana.org.pl/statut-rozdzialy-i-ii/ (in Polish) [accessed: 20 April 2013].

[62] Experts from various research centres invited by *Pro Loquela Silesiana* to join the group included Jolanta Tambor (linguist), Tomasz Wicherkiewicz (linguist), Tomasz Kamusella (sociolinguist), Elżbieta Anna Sekuła (sociologist, culture expert), Juan Lajo (Asturian Language Academy), and Jerzy Dadaczyński (philosopher).

by the excessively centralised state which, afraid of losing its authority, throttles regional communities seeking to increase their autonomy.

Few months after the dismissal of the amendment project, Marek Plura[63], MP of PO, once again submitted draft amendments to the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, but this time singed by a group of 65 MPs representing Śląskie and Opolskie voivodships. The leader of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy assessed that initiative in the following way:

> that issue is still on the table but we have not managed yet to make a considerable step forward. By a considerable step I mean a step that would lead to some measurable progress. As far as the awareness is concerned, then yes, we have moved forward. The pressure on central authorities is growing and I think that sooner or later concessions will be made because they will have to be made.[64]

As it turned out, the new project of amendments was also dismissed, in February 2013. That issue, however, was widely covered due to Franciszek Marek's opinion which was one of 11 expert opinions prepared for MPs working on the amendments to the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language. In his expert opinion, Marek, a Silesian historian, wrote that the amendments to the Act proposed by the "Silesian" team of experts

> seem devilishly cunning and prove that their authors are clever but cynical and, in my opinion, also demoralised experts. If those amendments become legally effective, then our voivodship and governmental authorities will need to constantly support any demands and actions of various political actors, even separatist and anti-Polish ones, aimed at destroying the unity of the State and of the nation. If approved, it would be easy to create artificial nations: the Kashubian nation, the Upper Silesian nation, and perhaps even the Podhale [highland] nation (after all, there was a "Goralenvolk" once).[65]

Marek's expert opinion was full of criticism of those supporting the change of the status of the Silesian tongue, accusing them of attempts to divide the Polish State and comparing their proposal with anti-Polish plans of Heinrich Himmler. In his opinion, the Silesian language would stand a chance to be granted the status of a regional language only if Upper Silesia was within the borders of the Germany. That expert opinion caused much indignation, both among inhabitants of Silesia

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[63] It is worth noting that it was an initiative of an MP of the governing party which few months earlier had dismissed similar draft amendments. In July 2012, an interviewed member of the Silesian branch of the Democratic Left Alliance party argued that Plura's activities aimed at turning Silesian voters away from the Movement for Silesian Autonomy which was increasingly successful in the region. It was also noted that Plura became more radical in his pronouncements than activists of RAŚ and that, most probably, he had the support of PO authorities trying, in that way, to set the stage for the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament, and then to the Sejm and the Senate. Plura's activities were judged to help eliminate RAŚ from the Silesian political scene.

[64] An interview conducted on 11 October 2012 [co-author R. Geisler].

[65] Expert opinion of Franciszek Marek, in: http://opole.gazeta.pl/opole/1,35089,13474119,Ekspert yza_prof_Franciszka_Marka.html [accessed: 20.04.2013].

and politicians. After a discussion in the Sejm, it was dismissed. What is interesting, however, is that MPs more frequently referred to the wording of the opinion than to the content of comments on the Silesian tongue which they did not question. It is worth adding that the issue of that expert opinion was raised again in a debate titled *Co nas* łączy*, co nas dzieli* [What unites us, what divides us] organised in Siemiano-wice. Its participants included both the author of the opinion and the leader of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy. That meeting was a manifestation of the openness of regional organisations in Upper Silesia and of the will to debate issues important to the region, which were missing in the Sejm. The issue of the Silesian tongue is a good example of the politics of recognition of Polish authorities. Due to the lack of objective criteria to determine whether what we are dealing with is a dialect or a language, the authorities decide which languages deserve to be entered into the list of regional languages and which of them will not stand a chance, unless the policy of the State towards specific regional groups changes.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Upper Silesian identity restitution processes are seen a threat to the unity and integrity of the Polish State by state authorities, the majority of political parties and citizens of Poland. Such an attitude largely results from the concept of the uni-tary state adopted in Poland, which, in the public opinion, clearly contravenes the restitution of Upper Silesia autonomy postulated by regional organisations. Outside Silesia, autonomy claims are perceived as an attempt to make Upper Silesia indepen-dent from central authorities and even to create a separate state. The financial issue is relevant as well. The restitution of the autonomy of the Śląskie [Silesian] voivod-ship from the inter-war period would mean, in practice, the restitution of the Silesian Treasury and of the "tangent" meaning a percentage of the local income passed each year to the State Treasury.[66] That could have a considerable impact on the national budget and its redistribution.

Initially, the discussion about the Silesian nation and nationality was an attempt to resolve issues related to the centralisation of power and the lack of concern of large political parties with difficulties faced by Upper Silesia. The Polish electoral system makes it impossible for candidates of regional organisations to win a seat in parliamentary elections if they were on election lists of such organisations alone. This limits the influence of local inhabitants on issues important for them. A gap in regulations was seen as an opportunity to bypass the electoral threshold. It seems, however, that citizens' weariness of conflicts among major political parties and their lack of involvement in local and regional issues will make voters cast their votes for

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[66] The amount of "the tangent" was calculated with the use of a special formula and it depended on the revenue inflow to the Silesian Treasury. Usually, about 40% of the revenue in the Śląskie voivodship was passed to the State Treasury.

regional organisations. In Upper Silesia, such a phenomenon has been demonstrated with increasingly better election results of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy.

The conflict over the Silesian nationality has largely resulted from the binding canon of national identity. The lack of understanding for historical, cultural and linguistic distinctness of Silesians makes the feeling of the "Silesian disadvantage" grow and indirectly contributes to the growing popularity of regional movements. Paradoxically, the politics of recognition of the State strengthens the identity of Silesians.

ABSTRACT

The main aim of the article is to analyse the processes of creation and reconstruction of Silesian identity after 1989 and problems related to these processes arising from the unitary concept of the state effective in Poland. The author focuses on contradictions resulting from applying this concept which are manifested by controversies over Silesian nationality, the Silesian tongue and the autonomy of the region. Another crucial issue involves differences in the perception of history and collective memory of the Silesian people who represent the national perspective of local and regional authorities. The paper is based on an analysis of qualitative data derived from the author's own research which she has been conducting since 1997, and from secondary research.

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KASHUBIANS 25 YEARS AFTER THE PROFOUND REGIME CHANGE

THE KASHUBIAN COMMUNITY AT THE ONSET OF REGIME TRANSFORMATION: CULTURE AND IDENTITY

The first extensive sociological research on Kashubians was carried in the late 1980s. It was conducted as part of a central research programme (CPBP 09.8), the main thrust and areas of which were regional development, local development, and territorial self-government. The leader of the research team was Marek Latoszek, and the research on Kashubia was titled *Ethnicity as a Structural Factor in Local Communities*[1]. Research results were published in a book form in 1990[2] while some parts of it were published earlier[3]. Thus, at the onset of the profound regime change in Poland, a relatively complete sociological description of Kashubians was available, portraying that community mainly in terms of its identity and culture.

It was concluded that Kashubians were a distinctive ethnic community of a regional nature, the constitutive characteristic of which was the fact that its

"members share the sense of belonging and identification with the group, shaped on the basis of objective elements of culture (e.g. language, customs), a specific territory, their own name and shared history". A kind of a natural "consequence of features constituting that ethnic community is that its members are aware of their distinctness" which is the basis of their own identity.[4]

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[1] See M. Latoszek (1992), *Portret zbiorowy Kaszubów. Przyczynek do tematu,* "Pomerania" No. 11, p. 2; idem, *Uwarunkowania, charakter i cele badań socjologicznych społeczności kaszubskiej,* "Komunikaty Zarządu Głównego Zrzeszenia Kaszubsko-Pomorskiego" 25.6.1986, pp. 3-4; *Badania socjologiczne na Kaszubach,* ibidem, 15.04.1987, p. 3.

[2] M. Latoszek (ed.) (1990), *Kaszubi. Monografia socjologiczna,* Rzeszów.

[3] J. Iskierski, *Kaszubskie społeczności lokalne – warianty przemian,* in: B. Jałowiecki, K. Z. Sowa, P. Dudkiewicz (eds) (1989), *Społeczności lokalne. Teraźniejszość i przyszłość,* Warszawa (abridged version titled *Kaszubi,* "Gazeta Samorządowa" 1990, No. 9, p. 12); H. Galus, M. Latoszek, *Kulturowo--etniczne, strukturalne i świadomościowe aspekty społeczności kaszubskich,* in: *Polska lokalna,* Warszawa,1987

[4] B. Synak (1991), *Tożsamość kulturowo-etniczna Kaszubów a idea krajowości (regionalizmu),* "Kultura i Społeczeństwo" No. 2, p. 84. See also idem, *Identyfikacja kulturowo-etniczna. Interpretacja pojęć i wskaźników,* "Zeszyty Naukowe UG. Filozofia i Socjologia" No. 14, Gdańsk, 1992, pp. 53-69.

The distinguishing criterion was, above all, their language. As Brunon Synak wrote:

> A common and definitely the strongest cultural and ethnic 'determinant' of the group is the Kashubian language. Its distinctiveness was commonly noted by respondents and 83 percent of them were of the opinion that Kashubians 'differ substantially' in that respect.[5]

Another important finding was that their strong ethnic identification co-existed with national identification (i.e. double identity), which was also confirmed by research conducted in the 1990s:

> Their strong Kashubian identification does not interfere with their clear identification with and underlining of their Polish identity. Being a Kashubian and a Pole are identities at different identification levels (the regional and national ones) but within the framework of the same universal cultural values. [...] Kashubian and Polish identities are not substitutive and thus the strengthening one of them does not have to lead to the weakening or divesting the other.[6]

That observation was found applicable to the entire cultural sphere and researchers concluded that complex historical and cultural processes led to a peculiar situation in Kashubia which can be described as internal pluralism, i.e.

> the culture of one's own regional and ethnic group and the culture of the dominant national community may harmoniously coexist in the awareness of an individual and – in the collective dimension – may permeate and enrich each other without destroying the autonomy, cultural distinctness, and social cohesion of the smaller ethnic group.[7]

In the light of that research, the Kashubian community appeared to be a relatively close-knit group, immune to assimilation processes, with a strong sense of its distinctness and, simultaneously, largely attached to the Polish national identity and with a well defined self-image. Main features of that self-stereotype included piety, diligence, attachment to the land, perseverance up to the point of stubbornness, and patriotism.[8] The elite of the Kashubian community was found to be relatively numerous.

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS

In the Kashubian-Pomeranian movement that developed the so-called Pomeranian political thought, the main author of which was Lech Bądkowski[9], topics and ideas of self-governance, self-organisation, and civic-mindedness have been always

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[5] B. Synak (1991), *Tożsamość kaszubska – aspekty świadomościowe,* "Roczniki Socjologii Morskiej" Vol. 6, p. 114.

[6] B. Synak (1998), *Kaszubska tożsamość. Ciągłość i zmiana,* Gdańsk, pp. 72-73.

[7] Ibidem*,* p. 37.

[8] See J. Borzyszkowski (1988), *Świat kaszubskich wartości,* "Pomerania" No. 12, pp. 8-11; T. Bolduan (1993), *Szanse realizacji pomorskiej myśli politycznej,* "Pomerania" No. 11, pp. 2-6.

[9] L. Bądkowski (1990), *Pomorska myśl polityczna,* 2nd edition, Gdynia. See also: *Lech Bądkowski a samorządna Rzeczpospolita,* "Samorząd Pomorza. Zeszyt Problemowy" 2009, No. 1.

present. This may be evidenced by the strong commitment of the Kashubian-Pomeranian Association (Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie, ZKP) to the democratic transformation of the political system in Poland at large, and, above all, the involvement in the forthcoming self-governance revolution. It suffices to recall that as early as in July 1989, the Board of the ZKP announced its position concerning the future of local governments.

> A profound step towards the implementation of self-governance should be a fundamental change in the political system of local authorities and their democratic election. Currently, local authorities are, in fact, but a link in the centralised State administration. Should the existence of local authorities in their current form and composition be prolonged, they will be incapable of resolving the pressing economic and social issues in towns, communes, and regions.[10]

The Board urged members and supporters of the Association to actively participate in the forthcoming local election campaign and to start a discussion on the direction of changes in the territorial system of the State. The issue was not only the restoration of local self-governance but also of self-governance at the regional level which had rich traditions in Pomerania.

Preparations to local elections in the Kashubian-Pomeranian community included numerous training sessions, seminars, and conferences. Most important conferences were the "Conference of Self-Governing Communities" held on 29 September 1989 which led to the formation of the Pomeranian Local Government Council (Pomorska Rada Samorządowa)[11] and the conference titled "Gdańsk and Pomerania in the self-governing Republic" held on 25 April 1990 in Gdańsk[12].

The *Pomerania* monthly, published by the ZKP, played a very special role. Papers published in *Pomerania* in 1988-1990 could well make a bulky self-governance textbook.[13] Another highly important institution was the Kashubian Folk University at which many trainings for future councillors, commune leaders and town mayors were given.

The 1990 local elections and the restoration of self-governing local councils at the commune level [the lowest administrative unit] brought considerable changes not only in the management of public affairs but also in the situation of the Kashu-

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[10] *Samorząd terytorialny. Uchwała Prezydium ZG ZKP z 1.07.1989,* "Pomerania" 1989, No. 11, p. 42.

[11] *Konferencja Środowisk Samorządowych,* "Komunikaty Zarządu Głównego Zrzeszenia Kaszubsko-Pomorskiego" 15.10.1989, p. 3; S. Pestka (1989), *Powrót do normalności,* "Pomerania" No. 12, pp. 6-8.

[12] *Wizja samorządnego Pomorza,* "Pomerania" 1990, No. 7-8, pp. 2-6.

[13] The following articles may serve as examples: L. Mażewski (1989), *Ku samorządowi terytorialnemu,* "Pomerania" No. 9, pp. 23-26; idem (1989), *Własność komunalna,* "Pomerania" No. 10, pp. 6-8; idem (1989), *Nowy ustrój władz lokalnych,* "Pomerania" No. 3, pp. 16-19; idem (1989), *Samorządność lokalna,* "Pomerania" No. 6, pp. 5-7; idem (1990), *Efektywność a demokracja w zarządzaniu lokalnym,* "Pomerania" No. 1, pp. 15-17; S. Pestka (1990), *Miejsce dla wszystkich,* "Pomerania" No. 4, pp. 1-2; G. Grzelak (1990), *Samorząd regionalny,* "Pomerania" No. 11-12, p. 27.

bian community. That was also evidenced by sociological research. As many as two thirds of respondents in the survey conducted by B. Synak recognised that

> "the role of Kashubians in their own communes has grown while but a fraction of respondents (as in the voivodship case) claimed that the situation has deteriorated in that respect". The author concluded that "there is a strong sense of being appreciated among Kashubians, which is associated with the political system change"[14]. He also underlined that "In the current system transformation, manifestations of social and ethno-cultural revival among Kashubians strongly prevail over isolation, passivity and apathy, and that is conducive to the development of the Kashubian land and its culture. That ethnic mobilisation is primarily oriented towards resolving local economic issues and increasing efforts to maintain traditions, language, and other elements of identity as part of the broader, national [Polish] culture. It has nothing to do with a shielded or closed ethnicity, with ethnic biases or hostility towards 'others'".[15]

Thus one may argue that the political transformation of 1989-1990 launched the process described as civic empowerment and, simultaneously, provided conditions for an autonomous development of the ethnic Kashubian culture, i.e. for ethnic empowerment or agency.

POLITICISATION OF THE MOVEMENT

Objectives of the Kashubian movement have always been primarily of cultural nature. That was true also of the Kashubian Association founded in 1956 and renamed the Kashubian-Pomeranian Association in 1964.[16] In the case of the Association, its political role and its acting as the representation of the Kashubian community in the past e.g. in 1980s, were important. Poland's democratic breakthrough provided the Kashubian community with new opportunities and the Kashubian-Pomeranian Association started to play the role of a quasi-regional political party but it must be underlined that there has never been a Kashubian political party in Kashubia.[17]

The new role of the Association resulted from its many assets at the onset of Poland's profound change.[18] First of all, it had the experience of acting in difficult and sometimes extremely adverse circumstances for a few decades, for example under the martial law. Thus it had what turned out to be its crucial asset, i.e. a large group of educated and experienced staff and a well-developed territorial structure. It meant

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[14] B. Synak (1993), *Kaszubskie doświadczenie przemian,* "Pomerania" No. 5, p. 25.

[15] *Ibidem,* p. 26.

[16] C. Obracht-Prondzyński (2006), *Zjednoczeni w idei. Pięćdziesiąt lat działalności Zrzeszenia Kaszubsko-Pomorskiego (1956-2006),* Gdańsk.

[17] C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Między kulturą a polityką Przypadek Zrzeszenia Kaszubsko-Pomorskiego,* in: J. Kurczewski (ed.) (2007), *Lokalne wzory kultury politycznej. Szkice ogólne i opracowania monograficzne,* Warszawa, pp. 325-344.

[18] For more comprehensive analysis, see: C. Obracht-Prondzyński (2002), *Ku samorządnemu Pomorzu. Szkice o kształtowaniu się ładu demokratycznego,* Gdańsk, chapter *Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie a lokalna i regionalna scena polityczna,* pp. 525-615.

that the Association was deeply embedded in the region in contrast to a number of newly-emerged political elites. Hence, the Association was an effective instrument for organising political support and even for mobilising voters. The latter proved useful not only during local election campaigns but also in the 1991 elections to the Parliament in which the ZKP candidate won a seat in the Senate[19]. In addition, local leaders associated with the ZKP enjoyed high authority and were not anonymous.[20] Finally, the organisation had its own press. First of all, it published the *Pomerania* monthly which impacted people's opinions[21], but also a number of local bulletins.[22] The Association had a wide network of contacts in various circles, good relations with the Church (at the level of the diocese and parishes), a clearly defined ideological programme and relatively considerable flexibility in adapting itself to new conditions. Moreover, in the past, the Association was not part of former structures of power and thus it did not have to deal with internal mistrust which always led to conflicts elsewhere.

When analysing the structure, objectives, and activities of the ZKP, one can conclude that it represents the type of regional movements which are

> a form of articulation of group interests within civil society; their aim is not to abolish the nation-State but to modify its self-governance, to deconstruct the authority of government, to decentralise the State, and to accelerate growth by releasing social energy.[23]

Marek Latoszek rightly identified the programme and organisational formula of the ZKP as "three Ps", i.e. pragmatism, professionalism and politicisation.[24]

In the following years, the participation of that community in political life was characterised by the following elements:

- Resignation from their own candidate lists in elections at regional and national levels. (That decision was taken after the successful attempt in 1991 and the unsuccessful attempt in 1993 in elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland). Simultaneously, the ZKP decided to take advantage of the opportu-

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[19] The candidate was prof. Józef Borzyszkowski, the-then chairman of the ZKP and Gdańsk vice-Voivode.

[20] That aspect was highlighted by B. Jałowiecki, *Scena polityczna Polski lokalnej,* in: B. Jałowiecki, P. Swianiewicz (ed.) (1991), *Między nadzieją a rozczarowaniem. Samorząd terytorialny rok po wyborach,* Warszawa, p. 58.

[21] See C. Obracht-Prondzyński (2001), *"Pomerania" – kaszubsko-pomorskie zwierciadło,* "Przegląd Zachodni" No. 1.

[22] A study of local press, in its part on the press of ethnic communities, reads: "Kashubians can boast the highest number of journals published. They published and still publish over a dozen of them. Usually, the magazines are bilingual." W. Chorązki (1994), *Obraz niezależnej prasy lokalnej w Polsce w pierwszej połowie 1994 r.,* Kraków, p. 25.

[23] H. Kubiak (1994), *Region i regionalizm. Próba analizy typologicznej,* "Przegląd Polonijny" No. 1, p. 30.

[24] M. Latoszek, *Regionalizm w procesie przemian,* in: M. Latoszek (ed.) (1993), *Regionalizm jako folkloryzm, ruch społeczny i formuła ideologiczno-polityczna,* Gdańsk, p. 9.

nity to introduce its candidates to lists of major political parties in elections to the parliament and the regional self-governing assembly (*sejmik*).

- Various forms of election campaigns in local (commune and county [poviat]) elections, including activities carried out under the ZKP name.
- In result, the ZKP has always had its strong representation in elected authorities starting from the commune level up to the parliament where the Kashubian Parliamentary Club has been very active since 2006.[25]
- At the same time, that representation has been always pluralised politically (including party affiliation) and ideologically. Kashubians are mostly members of political parties/elites of post-Solidarity origin. Occasionally, that pluralism led to some tensions but, at the same time, it provided an opportunity to play the role of a conciliator and negotiator (which at times was substantial) in relations between various political groups, primarily at the regional level.
- That strategy, however, gradually led to the ZKP ceasing to play the role of an autonomous, independent political entity at the regional level and, in many cases, also at the local level.
- Important was also the presence of leaders of the ZKP and of the Kashubian community in the voivodship administration and executive bodies of the Pomorskie [Pomeranian] voivodship self-governing assembly, and the same applies to poviats, towns and communes. In fact, that important presence extended to various "symbolic powers" such as higher education institutions, regional media, most important institutions of culture, and the like.

Thus, an analysis of the broadly understood regional elite in Pomerania in the last twenty-five years would reveal that the Kashubian community was strongly represented and its members performed many most significant functions (MPs, senators, voivods, chairpersons of the Executive Board of the self-governing Voivodship Assembly [*marszałek województwa*], rectors, chief editors of main media, mayors, starosts [heads of poviats]). Certainly, that contributed to raising the prestige of the community but it also led to internal debates indicating that the process of politicisation advanced too much, compromising the commitment to culture, and that political divisions resulting from party affiliations have been transferred to social and regional activities.

Nevertheless, we may conclude that that the civic empowerment has become a fact. The Kashubian community does not feel discriminated against in political life, which is relevant to the discussion about the group status of Kashubians and its legal regulation.

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[25] K. Kleina, *Kaszubska siła w Parlamencie,* in: K. Kleina, C. Obracht-Prondzyński (eds) (2012), *Społeczność kaszubska w procesie przemian. Kultura – tożsamość – język,* "Zeszyty Senackie" No. 12, Warszawa, pp. 137-159.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF KASHUBIANS

Changes in the legal status of Kashubians were, on the one hand, an effect of democratisation of the entire State system and, on the other hand, a result of frequently inconsistent decisions concerning the group status of Kashubians. In other words, legal regulations related to constitutional rights, educational and language issues, and access to the media meant that, at times, Kashubians were treated on a par with other minorities, sometimes in a separate and special way, and sometimes they took advantage of opportunities totally unrelated to ethnic issues (e.g. self-governance law).[26]

In that context it should be noted that from the very beginning of the 3rd Republic of Poland, i.e. after 1989, Kashubian elites demanded an appropriate regulation of the legal status of Kashubians. The aim was to change the old situation where discrimination was not infrequent. Examples included the suspension of the *Pomerania* monthly during the martial law years and the long battle for changing that decision, the continuous refusal to grant the so-called permanent publishing rights to the ZKP, and the lack of possibility to provide Kashubian education in any form whatsoever. That is why, already in 1990, i.e. during the first meeting of Kashubians with the Sejm Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities, Kashubians postulated that in the new Constitution there should be a provision guaranteeing Kashubians their legal protection by the State. The same postulate was repeated at the next meeting with the Committee held on 22 June 1994 at the Sejm. At that meeting, the ZKP presented its activities and achievements and problems of the Kashubian community. In addition to repeating the postulate of the relevant Constitutional provision, Kashubian participants of the meeting commented on the draft law on national and ethnic minorities. (At that time, the Committee worked on the draft law prepared by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.) Kashubians clearly stated that they wanted to be covered by the Act. It was, however, noted that "Kashubians are strongly aware of being an ethnic and cultural group and not a national one. The word *minority*, in their case, is negatively coloured. On the other hand, their linguistic distinctness is unquestionable and needs to be legally recognised and respected."[27]

The question whether to cover Kashubians under the planned parliamentary Act was a most difficult one, both due to the lack of consensus in the Kashubian community (some argued that Kashubians should not be covered under the Act because they were not a minority, while others demanded that Kashubians were recognised as a minority) and because of resistance of some politicians and civil servants who feared that the inclusion of Kashubians under the Act could set a precedent to be in-

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[26] S. Łodziński (2005), *Równość i różnica. Mniejszości narodowe w porządku demokratycznym w Polsce po roku 1989*, Warszawa.

[27] For an extensive coverage of that meeting, see S. Pestka (1994), *Spotkanie w sejmowej komisji,* "Pomerania" No. 9, pp. 1-3; *Zrzeszeniowcy w Sejmie,* "Stegna. Komunikaty ZG ZKP" June-July 1994, pp. 3-4.

voked by other regional groups. It suffices to recall the telling comment made by the then vice-Minister of Culture, Michał Jagiełło (who otherwise was very sympathetic towards Kashubians) at the meeting in 1994:

> The difficulty is that the community is at the borderline between a national minority and an ethnic group. There are considerable differences between the identity awareness among Kashubians and a distinctness of Mazovians or Cracowians which, basically, is none. We cannot, however, consider Kashubians to be a national minority in the full sense and this raises legal issues.
>
> The question is whether the issues raised should be regulated in the Act on minorities which is currently under preparation and in related regulations, or whether it suffices to strengthen communes and local governments which is the option that I support. What Kashubians expect, can be achieved not at the level of national and ethnic minorities but at the level of local cultures. What is going to help them, is a strong intellectual foundation, i.e. a numerous elite of educated people representing a wide range of professions.[28]

The lack of the Act on national and ethnic minorities did not mean that during that time Kashubians did not make use of other legal provisions. An example can be the fundamental change introduced by provisions of the Act on the Education System of 7 September 1991. Article 13 of the Act read that "public schools shall enable students to maintain their national, ethnic, linguistic and religious identity and, in particular, to study their language, history and culture"[29]. There was no doubt that the provision covering such a wide range of identity categories applied also to Kashubians, irrespective of how their identity would be defined. Provisions in related regulations narrowed the aforementioned obligations and referred to the "organisation of education enabling pupils belonging to national minorities to maintain their national, ethnic, and linguistic identity"[30]. Nevertheless, Kashubians were able to make use of new legal opportunities and slowly introduced Kashubian education to schools (language classes).[31]

Similarly, they made use of Article 21.1. 9 of the Act on Radio and Television of 29 December 1992, which read that programmes of public radio and television should "take into account needs of national minorities and ethnic groups"[32]. In practice, the term *ethnic group* applied to Kashubians and, with time, it was later used in a number of generally applicable legal acts, *inter alia*, in Article 2.2 of the Act on the Polish Language of 7 October 1999[33].

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[28] "Biuletyn No. 640/11: Komisja Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych" No. 12, 22-06-94, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf.

[29] Journal of Laws of 1991, No. 95, item 425.

[30] *Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 24 March 1992 on the organisation of education enabling pupils belonging to national and ethnic minorities to maintain their national, ethnic and linguistic identity*, Journal of Laws of 1992, No. 34, item 150.

[31] See G. Janusz, *Prawa językowe mniejszości narodowych w Polsce,* in: T. Gardocka, J. Sobczak (eds) (2010), *Prawa mniejszości narodowych,* Toruń, pp. 177-178.

[32] *Act of 29 December 1992 on Radio and Television*; Journal of Laws of 1993, No. 7, item 37.

[33] *Act of 7 October 1999 on the Polish Language;* Journal of Laws of 1999, No. 90, item 999.

The aforementioned legal regulations along with Constitutional provisions[34] resulted in a significantly wider public use of the Kashubian language. That was relevant in the final stage of the preparation of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities. In fact, that Act was one of the longest debated and redrafted Acts of the Polish parliament. Finally, having considered the specificity of Kashubians, it was decided that language rights of people belonging to that community should be included in the Act in a special way, which found its reflection both in the provisions and in the very name of the Act.[35]

Thus, the adoption of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language of 6 January 2005 concluded efforts aimed at regulating the status of the Kashubian language. It was the beginning of a new stage during which the Kashubian-Pomeranian Association and also Kashubian self-governments (local councils) have focused on using new opportunities provided by law to maintain and develop the Kashubian language. Such opportunities include introduction of bilingual names and of Kashubian as the auxiliary (supporting) language in qualifying communes, and grants supporting development of the Kashubian language. Such grants were awarded first by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, and now are by the Ministry of Administration and Digitisation. Those grants include grants for specific projects and grants-in-aid supporting activities of Kashubian organisations. So far, the latter have been awarded to the ZKP and the Kashubian Institute.

Of course, the above does not mean that there are no practical problems in the application of provisions of that Act and other legal regulations. Public media are a good example. The Act on National and Regional Minorities and Regional Language has not led to an increased presence of minority issues in the public media. The ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages by Poland in February 2009 raised hopes that the situation of minorities and of the regional language in public radio and television would improve. What happened, however, was the opposite. During the 6th term of the Sejm (2007-2010), the broadcast time for Kashubian programmes was substantially reduced, and the programme *Rodnô Zemia*, broadcast since 1990, was taken off air in 2010. Unfortunately, legal regulations in that respect fail to tally with the practice.

Nevertheless, after 1989, a major and unprecedented change of the legal status of Kashubians did take place.

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[34] See R. Chruśniak, *Konstytucjonalizacja mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych – z dyskusji nad artykułami: 35, 13 i 27 Konstytucji RP z 1997 r.*, in: T. Gardocka, J. Sobczak (eds) (2010), *Prawa mniejszości narodowych,* Toruń, pp. 103-126.

[35] Ł. Grzędzicki (2005), *Język w ustawie,* "Pomerania" No. 1, pp. 10-11; idem, C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Społeczność kaszubska wobec Ustawy o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz języku regionalnym,* in: K. Kleina, C. Obracht-Prondzyński (eds), *Społeczność kaszubska w procesie przemian. Kultura – tożsamość – język,* "Zeszyty Senackie" No. 12, pp. 105-133.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE INSTITUTIONAL SPHERE

In addition to legal and political matters, the greatest changes in the transformation period took place, probably, in the institutional sphere. Kashubians entered a new democratic era with an established regional organisation (the ZKP) which had well-developed field structures and specialised agencies (*Pomerania* monthly, *Pomorania* Student Club founded in 1962, and other clubs e.g. tourist clubs), and a pretty big group of active animators representing various communities from rural to metropolitan ones, from blue-collar workers to university professors. The organisation had also its procedures, a regular "event calendar", and skills needed to cooperate with various communities. At the same time, like all other regional associations, it faced the need to adapt to the new system, new financial and legal solutions, and new social and cultural environment.

Without pursuing a detailed analysis of the changes which took place in the Kashubian movement after 1989, it is worth noting some most important ones.[36]

Firstly, some significant changes occurred in the ZKP membership. Monika Mazurek's research on the ZKP, published in 2009, demonstrated that the democratic transformation was not, in fact, followed by a decrease in the ZKP membership, which was the fate of many other social organisations founded before 1989. Quite the opposite, the ZKP has grown in terms of its size (a few thousand members) and most of its members joined it in the late 1990s or later. That proves that the ZKP continues to be an attractive organisation appealing to a considerable number of regional activists.[37]

At the same time, after the democratic transformation, many Kashubian activists active before 1989 got involved elsewhere: in local self-governments, politics and business, leaving the ZKP or largely reducing their involvement in that organisation. That led to changes in the leadership of the Kashubian movement. That change was also connected with the fact that a new generation, born during the democratic transformation, entered the political scene.

Secondly, in the democratic transformation period, the ZKP consolidated and grew. A number of new field units were established and some old ones went still). There were new undertakings, projects and new entities were established within the ZKP structure. Some of them were active earlier and formally joined the ZKP in the new reality. One example is the aforementioned Kashubian Folk University (Kaszubski Uniwersytet Ludowy, KUL) established in 1982 in Wieżyca.[38] In 1997, its name was extended with the name of Józef Wybicki, the author of the text of

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[36] More in: C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Ruch kaszubsko-pomorski u progu XXI wieku. Stan organizacyjny i dylematy programowe,* in: A. Sakson (ed.) (2008), *Ślązacy, Kaszubi, Mazurzy i Warmiacy – między polskością a niemieckością,* Poznań, pp. 233-242.

[37] M. Mazurek (2009), *W poszukiwaniu tożsamości. Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie w oczach socjologa,* Gdańsk.

[38] http://www.kfhs.com.pl/.

Polish national anthem.[39] Initially, the university organised mainly courses for the staff of rural cultural institutions from voivodships in Pomerania, training sessions for local communities, and seminars and debates about the region. With time, the university extended its activities providing patronage to folk artists, promoting folk art (the university has its own folk art gallery), environmental and civic education[40], as well as inter- and multi-cultural education.[41] Formally, the university became an entity run by the ZKP in 1995. In 2000, its facilities became the property of the Association[42] and, in 2004, the *Kashubian Folk University* Foundation was established.

Other newly established entities include the Vocational Training Academy (Akademia Kształcenia Zawodowego) which, initially, in 2007, was a joint project of the ZKP and *Grone-Schule* Foundation in Hamburg. Since September 2008, the ZKP has been the only shareholder of the Academy which now provides education to adults, educational consultancy, trainings and the like. Another entity important from the point of view of the implementation of the ZKP objectives is the Council for the Kashubian Language. The Council was established in 2006 in response to the 2005 Strategy for the Protection and Development of the Kashubian Language and Culture. The Council's tasks include, *inter alia*, analyses and assessment of the condition of the Kashubian language, designing activities aimed at its strengthening and promotion, cooperation with State administration bodies on language matters, assessment and issuing opinions on the quality of and demand for publications and its own publishing activity, as well as taking measures aimed at standardisation of the Kashubian language and lexical normalisation.[43] In addition, the ZKP structure includes, among others, the ZKP Publishing Foundation and student clubs in Toruń, Słupsk, and even in Cracow.

Thirdly, institutional decentralisation and pluralisation of the Kashubian movement have progressed. Under the new law, some ZKP branches have a separate legal personality. In addition to the ZKP and its specialised agencies, new organisations have been founded. Their activities focus on the Kashubian culture but not solely. Some of them are quite original. The Pomeranian-Kashubian *Baśka* League attracts hundreds of fans of that Kashubian card game[44] to tournaments organised in dif-

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[39] *Imię Józefa Wybickiego dla KUL,* "Pomerania" 1997, No. 6, pp. 82-83; *Uniwersytet ochrzczony,* "Gryf Wejhrowski" 25.04.1997.

[40] T. Maliszewski, C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Pomorski KUL – Uniwersytet Ludowy Zrzeszenia Kaszubsko-Pomorskiego,* in: T. Aleksander (ed.) (2010), *Edukacja dorosłych jako czynnik rozwoju społecznego (Materiały I Ogólnopolskiego Zjazdu Andragogicznego, Kraków, 23-24 czerwca 2009),* Vol. II, Kraków, pp. 353-364.

[41] T. Maliszewski (2002), *Uniwersytety ludowe wobec wyzwań współczesności – czyli rzecz o pewnej pomorskiej inicjatywie,* "Edukacja Ustawiczna Dorosłych" No. 3, pp. 16-25.

[42] S. Byczkowska, M. Byczkowski, T. Maliszewski (2002), *Kaszubski Uniwersytet Ludowy u progu XXI wieku – stan obecny i perspektywy rozwoju,* Gdańsk, p. 5.

[43] Since 2007, the Council publishes its annual bulletins in Polish and Kashubian, informing widely on its activities and research. http://www.kaszubi.pl/o/rjk/artykulmenu?id=242

[44] D. Majkówsczi (2006), *Baszka - wspómink knópiczëch lat*, "Pomerania" No. 7-8, pp. 44-45.

ferent localities. There is also a separate *Baśka* Polish Association.[45] Another interesting example of a hobby organisation is the Kashubian Aviation Association (Stowarzyszenie Kaszubskie Towarzystwo Lotnicze), with its headquarters at the Korne airfield.[46] Its members include model-makers, paragliding and gliding pilots, parachutists, pilots, and aviation fans.

There are also Kashubian environmental (e.g. the Kashubian Ecological Association[47]) and economic organisations (e.g. the Kashubian Association of Strawberry Growers whose members are hundreds of farmers from central Kashubia, a major strawberry growing area), as well as associations interested in historical reconstruction, including re-enactment of chivalric orders[48] popular in the region.

The network of local organisations in Kashubia (and in a number of other places in Pomerania) is dense, diverse and dynamic.[49] In almost every commune, there are active clubs and other organisations frequently associating very small village communities.

Pluralisation also means the emergence of Kashubian organisations which specialise in specific fields. There are scientific associations and organisations oriented towards promotion of knowledge. Undoubtedly, the most important one is the Kashubian Institute established in 1996 which, at present, has over 100 members from various research centres in Poland and abroad, who are either of Kashubian origin and/or do research on Kashubia.[50] The Institute has published over 150 books. It publishes its scientific yearbook titled *Acta Cassubiana.* Every year it organises several scientific conferences and twice as many events promoting knowledge of the region. It also prepares exhibitions, discussions, and study visits, funds commemorative plaques, and does much more.[51]

Other organisations involved in the popularisation of knowledge include the Zabory Scientific Association (Zaborskie Towarzystwo Naukowe) in Brusy which publishes the *Terra Zaborensis* bulletin, the Chojnice Society of Friends of Sciences (Chojnickie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk) which publishes its annual *Zeszyty Chojnickie*, and Lębork Historical Brotherhood (Lęborskie Bractwo Historyczne) which, together with the Museum in Lębork, publishes the *Historical Bulletin*. In fact, similar local publications, often with scientific aspirations but of varying quality, are

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[45] www.baska.costerina.nazwa.pl; http://www.baska-arkada.strefa.pl/.

[46] http://lotniskokorne.gka.pl/index.php7option=com_content&view=article&id=293& Itemid=50.

[47] http://sudomie.eu/.

[48] http://www.rycerzebytow.pl.

[49] C. Obracht-Prondzyński (1999), *Pomorski ruch regionalny. Szkic do portretu,* Gdańsk; idem, *Konserwowanie czy kreowanie? Ruch regionalny na Pomorzu,* in: J. Kurczewska (ed.) (2008), *Oblicza lokalności. Ku nowym formom życia lokalnego,* Warszawa, pp. 181-202.

[50] www.instytutkaszubski.pl.

[51] J. Borzyszkowski (1999), *Instytut Kaszubski,* "Etnografia Polska" No. 1-2; C. Obracht-Prondzyński (2006), *Dziesięć lat pracy Instytutu Kaszubskiego 1996-2006,* Gdańsk ; idem, *Das Kaschubische Institut – Regionalforschung im deutsch-polnischen Kontext,* "Inter Finitimos. Jahrbuch zur deutsch-polnischen Beziehungsgeschichte" Bd. 8, 2010, pp. 239-247.

numerous e.g. *Kościerskie Zeszyty Muzealne*, *Nasze Pomorze. Rocznik Naukowy Muzeum Zachodnio-Kaszubskiego w Bytowie*, *Zapiski Puckie. Pùcczé Skriblënë* published by the Florian Ceynowa Museum of the Puck Region and Puck Municipal Office, *Merkuriusz Człuchowski*, and *Baszta* magazine published by the Historical and Ethnographic Museum in Chojnice.

Animation, popularisation, cultural and educational activities are also the domain of such organisations as the Kashubian Development Institute (Kaszubski Instytut Rozwoju) in Kościerzyna established in 2001 which aims at "initiating and supporting all forms of civic activity leading to the development of the local community of Kashubia"[52], *Naji Góchë* Foundation[53], KIETA Association – Kashubian Theatrical and Artistic Education Institute, and many others.

It must be noted, that the movement pluralisation is not limited to its structural and institutional dimension as it also applies to issues of identity and ideology. This is related to the emergence of a group which identifies itself with a Kashubian nation.[54] The group emerged before the 2002 National Census, urging Census respondents to declare their Kashubian nationality.[55] Next, for a couple of years, the group was incapable to organise itself as a separate institution while its leader, Artur Jabłoński, served two terms as the chairman of the ZKP. Finally, however, a conference was held on 19 November 2011 in Sopot, which was devoted to priest Franciszek Grucza who translated the Bible into Kashubian. At that conference, the group, known as *Zrzeszyńce* (Associates), launched the *Kaszëbskô Jednota* association.[56]

The association members are of the Kashubian national orientation, and the *Kaszëbskô Jednota* aims include

> the development of national, civic, and cultural awareness of Kashubians and protection of their language and traditions, as well as research and educational activities for the benefit of national and ethnic minorities and communities speaking a regional language, supporting the development of communities and local societies[57].

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[52] http://www.kir.org.pl/7page_id=10.

[53] http://www.naszegochy.org/.

[54] See C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Kim są Kaszubi – stare pytania, nowe odpowiedzi?,* in: J. Borzyszkowski, C. Obracht-Prondzyński (eds) (2004), *Z dziejów kultury Pomorza XVIII-XX wieku,* Vol. 2, Gdańsk, pp. 382-393; idem (2004), *Kaszubi i ich tożsamość w III Rzeczpospolitej – stare problemy, nowe wyzwania,* "Przegląd Polonijny" No. 3, pp. 61-72; idem, *„Nie ma Kaszub bez Polonii"? Dylematy tożsamościowe Kaszubów,* in: M. Kempy, G. Woroniecka, P. Załęcki (eds) (2008), *Tożsamość i przynależność. O współczesnych przemianach identyfikacji kulturowych w Polsce i w Europie,* Toruń, pp. 81-95.

[55] C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Spisy czy spiski, czyli o problemach z liczeniem Kaszubów,* in: L. Adamczuk, S. Łodziński (eds) (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe w świetle Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego z 2002 r.*, Warszawa, pp. 255-284. See also A. Jabłoński (2003), *Jeden z 5100,* "Pomerania" No. 9, pp. 22-23.

[56] J. Żaczek, *Stowarzyszenie Kaszëbskô Jednota zainaugurowało działalność,* http://naszekaszuby. pl/article.php?storyid=2889.

[57] http://kaszebsko.com. See also A. Jabłoński (2013), *Kaszubi. Wspólnota narodowa,* Gdynia.

Once this association was founded, the identity division among Kashubians took on an institutional dimension. Concurrently, the issue of the Kashubian community representation was raised and the entitlement of the ZKP to act as the representation was questioned.[58]

EDUCATIONAL AND MEDIA REVOLUTION

The already mentioned new law on education and public media provided a framework for significant transformations in the social sphere in Kashubia. Those issues, in fact, have been always part of activities of the Kashubian movement. Publication of periodicals has been important since the movement beginnings.[59] When the Kashubian Association was established in 1956, the provision of education about Kashubia and in Kashubian to children was one most important postulates of the Association.[60]

In the 1980s, there was more freedom and the *Drësztwo Szkólnëch*, an informal group of teachers-regionalists, joined the ZKP. Later, the Board of the ZKP established its Education Group to coordinate activities related to education. A major achievement of the Group was the negotiated compromise on the difficult Kashubian spelling as without its standardisation, it was impossible to carry any educational activities and to teach the language. On 12 May 1996, in Gdańsk, a Protocol confirming agreed spelling rules of the Kashubian language was signed. Some older rules were altered and it was decided that the new rules "shall apply to the standardised Kashubian. The agreed rules shall not be applicable, however, to new editions [of old publications] and to stylised texts styled in dialects of the Kashubian language."[61] As a result of the community consensus, the spelling standard for literary Kashubian was finally established, which, however, does not mean that its rules are rigorously observed.[62]

Other important developments were the opening of the first Kashubian Secondary School in Bursy in 1991[63] and the introduction of Kashubian language classes. The latter was at first spontaneous and later, with the introduction of higher subsidies

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[58] C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Kaszubi – naród „niereprezentowany" czy reprezentowany „nie-naród"*, in: E. Nowicka (ed.) (2009), *Kulturowa odmienność w działaniu. Kultury i narody bez państwa,* Kraków, pp. 67-78.

[59] W. Pepliński (2000), *Czasopiśmiennictwo kaszubskie w łatach zaboru pruskiego. Aspekty programowe, publicystyczne i wydawnicze,* Gdańsk.

[60] See A. Kuik-Kalinowska, D. Kalinowski (eds) (2012), *Edukacja kaszubska. Tradycje, aktualność, perspektywy,* Słupsk-Gdańsk.

[61] s.j., *Kaszubska pisownia w nowym wyrazie,* "Pomerania" 1996, No. 6, pp. 43-44.

[62] Cf. J. Zieniukow (2004), *Kashubian – Forming the Literary Standard,* "Cassubia Slavica. Internationales Jahrbuch für Kaschubische Studien" V. 2, pp. 98-106; J. Treder, *Formy kultywowania i aktywizacji kaszubszczyzny,* in: idem (2005), *Historia kaszubszczyzny literackiej. Studia,* Gdańsk, pp. 328-344.

[63] *XX lat Kaszubskiego Liceum Ogólnokształcącego w Brusach 1991-2011,* Gdańsk-Brusy 2011.

for schools, it has become more formalised.[64] That meant that first curricula were designed, first textbooks published, and the Kashubian syllabus for secondary school leaving exams was prepared.[65] The lack of staff qualified to teach the Kashubian language was a serious problem. Measures taken to ease that situation included provision of post-graduate courses and, in 2003, the Board of the ZKP established an examination board testing the fluency level of candidate teachers of Kashubian. At the end of 2011, almost 500 kindergarten and school teachers were issued certificates confirming their fluency in the Kashubian language qualifying them to teach it and conducting classes in that language at schools and kindergartens. In the 2010-2011 school year, a total of over 10.5 thousand students in 193 primary schools, 60 lower secondary schools, and 5 upper secondary schools studied the Kashubian language.[66]

At the same time, higher education for teachers was launched. Initially, the University of Gdańsk offered the Kashubian specialisation as part of the Polish philology course and, in October 2013, its launched its BA programme in Kashubian ethnophilology.

Of course, educational activities are not limited to the teaching of the Kashubian language or about the region at schools. There are also many other initiatives popularising the knowledge about Kashubia and the Kashubian language, such as the *Rodnô Mòwa* Contest of Kashubian Prose and Poetry Recitation which covers the entire Kashubia, attracting few hundreds of students every year. Its first stage are school contests. There are many local contests as well. Another initiative is the annual Kashubian Spelling Contest called the Kashubian Dictation, the aim of which is to distinguish the Kashubian spelling champion. The first one was held in 2002 at the University of Gdańsk.

Local organisations of Kashubian teachers also start to emerge, an example of which is the *Remùsowi Drëszë* Association of Kashubian Language Teachers established in 2010 with its seat in Kamienica Szlachecka.[67]

Similar essential if not revolutionary changes took place in the media. At the onset of the 3rd Polish Republic (1989), the Kashubian community published its *Pomerania* monthly and its internal bulletin (Komunikaty ZG ZKP). In 1989, in particular in the local elections context, new initiatives were abundant. They included a large number of local bulletins, many of which, at least in part, were in Kashubian. They focused was on local government but also on culture.[68] The nature of most such bul-

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[64] Cf. G. Janusz (2011), *Ochrona praw mniejszości narodowych w Europie,* Lublin, p. 635.

[65] The final *matura* exams in Kashubian were taken for the first time in 2005 by 16 students. In 2010, their number increased to 37.

[66] Data obtained from the Board of the Kashubian-Pomeranian Association.

[67] www.remusowidresze.eu.

[68] Cf. W. Pepliński (1998), *Kapitał zagraniczny w prasie Wybrzeża po 1989 r.,* "Zeszyty Prasoznawcze" No. 1-2, p. 60; idem, *Kontrowersje wokół transformacji prasy gdańskiej i pomorskiej,* in: A. Słomkowska (ed.) (1994), *Dylematy transformacji prasy polskiej (1989-1993),* Warszawa, p. 208; J. Błaszkowski, *Prasa lokalna i samorządowa,* in: W. Toczyski, P. Szubarczyk, G. Grzelak (eds) (1994), *Pomorze Gdańskie. Powrót demokracji lokalnej 1990-1994,* Gdańsk, p. 121ff.

letins was ephemeral but there were also projects with long-term effects. An example is the *Norda* magazine which, at first, was an independent title published in Rumia and after its acquisition by the *Dziennik Bałtycki,* the most popular newspaper in the region, it is its regular weekly supplement on Kashubian issues.[69] The Słupsk edition of the *Głos Pomorza* daily had a similar supplement titled *Głos Kaszëb* published in 1997-2001.

An ephemeral magazine was the *Tatczëzna* which was published at the turn of 1980s and 1990s (10 issues in total).[70] The magazine was important as, first of all, it brought together a group which formulated a new, more Kashubia-centered programme and, secondly, its journalists were to play a significant role in the Kashubian media and the movement at the turn of the 20th and 21st century. Among those journalists were A. Jabłoński, who was the chairman of the ZKP and, earlier, a journalist and co-author of a television magazine the head of which was Eugeniusz Pryczkowski, another journalist associated with *Tatczëzna*, and Piotr Dziekanowski, editor-in-chief of the *Kurier Bałtycki* daily and a writer and author of first Kashubian comic strips.

At present, in Kashubia (like in the entire Pomerania) there are truly many local journals. Some are privately published, some by local governments and other by communities and social organisations. Their publication cycles and profiles differ. Some focus on news, others popularise knowledge or focus on literature and culture.

The real breakthrough, however, were not local journals as they have long and rich tradition in Pomerania[71] but the electronic media[72]. The public Radio Gdańsk broadcasts *Na bòtach ë w bòrach* which is the longest running Kashubian programme broadcast since the end of 1989.[73] For some time, the programme was re-broadcast by the Radio Weekend a private broadcaster in Chojnice (covering southern Kashubia) and the Słupsk branch of the public Radio Koszalin which, with time, started to air its own Kashubian programme. Since 2004, the Radio Gdańsk has broadcast news in Kashubian in the *Klëca* magazine programme.

Importantly, in July 2004, the Puck Land Association (Stowarzyszenie Ziemia Pucka) was granted a concession to establish the *Radio Kaszëbë* which has broadcast since December that year. It is the first broadcaster which covers almost entire

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[69] E. Pryczkowska (1995), *"Norda. Pismiono Kaszëbsczi Zemi"*, "Pomerania" No. 4, pp. 55-56; B. Madajczyk-Krasowska, *Najważniejsze Kaszuby. Setny numer "Nordy"*, "Dziennik Bałtycki" 16.4.1997.

[70] D. Majkowski (2010), *Tatczëzna. W miono Bósczi nórodni wzénik,* Gdynia.

[71] W. Pepliński (1987), *Prasa pomorska w Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej,* Gdańsk. See also *Siła tradycji,* an interview with W. Pepliński, "Pomerania" 2000, No. 10, pp. 14-16.

[72] Cf. L. Szmidtke, *Radio i telewizja regionalna. Między komercją a kulturą,* in: W. Frankiewicz, K. Kossak-Główczewski (eds) (1997), *Pedagogia Celestyna Freineta a edukacja regionalna,* Gdańsk, pp. 269-271; M. Ratajczak (2012), *Różnorodność kulturowa w mediach. Doświadczenia europejskie,* Warszawa, pp. 158-166.

[73] *Program radiowy w języku kaszubskim,* "Komunikaty Zarządu Głównego Zrzeszenia Kaszubsko-Pomorskiego" 15.11.1989, p. 3; s.j. (1994), *Korespondencyjna potyczka o kaszubską audycję,* "Pomerania" No. 3, pp. 22-23.

Kashubia. It also totally devoted to the issues of that region and is aired mainly in the Kashubian language.

The oldest public television programme, in turn, was the *Rôdno zemia* magazine broadcast by the public Gdańsk Television. Discussions about launching a Kashubian television programme started with a visit of Andrzej Drawicz, the-then chairman of the Radio Committee, to Gdańsk in December 1989. At his meeting with authorities of the ZKP, he approved of the production and broadcast of such a programme. The programme started to be broadcast in 1990.[74] Its author and first editor-in-chief was Izabella Trojanowska. After her death, the duties were handed to A. Jabłoński and E. Pryczkowski and, following the resignation of Jabłoński, the programme host and the only author was Pryczkowski.[75] Unfortunately, as it was already mentioned, the programme was cancelled to the end of 2010.[76] A short programme titled *Tede jo* introduced in its place by the Kashubian community has been judged not attractive enough and insufficient, due to a relatively small number of materials in the Kashubian language.

The community which created *Radio Kaszëbë* launched also a CSB TV project which lasted from 1 August 2010 to 13 March 2012 and was unsuccessful.[77]

The lack of a major Kashubian programme in public television and the failure of the private Kashubian TV station do not mean, however, that no film materials are accessible. On the contrary, increasingly, private local TV stations, in particular cable ones, produce their own programmes in the Kashubian language and on Kashubians, which are available not only to cable TV viewers but also to Internet users and thus contribute to the communication revolution in the Kashubian world. At present, there are many Internet sites, mainly local, and websites devoted to Kashubia (also in Germany, USA, and Canada).[78] The Internet resources facilitate access to Kashubian literature[79], Kashubian language classes, dictionaries[80], information on major Kashubian organisations and institutions, and even to downloadable software which can be used for more than just writing in Kashubian. Today there are Kashubian-language versions of Windows, Linux and Google, and there is also the Kashubian Wikipedia.

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[74] CF. *Sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu Głównego ZKP za okres od 2 grudnia 1989 r. do 5 grudnia 1992 r.* (photocopy), 1992, p. 17; P. Dzianisz (1990), *Rodnô zemia,* "Pomerania" No. 10, pp. 42-43.

[75] S. Janke (2000), *Swojsko w kadrze,* "Pomerania" No. 10, p. 18.

[76] E. Pryczkowski (2011), *Funkcjonowanie i kres telewizyjnego Magazynu Kaszubskiego "Rodnô Zemia" (1990-2010),* "Biuletyn Rady Języka Kaszubskiego", pp. 264-273.

[77] J. Méjer (2005), *Radio Kaszëbë,* „Pomerania" No. 1, pp. 12-13.

[78] For example, K. Warmińska, *Naszekaszuby.pl – Kaszubi dla siebie – Kaszubi o sobie,* in: Ł. Kapralska, B. Pactwa (eds) (2010), *Agora czy Hyde Park? Internet jako przestrzeń społeczna grup mniejszościowych,* Kraków, pp. 130-142.

[79] E.g. www.czetnica.org. Cf. D. Kalinowski (2011), *Literatura kaszubska w internecie. Wydawnictwa. Ugrupowania. Twórcy,* "Biuletyn Rady Języka Kaszubskiego" pp. 220-229.

[80] W. Makurat (2008), *Kaszubskie słowniki internetowe,* "Biuletyn Rady Języka Kaszubskiego" pp. 126-139.

CULTURAL REVIVAL OR COMMERCIALISATION AND KITSCH

The mentioned phenomena, processes, initiatives and projects in the sphere of education, media, local government, and Kashubian organisations point to a considerable revival of the Kashubian community after 1989. Factors and developments which contributed to such a situation included both new legal and constitutional provisions which removed former restrictions, and the fact that a new generation entered the public scene, often advocating a stronger ethnic position which led to ideological disputes.

All that resulted in the empowerment of the Kasubian community, the fundamental element of which was the revival the Kashubian culture.[81] Undoubtedly, the greatest role in that regard has been played by the ZKP which, every year, both on its own and in cooperation with other entities, organises and runs dozens of events and various programmes, some of which have a long tradition and some new ones have already been embedded. The Association has also been an animator and co-organiser of a number of events which already redefined the cultural situation in Kashubia and Pomerania, and created new platforms for expressing the Kashubian identity and pursuing an ethnic discourse. Their significant symbolic meaning should not be overlooked.[82] Examples include: annual Conventions of Kashubians (Zjazdy Kaszubów) organised since 1999 to commemorate the reunion of Kashubians within a single voivodship, held each year in a different town in Kashubia[83]; Kashubian Christian pilgrimages to the Holy Land[84] and to Rome[85]; open-air workshops for folk artists, art festivals for children and the youth as well as many festival and festivities organised in various localities in Kashubia; folk art and literary contests, including the *Rodnej Mówë* Poetry Recitation Contest[86] which has already been organised for several decades and the Folk Talents (Ludowe Talenty) contest.[87]

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[81] More in: C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Przemiany kultury kaszubskiej po II wojnie światowej,* in: J. Borzyszkowski (ed.) (2001), *Z dziejów kultury Pomorza w XVIII-XX w.,* Gdańsk, pp. 190-234.

[82] C. Obracht--Prondzyński, *Rytuały nowe i "stare jak nowe", czyli o zmianach w kulturze kaszubskiej,* in: G. Woroniecka, C. Obracht-Prondzyński, D. Rancew-Sikora (eds) (2009), *Kreacje i nostalgie. Antropologiczne spojrzenie na tradycje w nowoczesnych kontekstach,* Gdańsk, pp. 78-96.

[83] M. Mazurek, *Zjazdy Kaszubów jako przykład sytuacji etnicyzującej,* in: G. Woroniecka, C. Obracht-Prondzyński, D. Rancew-Sikora (eds) (2009), *Kreacje i nostalgie...*, pp. 242-251.

[84] The first pilgrimage took place in 2002. It included a visit to the Church of the Pater Noster where a plaque with the Lord's Prayer in Kashubian was blessed. Cf. M. Szmidka, *Kaszubi śladami Chrystusa, "*Dziennik Bałtycki" 15.09.2000; E. Szczesiak (2000), *Kaszubska tablica z Ziemi Świętej,* "Czas Pomorza" No. 4, pp. 46-47. Subsequent pilgrimages were organised in 2001 and 2005 and during the 2013 pilgrimage, a plaque with *Magnificat* written in Kashubian was mounted in the church in Ein Karem.

[85] E. Pryczkowski (2005), *Bòże pòmagôj. Jan Paweł do Kaszubów,* Banino-Pelplin, pp. 124-145; T. Hoppe (2005), *Pielgrzymka Kaszubów do Ojca Świętego,* "Gdinskô Klëka" No. 1, pp. 1-2; No. 2, pp. 2-3.

[86] K. Krynicka (2011), *Chmielno. Stolëca Rodzy Mòwë*, Gdynia, pp. 31-59.

[87] *25 lat Ludowych Talentów. Kalendarium,* Gdańsk-Gdynia 1996; K. Kowalkowski (2006), *Jubileuszowe Ludowe Talenty,* "Pomerania" No. 7-8, p. 81.

In the 1990s, highly important events defining new perspectives for Kashubians and the Pomeranian regional movement were Congresses, in particular the 2nd Kashubian Congress in 1992[88], the 1st Kociewie Congress in 1995[89] as well as the Pomeranian Congress in 1997-1998 which began in Gdańsk and ended in Szczecin, with various events taking place across the entire Pomerania.[90]

Today, a stereotypical view of the Kashubian culture, echoed also in academic publications, as a folk, regional, or rural culture, is hardly valid. It is not only because there has been an impressive growth of Kashubian literature[91], theatre[92], music[93], and fine arts. It results also from Kashubians' changing sensitivity and attitudes to their culture. Cultural beliefs and practices of artists in Kashubia change as well. Finally, there is an impressively developed network of institutions involved in cultural activities in Kashubia. It is no longer about the ZKP, its different agencies or other associated organisations only. There is also a growing network of Kashubian museums.[94] There are numerous cultural centres and libraries, schools involved in the Kashubian education, different local associations and foundations, and – increasingly often – private businesses e.g. publishing houses and promotion agencies.

Kashubian literature passed the stage of folk or regional literature quite a long time ago and has concentrated on universal themes. Its social impact and the cultural context within which it functions have changed as well.[95] Completely new phenomena can be observed (e.g. the first crime story and a science fiction novel in Kashubian) not only in the traditionally understood literature but also in its peripheries (e.g. comic books). First Kashubian audio books have been produced. Kashubian

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[88] C. Obracht-Prondzyński (ed.) (1992), *II Kongres Kaszubski. Dokumentacja,* Gdańsk.

[89] C. Obracht-Prondzyński (1997), *Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie dla Kociewia i na Kociewiu,* in: *Księga Pamiątkowa Kongresu Kociewskiego,* Starogard Gdański.

[90] J. Borzyszkowski, C. Obracht-Prondzyński, S. Pestka (eds) (1999), *Księga pamiątkowa Kongresu Pomorskiego,* Gdańsk.

[91] Cf. J. Samp, *Literatura kaszubska. Kaschubische Literatur,* in: J. Borzyszkowski, D. Albrecht (eds) (2000), *Pomorze – mała ojczyzna Kaszubów. (Historia i współczesność). Kaschubisch-pommersche Heimat. (Geschichte und Gegenwart),* Gdańsk-Lübeck; J. Treder (2005), *Historia kaszubszczyzny literackiej. Studia,* Gdańsk; A. Kuik-Kalinowska, D. Kalinowski (2009), *Od Smętka do Stolema. Wokół literatury Kaszub,* Gdańsk-Słupsk; A. Kuik-Kalinowska (2011), *Tatczëzna. Literackie przestrzenie Kaszub*, Słupsk-Gdańsk.

[92] D. Kalinowski, *Teatr kaszubski. Od folkloru ku antropologii teatralnej,* in: R. Gaziński, A. Chludziński (eds) (2003), *Dzieje wsi pomorskiej. II Międzynarodowa Konferencja Naukowa,* Dygowo-Szczecin 2003.

[93] T. Fopke (2011), *Współczesna muzyka kaszubska a muzyka ludowa. Poszukiwania i inspiracje,* "Nasze Pomorze. Rocznik Muzeum Zachodnio-Kaszubskiego w Bytowie" No. 13, (2012 edition) pp. 235-242.

[94] C. Obracht-Prondzyński (2008), *Kaszubskich pamiątek skarbnice. O muzeach na Kaszubach – ich dziejach, twórcach i funkcjach społecznych,* Gdańsk.

[95] Cf. C. Obracht-Prondzyński, J. Treder*, Kashubian Literature: Its Phenomenon, History and Social Dimension,* in: C. Obracht-Prondzyński, T. Wicherkiewicz (eds) (2011), *The Kashubs: Past and Present,* Oxford, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Wien, pp. 109-140.

literature is translated into other languages but also increasingly often classical literature is translated into Kashubian.[96] Some new translations are popularised by public readings, an example of which might be the first reading in Poland of *The Tin Drum* by Günter Grass in the Kashubian language version, the language of its author and in Polish at the Wybrzeże Theatre in 2008. An interesting example was also the *Shakespeare in Kashubian* (Szekspir po kaszubsku) project executed together with the Theatrum Gedanense Foundation in 2007.

Similar phenomena occur in music (instrumental, sung and dance music). Kashubian folk music is still alive and there are over 100 folk music groups in Kashubia. At the same time, there are completely new projects which focus on identifying and reconstructing musical traditions[97] or "recalling" the Kashubian music. An example of that might be the *Kaszuby. Muzyka źródeł* album released in 1997 by the Polish Radio and the *Cassubia Incognita* project of the Western-Kashubian Museum in Bytów which included the production of a CD with oldest recordings of Kashubian songs in the phonographic collection at the Institute of Arts of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw.[98] Furthermore, after the second album was released, a series of meetings devoted to theatre and cinema was organised[99], during which young people prepared a theatrical étude inspired by the newly discovered music. The result of those activities has been the *Cassubia Cantat* festival, now an annual event, the aim of which is to present modern arrangements of old traditional Kashubian music[100]. In this context, the new Kashubian Choir Board (Rada Chórów Kaszubskich) should be mentioned. It brings together choirs of Kashubia which have Kashubian songs in their repertoire. Annual meetings of Kashubian singers[101] have been held since 2003.

The Kashubian Art Agency is also an interesting new development. Its completed projects include Kashubian dubbing of the *Dahil may isang ikawa* [Destined hearts] Philippine TV soap opera and of *David, el Gnomo* [*The World of David the Gnome*] a Spanish animated television series for CSB TV, as well as several albums e.g. songs of the *We Dwa Kònie, Kashubian Artistic Duo*. It also produces audio books, including two most important works of the Kashubian literature, i.e. *Żëcé i przigòdë Remùsa. Zvjercadło kaszubskji* (*Life and Adventures of Remus. The*

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[96] R. Kamiński (ed.) (2012), *Tłumaczenia na język kaszubski. Osiągnięcia, metody, cele,* Wejherowo.

[97] D. Martin (2009), *Ruch folklorystyczny a "wynajdowanie tradycji" w kaszubskiej muzyce ludowej,* "Nasze Pomorze. Rocznik Muzeum Zachodnio-Kaszubskiego w Bytowie" No. 11 (2010), pp. 251-259

[98] W. Frankowska (2009), *Cassubia incognita?,* "Nasze Pomorze. Rocznik Muzeum Zachodnio-Kaszubskiego w Bytowie" No. 11, (2010), pp. 261-266.

[99] http://www.pomorskie.eu/pl/kultura/aktualnosci/2009/bytow_cassubia_incognita_spotkanie_teatralno_filmowe.

[100] Project overview: www.kaszubi.pl/files/5085Cassubia_Cantat_opis_projektu.doc [accessed: 04.10.2011]. See also J. Szroeder (2011), *Uwagi na marginesie Festiwalu "Cassubia Cantat",* "Nasze Pomorze. Rocznik Muzeum Zachodnio-Kaszubskiego w Bytowie" No. 13, (2012) pp. 249-257.

[101] http://www.luzino.pl/05kultur/05akutur/05arch03/0541zjazd/0541zjazd.html.

Kashubian Mirror) by Aleksander Majkowski[102] and Hieronim Derdowski's satirical epic poem titled *Ò panu Czôrlińsczim, co do Pùcka pò sécë jachôł* [Mr. Czorlinsczi Goes To Puck To Buy Fishing Nets].

The above surely testifies to a considerable cultural revival in Kashubia and demonstrates the emergence of the Kashubian pop culture which is a completely new phenomenon. However, the question asked increasingly often is: Are Kashubians at risk of excessive commercialisation of their culture? That, actually, leads to two questions about the future. Will their culture continue to be important for Kashubians and maintain its authentic character and to what extent? Will it become a "tourism product" serving only promotion of the region and implementation of business projects? On the other hand, one may ask whether and to what extent that culture is in danger of becoming an "ethnic kitsch", which would mean not only that it would be trivialised and radically simplified, but also that its deeper meaning and values would be completely ignored. A symptom of such a change might be the Centre for Education and Promotion of the Region in Szymbark (Centrum Edukacji i Promocji Regionu w Szymbarku), symbols of which are the "upside down house" and the longest board in the world.[103] Are they going to be the most important symbols of entire Kashubia and its culture in the future?

ABSTRACT

The aim of the article is to present changes that took place in Kashubia and its society in the spheres of identity, institutions, policy and legal regulations after 1989. The analysis focuses on the institutional dimension (changes in the Kashubian movement, its pluralisation, organisational development, access to new areas of activity) and the identity of the group. Special attention is drawn to profound changes in education, mass media, research and funding. In the light of the research, the Kashubian community appears to be a close-knit group, immune to assimilation processes, with a strong sense of distinctness, but at the same time its vast majority is attached to the Polish national identity and has a defined self-image (the main characteristics of this auto-stereotype include: piety, diligence, devotion to one's land, perseverance even up to the point of stubbornness, patriotism); the group also has quite a numerous elite.

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[102] *Przygody Remusa teraz także do słuchania. To pierwszy kaszubski audiobook!,* http://www.pomorska.pl/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20111021/INNEMIASTA04/186206214; *Słuchanie "Zëcó i przigodów Remusa",* http://www.pomorskie.eu/pl/kultura/aktualnosci/2011/ remus_promocja_plyty.

[103] A. Bachórz, L. Michałowski, *Gdzie bije prawdziwe serce Kaszub. Przypadek dyskursu o nieuprawnionej tradycjonalizacji,* in: G. Woroniecka, C. Obracht-Prondzyński, D. Rancew-Sikora (eds) (2009), *Kreacje i nostalgie...*, pp. 323-340.

Niemcy po zjednoczeniu
Społeczeństwo – wielokulturowość – religie

[Germany after Reunification.
Society – Multiculturalism – Religions]

**Joanna Dobrowolska-Polak, Natalia Jackowska,
Michał Nowosielski, Marcin Tujdowski**

This interdisciplinary publication on the present shape of German society consists of four separate but complementary analyses of its structure, demographic issues, immigration and multiculturalism-related phenomena, and changes in the religious landscape. While discussing social changes in Germany, the authors consider consequences resulting from the reunification of two German states and the impact of other factors like globalisation and modernisation in a broad sense.

Described against the background of the division and reunification of Germany, the transition of German society from traditional to modern and, possibly, postmodern society has been a complex process. Issues discussed in this publication include the emergence of class structure, social inequality and growing poverty, ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, ageing of society, de-urbanisation of the eastern part of Germany, social mobility, and the place and role of immigrants in German society.

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GERMAN MINORITY LEADERS IN GDAŃSK POMERANIA AFTER 1989

The topic of the German minority in post-war Poland and in the 3rd Republic of Poland (after 1989) has been widely explored in Polish sociology[1] but, so far, the German minority in the Gdańsk Pomerania region as the subject and object of analyses has been present only against the background of other studies.

The aim of this article is to present the socio-demographic structure of German minority associations in selected localities in northern Poland after 1989 and national-ethnic identity of their leaders. The source of results presented in this article is the author's own research which was an in-depth case study. Having filled the gap in previous sociological research on Germans in other regions of Poland, that study is the first sociological monograph on the German minority in Gdańsk Pomerania.[2]

The analysed German minority associations operate in the Pomorskie voivodship, part of the Kujawsko-pomorskie voivodship, part of the Warmińsko-mazurskie voivodship, and in the northern part of the Wielkopolskie voivodship. The location

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[1] E.g. D. Berlińska (1999), *Mniejszość niemiecka na Śląsku Opolskim w poszukiwaniu tożsamości,* Opole; B. Domagała (1993), *Socjologiczna charakterystyka liderów mniejszości niemieckiej na Warmii i Mazurach,* "Przegląd Zachodni" No. 3; idem, *Mniejszość niemiecka na Warmii i Mazurach – narodziny organizacji,* in: B. Domagała i A. Sakson (eds) (1998), *Tożsamość kulturowa społeczeństwa Warmii i Mazur,* Olsztyn; C. Herrmann (1997), *Die deutsche Minderheit in Ermland und Masuren. Studie zur aktuellen Situation,* Allenstein; L. Janiszewski (1993), *Mniejszość niemiecka a Polacy na Pomorzu Szczecińskim. Szkic socjologiczny,* Szczecin; Z. Kurcz (1994), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce,* "Kultura i Społeczeństwo" No. 4; idem (1994), *Przywódcy mniejszości niemieckiej na Śląsku o sobie i swoich zbiorowościach,* "Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne" Vol. IV, Białystok; idem (1993), *Przywódcy mniejszości niemieckiej na Śląsku o sobie i swoich zbiorowościach,* "Przegląd Zachodni" No. 3; idem (1995), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce,* Wrocław; idem, *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce: geneza, struktury, oczekiwania,* in: Z. Kurcz (ed.) (1997), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce,* Wrocław; A. Sakson, *Socjologiczna charakterystyka mniejszości niemieckiej w Polsce ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Wielkopolski w latach 1945/89-1993,* in: A. Sakson (ed.) (1994), *Polska – Niemcy – mniejszość niemiecka w Wielkopolsce. Przeszłość i teraźniejszość,* Poznań; idem, *Geneza i struktura społeczna mniejszości niemieckiej w Wielkopolsce,* in: Z. Kurcz i W. Misiak (eds) (1994), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce i Polacy w Niemczech,* Wrocław; M. Szmeja, *Polacy, Niemcy czy Ślązacy? Rozważania o zmienności identyfikacji narodowej Ślązaków,* in: Z. Kurcz i W. Misiak (eds) (1994), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce...*

[2] M. Lemańczyk (2012), *Tożsamość narodowa liderów mniejszości niemieckiej w wybranych miejscowościach Polski Północnej* (to be published doctoral thesis supervised by Prof. Cezary Obracht-Prondzyński), Poznań, pp. 540.

of associations studied largely coincides with the territory of the former West Prussia province (1878-1920) and the former Free City of Danzig (FCD, 1920-1939). Having considered historical administrative changes, the research covered the area from Gdańsk to Toruń and from Iława to Złotów. Historical and geographical names have changed. Aiming to clearly explain nationality issues and processes, the author uses the name Gdańsk Pomerania (Pomorze Gdańskie) to refer to the post WW2 situation. In each case, however, the former areas of the Western Prussia province and the Free City of Danzig have been considered.

The associations in question have their registered seats in the following towns: Gdańsk, Gdynia, Tczew, Chojnice, Malbork, Sztum, Kwidzyn, Elbląg, Toruń, Grudziądz, Łasin, Lidzbark Welski, Nowe Miasto Lubawskie, and Iława. For historical and institutional reasons, the research covered also three minority centres in the territory of the former province of Pomerania, i.e. Bytów, Lębork, Wierzchucin, as well as Bydgoszcz and Złotów, which was considered necessary to fully portray developments in the German minority in the discussed area.

In total, from September 2006 to March 2009, the author conducted a research among 160 leaders of nineteen German minority centres.

The focus of the research, i.e. German association leaders, included both formal and informal leaders as well as persons actively participating in the ethnic life of associations who have never been and are not members of their Boards. The last of the aforementioned categories includes persons who have an impact on the functioning of the minority. Some act as informal members of an association board and prefer not to demonstrate their involvement externally for social or professional reasons. There are also informal leaders. The main criterion, however, has been one's formal function in the board or its lack.

The basic theoretical concept followed while examining the identity of leaders, is John Milton Yinger's concept of ethnic identity which is synonymous with ethnicity.[3] In Yinger's concept, identity has three main aspects which are also constitutive for an ethnic group. They are: the perception of members of a given group by others as ethnically different, self-awareness of ethnic distinctness, and the group ethnic activity[4] That basic theoretical concept is supplemented by other ones which are necessary to explain the national identity issue, including the concept of cultural valence, core values and inter-group relations.[5]

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[3] J. M. Yinger (1994), *Ethnicity. Source of strength? Source of conflict?,* Albany-New York.

[4] "The definition of an ethnic group (…) has three ingredients: 1. The group is perceived by others in the society to be different in some combination of the following traits: language, religion, race, and ancestral homeland with its related culture; 2. the members also perceive themselves as different; and 3. they participate in shared activities built around their (real or mythical) common origin and culture." *Ibidem,* pp. 4. and B. Synak (1998), *Kaszubska tożsamość. Ciągłość i zmiana: studium socjologiczne,* Gdańsk, p. 56.

[5] A. Kłoskowska (1996), *Kultury narodowe u korzeni,* Warszawa, p. 112; J. J. Smolicz (2000), *Współkultury Australii,* Warszawa, p. 202; G. W. Allport (1954), *The Nature of Prejudice,* Reading, Mass.

Several research methods and techniques and other sources of data were used in the research, supplementing one another and, simultaneously, providing different perspectives of relevant phenomena. They included field research, participant observation, a questionnaire, focus group interviews, and content analyses. In social sciences, such an approach is referred to as *triangulation*[6].

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE
OF GERMAN MINORITY ASSOCIATIONS

The determination of the size and socio-demographic composition of German minority associations both in Gdańsk Pomerania and in the other regions of Poland is a difficult task. Difficulties are due to several factors e.g. the lack of up-to-date data in the form of member lists, rotation of association members, internal group transformations, and the manners of determining associations' membership.

Some information follows from available calculations based on various methods of data collection and interpretation, different definitions of "the German minority" and varying access to information sources, i.e. social research, results of National Censuses of Population and Housing from 2002 and 2011, annual reports of the Central Statistical Office, as well as documents of German minority associations.[7] In the article, the author intentionally does not include a detailed standard analysis of the data on the professional structure and economic situation of respondents which, from their perspective, are sensitive and easily traceable.

Zbigniew Kurcz's data was recognised as the starting point. He calculated that in 1996 (i.e. prior to the administration reform of 1999), the German minority in Poland had approximately 300 thousand members affiliated to almost seventy associations.[8]

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[6] N. K. Denzin N K and Lincoln Y. S., *Introduction: Entering the field of qualitative research*, in: N. K. Denzin N. K. & Y. S. Lincoln (eds) (1994), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, London, pp. 1-17. [Polish translation: *Wprowadzenie. Dziedzina i praktyka badań jakościowych,* in: K. Podemski (ed.) (2009), *Metody badań jakościowych,* Vol. 1, Warszawa, pp. 26-27]; U. Flick (1992), *Triangulation Revisited – Strategy of or Alternative to Validation of Qualitative Data, "*Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior" No. 22, pp. 175-197; idem (1998), *Triangulation – Geltungsbegründung oder Erkenntniszuwachs,* "Zeitschrift für Soziologie der Erziehung und Sozialization" No. 18, pp. 443-447; idem (2008), *Triangulation. Eine Einführung,* 2. Aufl., Wiesbaden; M. Hammersley, P. Atkinson (1995) *Ethnography: principles in practice*, New York [Polish translation: *Metody badań terenowych,* Poznań, 2000, pp. 235-238; D. Silverman (2000), *Doing Qualitative Research. A Practical Handbook,* London [Polish translation: *Prowadzenie badań jakościowych,*Warszawa, 2008].

[7] The published results of the 2011 National Census do not contain a detailed analysis of declarations concerning nationality, ethnicity, language, citizenship, the distribution of sex, age, and education of persons declaring the German nationality by voivodships and communes [smallest administrative units]. Therefore, the author makes comparisons on the basis of results of the 2002 National Census, http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/LUD_ludnosc_stan_str_dem_spo_ NSP2011.pdf [accessed: 5.05.2013].

[8] Cf. Z. Kurcz (1994), *Mniejszość niemiecka...,* p. 149.

In the light of results of the 2002 National Census, out of the total of 38,230,080 inhabitants of Poland, 152,897 people declared their German nationality and 147,094 of whom declared also their Polish citizenship. That was the German minority of 2002. The highest number of declarations of German nationality, i.e. 134,930 (91.73% of all respondents who declared German nationality) was in southern voivodships, i.e. in the Opolskie and Śląskie ones.

In the area in focus, the size of the German minority in 2002 was as follows: 2,016 people in the Pomorskie voivodship, 636 people in the Kujawsko-pomorskie voivodship, 4,311 people in the Warmińsko-mazurskie voivodship (the author studied four organisations there), and 820 people in the Wielkopolskie voivodship (the author studied one organisation having its registered seat in that voivodship, i.e. the one based in Złotów).[9]

However, the results of the 2011 National Census, in which, for the first time, it was possible to declare double national and ethnic identity revealed a decline in German self-identification. In total, out of 38,511,800 people actually living in Poland, about 842 thousand (2.19%) persons declared both their Polish identity and some other national and ethnic identity, of whom 147,816 declared their German identity (63,847 declared both German and Polish identities, and 44,549 – only the German one).[10]

However, the data on the area in question indicate an increase in German identity declarations, i.e. 4,830 people in the Pomorskie voivodship, 2,507 people in the Kujawsko-pomorskie voivodship, 4,843 people in the Warmińsko-mazurskie voivodship, and 3,421 people in the Wielkopolskie voivodship.[11]

The results of the author's research, in which national and ethnic self-identifications were considered in an institutional context, are different. However, since not all persons of German origin are members of German minority associations, we may conclude that the observed differences reflect the tendency that despite declaring his or her German affiliation, some people are not members of any German minority association.

According to the 2001 accounts of the German Minority Association (Związek Mniejszości Niemieckiej, ZMN) in Gdańsk, associations of the German minority in the Pomorskie voivodship had 5,706 members, 4,500 of whom belonged to the ZMN.[12] According to calculations of the author, German minority associations in the Kujawsko-pomorskie voivodship had approximately 1,700 members in 2001. Four

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[9] L. M. Nijakowski, *Status grup etnicznych oraz mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce w świetle wyników Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego z 2002 roku,* in: L. Adamczuk, S. Łodziński (eds) (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w świetle Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego z 2002 roku,* Warszawa, p. 155.

[10] http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/LUD_ludnosc_stan_str_dem_spo_NSP2011.pdf [accessed: 5.05.2013.]

[11] *Ibidem*.

[12] Financial records of the German Minority Association in Gdańsk.

organisations surveyed in the Warmińsko-mazurskie voivodship had 907 members in total, i.e. the association in Elbląg had 391 members (as of 2002), the association in Iława had 256 members, the one in Lidzbark Welski had 200 members, and the association in Nowe Miasto Lubawskie had 60 members. The association in Złotów in the Wielkopolskie voivodship had slightly more than 100 members.

In total, according to the data on 2001-2002 provided by the leaders, German minority associations in the area being examined had about 7,460 members (excluding the association in Słupsk which is outside the area in question).

According to the data of the Union of German Social and Cultural Associations (ZNSSK, *Verband der deutschen sozial-kulturellen Gesellschaften in Polen,* VdG) on 2011[13], German minority associations in the Pomorskie voivodship alone has 8,005 members (including the association in Słupsk with 1,627 members). In the Kujawsko-pomorskie voivodship there are 2,652 members, in the Warmińsko-mazurskie voivodship there are 369 members (the association in Elbląg), and the association in Złotów has about 100 members.

Considering the rapid socio-demographic processes which, at the turn of the 20th and 21st century, affected the examined associations and declarations about a decreasing membership, the above data of the VdG on 2011 should be reduced by 30%. Leaving aside the way of counting the members of German minority associations in Poland at large[14] by various institutions and by the German minority itself, it can be cautiously estimated that in the first decade of the 21st century, the associations in the Pomorskie voivodship had 3,000-3,500 members, and all German associations in the area in question had 5,000-5,500 members.

The current age, sex, and education profiles of members of the German minority associations in the area reveal regional differences if compared to results of the 2002 National Census.

What is clearly noticeable is the much higher percentage of female members, which, in the opinion of the author, is 60%. In fact, results of the 2002 National Census indicate a slightly higher percentage of women than men, i.e. 51.4% and 48.6% respectively, a higher percentage of people aged over 60 (33.3%), and a very high percentage of people with primary education (both completed and not) and vocational education, i.e. 75.9% in total. In the associations surveyed, the percentage of people aged over 60 years was much higher than in the 2002 Census data. According to the author's estimates, people over 60 years old constitute over 60% of the German minority and the oldest generation aged over 70 years prevails. This huge difference is due to the marginal membership of the middle-aged generation (aged 40-59 years) and of children and the youth (aged under 39 years). On the national scale,

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[13] Simulation of changes in the VdG statutes of 8 March 2013, Opole.

[14] That refers to different approaches adopted by associations towards including various categories of members in their statistics, i.e. active members, their families (including members of purely Polish origin) and persons who have never been involved in ethnic activities of associations after having paid their membership fee.

according to the 2002 Census, the percentage of population aged up to 39 years was 42.9% in total, and of people aged 40-59 years it was 20.8%. Thus the share of the youngest and middle-aged generations in the German minority is jointly 63.7%. The national data is different because of the higher percentage of the youngest and middle-aged generation members of associations in southern Poland.

Estimates concerning education of the German minority members in the area examined are similar to the results of the 2002 National Census. People with primary education (both completed and not) and with vocational education strongly prevail, i.e. in total they constitute 70-75% of that population. The share of people with secondary education can be estimated to be 20-25%, and of people with higher education to be no more than 5%.

"US" AND "THEM" IN SPECIFIC POMERANIAN CONDITIONS
OF THE CULTURAL BORDERLAND

Relations between national groups in Gdańsk Pomerania and their evolution are an effect of complex socio-political and identity-related factors.

The perception of the German minority has undoubtedly been influenced by social and political transformations in Poland after 1989 and the overall climate favourable to national identity issues.

Old social ties in Gdańsk Pomerania transformed in effect of post-WW2 mass migrations, boosting *cultural synergy* based on the interaction (cooperation and competition) of cultural systems composed of various elements.[15]

In the context of the post-migration society being discussed[16], three major cultures – Polish, German, and Kashubian – coexist and variously shape their mutual relations.

In addition, the coexistence model of groups having different ethno-cultural and national heritage is (and was) to a large extent dependent on the individual and collective sense of identity based on self-awareness of distinctness[17], that is on the sensed "we-they" and "us - the others" distinctions. Distance and otherness (strangeness) were rightly differentiated by Georg Simmel who argued that "distance means that he, who is close by, is far, and strangeness means that he, who also is far, is actually near. For, to be a stranger is naturally a very positive relation; it is a specific form of interaction."[18] It may be concluded that the sense of "familiarity" and "strangeness" in the area discussed was determined by the fact that "That the different custom is not understood in its subjective meaning since the cultural key to it is

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[15] M. Golka (2010), *Imiona wielokulturowości,* Warszawa, p. 137.

[16] A. Sakson, *Specyfika procesów społeczno-kulturowych społeczeństw postmigracyjnych,* in: B. Domagała and A. Sakson (eds), *Tożsamość kulturowa,* pp. 7-11.

[17] F. Znaniecki (2001), *Socjologia wychowania*, Warszawa, pp. 23-26.

[18] G. Simmel (1950), *The Stranger*, in: *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, New York 1950, p. 402 [Polish translation: G. Simmel, *Obcy*, in: idem (1975), *Socjologia*, Warszawa, p. 505].

lacking, is almost as decisive as the peculiarity of the custom as such."[19] The above phenomena are therefore connected with the feeling of distance both in the socio-cultural and emotional sense.

It needs to be underlined that under specific Pomeranian conditions of the cultural borderland, the attitude of the incumbent population of different cultural origins was generally positive. For example, directly after WW2, German inhabitants of Pomerania were culturally closer to native Polish inhabitants than Polish immigrants of other cultural background. Similar conditions were in Poznań after WW1, which was confirmed in sociological research on antagonism towards strangers among inhabitants of Poznań carried out by Florian Znaniecki in 1920.[20]

Mutual relations between Poles and the German minority in the culturally diversified region of Pomerania were shaped by partial integration, partial acculturation and antagonism. Additionally, it is important to recognise a concurrent opposite process of dissimilation, i.e. the renaissance of ethnicity and the continuation of its power.[21]

It follows that in all processes mentioned, the key factor is the sense of national (and ethnic) identity, both individual and collective. It is in the borderland where two opposite trends collide, determining the direction of self-identification processes. On the one hand, increasingly often individuals experience the sense of anomy, alienation from society, "one-dimensionality", and, to an extent, the vanishing of traditional values and norms. On the other hand, we observe a basic human tendency towards "anchoring", maintaining bonds with ancestors and cultural roots, and building local ties. In result, individuals increasingly often search for a coherent image of themselves, a relatively stable self-identification, including their national and ethnic identity.

In case of leaders of the German minority in Gdańsk Pomerania, the ways in which they construe their identities are particularly interesting, constituting a sort of kaleidoscope of individual and group self-identifications and experiences. The multi-dimensional and different identity of German minority leaders reflects the borderland nature of the area in question. The differentiation occurs both at the level of self-identification and in the attitude towards native values such as the German language and collective memory, and in visions of the German minority functioning in the future. In many cases, that has far-reaching consequences for the group cohesion and ethnic activities of its members, and also for the image of the German minority among Poles.

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[19] M. Weber (1978), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Oakland, CA, p. 387 [Polish translation: (2002), *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo. Zarys socjologii rozumiejącej*, Warszawa, p. 307].

[20] F. Znaniecki (1930), *Studia nad antagonizmem do obcych*, "Przegląd Socjologiczny" Vol. I, pp. 171-172.

[21] J. M. Yinger (1994), *Ethnicity...*, pp. 41-67; idem, *Toward a theory of assimilation and dissimilation*, "Ethnic and Racial Studies" Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 249-264; J. Mucha (2006), *Stosunki etniczne we współczesnej myśli socjologicznej*, Warszawa, p. 227.

In the research on the national (and ethnic) identity of leaders of the German minority, two of its broad dimensions were considered, i.e. the subjective and objective one.[22]

The subjective criteria of the assessment of identity included: self-identification of respondents and the cultural valence which influenced it, the sense of bonds with the motherland, acceptance of values, awareness of being a member of a group and its distinctness, and awareness of being perceived as ethnically different by others, i.e. the looking – glass identity.

The objective dimension of identity includes its formal (natal) aspect and the behavioural one.[23] Factors of natal nature which were taken into consideration included: place of birth of respondents and their ancestors, the period of stay a given territory, and the descent of the spouse. Behavioural factors included: the motivation for establishing a German minority organisation and joining it, the ability to speak the German language and the use of that language as well as participation in the group ethnic activities.

The subject of analysis is an aspect of the leaders' identity, namely their national (and ethnic) self-identification and cultural valence.

NATIONAL (AND ETHNIC) SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF LEADERS OF THE GERMAN MINORITY

The area under discussion is characterised by the coexistence of groups of various cultural, national and ethnic origins. What is particularly interesting is the self-identification content, i.e. the way and the context in which the leaders construe their own sense of national identity.

While doing research on ethnic identification, the researcher may observe mutually excluding or competing identifications, identifications of growing and decreasing importance for an individual at a given moment, and other combinations which are compatible to a varying extent and make the identity structure more complex.[24]

Antonina Kłoskowska is of a similar opinion, writing that in an analysis of global identity, in addition to national identification, also one's adoption of national culture and its recognition as one's own, i.e. cultural valence, should be considered.[25] The degree of valence variation depends therefore on basic socio-demographic variables such as education, profession and the socio-cultural status of one's family.

Kłoskowska identifies four potential kinds of national identification: uniform (integral) identification, double identification, uncertain identification, and cosmopolitan identification. She also distinguishes among four kinds of cultural valence:

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[22] B. Synak (1998), *op. cit.,* p. 52.
[23] *Ibidem,* p. 53.
[24] J. M. Yinger (1994), *Ethnicity...,* p. 144.
[25] A. Kłoskowska (1996), *op. cit.,* p. 112.

univalence, bivalence, ambivalence, and polyvalence. Most of those kinds converge, depending on a moment in one's life and a situation. Most probably, the vacuously true variants include such pairs as double identification and univalence, cosmopolitism and univalence, and integral identification and ambivalence.[26]

The research on the identity of German minority leaders in Gdańsk Pomerania demonstrates that combinations of the above kinds with varying saturation level do occur. There are individuals who identify themselves with two ethnic or national groups and feel cultural ambivalence. Those are the people between two worlds who are not able to fully reconcile the two realities. There are also persons with double awareness[27] who have overcome the anxiety and burdens of that duality and use it creatively. That phenomenon can be compared to a three-dimensional vision, while most of us use only one "ethnic eye"[28].

It must be underlined that the co-existence of national and ethnic identifications is not a contradictory phenomenon because identifications take place at different reference levels. Nevertheless, the bond between the (collective) group and individual identifications may be loose, constituting a "dime store ethnicity"[29], an ethnicity which is symbolic[30], situational (under certain conditions), or more permanent and authentic. Recalling the concept of Florian Znaniecki, the above phenomenon should be studied taking into consideration the "humanistic coefficient" or, as Clifford Geertz argued, applying a "thick description"[31].

The survey conducted by the author as well as earlier analyses by researchers focusing on the German minority point to the impact of objective factors on the systematisation of the category of national (and ethnic) identification of respondents. Those factors are related to complex nationality-related processes in the first half of the 20th century, i.e. the pre-WW2 de-Germanisation, the *Eindeutschung* policy during WW2, processes of "national" verification and rehabilitation, and the general situation of people of German origin in the post-WW2 period.[32] In addition, the

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[26] *Ibidem,* p. 129.

[27] W. E. B. DuBois (1953), *The Souls of Black Folk,* Greenwich. After J. M. Yinger (1994), *Ethnicity...,* p. 146.

[28] J. M. Yinger (1994), *Ethnicity...,* p. 146.

[29] H. F. Stein, R. F. Hill (1977), *The Ethnic Imperative: Examining the New White Ethnic Movement,* Pennsylvania State UP, after J. M. Yinger (1994), *Ethnicity...,* p. 148; B. Synak (1998), *op. cit*., p. 56.

[30] H. J. Gans, *Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America,* "Ethnic and Racial Studies" 2 January 1979, after J. M. Yinger (1994), *Ethnicity...,* p. 148; also B. Synak (1998), *op. cit*., p. 56.

[31] F. Znaniecki (1988), *Wstęp do socjologii,* Warszawa; C. Geertz (1973), *Thick Description. Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture*, in: idem, *The interpretation of cultures: selected essays*. New York, pp. 3-30 [Polish translation: *Opis gęsty – w stronę interpretatywnej teorii kultury,* in: *Badanie kultury. Elementy teorii antropologicznej,* Warszawa 2003, pp. 35-58], and idem (1973), *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* [Polish translation: *Interpretacja kultur. Wybrane eseje,* Seria Cultura, Kraków 2005, pp. 17-47].

[32] D. Berlińska (1989), *Społeczne uwarunkowania ruchu mniejszości niemieckiej na Śląsku Opol-*

definition of ethnicity as a syndrome of symptomatic features has changed as well, moving from the imposed (inherited) ethnicity to identification being a matter of an individual's choice.

On the basis of the typology of people constituting the German minority in Poland and focusing on identity-territory structure, the following categories of members of that minority have been identified in the Pomeranian context: 1) "ethnic Germans" in western and eastern borderlands (i.e. citizens of the Reich within the borders from before 1939); 2) *Danzigers* in the territory of the former Free City of Danzig (German citizenship was given them after connecting of the city to the German Reich); 3) autochthons in Kashubia and Kociewie; 4) German immigrants and their descendants (who came from outside the area examined, most frequently from the neighbouring former Prussian provinces); 5) Poles of German descent (who lived in the Pomorskie voivodship in the interwar period); and 6) Poles interested in German culture and language.[33]

The semi-structured in-depth interview used and the applied methods of analysis provide estimated data which, to an extent, draws a more detailed picture of leaders' self-identification.

The determination of the number of "ethnic Germans" is most difficult, and, for various reasons, presidents or chairpersons of associations studied do not venture to give the figures. In the light of comments collected, it can be concluded that less than 20 respondents belong to the category of "ethnic Germans". They are citizens of Germany and of German descent, members of the Evangelical-Augsburg (Protestant) Church who, for various reasons, have not left for Germany. Some of them do not declare openly their religion, treating it as part of their private life. Some attend services at Evangelical churches close to their homes e.g. in Słupsk (service in German and Polish), Lębork (in Polish), and in Sopot (in Polish). Others, due to the lack of opportunity to attended a service in German at a nearby Evangelical church, attend services in the Polish language at Roman Catholic churches, or, in the German language, at St. John Church in Gdańsk.

The declared identity of people belonging to the above category geographically overlaps with areas annexed to the Reich in 1939 (i.e. the Free City of Danzig, Bytów, Lębork, Wierzchucino, Kwidzyn, Sztum, and Iława). The kind of their national self-identification can be qualified as an integral one. However, their cultural

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skim: (próba diagnozy w świetle badań socjologicznych), Opole; B. Domagała (1996), *Mniejszość niemiecka na Warmii i Mazurach: rodowód kulturowy, organizacja, tożsamość,* Olsztyn; Z. Kurcz (1994), *Mniejszość niemiecka..,* Z. Kurcz (1997), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce: geneza...;* C. Obracht-Prondzyński (2002), *Kaszubi. Między dyskryminacją a regionalną podmiotowością*, Gdańsk, pp. 135-220; A. Sakson (1990), *Mazurzy – społeczność pogranicza,* Poznań.

[33] A. Sakson (1994), *Socjologiczna charakterystyka...,* pp. 141-155; idem (1994), *Geneza i struktura społeczna...,* pp. 57-63; idem (1991), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem mniejszości niemieckiej,* "Kultura i Społeczeństwo" No. 4, pp. 185-201; Z. Kurcz (1997), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce: geneza...,* p. 97; idem (1991), *Kształtowanie się mniejszości niemieckiej na Śląsku,* "Kultura i Społeczeństwo" No. 2; idem (1997), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce...,* p. 67.

self-identification is bivalent or polyvalent. In the case of all respondents in that category, their early culturalisation took place in the German culture but their experience of adolescence and adulthood was in the Polish culture context or, in the case of people living in and near Bytów, Lębork, and Wierzchucin, also in the Kashubian culture context.

That fact is evidenced in comments of respondents:

> I have always felt that I am a German and I have never tried to hide it. I have never flaunted it either but I have been "deciphered" at work due to my conduct and performance. I also have German citizenship. Once I even tried to reconstruct the genealogical tree of my family, and I know my true German roots so well as few people do [...] and not some alleged roots like that once someone had the proverbial German shepherd [...]
>
> Madam, I am a German. My family was all German. But [...] my all adulthood, my 50 years in the People's Republic of Poland, and that is why I know the Polish language and culture too. Because I had to finish school and get a degree. My native language, however, is German so I think in German too. It was my own defence that I had to learn Polish in order to function within the Polish society. And the fact that I live here and not in Germany is due to a complicated private situation. Anyway, neither I nor anyone else has any doubts about me being a German, because I have documents proving it. [...] I am a German, but [...] I am not trying to make anyone happy against their will or forcefully argue that it is something what everyone must learn or cultivate.

German inhabitants of Gdańsk (*Danzigers*) are a special case of self-identification, i.e. a combination of German national identity and national affiliation, specifically, the local Gdańsk affiliation. The subjective bond with a territory which is manifested in the so-called local patriotism is the local identity most advanced.[34]

Basically, all *Danzigers* surveyed exhibit the integral kind of national identification and cultural bivalence, less frequently polyvalence. In the light of the research, they appear not to have assimilated psychologically and, partly, culturally. Their integration at the structural level was for them a matter of adaptation.

It should be added that the examined group of *Danzigers* is internally diversified in terms of origin and partly in terms of religion. Most frequently, they are descendants of German immigrants from the Kingdom of Prussia who had settled in Gdańsk. They are also descendants of immigrants from the then neighbouring Prussian provinces, who, in the context of provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, opted for Germany and Kashubians migrating from Western Prussia and Western Pomerania, and for Poles migrating from the Kingdom of Poland and neighbouring Prussian provinces. Most *Danzigers* are Roman Catholics and some are Protestants. It is difficult, however, to precisely determine the religious composition of that group because respondents have not been willing to declare their membership in religious groups

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[34] A. Sakson, *Odzyskiwanie Ziem Odzyskanych – przemiany tożsamości lokalnej i regionalnej mieszkańców Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych a rewindykacyjne postulaty niemieckich środowisk ziomkowskich,* in: A. Sakson (ed.) (2006), *Ziemie Odzyskane/ Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne 1945-2005. 60 lat w granicach państwa polskiego,* Poznań, p. 268.

or preferred to conceal the fact that they are Protestants. This can be illustrated with the following comments:

> I am a citizen of Gdańsk but also a German, so I am a *Danziger*. During the war I did […] have […] only the German citizenship and did not been qualified in any other way. My mother's roots were in Gdańsk for generations, and my father was born in Pelplin. Because my grandfather lived in Pelplin, had his property there, and then he sold it and moved to Gdańsk-Wrzeszcz and lived at Dworcowa Street. [...] My grandfather was an *Ostpreuβe*, and my grandmother was a *Danziger*. It was not a Polish family in any sense.
>
> I am a German. I was born in Gdańsk before the war just like my mother, grandmother, and the rest of my family. I had some family in Kashubia as well because we visited our aunt abroad [...]. That was what we used to say. My parents had passports of the Free City and I have documents confirming that I am a German.

In the light of the research, the largest group of members of the German minority are, in the opinion of the author, autochthones, i.e. Kashubians. It needs to be underlined that self-identification categories of that group are also diversified internally. This is due to the fact that there are Kashubians living in areas which belonged to Germany until 1939, and Kashubians living in the region which was part of the interwar Pomorskie voivodship.

According to the author, Kashubians make at least 50% of all people surveyed and they live mainly in Kashubia, Gdynia and Gdańsk. A marginal percentage of respondents who identify themselves with Kashubians are descendants of migrants from Kashubia who live now in the Kociewie region and in the south-eastern part of the Pomorskie voivodship (i.e. in poviats of Kwidzyn, Sztum and, partly, Malbork).

Their national and ethnic self-identifications are characterised by fluidity and instability typical of borderland groups. On the one hand, their identity is ambivalent and, on the other, it is bivalent or polyvalent. Thus, the results of the reported research correspond with opinion of Polish sociologists arguing that the native population has a large share in the German minority.[35]

In the awareness of those respondents, two national identifications, i.e. the Polish and the German one, clash with, compete against, or complement each other and the Kashubian ethnic identification overlaps. From declarations of respondents it follows that almost half of them have their German citizenship confirmed by the German Federal Office of Administration (*Bundesverwaltungsamt*) while the other half either do not have relevant documents confirming their German origin or have not tried to obtain such documents at all.

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[35] D. Berlińska (1989), *Społeczne uwarunkowania...;* B. Domagała, *Mniejszość niemiecka na Warmii i Mazurach. Organizacja i ideologia,* in: Z. Kurcz and W. Misiak (eds) (1994), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce...;* idem (1996), *Mniejszość niemiecka na Warmii i Mazurach: rodowód...;* Z. Kurcz (1997), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce: geneza...;* A. Sakson, *Procesy integracji i dezintegracji społecznej na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych Polski po 1945 roku,* in: A. Sakson (ed.) (1996), *Pomorze – trudna ojczyzna? Kształtowanie się nowej tożsamości 1945-1995,* Poznań; M. Szmeja, *Dlaczego Ślązacy z Opolszczyzny nie chcą być Polakami?* in: Z. Kurcz (ed.) (1997), *Mniejszości narodowe...*

In that situation, the leaders surveyed refer to themselves as: "both a German and a Pole, but also a Kashubian" or "a half German, a half Pole and a Kashubian", or "more a German than a Pole, and a Kashubian" and "more a Pole than a German, and a Kashubian" (Table 1). It is worth noting that the Kashubian identification is the core of all categories. It, however, remains in the background. It surfaces in the context of national identification only.

Table 1

Distribution of self-identification levels among respondents

Self-identification level	Percentage of the surveyed
"both a German and a Pole, but also a Kashubian"	about 50%
"a half German, a half Pole, and a Kashubian"	about 30%
"more a German than a Pole, and a Kashubian"	about 10%
"more a Pole than a German, and a Kashubian"	about 10%

Source: Author's data

Each of the above sub-categories of respondents has its own specific distinctive features. To the first of those categories, i.e. "both a German and a Pole, but also a Kashubian" belong leaders for whom national identifications are compatible and complement each other, and the Kashubian identification is treated as a natural enrichment of the identity. The kind of their national self-identification, despite their Kashubian identification, can be described as a double identification. The Kashubian identification takes place at a completely different (ethnic) level, which is neither a substitute of the national identification nor its opposite. People belonging to that category are culturally bivalent and polyvalent individuals. It is difficult to assess the scale of those phenomena because the saturation level of some narrative threads varies substantially in that regard. Generally, those people perceive reality in a three-dimensional way. They can combine and use elements derived from all three cultures on daily basis, even if their familiarity with those cultures varies.

The respondents do not feel much ethnic distance to any of those cultures and thus they do not feel being a "stranger". What is symptomatic about that subgroup of respondents is their perception of their own bi- or multiculturalism as them being privileged in comparison to the rest of the society. Another characteristic feature is that several leaders are members of the Kashubian-Pomeranian Association and that they had joined that organisation long before they became members of German minority associations. This can be illustrated with the following comments.

I feel I am a German, a Pole, and a Kashubian. After all, we have lived in Poland for so many years and we have to feel – from the nationality perspective – that we are also Poles, although in fact we are Germans. I am also a Kashubian. It happened that we have our small homeland and here there

is no other alternative. It must stay like that because one cannot isolate themselves here and feel to be a German only, because that would be unrealistic and illogical.

[…] at this moment I feel I am ... well, I have the Polish citizenship because we all had to have it, but we have always been and will be Germans. I do not know how to put it but I feel I am a Pole, a German and a Kashubian. My origin is very important to me. But we live in Kashubia and it is normal that I feel I am a Kashubian too.

The second category includes leaders who describe themselves as "a half German, a half Pole, and a Kashubian". Their national self-identifications are the area of competition, while the Kashubian identification remains a relatively stable element of their awareness. That group considers their double national identification to be an impediment to their functioning in society, due to a compelling pressure to choose between the two nationalities and cultures. It is a category of people suspended "between the worlds", frequently culturally ambivalent, with relatively low fluency in each language and often having only primary education. Their type of national identification can be described as the double one or, less often, as uncertain. It needs to be emphasised that they have not declared to be "neither a Pole, nor a German". A similar mechanism of being "between the worlds" can be found in autobiographies of Silesians. A conclusion is that an individual does not fully accept any of the worlds because "he or she repels each one for a different reason"[36]. This can be illustrated with the following comment of one of respondents:

[…] my mother was born in Kashubia, my father came from the Reich and somehow they met here. So I do not have any choice: I must be a half blood German and a half Kashubian. And I do not hide that my mother's family was more Polish thus I have to be a Pole too. So what is the point? It is not so easy to have such roots because I must choose all the time. And sometimes I even quarrel with myself when I am overtaken by my German or Polish part.

The third and the fourth category of respondents can be discussed together. They include people whose one national identifications is stronger and prevails, while the ethnic identification is present in the background. Those subgroups are almost of the same size. People classified as belonging to those categories describe themselves as "more a German than a Pole, and a Kashubian" or "more a Pole than a German, and a Kashubian".

Factors that determine which of their national identifications prevails include their subjective assessment of their dominant "blood ties", education and upbringing in the German language, and the impact of the dominant Polish culture. Thus those people have a double national identification and are characterised by cultural bivalence or, less frequently, polyvalence. The following comments are examples of the above.

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[36] A. Kłoskowska (1996), *op. cit*., p. 244.

[…] there were not many Poles here, we spoke only German, sometimes a bit of Kashubian because I have such family colligations on my father's side. And then Poland came, so we had to learn Polish. I learned Polish from newspapers and friends but that was hard graft. [...] What can I say? I still feel I am more a German than a Pole. But since I have German blood, it is normal, isn't it? I also somehow feel some connection with Kashubians.

[…] since I was born to a German family in Prussia, now Kashubia, I should feel I am a German. But in fact I have lived most of my life in Poland among Kashubians, and Germany had no longer been here I was little. I am more a Pole than a German. […] I have Kashubian roots but somehow, I always keep that to myself and my family.

One of the least numerous categories of respondents, next to "ethnic Germans", are German immigrants from outside the area in question, mainly from neighbouring provinces, and their descendants. In total, a dozen or so such declarations have been identified in the survey. Those respondents have been both descendants of German colonists who had settled in the area before World War I or World War II (e.g. civil servants, soldiers and farmers), Germans who fled to Pomerania in 1945 running away from the Red Army and their descendants, and people who arrived after WW2. Thus respondents in that category exhibit various national self-identifications and the degree of their socio-cultural embedding differs too.

The interviews carried have revealed that the integral type of national self-identification is the most common one among descendants of German colonists whose families have inhabited the studied area for generations. They describe themselves as "Germans, descendants of German settlers (colonists)" or "descendants of Germans from the Reich". Their frequent characteristic is cultural bivalence and high fluency in German. The majority of them have German citizenship. However, in their case, fundamental factors affecting their sense of identity are "blood ties" and long-term residency.

In contrast, Germans who arrived in Pomerania with the 1945 migration wave, and their descendants exhibit double self-identification and usually are culturally bivalent. Respondents in that group describe themselves as "a German and an East Prussian" or "a German-Ostpreuße". Characteristic features of that group include a weaker attachment to the area of residence and a weaker sense of group identity, but, at the same time, a higher fluency in German (and also Russian). Those people are usually members of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church, i.e. they are Protestants.

In contrast, most respondents who have arrived in the area in question after WW2 come from Silesia and Greater Poland (Wielkopolska). From the interviews it follows that they settled in Pomerania mainly for economic and educational reasons, i.e. they started their education or studies in the Tricity of Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia. Generally, their self-identification is double. Most of those people are culturally univalent, i.e. they have assimilated the Polish culture and consider it to be their own. Few of them are culturally bivalent.

The second most numerous social category of the leaders surveyed are Poles who acknowledge their German origin (mixed families) and inhabit the area which largely overlaps with the pre-WW2 Pomorskie voivodship e.g. Gdynia, Chojnice,

Toruń, Bydgoszcz, Tczew and Grudziądz. That category is also internally diversified. It includes both Poles of documented German descent and people whose descent is not documented but only alleged (e.g. entered into the 3rd of 4th group of the *DVL* during WW2 and whose ancestors fought in the German army). They may constitute about 20-30% of all respondents.

Respondents in that category feel that they "belong to the German nation" but do not have any documents to prove their German origin or the documents they have are insufficient. According to those respondents, their sense of bond with the German nation results from the fact that their fathers or grandfathers were *Wehrmacht* soldiers who, usually, got injured or killed, and derives from their German sounding names. That category of respondents has most claims addressed to institutions of the German state from which they expect "to be granted German citizenship which they rightfully should have".

In most cases their national identity is uncertain, less frequently it is double. In terms of culture, they are bivalent or ambivalent. Frequently, they make their own national self-identification and involvement in institutionalised activities of the German minority dependent on the fulfilment of the above demand. The following comment of a respondent confirms the above.

> […] at meetings of the associations I said several times that we have been discriminated against by the German government and refused membership in the German nation [...] are we a worse category of Germans? I am asking! I have been active in the German minority here for so many years, and the government in Germany continues to ignore us. That is the reason why many members have left [...] and I am considering it too.[37]

Another social category which is now part of German minority institutions in Gdańsk Pomerania are Poles interested in German language and culture. Those people are usually spouses of ordinary members of German associations or more distant family members and friends, as well as enthusiasts of German culture and people "in search for own identity". Respondents from that category describe themselves as "Poles" or Poles who "have something in common with the German nation" but that connection is unspecified, or have "a German origin after their husband or wife". They are actively involved in institutional or cultural activities whereas the identity dimension of the minority life is of secondary importance to them. Their national identification can be considered uniform and they are culturally univalent or, more rarely, bivalent. And although it is difficult to determine the size of that group, interviews with leaders suggest that every year that category of people grows in number. What is more, increasingly often the leaders believe that the socio-demographic transformation within the minority will lead to a change in institutional activities and that change has already started, i.e. the change in the membership from

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[37] M. Lemańczyk, *Tożsamość narodowa pomorskich liderów mniejszości niemieckiej,* "Studia Socjologiczne. Pomorze – portret regionu" B. Synak, M. Kaczmarczyk (eds) (2010), No. 3, p. 107.

the exclusive formula to the inclusive one as members are now both people of German descent and Poles interested in German culture.

Results of the research reveal also the existence of other kinds of self-identification of symbolic or situational nature, in which the national identity component combines with belonging to an administrative territorial unit or belonging to a given region e.g. a "West Prussian", a " Prussian", a "*Koschneider*" [Polish "Kosznajder"], and a "Pomeranian". The above kinds of the "symbolic universe" are a special kind of regional identity, related to clearly defined regions: the province of West Prussia, the province of Pomerania, or Gdańsk Pomerania. In addition, research results demonstrate that the above kind of the leaders' identification is to a large extent supported by activities of *Landsmanschaft* organisations (Landsmanschaft of West Prussia, Landsmanschaft of Pomerania, and Danziger Association), *Heimatkreisvertreter* groups, and associated organisations.

To conclude, the national and ethnic identification of the leaders is a combination of an individual's awareness and subjective experience and the official group identification and objective conditionalities. The multithreading of self-identifications results in discrepancies between expectations and objectives of associations. Ethnic distinctness is manifested not only by members and non-members of the German minority but it is also present inside the group. Due to socio-demographic processes within the German minority in northern Poland, i.e. migrations to Western Europe in the 1990s, little population growth and progressing extinction of the oldest generation, and little involvement of the middle and youngest generations, the leaders of associations are now faced with the need to develop a formula for future association activities. That issue is in fact about the degree of ethnic and socio-cultural diversity acceptable to members of the German minority in the light of the statues of their associations, ideology and ethical/moral values.

ABSTRACT

The article presents an analysis of selected aspects of German minority activities, i.e. the socio-demographic structure of the German minority associations in areas of northern Poland after 1989 and national/ethnic self-identification of their leaders. So far, the situation in the German minority in Gdańsk Pomerania was mentioned in the background or supplemented analyses of associations operating in other regions of Poland. By contrast, in this article the German minority in northern Poland is the subject of the research. On the basis of results obtained in in-depth sociological research, the author describes the present situation and the functioning of the German minority in Gdańsk Pomerania. Thereby, she fills the gap in previous analyses of the place and identity of people of German descent.

Stosunki gospodarcze między Polską a Niemcami 20 lat po zjednoczeniu

[Polish-German Economic Relations 20 Years after German Reunification]

Piotr Kalka, Editor

This volume of the "The Federal Republic of Germany 20 Years after Reunification. Politics – Economy – Society" series is dedicated to economic issues in an attempt at summarising Polish-German cooperation in this field in the years 1990-2010.

As Germany is Poland's most important economic partner, there is a constant need for monitoring trends in their bilateral cooperation and assessing changes that result from both internal and external conditionalities. Authors of this publication analyse financial transfers in the balance of payments to provide deep insight into Polish-German economic relations, the progress made in selected fields of cooperation such as foreign trade, migration of labour force and relations in the border zone. The latter is particularly interesting due to the history of the Polish-German borderlands, their economic and cultural diversity, varying local awareness, and long marginalisation of the regions. These are often decisive for barriers to cross-border cooperation and specificity of cross-border relations. The authors: Ilona Romiszewska, Piotr Kalka, Tomasz Budnikowski and Zbigniew Świątkowski, analyse Polish-German economic cooperation in the light of the balance of payments, trade exchange between Poland and Germany, migration of manpower, and the Polish-German cross-border economic cooperation.

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NATIONAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES
IN THE GREATER POLAND VOIVODSHIP

Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) is an area without any natural borders which, for centuries, has been a land of major trade routes and related flow of people. Some of them settled there, often enriching local history and culture.

In the light of the current administrative division of Poland, it needs to be underlined that it is not fully possible to clearly define the historical borders of the Greater Poland region. However, that problem concerns mainly the borderlands, as main parts of the region have always been part of the territory identified as Greater Poland. Roughly speaking, to this day the core of the region is the territory of the Kaliskie and Poznańskie voivodships of the 14th century.[1] In this paper, however, I am going to refer to the Wielkopolskie (Greater Poland) voivodship within its boundaries established in 1999 in result of the administrative reform.[2]

I

The paper is an analysis of publications and other legacy materials such as results of the 2002 and 2011 Censuses, documents of the Wielkopolskie Voivodship Office, the Wielkopolskie Education Authority, the Wielkopolskie Labour Office, and information on websites of national and ethnic minorities. A part of the study is based on results of field research carried from 2011 to 2013 among members of Roma, German, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Bulgarian minorities in the Wielkopolskie voivodship. Twenty in-depth interviews and 5 shorter ones were conducted. Twenty five people were interviewed, including 9 women and 16 men, all aged 21 to 85 years. The group included persons who declared their affiliation to German (10), Roma (9), Ukrainian (3), Jewish (2), and Bulgarian (1) minorities. The research was based on semi-structured interviews, guidelines for which were grouped into thematic blocks. In addition to interviews, the author refers to observations made at

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[1] W. Łęcki (ed.) (2004), *Wielkopolska. Nasza kraina*, Vol. 1, Poznań, p. 15.
[2] Journal of Laws of 1998, No. 96, item 603.

meetings at offices of minority organisations and General and Election Meetings of minority associations.

The aim of this paper is to answer the question what the situation of national and ethnic minorities in the Wielkopolskie voivodship is. The present trend towards demassification of the cultural order, i.e. empowerment of minority organisations, has contributed to activation of groups which, so far, have been barely noticeable. In Poland, the interest in the issue of national and ethnic minorities has been reborn.[3] However, the available information on minorities in Greater Poland seems insufficient. Research on minorities has, so far, focused on selected narrow topics, concentrating on some activities of largest minorities only, i.e. of Roma people and Germans.[4] Thus a question should be asked how all noticeable national and ethnic minorities in the voivodship present themselves against the background of the majority society.

Minorities in Greater Poland are small in number and territorially scattered. They do not form compact local communities in any part of the voivodship. Particular national and ethnic minorities differ in their internal organisation. As those minorities are dispersed, they have not founded major non-governmental organisations which would influence the political, social, or cultural life of the region in a significant way. Activities of existing associations and foundations largely depend on activities of individual leaders. The basis for the functioning of minority organisations are governmental programmes and subsidies.

<div align="center">II</div>

In the Second Polish Republic, i.e. after 1918, it was estimated that over 11 millions of inhabitants of Poland, i.e. around 35% of the entire populations, were members of national minorities. The Polish territory was inhabited by almost 5 million Ukrainians, over 3 million Jews, nearly 1 million Belarusians and 830 thousand Germans, to mention just the largest of the minorities.[5] After the nightmare of World War II, the approach taken by new national authorities was that Poland should be a uniform state in terms of nationality and ethnicity. After WW2, in result of war losses, changed borders and migrations of people, national and ethnic minorities constituted about 2.5% of the population of Poland.[6] In that context, the Wielkopol-

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[3] A. Chodubski, *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce: dziedzictwo przeszłości i teraźniejszości,* in: E. Subocz, S. Garbart (eds) (2013), *Współczesne wyzwania polityki wobec romskiej mniejszości etnicznej – edukacja, dyskryminacja, wykluczenie społeczne,* Warszawa, p. 126.

[4] Cf. A. Sakson (ed.) (1994), *Polska – Niemcy – mniejszość niemiecka w Wielkopolsce. Przeszłość i teraźniejszość,* Poznań; A. Choniawko (2007), *Polityka wobec mniejszości romskiej w latach 1952-1973 na przykładzie Wielkopolski,* "Przegląd Zachodni" No. 3.

[5] H. Chałupczak, T. Browarek (1998), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce 1918-1995,* Lublin, p. 22.

[6] H. Chałupczak, *Liczba mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce w świetle powszechnego spisu ludności z 2002 roku oraz badań naukowych,* in: E. Michalik, H. Chałupczak (eds) (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w procesach transformacji oraz integracji,* Lublin, pp. 264-265.

skie voivodship appeared to be a region where minorities were even less numerous and did not constitute any organised group.

While writing about national and ethnic minorities, it is common to refer to results of national censuses. Since detailed results of the 2011 Census are not available, I will refer to the previous 2002 Census too. It needs to be said, however, that the information on nationality and/or ethnic origin has a specific status in statistical research because it concerns highly subjective and sensitive areas of private life. Estimated minority numbers differ from the census data, usually because of one's fear or reluctance to officially admit his or her minority affiliation. According to the 2002 National Census, the Wielkopolskie voivodship was inhabited by 2,544 people belonging to national and ethnic minorities.[7] In 2011, for the first time in the history of Polish national censuses, respondents could declare complex national and ethnic identities. A comparison of results of the 2002 and 2011 Censuses reveals that the number of people who declared to be members of national and ethnic minorities grew substantially in 2011. According to preliminary results of the 2011 National Census, in the voivodship in question, the population of homogeneous Polish national identity strongly prevails. However, around 13 thousand people, i.e. 0.4% of the entire population of the voivodship, have both Polish and non-Polish national and ethnic identities, while about 5 thousand people have declared only their non-Polish identity. The huge majority of the voivodship population speaks only Polish at home. The census results reveal also that almost 14,700 people speak a non-Polish language at home, 13,600 of whom use it alternatively with the Polish language.[8]

National and ethnic minorities in the Wielkopolskie voivodship can be classified into three groups according to their size, historical ties with the region, internal organisation and external activity. The first group includes minorities whose presence is noted incidentally. Communities in that group had not played any major role in the history of Greater Poland. Generally, they have not created any stable organisations to represent them. The second group are minorities which are also small in number but clearly accentuate their presence in the voivodship. Those minorities have left their trace in the history of the region and are still present in the awareness of the majority society. Communities belonging to the second group have their non-governmental organisations and religious associations that represent them in external contacts. The third group of minorities includes the relatively largest communities which, in some parts of Greater Poland, form fairly compact societies that are noticed by the majority population. Communities in that group have left their mark on the history of Greater Poland. Compared to two first groups, those minorities have most strongly resisted assimilation and now have the largest and best functioning non-governmental organisations with active leaders representing their interests.

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[7] Statistical data on the 2002 National Census are based on the data published by the Central Statistical Office: www.stat.gov.pl/gus/8185_PLK_HTML.htm [accessed: 13.05.2013].

[8] J. Kowalewski (ed.) (2012), *Raport z wyników w województwie wielkopolskim. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011,* Poznań, pp. 85-87.

III

The first group distinguished above includes the Russian, Belarusian, Lemko, Lithuanian, Czech, Tatar, Armenian, Slovak, Greek and Bulgarian minorities. Their membership is exceptionally small. Their presence can be noticed primarily on the basis of results of general censuses, religious activities, and an analysis of historical events. Usually, they do not exhibit any forms of organised activities. According to the available 2011 National Census data, the following numbers of people declared their affiliation to those minorities in the Wielkopolskie voivodship: 504 people to the Russian minority, 311 people to the Belarusian minority, 167 people to the Lemko minority, 153 people to the Lithuanian minority, 120 people to the Czech minority, 94 people to the Tatar minority, 93 people to the Armenian minority, and 81 people to the Slovak minority.[9] According to the 2002 Census, also 66 people of Bulgarian nationality and 54 people of Greek nationality lived in the voivodship. The two latter groups were not included in the list of national and ethnic minorities in the Act of 2005[10]. In my opinion, however, they meet most conditions which identify national minorities and I have included them in my research. According to the 2002 Census, most members of each of the aforementioned minorities, except for Lemkos, lived in Poznań which is the capital city of Greater Poland.[11] In this group of minorities, the Russian minority is the largest. Between WW1 and WW2, there were noticeable communities of Russians in large Polish towns, including Poznań. Those were mainly families of Czarist officers and civil servants who immigrated after the October Revolution.[12] Today, members of that group can be found in religious Orthodox Christian communities. The Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland has two churches in the voivodship: the Saint Nicolas Orthodox Church in Poznań, erected during the inter-war period, and the Saints Apostles Peter and Paul Orthodox Church in Kalisz. The number of Russians and Belarusians grows in Greater Poland due to mixed marriages and increasingly open borders.

Due to their small size and lack of charismatic leaders, most minorities in the first group do not have their organisations. One exception is the Belarusian Cultural and Scientific Centre in Poznań. It is not, however, a typical organisation of national and ethnic minorities. Its members are mainly students from Belarus and Poland. The aim of the Belarusian Centre in Poznań is to promote democracy in Belarus and popularise the knowledge of Belarussian culture and history. Its co-founder and chairman is Vital Voranau, a Belarusian writer and poet.

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[9] The 2011 National Census data on the size of particular minorities used in this paper are based on: http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mac.gov.pl/mne/mniejszosci/wyniki-narodowego-spis/6999,Mniejszosci-narodowe-i-etniczne-oraz-spolecznosc-poslugujaca-sie-jezykiem-kaszub.html [accessed: 16.08.2013].

[10] Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 17, item 141.

[11] According to results of the 2002 National Census, the largest population of Lemkos, i.e. 32 people, lived in the Czarnkowsko-trzcianecki poviat.

[12] L. Olejnik (2003), *Polityka narodowościowa Polski w latach 1944-1960,* Łódź, p. 528

Bulgarians arrived to Greater Poland at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. They were émigrés. After World War II, there were about 200 Bulgarians in Poznań and they worked mainly in horticulture and gardening. Later, local authorities decided to drive gardeners from their farms in Rataje (a part of Poznań) in order to build residential estates in that area. Bulgarians, who mostly lived there, left Poland or moved to neighbouring villages.[13] To this day, the poviat of Poznań is still inhabited by people who identify themselves with the Bulgarian minority.[14]

The decision not to include Greeks in the list of national or ethnic minorities in the Act of 2005 was due to the fact that their ancestors have not "resided within the present territory of the Republic of Poland for at least a hundred years". Dozens of thousands of Greek citizens left their country after the defeat of communists in the Greek civil war of 1946-1949. About 15 thousands of them arrived in Poland. At the end of 1952, there were 19 Greek families with 61 members in Poznań.[15] As a matter of fact, some Greeks, usually tradesmen, had lived in Poznań in previous centuries. For instance, Janusz Żupański, a bookseller and a publisher, came from a Polonised family of Greek merchants. After World War II, a branch of the Nikos Belojanis Association of Political Refugees from Greece in Poland (Związek Uchodźców Politycznych z Grecji w Polsce im. Nikosa Belojanisa) was established in Poznań and, in 1984, changed its name to the Association of Greeks in Poland (Towarzystwo Greków w Polsce). Currently, there is no branch of that association in Poznań. Following the collapse of the Regime of the Colonels in Greece in 1974 and the Act on free repatriation of 1983, some Greeks returned to their homeland. Those who remained in Poland were usually married to a Polish spouse. At present, about 20 Polish-Greek families live in Poznań.[16] The Greek minority is characterised by a high level of education. In the 1980s and 1990s, women in that group were, for example, teachers at primary schools in the Rataje district of Poznań. Helena Dzoka, a singer from the Greek diaspora, whose stage name is Eleni, was a most popular pop music star in Poland from the 1980s to the mid 1990s.

IV

The second group of minorities identified above includes Ukrainians and Jews. According to the 2011 National Census, there were 831 people belonging to the Ukrainian minority in the Wielkopolskie voivodship. As the results of the National Census of 2002 suggest, Ukrainians live mainly in Poznań and the Czarnkowsko-

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[13] Cf. U. Kaczmarek (2001), *Bułgarscy ogrodnicy,* in: *Rataje i Zegrze,* "Kronika Miasta Poznania" No. 3, pp. 194-203.

[14] An interview conducted in 2012 with a person who declared to be a member of the Bulgarian minority.

[15] A. Górna-Kubacka (2007), *Związek Uchodźców Politycznych z Grecji w Polsce im. Nikosa Belojanisa. Oddział Poznański,* "Przegląd Zachodni" No. 3, p. 230.

[16] *Ibidem,* p. 238.

trzcianecki and Złotowski poviats. First Ukrainians settled in Greater Poland between 1918-1939. They were mainly Symon Petliura's soldiers interned in Kalisz. In result of the 1947 Operation Vistula forced resettlement, over 8 thousand people of Ukrainian origin moved to 9 poviats in the Poznańskie voivodship (which in 1945-1950 included the Lubusz Land).[17] After 1947, in Poznań alone, there were about one thousand Ukrainians. Ukrainians were to settle in the so-called Recovered Territories bordering with Germany, where attempts were made to disperse them. At that time, the rule was that there could be no more than three Ukrainian families in one village. From 1957 to 1958, there was a wave of their returns to eastern parts of Poland. In the late 1950s, Ukrainians in Greater Poland began to get involved in social and cultural life, mainly under the umbrella of the Ukrainian Social and Cultural Association (Ukraińskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne)[18]. Their integration was supported by the *Nasze Słowo* [Our Word] weekly published in the Ukrainian language and available across Poland. Its distribution network and subscriptions facilitated learning who lived where. In addition, meetings were organised at the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society (Towarzystwo Przyjaźni Polsko-Radzieckiej) in the centre of Poznań at Ratajczaka Street. The Poznań branch of the Associations of Ukrainians in Poland (Związek Ukraińców) is still active though not much. The branch meetings bring together people of different age and those aged 20 to 40 years prevail. Ukrainians have integrated in their non-governmental organisations and around the Greek Catholic Church. In the 1970s, an opportunity arouse to attend services celebrated by a Greek Catholic priest. Starting from 2002, a Greek Catholic mass has been celebrated each Sunday. It is attended primarily by members of the Ukrainian minority living in Poznań, students from eastern regions of Poland, and Ukrainian citizens who study or work in Poznań. According to people interviewed, the attendance ranges from 20 to 50 people. The Greek Catholic community does not have its own church and, in the past, they used the Roman Catholic church at Żydowska Street in Poznań. Starting from 2013, the community has been using the Roman Catholic church at Toruńska Street in Poznań. Many initiatives related to the Ukrainian culture are organised by communities which are not directly connected with that minority. At the *Bukowińskie Spotkania* International Folk Festival, which has been organised in Jastrowie for over twenty years, the Lemko and Ukrainian cultures are presented. There is also the *Poland-Ukraine* Social and Cultural Association (Stowarzyszenie Społeczno-Kulturalne "Polska-Ukraina") in Poznań which brings together a large group of people interested in the Ukrainian culture. Its aim is to integrate the population of Greater Poland with inhabitants of different regions of Ukraine.[19] Every year, the largest event organised by the Association is the *Ukraińska Wiosna* [Ukrainian

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[17] R. Drozd (1997), *Droga na zachód. Osadnictwo ludności ukraińskiej na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych Polski w ramach akcji "Wisła"*, Warszawa, p. 14.

[18] Information contained in this part, comes from interviews conducted in 2013 with three persons who declared to be members of the Ukrainian minority.

[19] www.poznajsasiada.org/event/ukrajinska-vesna/ [accessed: 13.05.2013].

Spring] festivity, the programme of which includes concerts, folk craft exhibitions, historical workshops, and scientific conferences. In 2013, it was held for the 6th time and events were organised in Poznań, the Poznański poviat, Leszno, Zbąszyń, Piła, and Gniezno.

According to the 2011 National Census results, there were 285 people in Greater Poland who declared their affiliation to the Jewish minority. Most of them lived in Poznań and in the Poznański poviat. In the history of Polish Jews, Greater Poland, and in particular Poznań, were highly important places. In the 19th century, in the territory annexed by Prussia, Jews assimilated to the German society. Having been granted equal rights in the Prussian state, Jews frequently were very loyal to Prussia, which made Poles averse to them. After World War I, a large part of the Jewish community moved to Germany. The subsequent World War II permanently interrupted the history of that minority in Polish lands. Almost 90% of pre-war Polish Jews died during the Holocaust.[20] After 1945, the size of the Jewish population in Poland shrank gradually in result of emigration waves. At present, it is difficult to determine the precise size of that minority in Poland. The Jewish commune has about 40 members active in Poznań.[21] It is thus a small but highly organised group. In accordance with the principle that every child born to a Jewish mother is a Jew, the Jews of Poznań refer to their matrilineal descent. Many persons keep searching for their Jewish identity and this, usually, does not exclude the sense of being also a Pole.[22] The organisation that represents their religious life is the Poznań branch of the Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Poland. Its leader is Alicja Kobus, a charismatic local government activist. The community organises celebrations of the Shabbat and other Jewish holy days. Since the year 2000, a field branch of the Jewish Social and Cultural Association in Poland (Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Żydów w Polsce), which is the largest Jewish organisation in Poland, was established in the Wielkopolskie voivodship. Another organisation active in the voivodship is the Association of Jewish War Veterans and Victims of World War II (Stowarzyszenie Żydów Kombatantów i Osób Poszkodowanych w II Wojnie Światowej). Activities of the association are financed with governmental subsidies, its own funds, and by private sponsors. An important spot on the cultural map of Poznań is the *Miasteczko Poznań* [The Little Town of Poznań] which is "a Jewish magazine about small homelands" as its authors describe it. Its editor is Zbigniew Pakuła, a Posnanian writer and journalist and the author of book about the Poznań Jews: *Siwe Kamienie* and *The Jews of Poznań*. So far, the *Miasteczko Poznań* magazine has been published twice a year but the intent of the editorial staff is to make it a quarterly from

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[20] A. Cała, *Mniejszość żydowska,* in: P. Madajczyk (ed.) (1998), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce, Państwo i społeczeństwo polskie a mniejszości narodowe w okresach przełomów politycznych 1944-1989,* Warszawa, p. 245.

[21] www.poznan.jewish.org.pl/index.php/0_naszej_gminie/ [accessed: 10.05.2013].

[22] Information contained in this part of the paper comes from interviews conducted in 2013 with two persons who declared to be members of the Jewish minority.

2013. The magazine is published in 1,200 copies and each issue has about 144 pages. The Jewish heritage of Poznań and Greater Poland is an increasingly popular topic. For some time, the issue which had been most frequently covered in the media is the restoration of the Poznań synagogue building. The building of the so-called New Synagogue was built 1907 at Stawna Street and testified to the prosperity of the Poznań Jewish community. In 1941, the German occupation authorities turned the synagogue into a swimming pool, greatly disturbing the architecture of that part of the Poznań Old Town. Attempts at establishing a centre for dialogue and tolerance in the synagogue have been made for a long time. Every January, the Catholic Church, in cooperation with the Jewish community, organises the Days of Judaism. The festivity of the Jewish Street in Poznań and celebrations of the founding of Israel which were held in May 2013 in Greater Poland, confirm the impact of the Jewish heritage on the present inhabitants of the region.

<div align="center">V</div>

The third group, which I have identified above, includes Roma and German minorities. They are the largest and best organised groups. According to declared national/ethnic affiliations in the 2011 National Census, there were 1,221 people of Roma origin and 3,191 people of German origin in the Wielkopolskie voivodship.

During the Second Republic of Poland, the German minority in Greater Poland was a compact and well organised community.[23] In 1931, about 193 thousands members of the German minority lived in the then Poznańskie voivodship.[24] The end of World War II and the subsequent expulsion of the German population reduced the size of that community markedly. According to results of the 2002 National Census, most members of the German minority lived in the Złotowski poviat, in Poznań and Piła. Today, the German community in Greater Poland is dispersed and diversified. Its members include both ethnic Germans from Poznań and the former Leszczyńskie voivodship who were citizens of the Second Polish Republic before WW2, and Germans who, before WW2, were citizens of the 3rd Reich and whose places of residence became part of the territory of the Polish state after 1945. There are also some Germans from the former eastern parts of Poland who arrived to Greater Poland during World War II and decided to stay, usually because of marrying a Polish spouse. Last but not least, there are Germans from other regions of Poland who settled in Greater Poland after WW2.[25] Most members of the German minority in the Wielko-

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[23] A. Sakson, *Niemcy i mniejszość niemiecka w Wielkopolsce – od grupy dominującej do grupy diasporycznej,* in: *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce. Niemcy w rozproszeniu,* Vol. 2, Series: Poland-Germany, No. 4, Warszawa 1999, p. 36.

[24] H. Chałupczak, T. Browarek (1998), *op. cit.,* p. 125.

[25] A. Sakson (1993), *Działalność Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego Mniejszości Niemieckiej Ziemi Wielkopolskiej,* "Przegląd Zachodni" No. 1, pp. 163-164.

polskie voivodship are people born before 1939.[26] While being interviewed by me, those who were born after 1945, underlined that they have maintained their German identity thanks to their parents and grandparents. The noticeable lack of younger people in the German community is usually explained with possibilities to leave for Germany in the 1990s. About 85% of members of the German minority, who were active in Poznań in the first half of the 1990s, did not know the German language.[27] According to interviewed members of that minority in Piła, in the northern part of the voivodship, the ability to speak and write German is higher (about 50%-60%). It is worth noting, however, that meetings of the minority members in Piła, which I had the chance to observe in 2011, 2012, and 2013, were held in the Polish language.[28] German was used by some members only. Some of them were disappointed that the whole meeting could not have been held in the German language. The interview data demonstrate that most members of the German minority in the Wielkopolskie voivodship are Roman Catholics. The interviewees said that the Sunday mass in the Evangelical-Augsburg parish in Piła is attended by about 60 people, some of whom are members of the German minority.

The first German minority organisation in Greater Poland was the Cultural and Social Association of the German Minority in Greater Poland (Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Mniejszości Niemieckiej Ziemi Wielkopolskiej, TSKMNZW) which was registered in the early 1990s by people from Poznań, Luboń and Ostrów Wielkopolski. In 1993, the Association had 426 members and 274 supporters.[29] The largest number of its members lived in Poznań and in the former Poznańskie and Leszczyńskie voivodships. The association had three branches covering western and northern Greater Poland, Poznań, and southern Greater Poland. The first leader of that organisation was Włodzimierz Alois Siebert from Luboń. In November 1992, an explosive device was planted at the seat of the Association in Luboń, causing serious material losses. The threatened Board of the Association decided to close its Luboń office. During the initial period of its activity, the Association effectively cooperated with many institutions in the voivodship. In cooperation with the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznań, it organised conferences on the history of the region and the German minority in Greater Poland. However, the lack of a charismatic leader, personal conflicts, and internal differences curbed further development of the Association and it split in 1994. New organisations gradually declined. At the beginning of the 21st century, there was the Social and Cultural Association of the German

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[26] Information contained in this part of the paper comes from interviews conducted in 2013 with ten persons who declared to be members of the German minority.

[27] A. Sakson (1993), *Działalność Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego...,* p. 167.

[28] Based on observations of the General Meeting of the German Social and Cultural Association (Niemieckie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, NTSK) in Piła on 14 May 2011, of the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the NTSK in Piła on 2 June 2012, and of the General Meeting of the NTSK in Piła on 27 April 2013.

[29] A. Sakson (1993), *Działalność Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego...,* p. 163.

Minority in Poznań (Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Mniejszości Niemieckiej w Poznaniu). In 2007, it reported that the German minority in Poznań and its vicinity was about 760 people strong, including family members.[30] That Association had its seat in Poznań. It organised lectures on the German heritage, Advent celebrations and language courses. Its members cared for the graves of German soldiers at war cemeteries. They also collaborated with the Poznań Evangelical Association (Poznańskie Towarzystwo Ewangelickie). In addition, they published a quarterly information bulletin titled *Posener Heimat*. However, a personal conflict combined with a suspicion of fraud and the Association broke down. Due to organisational problems and the lack of a local leader, no attempts were made to rebuild the Association in Poznań. Only now, thanks to the declared active support of the Union of German Social and Cultural Associations (Związek Niemieckich Stowarzyszeń Społeczno-Kulturalnych), about 15 members of the German minority in Poznań try to reconstruct its structure. The rebirth of organisational life of the German minority in Poznań may be successful thanks to new projects financed by the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In contrast, the German minority in northern Greater Poland has its one NGO which has been active to this day. Members of that community are mostly German citizens since birth who, after 1945, remained in Poland. In Piła, first activities of the German minority members began under the umbrella of the Social and Cultural Association of the German Minority in Gdańsk, and later of the Association in Bydgoszcz. In 1992, an independent German Social and Cultural Association (Niemieckie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, NTSK), was established and covered Piła and Złotów. The Association in Piła appointed Edwin Kemnitz to be its chairman. Kemnitz was born in 1934 in the area of the now Chodzieski poviat. He has been the chairman for over 20 years, proving his great commitment despite his age related health issues. Throughout those years, over 1300 people were members of the NTSK in Piła. At present, the Association has 221 members in Piła and 68 in Złotów, including 157 ordinary members with documented German origin; others are supporting members who usually are family members. On 27 April 2013, the General Meeting of the NTSK in Piła was attended by 42 ordinary members and 20 supporting members. When interviewed, activists of the Association explained that the low attendance was due to the old age and poor health of many members. It was also underlined that cultural and social events organised by the Association often enjoy better attendance than election meetings. The persons interviewed were of the opinion that the number of persons of German descent in northern Greater Poland is higher than the number of the NTSK members. They said that some people who declare to be Germans have not joined the NTSK for many reasons including the obligation to pay the membership fee.

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[30] M. Wittek (2007), *Związek Niemieckich Stowarzyszeń Społeczno-Kulturalnych w Polsce 1991-2007*, Opole, p. 253

The NTSK in Piła is a permanent member of the Union of German Social and Cultural Associations in Poland. The NTSK in Piła cooperates with the Union of Former Piła (Schneidemühl) Residents in Germany and Denmark. The Association offers German language courses at different levels for various age groups. There is also a choir which popularises German songs. The NTSK has its own office with a library of German literature and press. The seat of the Association is the place of meetings with guests from Poland and Germany and of social gatherings of senior persons. In addition, the NTSK has its website. The interviewees emphasised also the relatively good cooperation with the local government. The Association assists two kindergartens in Piła in teaching the German language to children. Celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the Association in Piła held in 2012 were attended by the Mayor of Piła and the head (*starosta*) of the Pilski poviat. Activities of the NTSK in Piła are funded with governmental subsidies for national and ethnic minorities as well as financially supported by the Foundation for the Development of Silesia and Support of Local Initiatives in Opole (Fundacja Rozwoju Śląska oraz Wspierania Inicjatyw Lokalnych w Opolu), the German Consulate General in Gdańsk, and the Union of German Social and Cultural Associations in Poland which has its seat in Opole.

After their dynamic and spontaneous development in the early 1990s, organisations of the German minority entered a stagnation phase. That is best illustrated with the history of the association in Poznań. In the beginning, German organisations were attractive to potential members. Being a member of a minority was useful for those who applied for double citizenship and it helped them get legal jobs in Germany. The process of European integration contributed to the loss of the original appeal of German associations. Activities of those associations have gradually been based on the involvement of their senior members. In contrast to the situation in Poznań, leaders of the NTSK in Piła, despite their old age health issues, have succeeded in keeping the NTSK alive. It is clear, however, that German associations need new younger elites and a wider intellectual base. German minority organisations may provide the still needed support in the difficult of task of familiarising residents of Greater Poland with the German cultural heritage.

VI

The Roma people are a group oriented towards intra-group activities and that clearly differentiates them not only from the majority population but also from other minority groups. Having a culture perceived as exotic and archaic, the Roma minority has managed to resists assimilation. At the same time, the cultural distinctness and a specific social and economic situation make the Roma most endangered with social exclusion and negative perception by the majority population.[31] After World

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[31] E. Subocz, *Romowie w Polsce – między egzotyką a marginalizacją społeczną,* in: A. Chodubski,

War I, when Poland regained independence, different groups of Roma people found their home in Greater Poland. They were descendants of those who lived in the Republic of Poland for centuries, the nineteenth-century immigrants from Wallachia and Transylvania, as well as those whose earlier cultural environment was German or Russian. The Roma in Greater Poland, like in other regions of Europe, have never been a uniform community. They are divided into many groups which differ in terms of their dialects, history, internal laws, and traditions.

According to the 2011 National Census data, the Roma population in the Wielkopolskie voivodship is the fifth largest in Poland. To compare, according to the "Census of Gypsies" carried out by the administration in 1976, there were about 1,500 Roma people registered (permanent residence) in Greater Poland (at the time divided into four voivodships). They formed over 300 families. In Poznań, 78 people (13 families) lived in 1976.[32] In an attempt at describing the size and territorial distribution of the Roma in Greater Poland, I will supplement the aforementioned results of censuses with my research findings. I found an analysis of Roma cooperation with local governments, which is part of the governmental Programme for the Roma Community in Poland[33], performed by the Wielkopolskie Voivodship Office to be helpful. Another useful document was a report on Roma pupils which included the number of Roma children in school age and the number of children who actually attended schools[34] prepared by the Wielkopolskie Educational Authority for the head (viovod) of the Wielkopolskie voivodship. My analysis also included information on the number of registered unemployed Roma persons and the scale of unemployment in that population provided by the Wielkopolskie Labour Office.[35] The above was supplemented with information obtained while interviewing members of the Roma community who determined the size of their groups on the basis of their own knowledge coming from them attending various Roma family events, such as weddings or funerals.[36]

According to my findings, the Roma in the Wielkopolskie voivodship live in thirty communes [smallest administrative units in Poland]. The largest Roma community of 500 people lives in Poznań. About 300 Roma people live in Swarzędz, and groups with more than 100 members live in Leszno, Ostrów Wielkopolski, Kostrzyn,

L. Ozdarska (eds) (2013), *Europejskie doświadczenia mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych,* Warszawa, p. 138.

[32] W. Olszewski (1985), *Dystans etniczny Polacy-Romowie,* "Etnografia Polska" Vol. XXIX, No. 2, p. 244.

[33] Letter, Ref. No. BW-II.6113.13.2013.10 of 28.02.2013, in the archives of the Wielkopolskie Voivodship Office.

[34] Letter, Ref. No. WKWiO.572.1.2013 of 21.02.2013, in the archives of the Wielkopolskie Voivodship Office.

[35] Letter, Ref. No. WUPXX/3-0240/7-3/2013 of 9.01.2013, in the archives of the Wielkopolskie Voivodship Office.

[36] Information contained in this part of the paper comes from four interviews and five brief conversations carried in 2012 with nine persons who declared to be members of the Roma minority.

Pleszew, and Kłodawa. Roma communities are also noticeable in Jarocin, Kalisz, Witkowo, Gniezno, Oborniki, Rawicz, Wolsztyn, and Konin. Less numerous groups live in Września, Kępno, Chodzież, Kościan, Kórnik, Piła, Złotów, Turek, Koło, Stare Miasto, Tarnowo Podgórne, Szamocin, Słupca, and Środa Wielkopolska. My research indicates that, in total, about 2,200 Romani people live in the Wielkopolskie voivodship. It is worth noting that the size of the Roma population in Greater Poland reported by Roma non-governmental organisations is frequently more than twice that large.

So far, no detailed research has been conducted to determine the size of specific Roma groups in the Wielkopolskie voivodship. Relevant information on that issue can be found in very few publications on the Roma in Greater Poland, in documents of Roma non-governmental organisations, and some information was obtained from interviewed members of the Roma community. Most frequently, the Roma groups in Greater Poland are Polska Roma and Lovari. The ancestors of Polska Roma arrived in Greater Poland in the 16th century. They came from the territories of German countries where they had been increasingly persecuted.[37] For a few hundred years, the territories of the present Wielkopolskie voivodship were an area there they continued their nomadic lifestyle. Polska Roma is divided into a number of subgroups and families whose names derive from a given territory, the name or nickname of an ancestor, a profession practised, and the like. According to the Romani interviewees, most respected families of Polska Roma are *Kaliszaki* and *Jaglanowie*. Individual families in the Polska Roma group are often joined by marriages with Sasytka Roma people originally from Germany and Xaladytka Roma originally from Ukraine and Lithuania. Both Sasytka and Xaladyka groups live in similar parts of the voivodship as Polska Roma groups do.

The Lovari Roma arrived in Greater Poland in great numbers shortly before and immediately after World War I began. They moved to Greater Poland to avoid conscription into the Austrian army. After World War II, new Lovari families arrived in Greater Poland. They came from the former eastern borderlands of Poland and territories of the USSR. Conflicts with the Romani people who already lived in Greater Poland started immediately. The newcomers accused them of abandoning their Romani traditions and way of life. The Lovari, who often invoked their royal descent, were in a much better financial situation. The distance between the Lovari and other Roma groups in Greater Poland is still noticeable today. At present, the Lovari constitute the largest Roma group in Poznań. They also live in Swarzędz, Leszno and Gniezno.

The Kalderash Roma arrived in Greater Poland in the mid 19th century. Most of their traits can be found in Poznań. This group is associated with pre-WW2 artisanal workshops and the Poznań copper boilers factory of Matejasz Kwiek who employed over four hundred workers.[38] After World War II, several Kalderash families arrived

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[37] A. Mirga, L. Mróz (1994), *Cyganie. Odmienności i nietolerancja,* Warszawa, p. 35.
[38] J. Ficowski (1965), *Cyganie na polskich drogach,* Kraków, p. 81.

from the former eastern parts of Poland and the USSR, but the size of that group clearly shrank in the voivodship. Today, the Kalderash live mainly in Oborniki and Swarzędz.

The Bergitka Roma group has been always very small in Greater Poland. Today, few of Bergitka Roma people live in Chodzież, in which they arrived after World War II in result of resettlement from the east. The family of well-known musician Miklosz Deki Czureja, who have lived in Poznań for several years, should be mentioned in this context.

In Greater Poland, there is no big community of Roma people from Romania and countries of former Yugoslavia. After their massive arrivals in the 1990s, they left Poland heading for their native countries or moved to western Europe.

In the 1960s, Roma families in Greater Poland were the most active ones in Poland in pursuing their nomadic life. They settled after 1964, being forced to do so by the state administration. The majority of them settled in cities and towns. Wojciech Olszewski, in his study of ethnic distance on the example of one of Poznań boroughs, mentions that Roma people of the Sasytka Roma group lived in barracks in outskirts of Poznań after years of setting up their summer camps in that place. Few years later, the borough authorities decided to demolish the barracks, and the Roma people were given, *inter alia*, two flats in a housing estate consisting of concrete blocks of flats.[39] In the whole voivodship, Roma people were initially offered poor housing conditions in unattractive locations. Richest Roma families were in the best situation. In Poznań, the Lovari would usually choose their places of residence themselves. One of their families bought a residential property in a quiet and sparsely populated area because of its location. With time, its relatives move in nearby.[40] A similar trend could be observed in Leszno and Kalisz, where affluent families of Polish Roma opted for buying houses next to one another, creating miniature residential Roma districts.

The 2002 National Census data provide more detailed information on the Roma community. It is a young population aged 27.7 years on average. It is also a typically urban community as in 2002, as many as 92.5% of Roma people lived in towns.[41] Characteristic features of the Roma population in Poland include a high unemployment rate and deep income stratification. For 90% of the Roma population the only income are benefits, annuities, or pensions.[42] When describing the financial situation of the Roma people in Greater Poland, one can refer to the official data on the situa-

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[39] W. Olszewski (1985), *op. cit.,* p. 243.

[40] *Ibidem*, p. 245.

[41] G. Gudaszewski, *Demograficzno-społeczna charakterystyka obywateli polskich deklarujących „narodowość niepolską” w Narodowym Spisie Powszechnym w 2002 roku*, in: L. Adamczuk, S. Łodziński (eds) (2006), *Mniejszości narodowe w świetle Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego z 2002 roku*, Warszawa, pp. 108-127.

[42] J. Klima, A. Paszko, *Romowie w warunkach przemian wolnorynkowych*, in: M. Zawicki, A. Paszko (eds) (2010), *Polityka wspierania romskiej mniejszości etnicznej na rynku pracy*, Kraków, pp. 129-130.

tion of that community in the labour market. That data, however, needs to be supplemented with information obtained while interviewing members of that community. The Wielkopolskie Labour Office delivers annual reports on employment among the Roma people. That is part of the governmental Programme for the Roma Community in Poland, the implementation of which is supervised by voivods. According to information obtained from Poviat Labour Offices, at the end of 2011, the number of Roma people who registered as unemployed was 205 in the Wielkopolskie voivodship. The registered unemployed Roma people only incidentally took advantage of subsidised employment programmes (work placements), internships and free training courses which help update one's professional qualifications or change a career. In Poland, only about 10% of Roma people make their living out of legal jobs and pay taxes regularly.[43] From interviews conducted, it follows that their percentage in the Wielkopolskie voivodship is even smaller. Most frequently, the legally employed earn much less than the national average wage. The Roma who have their own registered businesses are in a better situation but there are few of them in Greater Poland. My research findings on Greater Poland are that among the entrepreneurs were used car dealers, a gas station owner, a hotel owner, and a publisher of local newspaper. For the majority of the Roma in Greater Poland, the source of income are small-scale trading activities, often based on family connections abroad. Usually, such activities are part of shadow economy, both in Poland and abroad. That way of earning money necessitates frequent trips abroad. The Roma interviewees emphasised that many families became rich in the 1980s and 1990s thanks to trips to eastern Europe and differences in currency rates. At present, even most affluent Roma families begin to feel consequences of the economic crisis. A vast majority of Roma interviewees claimed that their earnings from trade have considerably decreased since 2009-2011. The wealth of some Roma families manifested with expensive houses and cars overshadows the poorer part of that community. Luxurious residences, on the basis of which many inhabitants of the voivodship judge the financial status of all Roma people, belong to the already mentioned families of *Kaliszakowie* and *Jaglanowie* of Polska Roma and several families of the Lovari group. Big fortunes have hardly been made overnight. They have been accumulated for generations. In 1979, assets of each of the Lovari families in Poznań were assessed by the militia [police] to be worth at least a few million zlotys, which was a considerable amount as at that time as assets of a moderately affluent family in Poznań were estimated to be worth a few hundred thousand zlotys.[44] However, next to the wealthy Roma live families whose financial situation is much worse. The same militia reports of 1979 described members of the Sasytka Roma group in Poznań as very poor and prone to law breaking.

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[43] J. Klima, A. Paszko, *Polscy Romowie i ich strategie gospodarcze. Perspektywa historyczna*, in: J. Balvin, Ł. Kwadrans (eds) (2010), *Situation of Roma Minority in Czech, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia*, Wrocław, p. 33.

[44] W. Olszewski (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 246.

"Those gypsies commit various crimes, starting from minor scams involving pans and fabrics, through theft and burglaries, to rapes and robberies."[45]

Formal education, certificates and diplomas are not valued in the Roma culture. In the interviews, the Roma emphasised that they would decide to study if it brought them benefits shortly. The 2002 National Census data demonstrates that over 90% of that population attended primary schools only, 50.8% of whom did not complete their primary education or any level of that education.[46] In the Wielkopolskie voivodship, the situation of Roma people is similar or worse than in Poland at large. According to the Wielkopolskie Education Authority, in 2004-2011, about 161 to 215 Roma pupils should have been in compulsory education in Greater Poland. The actual number of Roma pupils attending school in those years ranged from 99 to 133. The attendance among Roma children was 60% to 70%. Unfortunately, grades earned by them were very low and ranged from 2.38 to 3.2 [1 is the failing grade and 6 is very good] in the years examined.

Roma non-governmental organisations are clearly more numerous than organisations of any other national and ethnic minority in the Wielkopolskie voivodship. The most active organisation is the Greater Poland Cultural and Educational Association of Polish Roma (Wielkopolskie Stowarzyszenie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Polskich Romów). It was established in 2004 by Mikołaj Głowacki, the first chairman of the association, and Marek Miller, the present chairman and the-then vice-chairman. Both of them have their roots in Pomerania, and stayed abroad in the 1990s, mainly in Germany and Great Britain. According to Miller[47], the idea to establish a Roma organisation that would safeguard rights of that population in Poland was born during their stay abroad. The first issues the Association dealt with concerned the return of Roma people from emigration and passport issues. In 2007, the Greater Poland Cultural and Educational Association of the Polish Roma received the first governmental subsidy for projects titled "White Saturdays for Roma people in a difficult financial situation" (health care) and "Social integration of Roma children through educational and integrative activities". Since then, every year, the Association actively participates in the governmental Programme for the Roma Community in Poland. From 2007 to 2012, the Greater Poland Cultural and Educational Association of the Polish Roma implemented 20 projects. In addition to projects mentioned above, the following should be mentioned: "Social integration of Roma children through an educational-integrative trip", "Promotion of the Roma culture through the participation of the Roma artistic groups in the celebrations of the Days of Swarzędz", "Prophylactic dental examinations for Roma people in a difficult financial situation", "Promotion of the Roma culture and history in Poland. Overcoming the barriers and racist biases among school children", and "Organisation of training courses to upgrade professional qualifications".

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[45] *Ibidem.*, p. 245.

[46] G. Gudaszewski (2006), *op. cit*., pp. 108-127.

[47] An interview with M. Miller conducted in 2012.

The *Bahtałe Roma* Foundation is active mainly in Poznań and its vicinity. The foundation was established in 2002 at the initiative of Miklosz Deka Czurej, a Roma violinist, and his partner Anna Markowska. Until 2010, its name was the *Fundacja Bahtałe Roma – Szczęśliwi Cyganie* [*Bahtałe Roma* – Happy Gypsies Foundation]. Since its very beginning, the Foundation has had a specific place in the Roma community due to the descent of its founders. The president of the *Bahtałe Roma* Foundation is a woman and a person of non-Romani descent and as such has met with opposition and, often, hostility on the part of traditional leaders of the Roma community. Czureja, in turn, is a members of the Bergitka Roma group and as such has not been fully accepted by the dominant Polska Roma and Lovari groups. Due to the lack of support of traditional leaders, activities of the Foundation are often badly received by the Roma. Projects undertaken by the Foundation are dependent on its relations with particular families. Participation in its activities is conditioned by personal interest and in return for cooperation, the Roma demand money from the Foundation. Not being able to meet such demands, the Foundation is accused of misappropriation of subsidies for the Roma. Such a situation results in the temporal character of activities and the need to manoeuvre to meet expectations of specific groups.

In its activities, the Foundation has concentrated on education. In 2007, its primary and secondary level Schools of Music were entered into the registry of non-public artistic schools kept by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage. In 2007, following a decision of the President of Poznań, the following schools were registered as public schools: the *Bahtałe Roma* Foundation Public Primary School for Adults, the *Bahtałe Roma* Foundation Public Lower Secondary School for Adults, and the *Bahtałe Roma* Foundation Public Upper Secondary School for Adults. The schools have their seat on the premises of the 11th Comprehensive Upper Secondary School at Ściegiennego Street in Poznań. Artistic activities of the *Bahtałe Roma* include meetings with artists and exhibitions of visual arts. The Foundation has published a Roma-Polish and Polish-Roma dictionary. It participates in the governmental Programme for the Roma Community in Poland and in 2005-2012, the Foundation implemented the following projects: "Employment of Roma education assistants", "Employment of a support teacher", "Education of adults: completion of secondary education", "Education of adults: vocational training for drivers", "Activity of the Roma House: purchase of equipment", "Computer equipment for the Roma integrative daily care centre", "Organisation of a tailor's shop", "Running a citizens' advice bureau", "Education of children and teenagers at schools offering the Roma education programmes", "Provision of an entrepreneurship training course", "Equipment for an art room for children", "Purchase of fabrics for stage costumes for an art room for children", and "Purchase of textbooks for Roma pupils".

Other non-governmental Roma organisations in the Wielkopolskie voivodship are less active. The oldest one, the Roma Foundation (*Fundacja Romów*), was established by Józef Łakatosz from the Poznań group of Lovari. The foundation was

registered in 1992 and had its seat in Warsaw. According to its president, at the beginning of its activity the Foundation cooperated with Jacek Kuroń who then was the Minister of Labour and Social Policy.[48] The main area of cooperation was the issue of Romanian Roma who, at that time, arrived in Poland in large numbers. Using its contacts abroad, the Foundation acted as an intermediary in persuading the migrant Roma to continue their journey to western Europe or go back to Romania. As the president of the Foundation claims, all documentation from that period was lost in Germany when a car was stolen. Currently, the Foundation provides assistance mainly in obtaining or confirming Polish citizenship. In 2012, the Foundation officially moved its seat to Poznań and, for the first time, applied to participate in the Programme for the Roma Community in Poland. In fact, it was after the year 2000 that other Roma organisations emerged in Greater Poland. In 2004, the *DROM* Roma Association in Poland (Stowarzyszenie Romów w Polsce "DROM") was registered in Pleszew. In 2006, it applied to the governmental Programme to finance the purchase of textbooks for Roma pupils and heating fuels for poorest Roma families. No subsidy was granted and the Association has not been active since then. In 2005, another organisation was registered in Pleszew, i.e. the Greater Poland Association of the Roma (Wielkopolskie Stowarzyszenie Romów). The 2011 elections gave it an impulse to act and, one year later, the Association implemented two projects as part of the governmental Programme for the Roma Community in Poland: "Citizens' advice bureau" and "Back to the roots. Lessons on working with horses" which was addressed to children and teenagers. Another initiative the aim of which was to bring together individual Roma groups, was the establishment of the World Chamber of Roma Lords in March 2007. The Chamber was set under the aegis of the *Bahtałe Roma* Foundation following agreements reached at the 4th World Meetings with the Roma Culture held in Zielona Góra. Attempts were made to make that organisation international. It was decided that its major objectives would include the creation of an international Romani cultural trail and Roma research and development centres, improvement of living standards of the Roma population by advancing the level of employment, education, entrepreneurship, housing, health care, culture and sport, and improving the social situation. Joint acting, however, proved to be difficult, and the World Chamber of the Roma Lords has not launched any initiative so far.

VII

Summing up, national and ethnic minorities in the Wielkopolskie voivodship do not play a major role at present. All minorities are small in size and territorially dispersed. Non-governmental organisations of the relatively largest Roma and German communities are most active. German minority associations were active in the 1990s but much less active in the new millennium. In contrast, Roma associations

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[48] An interview with J. Łakatosz conducted in 2012.

and foundations in Greater Poland started to be active only in the early 21st century. The growth of those organisations was largely influenced by the implementation of governmental programmes aimed at reducing social exclusion of the Roma minority. It is also worth highlighting that the Roma community is the least assimilated minority in Greater Poland. In addition to those largest and most active minorities, there are also minority groups which are perceived mainly through the prism of historical heritage. The best example is the Jewish minority which, despite being small, is still present in the awareness of inhabitants of the region. In the case of the Jewish minority but also the Ukrainian minority, most important cultural initiatives are launched and implemented by communities which are not directly related to the minorities. In general, minority organisations are active in their own communities. There are not many initiatives of minority organisations addressed to the majority society. There are also no activities which would significantly influence the political, social or cultural life of the region. The case of the split of the Social and Cultural Association of the German Minority in Greater Poland demonstrates that the existence of minority organisations is based on the activity of leading individuals. Without their dedication hardly anything would be achieved. The charisma and involvement of individual leaders are often the necessary condition for the existence of any organised life of a minority. Finally, the functioning of specific minority organisations largely depends on external (governmental) subsidies.

In the light of the deepening European integration and the related growing mobility of people, the growing number of immigrants working in Poland, and the already observed changes in the identity experience in an multicultural environment, it is likely that the research on national and ethnic minorities in the economically attractive Wielkopolskie voivodship will change its scope to include new phenomena.

ABSTRACT

The paper describes the situation of national and ethnic minorities in the Greater Poland voivodship. In part, it refers to results of a field research carried by the author in 2011-2013. On the basis of the size, territorial location, internal organisation and activities of NGOs, the minorities studied were classified into three groups. The following minorities are described: Russian, Belorussian, Lemko, Lithuanian, Armenian, Tartar, Czech, Greek, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Jewish, German, and Roma.

Minorities in Greater Poland are rather small in number and territorially dispersed. They do not form any compact local communities in any part of the voivodship. Particular national and ethnic minorities differ in the level of their internal organisation. As these minorities live in deep diaspora, their NGOs do not have much impact on the political, social or cultural life of the region.

Gospodarka niemiecka 20 lat po zjednoczeniu

[German Economy 20 Years after Reunification]

Tomasz Budnikowski, Editor

This publication is devoted to challenges which German economy faced in the first 20 years after the reunification, a topic which is both current and important from the perspective of research and economic performance. The authors – J. Misala, M. Götz, I. Romiszewska, P. Kalka, T. Budnikowski and M. Żukowski – comprehensively discuss most important issues since East and West Germany merged.

The first issue discussed is how big the economic disproportions between eastern and western lands are at present. Then changes in Germany's foreign trade are analysed in detail as its role in Germany's economic growth is important. Next, the focus moves to the structure of R&D expenditure. A comparison of R&D outlays in Germany and other highly-developed countries shows that the volume of Germany's investments continues to be relatively huge.

Much space is given to Germany's social integration, primarily to unemployment resulting from the introduction of market economy in the former German Democratic Republic. Another issue tackled is the rapid ageing of German society and the functioning of the social security system.

Conclusions offered in each paper are on both the theory and practice of German economic policy, making this publication useful for researchers, students of economics as well as politicians and economists.

EWA NOWICKA
Warsaw

YOUNG VIETNAMESE GENERATION IN POLAND:
CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

In Poland, Vietnamese people are the largest immigrant community whose culture is not European. It is difficult to determine their number. It is currently estimated at 35 thousand. In Poland, which more frequently "sends" its citizens abroad than "welcomes" foreigners, the Vietnamese group attracts attention of scholars. What they find interesting is the manner in which Vietnamese people adapt to the Polish environment, diverse identity strategies of various groups, and the functioning of Polish-Vietnamese marriages. In the subject literature, it is highlighted that Vietnamese people usually enter the Polish community through group adaptation processes and, to a large extent, remain socially closed within their own ethnic group. Their social contacts with Poles are usually superficial and their cultural bonds with Poland are most frequently limited. Despite the above, there are Vietnamese immigrants who deeply relate to the Polish culture and have close relations with Poles, including Polish spouses.

It is possible to distinguish two waves of Vietnamese migrations to Poland with different social characteristics. In addition to the two waves, there is a third different group of the Vietnamese living in Poland. The third group consists of people born and brought up in Poland, who are the second generation of immigrants and most of them are children of the first-wave immigrants.

Issues tackled in this article concern the young generation of Vietnamese people who were either born or brought up in Poland since their early age. The main questions asked concern their level of adaptation and acculturation to the Polish society, their identity types and models, and internal group conflicts. Those people are in a specific psychological situation being under the pressure of both cultures which is well illustrated by the expression *caught between a rock and a hard place*. Intuitively, *a rock* is the culture of their destination country and *a hard place* is the native culture of their parents and grandparents. The situation of those young people is not easy. On the one hand, cultural differences within the Vietnamese society are huge while family bonds and traditions are strong. On the other hand, the young Vietnamese have a feeling that it is difficult for them to fully "melt" into the Polish society because of physical differences which Poles perceive as noticeable and big. I will

also try to show differences, which can be observed in the process of adaptation and acculturation to Polish culture, between young people who are the second generation, i.e. children of Vietnamese immigrants of "the first wave", and "the second wave" Vietnamese, and between young men and women from both waves.

Research of anthropologists like P. Radin, H. Spicer, R. Linton, and N. Lourie suggests that when communities of native Americans collide with the Western civilisation, differences between sexes surface. That refers to the ways and intensity of adaptation and acculturation to a new Euro-American way of life. For men, that process is much more difficult and more frequently accompanied by pathological phenomena and dramatic psychological issues. For women, acculturation to Euro-American models is easier, *inter alia*, because their social status tends to improve rather than worsen, and traditional roles are maintained while daily life is easier thanks to technological advancements of Western civilisation. In contrast, men have suffered more because of being cut off from their previous social roles which granted them a higher place in the social hierarchy and enabled to demonstrate their manhood power.

Being aware that examples from the area of the United States described by anthropologists refer to a different setting than those of Vietnamese immigrants' encounter with Poland and the Polish culture, I use American examples only as an inspiration for my analysis of different reactions to Polish European culture. One of such contact situations is marrying a Pole, which requires trespassing principles essential to maintaining the cohesion of value systems and conduct patterns. The identity of children from mixed Polish-Vietnamese marriages is a separate issue beyond the scope of the present paper.

TWO IMMIGRATION WAVES AND TWO TYPES OF THE POLISH VIETNAMESE

The inflow of Vietnamese immigrants to Poland started in the 1950s and had its first peak in the mid 1960s to the late 1980s. The policy of the then Polish People's Republic was to provide educational support to young people from poorer socialist or pro-communist countries. The first wave of Vietnamese immigrants to arrive in Poland were students and young scientists who came here to study. Some of them have stayed in Poland, started families, and took up jobs. Those young people were the first wave of Vietnamese immigrants to Poland. All of them were selected to study in Poland while in Vietnam. They are graduates of Polish higher education institutions and their professional careers have been successful. As a group, they are the intellectual elite of the Vietnamese minority in Poland.[1]

The second immigration wave of Vietnamese people began in the 1990s. In contrast to the first wave, it was a massive labour immigration though some new im-

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[1] T. Halik, E. Nowicka (2002), *Wietnamczycy w Polsce. Integracja czy izolacja?,* Warszawa, pp. 23-24.

migrants were students, including doctoral students, who arrived in Poland to study, and people associated with religious or opposition movements who had been persecuted by authorities of the still communist Vietnam.[2] Poles, however, most frequently encounter representatives of the second immigration wave at open markets in large towns, in Asian shopping centres, bars and restaurants.

The third group of Vietnamese people living in Poland are children of immigrants, usually of the first wave immigrants. That special category of young people born and brought up in Poland is the focus of this paper. Most of them have lived all their life in Poland or started to live in Poland in their early years and attended Polish schools. Children of the second wave immigrants usually spent their early childhood in Vietnam. Some differences between the three groups are well depicted in the following comment of a young Vietnamese woman:

> All Vietnamese people of my generation learned a lot and now they study abroad or at some prestigious institutions, but these new generation pupils get mediocre grades. So that has changed somewhat; they are average pupils. My generation had parents who came here to study at universities, as my father did. In my family, much emphasis was put on education, and now the majority of Vietnamese people come from Vietnam to earn money only.[3]

The second wave of the Vietnamese came to Poland for economic reasons. This group exhibits a low level of acculturation and integration but they are well-adapted in the practical sense. They can rarely speak fluent Polish, are not much interested in Polish culture and therefore they know it a little.

The Vietnamese of the first "student" wave who settled in Poland differ also from the second (economic) wave in terms of awareness. They have a feeling of their distinctness. Their Vietnamese friends are mainly people they met at university. They have hardly any contact with the newly-arrived Vietnamese. When speaking about economic immigrants from Vietnam, they refer to them as "they", i.e. "They are of a completely different line because they come here to trade and open restaurants, and I am doing something totally different, so we do not get along with each other. Sometimes, I buy something from them or eat at their restaurants but that is all. There are no contacts."[4] It is very rare that they speak of their lively contacts with the new-comers, of an exchange of services and mutual assistance.

To understand the changes in the attitude to gender roles, it is important to observe differences in the social situation of both immigration waves. The residence status of immigrants from Vietnam varies much. Vietnamese people of the first wave are

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[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] I quote parts of interviews conducted during a research seminar I taught at the Institute of Sociology of the University of Warsaw, and interviews conducted by my doctoral students (Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz and Aleksandra Winiarska) and MA students (mainly Anna Małachowska). Footnotes accompany only interviews which have been quoted in other published texts.

[4] A. Winiarska, *Rodzina wielokulturowa, czyli małżeństwa polsko-wietnamskie w Polsce,* in: E. Nowicka-Rusek (ed.) (2011), *Blaski i cienie imigracji. Problemy imigrantów w Polsce,* Warszawa, p. 82.

well-settled, have jobs, and their stay in Poland has been fully regulated. The situation of immigrants of the second wave is different. Some of them stay in Poland illegally; others have been granted permanent or temporary residence.[5] In 2003, a new law provided for "abolition" of illegal stay in Poland. In 2007, 1,078 Vietnamese people took advantage of it and were granted a fixed time residence permit in the Republic of Poland. They were the largest group of foreigners seeking to legalise their stay.[6]

The Office for Foreigners suggests that during the next abolition planned to be announced shortly, as many as five thousand people will manage to legalise their stay, i.e. twice as many as during the two previous abolitions.

Cultural distinctness in the perception of the Vietnamese and Poles

Cultural differences which separate Polish and Vietnamese societies are perceived by both the Vietnamese and Poles as significant. To Vietnamese people, some differences seem impossible to overcome. Poles find it difficult to deal with the Vietnamese because of their low expressiveness, i.e. not showing emotions and not expressing opinions, which is perceived as "secretiveness". Vietnamese people, in turn, are surprised with the fact that Poles attach great importance to privacy which, from the Vietnamese perspective, makes Poland a sad country. Many deep differences between the two cultures are highlighted in the subject literature. One of them is the concept of a human being, his or her tasks, duties, and place in the world as well as the system of values which guides people's actions. Those differences are also expressed in definitions of social roles connected with such criteria as age and sex.

Communitarianism, hierarchy and obedience

Different ways of thinking of Polish and Vietnamese people were discreetly and to an extent secretly shaped by different philosophical/religious systems. In Poland, that system was Catholicism while in Vietnam, it was shaped by Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, and older but still present animist beliefs, including the socially important cult of ancestors. Despite the inevitable dynamics of changes in both areas, foundations of the aforementioned normative systems have survived. Vietnamese society is characterised in communitarism/collectivism categories. The importance and value of community in the social life of an individual is emphasised, while values related to manifestations of individualism, typical of the Western culture, are not recognised as important. In Vietnam, an individual is defined by his/her belonging to the State, society, and family, while his/her tasks consist in duties, loyalties and activities for the benefit of the family, a local community, and the State. Western individualism is disapproved of. It is viewed as selfishness and the in-

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[5] *Ibidem.*
[6] http://warszawa.gazeta.pl/warszawa/1,34862,10921581,Ukraińcy_i_Wietnamczycy_legalizuja_pobyt_w_Polsce.html.

ability to sacrifice individual goals for the success of a group, which might pose a threat to the orderly and harmonious functioning of a community.

Social hierarchy plays a huge role in the Vietnamese society and is present in almost all spheres of life. The hierarchical structure is essential in families, religious communities, institutions, the labour market, and politics. That feature can be described aphoristically in the following way: in Vietnam, there are no equal people: each person has its place on the social ladder with strictly ascribed roles and positions. The principle on which one's social status is based is worth emphasising. It includes most simple and archaic criteria of social divisions which determine the place of an individual in the social structure and which refer to biological differences between people, i.e. their age and sex. Secondly, the place of an individual in the social structure is determined by his or her financial situation, professional status and job position. In addition, a higher position is connected not only with privileges but also with some obligations like providing assistance to people lower in the social hierarchy. Inviolable principles include the sense of obligation and obedience. According to Vietnamese people living in Poland, Poles do not understand the Confucian principle of absolute obedience to the elderly and the obligation to assist one's broadly understood family. The Vietnamese culture strongly emphasises showing respect to the elderly. Children are to be completely subordinated to parents and never question what parents say. The hierarchy is there to ensure harmony among people.

A man and a woman

Female and male roles are strictly defined and there are no doubts what is proper or appropriate, what should guide one's conduct, and which tasks should be performed by women and which by men. Now, along its modernisation, the communist regime tries to promote gender equality in the labour market and more women take jobs outside their homes. That does not mean, however, that women's workload at home has been reduced or that traditional expectations towards women have changed in any significant way. Only the situation of labour migration has a considerable impact on changing women's traditional roles, and that applies to Vietnamese women of the second immigration wave. Nevertheless, the belief that a man is obliged to earn his family living and a woman should raise children and do all housework still holds strong. Differences between norms of the Vietnamese and Polish cultures are visible also in informal relations between the sexes. For the Vietnamese, it is natural and obvious that a woman opens the door for a man, serves him food, and manifests her humbleness and devotion (in particular in public places). The courtesy of men towards women, which is typical of the Polish culture, seems strange to the Vietnamese e.g. paying compliments to a woman, helping her get seated, opening doors for her, or helping her to put on her coat. In contacts between women and men, in particular in public places, no emotions should be expressed, i.e. kissing or hugging are not appropriate according to the Vietnamese. The private/family life and the professional life are clearly separate spheres. Private or family affairs are not discussed at work.

Family

Both Vietnamese and Polish people consider family to have the highest value in one's life, which does not mean that family-life models in the two cultures are identical. In the traditional Vietnamese model having its sources in Confucian conceptions, the wedding was, in the fact, a ritual honouring family ancestors. A marriage was concluded because of family needs and it was the parents' decision. Today, that tradition is commented upon in the following way: "Family was considered the superior value and its interests prevailed over the fact that it was a woman and a man who were getting married"[7]. Generally, a Vietnamese family is multi-generational and relations between family members have been based mainly on the patrilineal authority as the head of the family has been the oldest living male. A wife has had a lower position than a husband due to his sex, and a lower position than her mother-in-law due to age. The aim of a marriage is to ensure the continuity of the family. That reflects the Vietnamese world-view in which the cult of ancestors is very important.

In contrast, in Poland, the family model now is that of two generations living together (parents and children only) and spouses' partner relations and, to some extent, also a partnership of parents and children. In Vietnamese families, children are introduced to the hierarchy at a very young age and they are not taught that people are equal, including family members. Children are awarded for their obedience to people who have a higher social status and not for voicing their own opinions, being assertive or thinking independently. From a very early age, the Vietnamese are taught the etiquette, i.e. specific conduct towards family members and subordination to the clear hierarchical structure. The etiquette observance is to ensure an orderly and harmonious functioning of the community at all levels of social life, including family. Traditionally, a multi-generation family was part of the local community which constituted an economic unit of people working together on the land. It was only the French colonialist authorities that introduced the acceptance of emigration which required leaving the family and the home village.[8]

The value of education

The attitude towards education is another difference between the Vietnamese culture and the Polish one. Education has, traditionally, played a more profound role in the Vietnamese culture than in European countries where practical goals are set for education. In Vietnamese culture, education has been important to ensure that an individual would become a respected citizen and member of the commu-

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[7] T. Halik, *Nowe podejście do starych wartości,* in: A. W. Jelonek (ed.) (2004), *Wietnamczycy. System wartości. Stereotypy Zachodu,* Warszawa, p. 207.

[8] T. Halik (2006), *Migrancka społeczność Wietnamczyków w Polsce w świetle polityki państwa i ocen społecznych,* Poznań, p. 17.

nity. Through education, individuals learned to coexist with fellow citizens and to respect the authority.[9]

The observed cultural (social and religious) differences between Polish and Vietnamese people must manifest themselves most strongly in a marriage. In such a relationship it is not possible to avoid collisions of different concepts of female and male social roles. Thus it is important to study how those differences are overcome and resolved in a marriage. That includes communication patterns between spouses, passing norms and values to children, and relations of both spouses with their Polish and Vietnamese relatives.

CULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS: ACCULTURATION

The concept of acculturation is differently understood in social anthropology and inter-cultural psychology. In anthropology, acculturation refers to communities and value structures. In psychology, it concentrates on processes transforming the system of values of an individual.[10] It is no surprise that Vietnamese people who left their homeland in their early years are more deeply connected with Poles and the Polish culture than those who arrived in Poland as adults. Usually, children who have been brought up in Poland have (or at least declare to have) stronger ties with the Polish culture than with the Vietnamese heritage, regardless of whether they have been raised in ethnically mixed families or in Vietnamese families in which parents are strongly attached to tradition.[11] Emigration and immigration always entail, to a larger or lesser extent, the aware disposal of cultural capital accumulated in the country of origin.[12] Poland and Vietnam are culturally very different. Ignorance of the cultural code of the country of residence results in practical problems and the feeling of being lost in the environment of unfamiliar institutional rules. At the same time, the Vietnamese unknowingly violate Polish norms which leads to conflicts with the Polish law and Polish society.[13] Both Polish and Vietnamese people perceive their communities as distinct from each other and that marks their mutual contacts with "strangeness". The same applies to every-day life when the two are in touch. Vietnamese men who married Polish women are in a particularly difficult situation. They have assumed that they have no other choice but to adapt. "There is a Vietnamese saying that when you enter a new family, you must accept its customs."[14]

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[9] *Ibidem,* p. 23.

[10] P. Boski (2009), *Kulturowe ramy zachowań społecznych. Podręcznik psychologii międzykulturowej,* Gdańsk.

[11] T. Szlendak (2011), *Socjologia rodziny. Ewolucja, historia, zróżnicowanie,* Warszawa, p. 32.

[12] T. Bauer, K. Zimmerman (1999), *Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and Its Labour Market Impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe,* Department for Education and Employment, Bonn.

[13] I. Koryś (2009), *Kobiety-migrantki. Warunki udanej integracji,* Warszawa, p. 7.

[14] A. Winiarska (2011), *op. cit.,* p. 14.

A considerable number of Vietnamese people come to Poland with their fami-
lies.[15] Usually, husbands living in Poland are later joined by their wives and children.
Nevertheless, men are the dominant group of Vietnamese immigrants, constituting
two thirds of the Vietnamese population in Poland. Due to traditional family and
household obligations, Vietnamese women feel more attached to their country.

Vietnamese female immigrants

The situation of women living in Vietnamese communities in Poland appears
to be more complex than the situation of men regardless of whether they come to
Poland alone, with their family or friends. A Vietnamese woman who has children,
faces a number of challenges connected with the regulation of the immigration sta-
tus, a decision about separation from her children and leaving them under the care
of strangers. The situation of those women in the labour market is more complicated
too. They face negative biases against employing women and immigrants.[16]

Vietnamese women who have their family and friends in Poland can count on
their assistance in finding a job, accommodation, and resolving every-day difficul-
ties. Women are subject to the acculturation pressure to a lesser extent than men as
most women do not need to speak any other language than Vietnamese.

Recent research[17] demonstrates that Vietnamese women, because of their roles
at home, are more attached to their native language and conduct patterns than men.
Frequently, Vietnamese women are less fluent in Polish and are dependent on their
husbands, family, and friends. Usually, they are not strongly motivated to learn Pol-
ish because they are not required to be fluent in Polish at work and, in their every-day
life, they are usually in touch with people of their own nationality. That applies to
women from the second immigration wave but also from the first wave. Only gradu-
ates of Polish universities from the first wave of immigrants and their children, who
were brought up in Poland, can speak good or fluent Polish, and that is true both in
the case of men and women.

Major difficulties which are faced by Vietnamese female immigrants are related
to balancing their employment duties and family responsibilities. The majority of
them left Vietnam to work, to improve their own and family situation. Both single
and married Vietnamese women take jobs which they have to reconcile with daily
chores at home. Cleaning, laundering, washing dishes, babysitting, cooking, and
shopping take much time, as required by the Vietnamese tradition. While in Viet-
nam, it is a man who is responsible for earning the family living. Female immigrants,

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[15] *Ibidem,* p. 63.
[16] I. Koryś (2009), *Kobiety-migrantki...,* p. 1; A. Titkow, D. Duch-Krzysztoszek, B. Budrowska
(2004), *Nieodpłatna praca kobiet,* Warszawa.
[17] A. Grzymała-Kazłowska (2007), *Od zbiorowości do społeczności: rola migrantów osiedleńczych
w tworzeniu się społeczności imigranckich w Polsce,* Centre of Migration Research, Faculty of Econo-
mic Sciences, UW, Warszawa.

however, must both have a paid job and manage family responsibilities at home. In richest families, both spouses have jobs and employ a babysitter or a person who looks after their house or flat. It is not rare that children are raised by grandparents who come from Vietnam especially for that purpose.

As in all emigration cases, there also instances when emigration is for women a way to escape conflicts, tensions in their families, or a crisis after the end of a relationship or marriage.[18] Going abroad is an opportunity to start a new life.[19]

THE YOUNGEST GENERATION OF VIETNAMESE IMMIGRANTS: THE THIRD GROUP

As it is usually the case with economic immigrants, that group of Vietnamese people in Poland is young and 73% of that population is 20 to 49 years old. Thus they are in working age. About 12% of that group is 19 years old and younger, and only 4% is over 60 years old. At the same time, research done suggests that there is a direct relation between the duration of contact with Polish cultural models and changes in beliefs about what is right and what is wrong. With time, the foreign (destination country) normative system begins to be accepted and even considered to be a better one. For women, as they admit it less or more openly, it appears to be more attractive, favourable and comfortable. The second generation of immigrants and subsequent generations often have their own cultural specificity and their own strategies of living and integrating.[20] Differences between generations in the Vietnamese minority are considerable when it comes to accepted norms. Traditions cultivated by older generations are far less important to young people although they are not able to avoid the pressure of their families. Their perception of the role of women is different too. Out of necessity, the patriarchal model of a Vietnamese family has eroded to an extent, particularly in the second generation. That model can hardly be reconciled with the role of a working woman who has to work hard as all female labour immigrants do in Poland.

Identity dilemmas

Identity is best described as "all self-defining acts of a human agent".[21] Teresa Halik asks the following questions pertaining to the identity of the Vietnamese living in Poland:

> Deliberations on the ways of identity forming can be summarised in a simple conclusion expressed in the question: who am I? Undoubtedly, members of the Vietnamese community will have one answer: "A Vietnamese!". What does it mean, however, to be a Vietnamese? What is the measure

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[18] I. Koryś (2009), *Kobiety-migrantki...,* p. 8.
[19] *Ibidem*, s. 8.
[20] *Ibidem,* p. 104.
[21] *Ibidem*.

of the Vietnamese identity? Is it the same in the case of a Vietnamese child raised and educated in a community in which the Vietnamese culture is not the dominant one and in the case of his or her parents?[22]

Differences in the length of stay in Poland and in the time of arrival to the destination country in one's personal lifeline are causes of significant differences in identity choices in the Vietnamese diasporas. And again, the division into the three aforementioned categories appears to be relevant. Those whom we include into the first wave of immigrants (who arrived in Poland as students) describe themselves as "a Polish Vietnamese", "Vietnamese Poles", and "a Vietnamese with the Polish soul"[23]. The Vietnamese of the second wave, however, would not describe themselves in the same categories. Those who have come to Poland only to earn and save money and do not plan their future in Poland, have no doubts concerning their Vietnamese identity and consider themselves to be the Vietnamese without any adjectives or other qualifiers. What deserves special attention is the identity situation of the third group, that is of people who were born or/and raised in Poland. Some research on Vietnamese students who belong to the third group was done.[24] The survey covered only students who completed at least part of their education at Polish schools: a primary school, a lower secondary school, or an upper secondary school. The objective of choosing such a sample was to select persons who, despite coming from Vietnamese families, have to a certain extent been subject to social adaptation to the Polish culture which affected them *via* the education system. The collected material consisted of seventeen in-depth, semi-structured interviews with young people who arrived in Poland at the age of 2 years at the earliest and at the age of 14 years at the latest. It was assumed that the impact of Polish schools and Polish friends was considerable in their case. That assumption seemed to be justified in the light of arguments of psychologists according to whom adolescence is the period particularly important for the formation of one's identity and self-image.[25] Szymańska quotes comments of her interviewees which, in her opinion, suggest that the Vietnamese identity is considered to be an "optional" feature and not an "ascribed" one, and thus one which is attainable but also one that can be lost. Such an interpretation of the concept in question can be inferred from comments of the persons interviewed, according to whom an individual may both "become a Vietnamese" and drop out from that category, i.e. lose their "Vietnamese identity". "In that sense, being born a Vietnamese is not a factor which determines being a Vietnamese for the entire life of a given person".[26] A personal individual decision or an act of will becomes the most

[22] T. Halik (2004), *Nowe podejście...*

[23] I. Koryś (2009), *op. cit.,* p. 107.

[24] G. Szymańska, *Tożsamość etniczna studentów wietnamskich wychowanych w Polsce,* in: E. Nowicka, S. Łodziński (ed.) (2006), *Kulturowe wymiary imigracji do Polski,* Warszawa.

[25] E.H. Erikson (1959) *Identity and the Life Cycle. Selected Papers*, New York [Polish translation: *Tożsamość a cykl życia,* Poznań 2005].

[26] G. Szymańska (2006), *Tożsamość etniczna...,* p. 285.

important factor in reflecting on one's identity, which makes thinking about one-self close to Bauman's concept of a liquid identity without any stable determinants[27]. The conclusion drawn from the analysis of interviews with Vietnamese students who as children and teenagers attended Polish schools (socialisation) is that their national/ ethnic identity is complex, non-uniform, and multi- or at least bi-cultural. It is striking that in opinions of young Vietnamese people about ethnicity of their peers, there is the tendency to describe their peers referring to the quality or state of being both Polish and Vietnamese, i.e. a person can be simultaneously called a "Vietnamese" and a "Pole". The Vietnamese identity, however, concerns a different level of reflection or awareness than the Polish identity of an individual who can feel comfortable a Pole but at the same time cannot "sign off" from being a Vietnamese. The fact of being born of Vietnamese parents, being culturally competent and feeling comfortable in both systems of cultural codes, all define the Vietnamese identity of that group which is complex. The trouble is rooted in the multilayered thinking about the Vietnamese identity. Although that identity, according to the interviewees, is a matter of choice, it is not acceptable to refer to a person born to Vietnamese parents in a different way (e.g. a Pole). Such a person is described as "a Vietnamese who does not feel being a Vietnamese". In the analysis of that type of ethnic identity, constructivist categories of ethnicity[28], which provide for its free choice by an individual, are insufficient to determine one's Vietnamese identity. Other culturally acquired but also substantial elements are needed too.[29]

The way in which young Vietnamese people think of themselves has also been shaped by their and Poles' perception of each other. Both Polish and Vietnamese communities treat each other as profoundly different not only in cultural but also in physical terms. The survey from 2000 (designed by Ewa Nowicka and Teresa Halik and carried out on a representative nationwide sample by the OBOP, a public opinion research institute) revealed that in response to the question "What are Vietnamese people like?", a substantial group of respondents (14.3%) mentioned characteristics associated with their physical distinctness: "a different look", "racial distinctness", "short stature", "slanted eyes", and "yellow skin colour".[30]

Vietnamese people living among Poles have no doubt that they are perceived as different by Poles and notice their distinctness themselves.

Among acquired elements of cultural competence, i.e. not ascribed at birth, which determine one's Vietnamese identity is the ability to speak the native Vietnamese language. What is more, for the Vietnamese, speaking Polish and not Vietnamese as one's first language seems to be decisive about moving to the ethnic category of

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[27] Z. Bauman (1993), *Ponowoczesne wzory osobowe,* "Studia Socjologiczne" No. 2.

[28] A.D. Smith (1991), *National Identity,* London.

[29] S. Ossowski (1939), *Więź społeczna i dziedzictwo krwi,* Warszawa.

[30] E. Nowicka, *Wietnamczycy w oczach Polaków,* in: M. Kempny, G. Woroniecka (ed.) (2003), *Wymiary globalizacji kulturowej. Wyzwania badawcze,* Olsztyn, pp. 184-195.

Poles. "Those little kids, you know, are simply Poles [...]. My sister is also like that, 15 years old, she is already also such a Pole, isn't she?"[31]

Having analysed comments of her interviewees and using the emic concept, Szymańska introduces the category of "atypical" Vietnamese people to describe those who were raised in Poland, have lively contacts mainly with Polish people, and feel their own specificity. The above distinguishes them from "typical" Vietnamese people raised in Vietnam.[32]

It should be noted that those "atypical" Vietnamese people come from families of "typical" Vietnamese people. What is more, their development as children was constantly influenced by their "typical" families which remain a permanent reference point also in their adult life. Thus, young Vietnamese people raised in the Polish environment by their "typical" Vietnamese families are between a rock and a hard place when it comes to adhering to values which cannot be practically reconciled. They face expectations and requirements of their "typical" Vietnamese families (mainly their parents) and, at the same time, they are constantly "beleaguered" by the Polish community. Young Vietnamese people live at the crossroads of two cultures which profoundly differ from each other. They are beleaguered by two languages, two normative systems, and two models of thinking about family and society.[33]

The "atypical" young Vietnamese overtly resent characteristics attributed to "typical" Vietnamese people.

> "A skinny man, very polite, always elegantly dressed [...] he lacks assertiveness."[34]
>
> [The] young Vietnamese do not meet the criteria characteristic of "post-modern figures". The freedom of choosing one's place in the social system within which they function, i.e. in the Polish society, is limited. And this is not due to economic factors pushing them to the margin of the consumer reality, which Bauman would agree to consider.[35]

The majority of students surveyed are people in a good and very good financial situation. The factor that cannot be eliminated and which limits the freedom of Vietnamese students in choosing their place in the reality of the immigrant community is, in their opinion, "a social stigma" attached to their physical distinctness in the immigrant society.[36]

The reflective nature of the identity of Vietnamese students studying in Poland is striking. Having been brought up in two cultures simultaneously, they cannot confine to a mechanistic, "obvious" relation towards none of them. They must define their position and make choices in situations in which it is impossible to be culturally

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[31] G. Szymańska (2006), *Tożsamość etniczna...*

[32] *Ibidem.*

[33] P. Majkut, *Strategie adaptacyjne wietnamskich licealistów w Warszawie,* in: E. Nowicka (ed.) (2011), *Blaski i cienie imigracji. Problemy cudzoziemców w Polsce,* Warszawa, p. 24.

[34] G. Szymańska (2006), *Tożsamość etniczna...*

[35] *Ibidem.*

[36] *Ibidem.*

both a Vietnamese and a Pole. Those positions differ much from each other despite the fact that the social situation of individuals does not different much. Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz has identified several types of identity choices which manifest themselves in different configurations of attitudes towards Vietnamese and Polish cultures. The emerging picture of the attitude towards different elements of the Vietnamese culture is not uniform. One of the interviewees has said that

> he will try to instil into his children the Vietnamese respect for elders and associated customs e.g. eating meals together. At the same time, he is put off by the way in which, in his opinion, the Polish youth spends its free time. That is why he says that he will not allow his children, especially daughters, to go to discos. He justifies that declaration by saying "the Polish youth scares me."

The interviewee is willing to accept a number of important elements in his own life. We may presume that the affirmation of the above described rigorous upbringing system, despite his negative personal experience reported in his other comments, is a reaction to the "situation of uncertainty and confusion" which he experiences now.[37] While describing such an identity choice, Szymańska-Matusiewicz argues that a Vietnamese while

> construing their identity between the world of strict and, to an extent, oppressive parents and the community of the Polish youth described as self-promoting or spoiled, is inclined to choose the rigorous normative system which gives that person a sense of stability and security.

In her interpretation of such an identity choice, Szymańska-Matusiewicz refers to the concept of authoritarian personality. Authoritarian attitudes are typical in particular of those persons who, during their socialisation, experienced hierarchical systems and rigorous upbringing. Those elements, in fact, are present in the Vietnamese culture and, according to scholars studying that cultural area, have their roots in the Confucian tradition. Thus the bi-cultural nature of the interviewees' situation, their confusion and normative uncertainty may all contribute to their high level of fear. That fear is the foundation of authoritarianism of highly educated people and results in them looking for support in a culture providing rigorous and clear norms of conduct like the traditional Vietnamese culture. To the above interpretation one may add the search for one's embedding in a community. That may but does not have to be related to the authoritarian attitude in a situation where one's own identity, which is culturally close to the Polish identity, diverges from an asymmetrical description of a Vietnamese in invariably unambiguous categories of physical differences. In that situation, it is impossible to overcome barriers to any identity change. It is worth noting that choices between being a Pole and being a Vietnamese and all constructs

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[37] G. Szymańska-Matusiewicz, *Tożsamość narodowa w całokształcie tożsamości jednostki. Portrety czterech studentów wietnamskich wychowanych w Polsce,* in: E. Nowicka-Rusek (ed.) (2011), *Blaski i cienie migracji...*

combining the two are manifested in family relations. One can be fully or partially accepted or rejected.

Another identity model identified by Szymańska-Matusiewicz is the "Vietnamese cosmopolitanism". It is a model referring to postmodern individualism. At its core is the rejection of the rigorous and hierarchical system of family relations based on limiting children's freedom by their parents. That is clearly an identity model of choice, i.e. one which is construed and not given or instituted. Politeness and respect for tradition approved of by the above quoted interviewee of Szymańska-Matusiewicz are in her interpretation not related to the acceptance of family hierarky. To a person who has that type or kind of identity, the national/ethnic identity is not central to the comprehensive identity of an individual, giving way to identity components related to education and professional work, social position and individual interests. That individual identity model is close to Bauman's model of "a tourist" who takes advantage of his or her borderland (crossroad) migrant status. An individual (a young Vietnamese person in that case) keeps building his or her identity in opposition to elements of the Vietnamese tradition and the critically assessed characteristics of the Polish and, more broadly, Western society.

The third type of the identity model or construct is "an individualistic intellectual". In that construct the attitude towards the Polish and Vietnamese cultures is also conditioned by attitudes to concepts of family relations. An individualistic intellectual adheres to a external position to both cultural worlds which he or she explores. The result is a balanced and critical approach to both cultures.

> "Polish people think that once they are eighteen, their parents have truly nothing to say. Whereas we, or at least I, I prefer to speak for myself rather than in general, I have a feeling that sometimes they do have some wisdom and it is worth listening to what they have to say."[38] I would interpret the above respondent's comment as an expression of his intellectual distancing and not of being torn as Szymańska does: "I have friends but I do not know if they fully understand me. I have a family but I also do know if they fully understand me."

That young male interviewee is in somewhat isolated from the Vietnamese culture. He, alone, without his mother's help is not able to understand Vietnamese poetry so his Vietnamese language skills are limited and this cuts him off from the "typical Vietnamese culture" which is the "core" culture[39]. This individualised intellectual or intellectual individual accepts, to an extent, the Polish perspective while building his national/ethnic identity, a component of which is his fascination with Eastern philosophies. In addition, he compares his own plans for the future with plans of many "other Poles", as he puts it. In fact, that last phrase undermines the full "Vietnamese" identity of the interviewee.

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[38] G. Szymańska-Matusiewicz (2011), *Tożsamość narodowa…*

[39] E. Nowicka, *Polskość niejedno ma imię. Polacy za wschodnią granicą państwa polskiego.* in: M. Głowacka-Grajper, R. Wyszyński (eds) (2011), *Polska inteligencja na Wschodzie,* Warszawa, pp. 34-54.

In all cases identified, the impact of the Vietnamese culture has been exerted by the family home of the interviewees, friends of their parents and of their own friends, the entirety of the Vietnamese community in Poland, both institutionalised and not, and by Vietnam's culture in its original form during visits in Vietnam. The interviewees have had contacts with the Polish culture both at school and in every-day life. Their chosen identity configurations vary, which can be attributed to more individual psychological factors.

According to already quoted Teresa Halik, despite the variety of identity strategies, their first choice is to define themselves as Vietnamese people, totally disregarding the option that they could be recognised as Poles. Such a qualification is automatic also in the case of researchers. The selection of respondents for all types of surveys among Vietnamese people in Poland conducted by me and my colleagues and doctoral students was based on criteria which we found obvious, i.e. related not to the conventional but substantial criteria, to use Stanisław Ossowski's terminology[40]. That level of obviousness is at "the bottom" of both scholars' and respondents' reasoning.

Those who have lived in Poland for many years and came here to study as very young people can be described in the categories of a layered identity.[41]

> Vietnam is my homeland but I do not live there anymore, so Vietnam issues are foreign to me. You understand, when one does not live in the society there, their problems do not concern me. But, on the other hand, I live in Poland and everyone asks me: What is new over there in your country? What is the news in your Vietnam? Thus here, I am not a Pole in that sense, am I?[42]

The acculturation process of young men and women

It is not without a reason that all persons portrayed by Szymańska-Matusiewicz as people who particularly clearly present they approach to Vietnamese and Polish cultures are men.[43] When analysing the ways of construing or conceptualising one's own national identity in the Vietnamese community, one can notice that this issue is more rarely and less analysed and disputed by Vietnamese women than by men. The reasons for that situation can be found in the specificity of the Vietnamese culture, in which women, and in particular young and single women, are to a much greater extent tied to "their family home space"[44] which limits their contacts with peers and with the community external to their homes in general.[45] It is striking that only four

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[40] S. Ossowski (1939), *op. cit.*

[41] E. Nowicka, *Obcy wśród nas. Afrykanie w Polsce,* in: M. Bucholc, S. Mandes, T. Szawiel, J. Wawrzyniak (eds), *Polska po 20 latach wolności*, Warszawa, pp. 422-439.

[42] A. Winiarska (2011), *op. cit.*

[43] G. Szymańską-Matusiewicz (2011), *Tożsamość narodowa...*

[44] Ngo Thi Thanh Binh, *The Four Confucian Feminine Virtues*, in: L. Drummond, H. Rydstrom (eds) (2004), *Gender Practices in Contemporary Vietnam,* Singapur.

[45] G. Szymańska (2006), *Tożsamość etniczna...*

of fifteen Polish-Vietnamese married couples studied by Aleksandra Winiarska were those of a Vietnamese woman and a Polish man, while the other 11 were those of Vietnamese men and Polish women.[46] The lack of symmetry in the sample of the families studied resulted from difficulties in finding couples in which the wife was a Vietnamese woman married to her Polish husband. The number of men among Vietnamese students has been higher than that of women. However, it is also easier for a man than a woman to go beyond their ethnic group while planning their life, and women tend to be more "protected" by the close-knit ethnic community ties. In addition, as observations suggest, girls in Vietnamese families are given much less freedom in their social life and their every-day life is more controlled. In one of the couples studied, the Vietnamese woman was met by her now Polish husband in Vietnam. Her wedding to her Polish husband was preceded by difficult efforts to obtain the consent of her family and the wedding ceremony was agreed to be accompanied by all traditional Vietnamese rituals.[47] In general, it is noticeable that Vietnamese traditions are present in Polish-Vietnamese homes where the wife is a Vietnamese. Maintaining customs and passing on traditions are mainly the woman's tasks. Vietnamese husbands, even if they attach importance to Vietnamese customs, remain passive and do not take any actions in that regard, thus one may suppose that they do feel a need to act in that respect. Some Polish wives of Vietnamese men conclude that it is their task to sustain Vietnamese values of their husbands, although for Polish wives Vietnamese customs have usually only an aesthetic value.

The situation of female and male immigrants from the labour immigration wave is different. For a working Vietnamese woman, it is difficult to meet all requirements of her traditional culture. Raising children and doing housework are still considered to be the exclusive domain of women and thus a female Vietnamese immigrant finds it problematic to balance her traditional duties with her job. The situation of immigrant single women, in particular single mothers, is even more complicated. If they do not have anyone close in Poland, finding a job is much more difficult. A young Vietnamese woman says openly:

> There are less Vietnamese women in Poland because boys more often decide to emigrate and improve their status. It is also easier for them. Women are, for sure, physically weaker. But I can tell you that many such single women come here; they come alone and are later joined by their children. Men immigrate more often. There is also a discussion at home: who will take better care of children and who knows more about earning money. It is a calculation.

Working in retail, which makes one leave home early in the morning or even in the middle of the night, makes it difficult to reconcile family roles with professional responsibilities. Vietnamese women speak about it too.

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[46] A. Winiarska (2011), *op. cit.*

[47] *Ibidem.*

> In my opinion, being a working mother highly disturbs family life. I have heard that when the market at the stadium was opened, women usually had to leave home at 3 or 4 in the morning and their children were left at home for the whole day. And later such parents feel guilty and that is why they give a lot of money to their children.

A female interviewee whose father came to Poland as a scholarship student blames working parents for not having time for their children. It happens also that Vietnamese parents send their children to Polish families in the countryside to be raised there for some time. Only the richest hire a Polish nanny or, more rarely, a Ukrainian one. The priority, i.e. earning money during their stay in Poland, often creates extreme conditions for bringing up children, including infants, who are neglected and treated as an obstacle to family happiness rather than its source. Polish babysitters hired by Vietnamese parents speak about it with disapproval. A young woman justifies that situation as follows:

> That is such a hard-working nation that they will always find a job. Even when their journey is one month long and exhausting and they cross the green border illegally, they are at work on the following day and there is really no difference whether it is a man or a woman. Besides, some of them have come here to improve their life, so it would be silly that they come and do nothing.

Young Vietnamese women studying in Poland have other life aspirations that the role traditionally ascribed to a woman in Vietnam:

> I also know a Vietnamese woman who graduated from a university and studied also abroad but returned to Poland and got married. Her husband works in retail and she joined him at work. It is a pity because her mother spent a lot of money on those studies abroad and now she works in retail. It does not make much sense. I would not like it.

Also mothers, who work in shopping centres, do not want their daughters to do what they do.

> My parents always tell me that they work so hard for my life to be easier. So that I would not have to work in retail as they do because it is hard work. That is why they always tell me to study because then, they think, I will have a good job.

The collective entity of strictly economic immigrants from the 1990s and the early 20th c. is not interested in the Polish culture. They are oriented towards maintaining their Vietnamese traditions and ties with Vietnam. The situation of women born to Vietnamese people who came to Poland as students (the first wave) is totally different from the situation of women of the second wave of (economic) immigration. That applies also to young men but the role of a woman is more threatened with change as regards the Vietnamese tradition. The earlier immigrants – the less traditional and more acculturated ones – are mainly those who married Polish women and largely resigned from passing their Vietnamese culture to their children.

In the case of Vietnamese people who have lived in Poland for a longer time, the traditional and rigid division between the private sphere (home) and the exter-

nal public sphere blurs. In result, the clear division between female and male roles breaks down. However, while women do enter the sphere once reserved for men, men take on female roles in domestic life much more rarely. Thus the workload and responsibilities of Vietnamese women at home do not change even though they perform other roles too.

Requirements of Vietnamese and Polish cultures affect young Vietnamese women simultaneously, and that refers to both women raised in Poland, i.e. daughters of former Vietnamese students who settled in Poland, and women who have lived in Poland for some time and came to Poland with their parents with the economic immigration wave. A Vietnamese woman summarised her situation in the following way:

> "It is an adaptation to a given culture, to a place where one lives. And thus people try to somehow combine those cultures: the Vietnamese and the Polish one." Some young women say openly: "Well, and I accept this system. I am almost as if I was born in Poland so I definitely want to work and earn a senior position, so I would like him to accept that." "I do not want to be some stay-at-home housewife. There should be an equal division of tasks at home. I want to work at a bank and not to take care of the house only."

Attractiveness of Polish culture

To young Vietnamese women, Polish reality appears to be much more attractive than their native Vietnamese one. In the interviews, they frequently spoke about positive aspects of the Polish culture while criticising the Vietnamese approach to certain issues that results from the tradition largely rooted in Confucianism and Buddhism. The women surveyed did not pass overall judgements on the Polish or Vietnamese culture. Instead, they spoke about some expectations about them in both cultural traditions. They did not consent to the established roles of women in the Vietnamese tradition and accepted Polish standards of task division between the sexes. Being well aware of expectations about the Vietnamese woman, they preferred to perceive themselves in the categories and roles which Poles assign to women, highlighting the value of individual development, life satisfaction and some timid hedonism. Although the female respondents underlined that for them and their parents maintaining the their Vietnamese identity was important, they did not agree with the expectations which they as women were to meet. They had a feeling that that their aspirations changed if compared to women who spent most of their life in Vietnam. Their individualisation through the pursuit of one's own personal ambitions, passions and goals contradicts the collectivist perception of family and kinship as the major point of reference when it comes to values and assessments. A manifestation of the above is them rebelling against the control of those young women's life by the family and by parents in particulars. The ideal of a Vietnamese woman who is submissive, calm, quiet, always smiling, modest, compliant, passive, and who always agrees with her husband, is no longer attractive. A young Vietnamese female respondent pointed to various aspects of attitude transformations:

Polish women are certainly more independent. Vietnamese women, to accentuate the pitfall, are actually perceived as a property of men. In Poland, people are taught to be very self-confident, so women in Poland are more self-confident and usually do what they want to do. When I was in Vietnam, there were women who were good students but in general had little self-confidence. They were pretty but they were never taught to speak out aloud, express their opinions, look into other people's eyes, and so on. That did not change when they looked for a job. They did not believe that they could find it and, in general, they are very pessimistic in every respect. Despite the fact that many women are very intelligent. But they were taught not to answer back to their senior, and so on. The reason for such a belittling of women is that a woman must always take care of the man, and his needs always come before hers and that it is a man who chooses his female partners. And in Poland, the tendency is opposite. Many women pick up men.

According to the Vietnamese, some young Vietnamese women start to behave in the same way as Polish women do.

Because of such acculturative changes, the majority of young Vietnamese women raised in Poland cannot envisage them returning to Vietnam for good. "My parents want me very much to return. And I do not really fit into the Vietnamese society and its culture there." The respondent presumes that, in Vietnam, old habits are impossible to break: "Because as I see it, a woman in Vietnam should be more the traditional woman, a housewife. And I will never get used to that. Besides, I would not like to get used to it. I told my parents that, at most, I can ...". That pause at the end of the comment indicates some concession to Vietnamese habits, but it remains unarticulated. In the end, the woman invokes an economic argument: "In addition, earnings in Vietnam are five times lower than in Poland. The standard of living is also different. Everything costs less. There is a difference." The respondent has some plans for the future and Poland is not her ultimate choice: "In the future, I would like to live in some place close to Asia, in Singapore or Australia, so that I can visit my parents from time to time". This is an example of a peculiar combination of values which is relatively common among young Vietnamese women living in Poland. They reject, if only in part, Vietnamese cultural norms concerning women and men; they accept the cultural distinctness of Vietnam; and they are attached to their families even if they emigrate (that refers not only to Poland). A similar opinion was expressed by another Vietnamese woman:

"Family is important, it is about respect for another person. But not staying in one place and approving of everything means a growth ... To develop, to educate oneself, to see the world and how other people live and what their dreams are, that is very interesting. Also to help others as much as one can". She cautiously adds: "Of course not at any cost, not to lose oneself. All within reason. But not to stay in one place and be part of a 'grey mass' as other people do. Not to listen only to what they say next door and not to... One simply has to be open and to be active in life to feel it." The long time immigrant analyses the situation of Vietnamese people in Poland drawing on her own experience: "the childhood conditioning is very strong and so subconscious that one cannot overcome it but I think it is worth the effort. Because people can do that. They are not animals living by their instincts. People are self-aware and should make their choices in order to experience and enjoy life as much as possible because time passes so quickly. I have lived here for 20 years already I feel as if I arrived only yesterday. People [more] regret what they have not done than what they did."

The Vietnamese youth observe young Polish people having fun and want to do the same. However, they almost never totally exclude them going back to Vietnam at some point in life.

Children as a value

Having children is undoubtedly important to Vietnamese families and women decide to have a child as soon as possible. All women emphasise that they would like to have children and none of the young women interviewed had any doubts about that.

> Vietnamese women want to have children because for them a child is a gift. So they give birth to children. There are very few women in my age who do not have children. All of them have two or three kids. Some decide to have the second child too late and there are problems but they keep trying because that is the purpose behind earning money. If you do not have children, then what all of this is for... It is true, you can travel, but children are a real gift and I believe so myself. If I had right conditions, I would want to have kids too. You pass on your genes, your children inherit them, and there is more fun and joy in the family. When you are older, your grandchildren will come to visit you and there will be joy at home. So if only for that reason, it is worth it.

Children are the continuators of the family and they are obliged to take care of old parents. It is the fulfilment of the obligation which has its roots in the Confucian tradition. Young immigrants spoke about it too.

> Vietnamese families, especially those with a tradition, simply must have children, and those children are considered a gift. They are a gift and everybody believes that if a young couple has children then it is a gift from heaven. And if a woman is not able to give birth to a child, it means that something happened and the couple is punished for it. So it is very desirable to have children. And few people decide not to have children, that they do not want to have children. It seems to me that there are less such women than, for example, in Poland.

In practice, however, the number of children (two or three) depends on the living conditions of immigrants.

The hierarchy of the sexes is important in this context too. It is still important that one of the children is a boy who will be the continuator of the family. That is why parents of two and three girls often want to have more children:

> "I would like to have two or three children. But I would definitely want my first child to be a boy. If I have one, the sex of the next one does not matter." When asked: "Why?", the female respondent says that: "Because that is the Vietnamese tradition which I have inherited, that there should be a boy. On the other hand, there are only boys at the university and I am the only girl in the group. And I have noticed that all men who have an older sister are less masculine. I have seen it that if a boy is first, it's great." The same wish is repeatedly mentioned in other interviews: "I would like to have a boy, and then a girl, because I have always wanted to have an older brother. And I would like to have two children". In addition, young Vietnamese women pay attention to preferences of their husbands: "It is very important for a father to have a son."

There are sayings in Vietnam: "A daughter is worth less than 2 hens" and "Ten daughters mean less than one son".[48] Boys are treated as parents' old-age insurance. Traditionally, it is the son's duty to stay in the family house and take care of his father and mother, while daughters leave home when they get married. Although today daughters help their parents in the same way as sons do, Vietnamese people still do not consider the two sexes equal, which is related to their patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal system.

In Vietnamese families living in Poland, no person is indicated to be the head of the family, thus living abroad contributes to the emergence of a new model. However, it is meaningful that in interviews with young women, it was never mentioned that a woman was the head of a family despite emphasising the egalitarian model of family relations. A working female immigrant breaks with the Vietnamese tradition usually for economic reasons and she continues to work during pregnancy until the time of delivery. It is also rare for a woman to give up her job once she gives birth to a child. She returns to work as quickly as possible, while the infant is taken care of either by grandparents who also live in Poland or by a hired babysitter. It also happens that she takes her children with her to work. One of the young women from the second generation of immigrants commented on that as follows:

> Vietnamese children. Vietnamese children... Now, in the new generation, Vietnamese children are very spoiled. Because parents, in particular in Poland, work at the market at the stadium or in some other place, and they have no time at all to take care of their children. That is why parents usually give their children a lot of money and they buy what they want.

Gradually, young Vietnamese women raised in Poland start thinking differently about having children and that includes having children not necessarily shortly after the wedding. Women want to provide their children with better living but also to enjoy their own life. Vietnamese immigrants of the first wave have followed the traditional family model and try to impose it on their children. The situation among the second-wave immigrants is different. However, all parents still believe that they have the right to participate in decisions about their children's marriage and that refers not only to daughters. Young women are not able to ignore the will of their parents although they often rebel against it secretly.

> I got married at the age of 23. My parents knew that I had been dating my present husband for some time and insisted on us getting married, saying that it was the right time. It is an element of the Vietnam culture that a woman should get married to have children. May parents wanted to have grandchildren very much.

In the past, matchmaking was common practice in Vietnam. I have observed the same phenomena also in the Vietnamese community in Poland. Such activities, however, are carefully camouflaged and kept secret from Poles and even in the Vietnamese community.

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[48] Xuan Phuong, Danièle Mazingarbe (2001) *Ao dai: du couvent des Oiseaux a la jungle du Viet--Minh*, Paris [Polish translation: *Niepokorna córka,* Warszawa 2003].

It is also symptomatic that young female interviewees are reluctant to marry Vietnamese men:

"I would prefer to marry a Polish man. Vietnamese men are rude. At first they are so loveable but after they get married, they will cheat, lie and do nothing". Another comment is very similar: "A daughter should be gentle, loving, kind (mocking tone), and take care of everyone. She should know how to cook, in particular Vietnamese dishes. That is extremely important. She should also take care of her husband and family and, in general, be a perfect housewife. That is the ideal girl. And a man... in general, a perfect man should earn money and that is the only thing which is required of him because otherwise they only drink, play cards and are rude." Being aware of and rejecting the following is also common: "Vietnamese people always believe that if you are a Vietnamese woman you must marry a Vietnamese man and vice versa. They say that later, cultural differences matter and [other] marriages are unhappy and can fall apart. My parents always tell me to marry a Vietnamese man and not a Pole, but I do not think so." As one Vietnamese woman wrote on her blog: "In paradise, your wife is a Vietnamese woman. In hell, your husband is a Vietnamese man"[49].

FAMILY RELATIONS

The hierarchy based on age and sex criteria still prevails in Vietnamese families living in Poland. Vietnamese women reflect upon it and get emotional while talking about it. Relations between parents and children are based on subordination to older people. Older people are to be respected and obeyed, and this does not change with age. In relations between a mother and a daughter, a grandmother and a granddaughter, an aunt and a niece, and other related women, and even between older and young siblings[50], no signs of hierarchy can be observed in phrases used.

In my opinion, in typical Vietnamese families the situation is different from the one in Polish families. For example, children must obey their parents and sometimes no discussion is possible because for parents it means talking back. In my case, for example, it is difficult to have any conversation or discussion with my parents. And this is so because they think that they are always right. Because they are experienced people; they have life experience. They think that they are always right and not their children, while sometimes the opposite is true.

A mother would usually instruct her daughter and give her guidelines only. A mother hardly talks with her daughter about her daughter's problems, and their relations are formal. Young women compare that with the situation in the Polish community:

"Recently I have talked with my friends and it seems to me that in Poland, people often talk with each other. In Poland, a mother often talks with her child about the child's romantic affairs and, generally, about any anything. In Vietnam, however, there is some hierarchy and, in general, parents talk with their children only about school, and the like. They never talk about feelings. Feelings are not a topic. It was very strange for my friends to learn that my parents do not know that

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[49] Miss Saigon Blog, http://saigon.blox.pl/2012/03/A-moze-Ho-Chi-Minh-tez-byla-kobieta.html [accessed: 12.06.2013].

[50] G. Szymańska (2006), *Tożsamość etniczna...*

I have friends or that I have a Polish boyfriend because the Vietnamese do not talk about things like that. If you introduce your boyfriend to your parents, it means that most probably he is your future husband. In Asia, a child and its parents interact much less with one another than in Poland." Sometimes, because of their hard work in retail, parents have little contact with their children. "From time to time I watch TV with my parents and that is all. It is also because I have to study a lot. During the school year, I come back home very late and sometimes I even do not see my parents. I am back when they are already asleep and we do not see each other. And if we meet, it is usually at dinner in the evening and then if I watch TV, I watch it with them."

Due to such relations between adults and children, their contacts are not always good. For Vietnamese children, who spend much time with their Polish peers, it is not always easy to accept complete subordination to and dependence on their parents at home. It is difficult to accept that they have no say. "Since I came to Poland 8 years ago, I have never been able to find a common ground with my parents. I mean talk with them openly."

Men and women in and outside the family

The traditional division of work between men and women changes if the only objective of an immigrant couple is to earn money when living in Poland. Also the choice of the future spouse is based on emotional criteria. Actually what matters is pragmatics. Vietnamese women admit that women in Europe are romantic in their spouse choices while women in Asia are more materialistic. An unemployed Vietnamese man does not have a chance to date a girl, not to mention marrying her.

Girls are taught to cook, sew and keep home clean. It is the daughter who performs the majority of simple domestic tasks at her family home. Young Vietnamese women see the difference between Poland and Vietnam:

When I came to Poland, I was a bit surprised that Polish children were not able to do that. But it was not that those were my duties at home but simply that girls were busy with some things and boys with different ones. That they would play with toy cars and so on.

Both little girls and young women are expected to smile, be happy and willing to help. Boys are more easily forgiven their misbehaviour which is explained with the fact that they are boys. They are allowed to be undisciplined and disobedient. A girl who forgets her good manners is made feel ashamed because she is not allowed to behave like that. A perfect woman is kind, happy, never gets angry, never raises her voice, is obedient, never confronts anyone her senior and agrees with them even if they are not right. She is unassuming, inconspicuous, and does not protest against what she does not like. Young Vietnamese women comment on that in following way:

A perfect son and daughter. Well, in Vietnam, surely there is the rule that one cannot answer back older people. So even if an older person is not right, you should not answer him or her back because that means that you are bad-mannered. Certainly, you should not, you cannot say anything rude to your parents.

Control over children

Children in Vietnam families are under strictly control although the attitude towards boys is much more liberal than towards girls. Vietnamese parents attach great importance to the reputation of their daughters. Daughters are not allowed to come back home late and they always must say where, with whom, and for how long they want to go. A young Vietnamese woman comments upon it ironically:

> "It would be best if I did not leave house at all. I can go out, but I always hear: 'OK, so go', said with resentment. I can go out from time to time but I must say where, with whom, what for, for how long, and when I will be back." Older girls cannot live without guardians. "We, Vietnamese women, we cannot live alone, without parents, like you do. It is unthinkable for my parents that I would live with a girl who is my friend. In our Vietnamese culture, the norm is that young women live with their parents. Only when they get married, they can leave their family home. And women who live with a boyfriend or other unrelated Vietnamese people do not have a good reputation."

I personally know stories of young Vietnamese girls who lived with their peers. Many Vietnamese people, both older and younger ones, considered those girls to be undisciplined and lacking self-respect. I have also heard negative opinions about their parents who were blamed for not taking good care of their daughters.

> For the older generation it unacceptable that a Vietnamese girl from a good family swears, drinks alcohol or smokes cigarettes. In Poland, only few Vietnamese women smoke because it is disapproved of. It is in the culture that those who smoke are... but of course some women smoke; some of those raised in Poland. I do not know, I think it is a matter of culture that men have always smoked and women have not.

Some young Vietnamese women admit that occasionally they have a drink, a beer or smoke a cigarette. They cannot imagine, however, that their parents would find out about it as, most probably, they would be forbidden to leave home ever. Young girls should be busy learning. Generally, young women raised in Poland much more often prefer the European life style which provides them with more opportunities that the Asian one. In contrast, the older female generation, who lived most of their life in Vietnam, remains faithful to Vietnamese traditions and customs.

The value of education

Nowadays, for Vietnamese parents, education of their children is most important. That refers to boys but also to daughters. Vietnamese parents see the future of their children in professions other than their own, that is not in a warehouse, in retail or in a restaurant. Education of children is the top priority for the family.

> Our duty is to be very good students and make our parents proud. In fact, there are not many Vietnamese people in Warsaw and everyone knows one another. So when children are good students, they make their parents so proud. Education was hugely emphasised and much pressure was put on me and my brother. And, generally, there was much emphasis on work and so on.

In Poland, however, there are also very poor immigrants. Difficulties which their children have at school are mostly due to their low fluency in the Polish language. In result, they are made to help their families at work and their education is of lesser importance. It is a side effect of the situation where for immigrants their immediate economic gain is the top priority. This disturbs the traditional normative order and it is not so much a consequence of acculturation but of a specific socio-economic situation. Nevertheless, education of children is important to those families too, though, in their situation, it is an objective more difficult to implement. Today, all Vietnamese parents want their daughters to be well-educated too but not necessarily that they pursue their professional career. What Vietnamese immigrants still consider most important are the family and children as well as the continuation of generations while maintaining, to every possible extent, the Vietnamese tradition.

ABSTRACT

The article presents the specific identity situation and acculturation processes pertaining to the young generation of the Vietnamese living in Poland since childhood. On the one hand, they spent the period of their early socialisation in Poland, went to Polish schools and their most frequent daily contacts were with their Polish peers while, on the other hand, they remained in the circle of their Vietnamese families so the milieu of Vietnamese friends and acquaintances and especially of their parents puts them under the psychological pressure of both cultures. They cannot completely ignore the demands of their families to which they feel attached but often they more highly value Polish cultural models which appeal especially to young women more than the Vietnamese ones. Young Vietnamese women find Polish culture attractive as it raises the woman's status shortening the distance between her traditional social roles and male roles. Vietnamese men and women differ significantly in their reactions to contacts with Polish culture although both adhere to stable elements of the Vietnamese tradition: strong ties with the family, the desire to have children as the greatest value and attributing some greater value to the birth of a boy than a girl.